A study of capital structure and dividend policy determinants in multinational and domestic corporations : a cross-country comparison by Akhtar, Shumi
A Study of Capital Structure and Dividend 
Policy Determinants in Multinational and 
Domestic Corporations -  A Cross-Country
Comparison
By
Mahmuda Shumi Akhtar 
B. Comm (ANU) and MPhil (ANU)
August 2007
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Finance) of 
The Australian National University.
Declaration of Originality
I hereby declare that this thesis is entirely the work of the author and has not been submitted to 
any other institution or university. Furthermore, all sources used in the production of this thesis 
have been acknowledged in the usual manner.
Shumi Akhtar
7th August 2007
Acknowledgement
The author would like to express a very special gratitude to Prof. Tom Smith for his excellent 
supervision and Dr Barry Oliver for his splendid advice and friendship. Special thanks go to 
Prof. Michael Martin, Ms. Jennifer Hunt and Dr Steven Roberts for their sense of humour and 
great friendship. Extraordinary thanks also extend to my exceptionally super special family -  
my mum, dad, brother (Azim) and sister (Farida) for their sacrifice, unconditional love, support 
and encouragement.
iii
Abstract
This thesis uses a unique data set to assess whether the dynamics of financial structure can be 
captured through the specification and estimation of capital structure and dividend payout 
models for domestic corporations (DCs) and multinational corporations (MCs) across countries 
with different characteristics. Therefore, this study attempts to provide a comparative and 
comprehensive understanding of the capital structure and dividend policy determinants at both 
the micro (single country) and macro (multiple country) levels for 6038 DCs and 5918 MCs 
across Australia, the United States (U.S.), the United Kingdom (U.K.), Japan and Malaysia over 
the 1995 to 2004 period. These countries are characterised by different financial, taxation and 
legal systems which may have an impact on capital structure and dividend payment 
determinants. Both cross-sectional and time-variation in capital structure and dividend policy 
are explored. This thesis includes four empirical essays. Essay I is focused on capital structure 
determinants for DCs and MCs in Australia. Essay II expands this to a multi-country 
comparison of capital structure determinants for DCs and MCs. Essay III is centered on 
dividend policy determinants for DCs and MCs in Australia while Essay IV expands this 
analysis to a comparison of dividend policy determinants for DCs and MCs in multiple 
countries. Lintner’s (1956) speed of adjustment costs for capital structure and dividend payout 
ratios over time is also tested for DCs and MCs across countries. Finally, results of sensitivity 
of different definitions of dependent variables and interdependent (endogeneous) relationship 
between long-term debt and dividend policy is presented.
The results in Chapter 3 (Essay I) evidenced that multinationality of a firm is important in 
explaining long-term debt ratios for Australian firms. The determinants for short-term debt and 
long-term debt ratios vary for Australian DCs and MCs and the difference between DCs and 
MCs capital structure is explained by geographical diversification, firm’s age, bankruptcy risks 
and growth. The impact of increasing Australian firms’ global association through foreign sales 
(depth) and number of subsidiaries (breadth) show no significant optimal relationship with debt 
ratios. In addition to industry and time effects, other important capital structure factors (e.g.
iv
industry median credit risk, financial risk and economic risk) are also tested and it is found that 
the inclusion of these variables improves the strength of the proposed model. Strong evidence 
of time variation in capital structure for both Australian DCs and MCs is confirmed through 
significant positive partial speed of adjustment costs.
In determining capital structure determinants across Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia, 
the results show that the majority of the explanatory factors vary between DCs and MCs and 
also across countries (Chapter 4: Essay II). Debt holding capacity of firms varies significantly 
between DCs and MCs and across countries. In the U.S., MCs hold significantly less debt (both 
short-term and long-term debt) than DCs, but the opposite is found for Malaysia. After 
controlling for country effects, it is found that firms in Australia, Japan, U.K. and Malaysia hold 
significantly less long-term debt relative to U.S. firms. Also, DCs and MCs that operate under 
an imputation tax system (Australia and U.K.), hold significantly less short-term and long-term 
debt as opposed to classical tax system countries (U.S., Japan and Malaysia). Further, DCs and 
MCs operating under common law system (Australia, U.S., U.K. and Malaysia) have 
significantly less short-term debt and significantly higher long-term debt than the firms in civil 
law practice (Japan). When industry and time effects are considered, the results indicate that 
they are not consistent across DCs and MCs and they vary across countries. Testing the speed 
of adjustment costs indicates that Australian and Japanese MCs adjust their long-term debt 
ratios towards their target level faster than their counterparts DCs while firms U.K. and 
Malaysia exhibit the opposite. Similarly, Australian, U.S. and U.K. MCs adjust their short-term 
debt ratios towards their target level relatively quicker than their DCs counterparts.
Chapter 5 (Essay III) investigates the determinants of dividend policy for Australian DCs and 
MCs. In considering dividend payout ratios we adopt two definitions -  cash dividends and total 
dividends. The cash dividend payout ratios consists of cash dividends to net earnings while 
total dividend payout ratios consists of both cash dividends and share repurchases to net 
earnings. The determinants of foreign exchange, tax clientele and financial slack are significant 
in explaining the difference of total dividend payout ratios between Australian DCs and MCs.
Diversification, profitability, firm-specific risk, size, collateral value of assets and financial 
slack are the significant variables in explaining the difference in cash dividend payout ratios 
between Australian DCs and MCs. These results remain unaffected irrespective of controlling 
for industry and time effects.
Lastly, we examine the determinants of dividend payout ratios across the five sampled countries 
(Chapter 6: Essay IV). The results reveal that stock return, cash flow variation, profitability and 
age are significant factors in explaining cash dividend payout ratios for DCs across countries. 
Tax clientele, cash flow variation and profitability are the significant factors in explaining cash 
dividend payout ratios for MCs across countries. However, the significant determining factors 
for total dividend payment ratios are slightly different for both DCs and MCs across countries. 
The factors that significantly explain the difference of DCs and MCs cash dividend and total 
dividend payout ratios vary across countries. Importantly, country effects shows that firms 
operating in an imputation tax system and in a common law environment pay comparatively 
higher dividends (both cash dividends and total dividends) relative to firms operating in a 
classical tax system and civil law regime. Further, MCs operating in the imputation tax system 
and common law regime pay significantly lower dividends (both cash dividends and total 
dividends) relative to DCs counterparts. The speed of adjustment towards the target level of 
cash dividend payout ratios suggests that MCs in Australia, U.S. and Malaysia adjust their 
target dividend payout ratios faster than DCs, while the opposite holds for Japanese and U.K. 
MCs. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of endogeneity and alternative measurement of proxies 
suggests that the initial findings are robust and reliable.
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Despite extensive research for over half a century, the determinants of capital structure and 
dividend policy for corporations remains a controversial issue in modem corporate finance.1 
Since the seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958), a plethora of research has been 
undertaken especially investigating the determinants of both capital structure and dividend 
policy on domestic corporations (DCs), especially in the U.S. Considerably less research has 
been published on both capital structure and dividend payout determinants for multinational 
corporations (MCs). It is surprising that the dynamics of financial structure decisions have not 
received much attention for MCs given that the MCs have become some of the most powerful 
economic and political entities in the world. For example, the revenues of the top 500 
corporations in the U.S. equal about 60 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
and the top six trading companies are nearly equivalent to the combined GDP of all of South 
America (World Investment Report, 2005). Further, in 2005 MCs held 90 percent of all 
technology and product patents worldwide, and were involved in 70 percent of the world trade 
(World Investment Report, 2005). The increase in globalisation suggests that the determinants 
of MCs’ dividend payout ratios and capital structures2 should be important for managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Given the importance of MCs, it is perhaps surprising that 
relatively few studies have examined the unique financial variables explaining the dynamic 
levels of capital structure and dividend payout ratios for MCs. In addition, obtaining an 
understanding of the determinants of both capital structure and dividend payout ratios for DCs 
and MCs across countries with different legal and tax structure such as Australia, U.S., Japan, 
U.K. and Malaysia is of interest to financial decision makers, shareholders, financiers, 
politicians, government policy makers and academics.
1 Throughout this thesis the terms company, firm and corporation are used interchangeably.
2 Throughout this thesis the terms capital structure, long-term debt and leverage are used interchangeably.
1
The determinants of capital structure and dividend payout ratios have captured academic 
thought for many decades, particularly since Modigliani and Miller (1958). If optimal capital 
structures and dividends payout ratios do exist and if these structures maximise firm value, 
obtaining an understanding of the determinants of both capital structure and dividend policy is 
important in order to understand the way firms maximise their value. MCs control considerable 
assets and some control more assets than those controlled by some countries and therefore it is 
economically significant to study MCs’ capital structure and dividend payout ratios and their 
determinants. For example, Table 1.1 (the detailed summary of these statistics can be found in 
Appendix 1A and 1B) shows the amount of foreign assets that MCs hold for our chosen sample 
countries. This table also provides a brief summary of the top 25 developed nations and top 25 
developing nations MCs’ wealth distribution around the world. The proportion of assets and 
sales for the chosen sample countries’ hold 60% and 63% relative to the top 50 developed and 
developing MCs’ total assets and sales around the world. Further, Table 1.1 also presents that 
the chosen sample countries MCs’ foreign assets and sales relative to their total assets and sales 
are approximately 55% and 59% respectively. These figures are quite substantial from any 
financial decision maker’s point of view.
Table 1.1
Proportion of assets and sales distribution (US$ millions) for MCs across 5 sampled countries: 
Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia in 2004
Details of MCs’ Origin Assets(USS) Sales(USS)
F o r e ig n T o ta l F o r e ig n T o ta l
A u s tr a lia  (D e v e lo p e d  C o u n try ) 50803 55317 M i l l 19086
U .S . (D e v e lo p e d  C o u n tr y ) 803867 1773107 423971 886181
J a p a n  (D e v e lo p e d  C o u n try ) 147277 267269 141552 219587
U .K . (D e v e lo p e d  C o u n try ) 497977 608244 372809 494192
M a la y s ia  (D e v e lo p in g  C o u n try ) 18992 59705 9470 26721
T otal Sam ple  C ountries A ssets a n d  Sales 1518916 2763642 965574 1645767
O th e r  D e v e lo p ed  C o u n tr ie s  (T o p  2 5  M C s) 816301 1553845 436385 741582
O th e r  D e v e lo p in g  C o u n tr ie s  (T o p  25  M C s) 179608 483502 139168 537503
T o ta l D e v e lo p ed  C o u n tr ie s  (T o p  25  M C s) 2316225 4257782 1392489 2360628
T o ta l D e v e lo p in g  C o u n tr ie s  (T o p  25  M C s) 198600 543207 148638 564224
G rand T otal (D eveloped  an d  D evelopin g C ountries to  50 M C s) 2514825 4800989 1541127 2924852
%  o f  sam ple countries w ealth  rela tive to top 50  M C s w ealth  a ro u n d  the w o rld 60% 58% 63% 56%
% o f  sam ple countries w ealth  rela tive to  their to ta l wealth 55% 59%
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005
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Table 1.2 show the median figures of selected sampled countries’ MCs market value, total sales 
and total assets over 1995-2004. It shows that the MCs in Australia are approximately three­
fold larger relative to DCs in market value of the firms, total sales and total assets. A similar 
pattern is observed in U.S., U.K. and Malaysia but not in Japan. The market value of Japanese 
MCs are only approximately twice as high as Japanese DCs; however, Japanese DCs are 
approximately one and a half times larger in total sales and control of total assets relative to 
Japanese MCs. These differences may have an impact on the decision of capital structure 
choice and dividend payments.
Table 1.2
Median market value, sales and total assets of DCs and MCs across 5 countries: Australia, U.S.,
Japan, U.K. and Malaysia
This table presents the median annual values of market values, total sales and total asset figures of DCs and MCs across Australia, 
U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia for 1995-2004. All figures are in millions of original currencies.
AU US JP UK ML
DCs MCs DCs MCs DCs MCs DCs M Cs DCs MCs
M ark et V alue 1280 4120 30460 85570 755550 1982340 520 2140 1620 5170
T ota l Sales 1400 4340 34600 75980 372960 200600 830 3180 1620 5780
T ota l A ssets 1570 4980 47120 86730 454710 306660 810 2300 3100 11330
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 considers the definitions of DCs and MCs 
adopted in this thesis, section 1.3 provides a brief overview of the theories of capital structure 
and dividend payout policy and section 1.4 provides the scope and the objectives of the thesis. 
Section 1.5 summarises the data, methodology and the key findings, while section 1.6 
overviews the limitations and section 1.7 outlines the thesis.
1.2 Definition of Multinational and Domestic 
Corporations
To identify the determinants of capital structure for DCs and MCs it is necessary to categorise 
corporations as either DCs or MCs. This can be achieved by considering what constitutes a 
multinational corporation. The remainder can then be regarded as domestic corporations. 
Several criteria have been suggested in the literature to define MCs, including foreign sales ratio 
(Geyikdagi, 1981; Errunza & Senbet, 1984; Fatemi, 1984, 1988; Kim & Lyn, 1986; Shaked, 
1986), foreign tax ratio (Lee & Kwok, 1988) and the number of countries in which the firm
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operates through subsidiaries (Errunza & Senbet, 1984; Kim & Lyn, 1986; Michel & Shaked, 
1986; Shaked, 1986). Burgman (1996) and Chkir and Cosset (2001) use the foreign tax ratio to 
classify firms as MCs. The foreign sales ratio has been popular but it does not differentiate 
between firms that earn income through export or firms that generate foreign source income 
through subsidiary operations. Thus, in this thesis MCs are corporations that have at least one 
subsidiary in another country (other than the domicile country) in which a firm operates and 
earn income (Tallman & Li, 1996). Domestic corporations, being the remainder.
1.3 Brief Overview of Capital Structure and Dividend 
Payout
1.3.1 Theories of Capital Structure
While Modigliani and Miller (MM, 1958) provide a starting point for the discussion of capital 
structure decisions of firms, regardless of the degree of multinationality (MCs), others (Ferri & 
Jones, 1979; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Wald, 1999; Booth et al., 2000; Bevan & Danbolt, 2002; 
Fan, Titman & Twite, 2003 among others) attempted to explain the variation in debt financing 
either by examining the firm-specific factors or country-specific data to determine the optimal 
level of capital structure. Empirical work has revealed some important facts on capital structure 
choice, but this evidence is largely based on either firms in the U.S. or single country data. 
Further, it is not clear how the firm-specific and international environmental factors for MCs in 
different countries vary from each other. While a number of studies have been published that 
investigate the cross-sectional difference in capital structure between DCs and MCs during the 
1990s (Lee & Kwok, 1988; Burgman, 1996; Homaifer & Benkato, 1998), no research has been 
undertaken thus far on a cross-country comparison of the determinants of capital between DCs 
and MCs.
Research published, particularly that by Rajan and Zingales (1995), attempts to apply theories 
of capital structure to international data (G-7 countries), while Wald (1999) examines firm 
characteristics that are not similarly correlated with leverage across countries. This thesis 
differs most from Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Wald (1999) in that, firstly, it examines each
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sampled country’s MCs and DCs characteristics along with additional international 
environmental factors (political risk, foreign exchange risk and multinationality). Secondly, 
previous studies were based on short periods of data set whereas this thesis investigates ten 
years of data to 2004. Thirdly, this thesis investigates the differences on capital structure for 
DCs and MCs in five different sampled countries.
Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that a firm’s choice of capital structure is irrelevant to its 
value under the assumptions of perfect markets. However, when markets are imperfect, the 
following have been found to be important determinants of a firm’s capital structure: size 
(Titman & Wessels, 1988), agency cost (Bradley, Jarrell & Kim, 1984), bankruptcy costs 
(Homaifar & Benkato, 1994), non-debt-tax-shield (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980) and growth and 
profitability (Myer, 1977).
In relation to firms operating internationally additional variables have been found significant in 
explaining capital structure. These include political risks, foreign exchange risk, diversification 
and multinationality (Lee & Kwok, 1988: Burgman, 1996; Akhtar, 2005). Further, regional 
differences are also important on firms capital structure decision (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; 
Wald, 1999; Doukas & Pantzalis, 2003). For example, although some countries are fairly 
homogeneous in their level of economic development, bankruptcy costs, tax code, corporate 
control and debt markets are different. Therefore, capital structures may be different among 
similar firms across the countries.
1.3.2 Theories of Dividend Payout
Much of what we know about dividend policy originates from a series of interviews conducted 
by Lintner (1956) and the subsequent development of a model consistent with these facts. At a 
theoretical level Miller and Modigliani (1961) showed that dividend policy is irrelevant to firm 
value. However, relaxing the assumptions associated with their model has shown that dividend 
policy may affect firm value and is influenced by several factors such as stability of earnings;
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legal, tax and contractual requirements; stockholders' considerations; and firm-specific factors. 
Many of the factors that have been shown to influence dividend policy and firm value have been 
developed through empirical research on listed corporations. Regard for whether the 
corporations are DCs or MCs has not been considered. This is surprising given that the factors 
that have been identified as determinants of dividend policy could differ substantially in these 
two different types of corporations. For example, MCs may be more prone to international 
risks exposures (e.g. foreign exchange risk, political risk and the extent of multinationality). 
Given that previous studies have identified determinants of dividend policy from a sample of 
both DCs and MCs, the significance of these different types of firms is unknown. MCs have 
characteristics that are often very different from DCs and it may be these differences that have 
driven the results.
A number of researchers have provided insights, theoretical as well as empirical, into the 
determinants of dividend policy. However, a complete explanation as to why firms pay 
dividends is as yet unresolved. Several rationales for a corporate dividend policy have been 
proposed in the literature, but there is no unanimity among researchers.
The issue of dividend policy is important for several reasons. First, researchers have found that 
a firm uses dividends as a mechanism for financial signalling to outsiders regarding the stability 
and growth prospects of the firm (Litzenberger & Ramaswamy, 1979, 1982; Rozeff, 1982; 
Schooley & Barney, 1994; La Porta et al., 2000). Secondly, dividends play an important role in 
a firm's capital structure (Kalay, 1982; DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1990; Jensen et al., 1992; Long 
et al., 1994; Mougoue & Mukherjee, 1994; Adedeji, 1998). Yet another set of studies have 
established the relationship between firm dividend and investment decisions Kogut, 1985; 
Barlett & Ghoshal, 1989). According to the ‘residual dividend' theory, a firm will pay dividends 
only if it does not have profitable investment opportunities.
A firm’s dividend policy is determined by a trade-off between retaining earnings for 
reinvestment and paying a dividend to shareholders (Dittmar & Dittmar, 2004). Much of what
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we know about dividend policy originates from Lintner (1956). Following Lintner (1956), 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) proposed a model that under certain conditions showed that 
dividend policy was irrelevant to firm value. That is, it did not matter what dividend policy 
managers chose, the value of the shares would be unaffected by the dividend decision. This 
model is essentially based on zero arbitrage. If a firm could influence its value through 
changing its dividend policy, the premium enjoyed by this firm would quickly disappear as 
other similar firms followed suit. However, since the early studies, research has shown that 
dividend policy can be explained by factors such as firm size (Barlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Fama & 
French, 2001), growth opportunities (Rozeff, 1982; Smith & Watts, 1992; Schooley & Barney, 
1994), agency cost (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, 1986), levels of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986), 
debt, tax (Litzenberger & Ramaswamy, 1979; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980), earnings volatility 
(Asquith & Mullins, 1983; Miller & Rock, 1985) and profitability (Barlett & Ghoshal, 1989; 
Fama & French, 2001). Dividend policy may be influential on share value. However, a general 
model of dividend policy has not yet been developed. Firms come in a multitude of different 
sizes and forms and one important distinction is between DCs and MCs. This distinction 
provides a rich area of research on issues such as dividend policy. Obtaining a better 
understanding of the differences in dividend policy in these two types of firms will shed light on 
factors that may be influential in maximisation firm value. MCs control considerable amounts 
of assets and wealth, and obtaining evidence on their approach to dividend policy is an area of 
research that is severely lacking.
1.3.3 Speed of Adjustment Costs for Capital Structure and Dividend 
Payout Ratios
Firms may adjust their capital structure and dividend payout ratios to a target level from year to 
year. The magnitude of this adjustment depends on the costs and benefits that associate with the 
adjustments towards the optimal level of capital structure and dividend payout ratios. A firm 
cannot instantly change its capital structure and dividend payout decision to reach to a target 
level at any given time without incurring some costs. These costs are known as adjustment 
costs. The speed of adjustment is how quickly a firms rebalances their target level of capital
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structure and dividend payouts from time to time. The trade-off theory of financial structure 
determines the costs and benefits of these adjustments. Thus far, previous empirical studies 
implicitly assume that firms adjust their capital structure and dividend payout ratios on a 
continuous basis and the process is costless. Flannery and Rangen (2006) argue that if previous 
studies have inappropriately constrained firms to make continuous adjustments, they may have 
distorted conclusions about whether firms rebalance their capital structure magnitude and the 
rate of changes.
Given the considerable differences between DCs and MCs it is hypothesised that speed of 
adjustment w ill differ between these two types of corporations.
1.3.4 Endogeneous Relationship between Capital Structure and 
Dividend Payout Ratios
Recently, Fama and French (2002) argue that the finance literature offers two competing models 
of financing decisions. Firstly, in the trade-off model, firms identify their optimal leverage by 
weighing the costs and benefits of an additional dollar of debt. The benefits of debt include, for 
example, the tax deductibility of interest and the reduction of free cash flow problems. The 
costs of debt include potential bankruptcy costs and agency conflicts between stockholders and 
bondholders. At the optimal level, the benefit of the last dollar of debt just offsets the cost. 
Firms maximise value by selecting the dividend payout that equates the costs and benefits of the 
last dollar of dividends. Secondly, Myers (1984) develops an alternative theory known as the 
pecking order model of financing decisions. The pecking order arises if the costs of issuing new 
securities overwhelm other costs and benefits of dividends and debt. The financing costs that 
produce pecking order behaviour include transaction costs associated with new issues and the 
costs that arise because of management’s superior information about the firm’s prospects and 
the value of the firm. Because of these costs, firms finance new investments first with retained 
earnings, then with safe debt, then with risky debt, and finally under duress, with equity. As a 
result, variation in firm leverage is driven not by the trade-off model’s costs and benefits of 
debt, but rather by a pecking order.
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Given the trade-off and pecking order models share many predictions about dividends and debt, 
it is clear that there is interdependence between capital structure and dividend payout which 
demands a test of an endogenous relationship. Failure to address the effect of endogeneity may 
lead to wrong conclusions in the financial decision-making process. Further, it would be 
interesting to investigate how this endogenous relationship holds across DCs and MCs because 
the additional benefits and costs that MCs experience through international involvement might 
have a different impact on the extremity of the endogeneous relationship between capital 
structure and dividend payout ratios for MCs relative to DCs.
1.4 Scope and Objectives of the Study
The intent of this research is to provide additional empirical analyses on capital structure and 
dividend policy literature across DCs and MCs in different countries. The studies that 
investigate the capital structure and dividend payout ratios of corporations across different 
countries are somewhat dated, use limited data, or have a narrow focus on firm types (Lee & 
Kwok, 1988; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Burgman, 1996; McClure, Clayton & Flofler, 1999; 
Booth et al., 2001). Therefore, this thesis investigates the different financial and institutional 
traditions of DCs and MCs in Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia. This will help to 
ascertain whether different financial and institutional traditions do impact on capital structure 
and dividend payment determinants. Secondly, the data for most of the previous studies do not 
cover the period through the mid-1990s to early 21st century when there were important 
developments in the globalisation of financial markets (McClure, Clayton & Hofler, 1999; 
World Investment Report, 2005), especially when barriers to entry to many countries were 
removed and it provided MCs with the opportunity for global expansion. Thus, this thesis 
examines whether there are systematic differences in the determinants of capital structure and 
dividend payout ratios between DCs and MCs across countries, and whether there are 
additional, uniquely international, factors that may help to explain the capital structure and 
dividend payment choices of MCs. Thirdly, given the problems potentially encountered by 
firms as they attempt to establish optimal global financial structures, it is important to determine 
whether financial norms and practices vary across countries. These countries represent different
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financial structures and traditions. The U.K. and U.S. are known to follow the English tradition 
where there are large numbers of publicly-listed companies, and hostile takeovers owing to 
agency conflicts are common ((La Porta et el., 2002). Japan follows a unique Japanese tradition 
where corporate decisions and restructuring are made through the involvement of universal 
banks and financial holdings (La Porta et el., 2002). On the other hand, Malaysia is known to 
follow the Latinic tradition where corporate ownership structure can be characterised by family 
control, financial holdings, state ownership, cross-shareholdings, and where agency problems 
are internalised (Booth et ah, 2001; (La Porta et eh, 2002). Financial theory would suggest that 
in an efficient global market the capital structure and dividend payments of similar firms in 
different countries would be the same (McClure, Clayton & Hofler, 1999). If international 
market imperfection existed through the mid-1990s and early 21st century, capital structures, 
dividend payout ratios and associated costs may be different among similar firms in different 
countries and business advantages (or disadvantages) may provide profits (or costs) to firms 
incorporated in different countries. Fourthly, the recent evidence of considerable time variation 
in cash dividends (disappearance versus reappearance) in U.S. firms begs the question of 
whether the types of firm (e.g. MCs vs. DCs) have any impact on this and also whether this 
trend is in existence in other countries around the world. Fifthly, the speed of adjustment costs 
for firms in adjusting the capital structure and dividend payments have not been investigated for 
DCs and MCs. Sixthly, the interrelationship that exists between capital structure and dividend 
payout ratios creates an endogeneity which has a significant statistical implication. Therefore, 
failing to account for this endogeneity may lead to wrong conclusions. No attempt thus far has 
been made to investigate the endogenous relationship of capital structure and dividend payout 
within the framework of DCs and MCs. Therefore, the endogeneity between capital structure 
and dividend policy will be considered for DCs and MCs. Seventhly, the industry effect on 
DCs’ and MCs’ capital structure and dividend payout ratios is considered as prior studies 
indicated that industries have significant impact on capital structure and dividend payout 
decisions. Lastly, the relationship between financial structure and overseas operation, especially 
for MCs, has led in recent years to the development of a considerable literature that underlies its 
time-variant effects (Bemanke & Gertler, 1989; Greenwald & Stiglitz, 1993). Thus an intention
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of this study is to update the literature by shedding light on the role of these financial and 
institutional traditions on capital structure and dividend payment decisions across countries. In 
this aspect, the focus of this thesis is on answering the following questions:
□ Do capital structure and dividend payout ratios differ significantly between DCs and MCs 
and across the sampled countries?
□ Does the dividend appearance and disappearance (captured through dividend payout ratios: 
cash dividend payout ratios versus cash and share repurchase dividend payout ratios) exist 
between DCs and MCs and across countries?
□ Do international factors explain MCs’ capital structure and dividend payout decisions better 
than DCs across the sampled countries?
□ Are the predictions of conventional capital structure and dividend payout determinants 
improved by knowing the nationality of DCs and MCs?
□ Does the speed of adjustment costs vary between DCs and MCs and across the sampled 
countries?
□ Does the endogeneity have a significant impact on the determination of capital structure and 
dividend payout ratios between DCs and MCs across the sampled countries?
□ Does industry play a significant role in determining DCs’ and MCs’ capital structure and 
dividend payout ratios?
□ Is capital structure and dividend payout ratios of DCs and MCs time-variant? Are the 
factors that affect cross-sectional variability in individual countries’ capital structures 
similar across the sampled countries for both MCs and DCs ?
The last question is particularly important, because institutional factors such as tax rates and 
business risk, profitability and growth can result in different financing patterns in DCs’ and 
MCs’ capital structure and dividend payments across countries, which then show up in firm- 
level data as well as aggregate data. Therefore, it is believed that the additional information and 
efficiency that can be extracted from a time series and cross-sectional data set can considerably 
improve the understanding of the relevance of financial market imperfections in different
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economies and will allow a better understanding of the determinants of firms’ capital structures 
and dividend policies across countries.3
1.5 Significance and Contribution of the Study
This thesis will provide a sound foundation for further work and the better understanding of 
corporate capital structure and dividend policy in firms. Given the existing empirical research 
that shows capital structure and dividend policy are important in firm value, understanding the 
determinants, adjustment costs of capital structure and dividend policy will have important 
financial implications for firms. MCs control vast amounts of wealth and even a small change 
in their value has substantial financial implications. This research will provide the base for 
further research on the implications of capital structure and dividend policy on firm value. 
Further, this thesis has significant practical import as the results will be useful to corporations in 
their management of capital structure and dividend policy within their organisations and across 
groups of organisations.
1.6 Data and Methodology
The data set comprises 10 years of data for five countries: Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and 
Malaysia. These countries were selected because they represent different major economic 
regions including Europe, America, Pacific, and Asia. The countries were also chosen because 
they reflect the English-speaking capital markets and Continental-Japanese banking systems and 
Malaysia’s Latinic style of business operation. The diversity of cultural and economic factors in 
these countries should provide an adequate test of capital structure and dividend payout models. 
The sample consists of 11956 firm years (6038 DCs and 5918 MCs) from 1995 to 2004. 
Univariate and Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression models are utilised to test the proposed 
hypotheses. OLS regression method is justified to suit the purpose of the analysis since our 
capital structure, dividend payouts and their determining factors are normally distributed.
3 Exceptions are Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wald (1999), McClure, Clayton and Hofler (1999) and Booth et al. 
( 2001) .
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Different econometric models are developed across chapters to investigate the intentions of this 
thesis. The nine queries raised in the introduction have been answered throughout the 
discussion and analysis in chapter 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. The following discussion is a brief 
summary of the overall results of this thesis.
1.7 Summary of the Thesis
1.7.1 Key Findings of Essay I
Essay I (Chapter 3) investigates the determinants of Australian MCs’ and DCs’ capital structure 
from 1995 to 2004, focusing on multiple measurements of dependent variables (debt ratios), the 
effect of multinationality, the nonlinearity effects or optimal involvement of firms’ international 
operation, the impacts of additional financial variables on debt ratios, and time variation of 
capita! structure across MCs and DCs through speed of adjustments. The results show that after 
controlling for multinational effects, foreign exchange risk, firm-specific risks, average tax rate, 
size, age, cash dividend payments, free cash flow and growth variables are significant 
determinants for long-term debt across DCs and MCs. These results are insensitive to the 
definition of long-term debt ratio adopted. Multinationality is also a significant variable in 
explaining long-term debt ratios. In explaining short-term debt ratios, the significant 
determinants are bankruptcy risks, firm-specific risks, age and free cash flows. The impact of 
increasing Australian firms’ global association through foreign sales (depth) and number of 
subsidiaries (breadth) show no significant optimal relationship with debt ratios. In relation to 
interaction effects that explain the differences between DCs’ and MCs’ debt ratios, the 
significant interaction factors are diversification and age for long-term debt ratios while 
diversification, bankruptcy risks and growth are significant for short-term debt ratios. 
Additional financial factors -  credit-risk, economic-risk and financial-risk have no significant 
impact on capital structure; however, inclusion of these variables largely improves the 
explanatory power of the model. When industry effects are considered, the significance of the 
original determinants remains unchanged, but some industries become significant. Finally, the 
capital structure varied significantly over the sample period. This variation is explained by the
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positive significant speed of adjustment, indicating the possible existence of positive net benefit 
in annual adjustment of the capital structure towards their target level. Further, results also 
suggests that MCs in Australia adjust their target levels of debt faster relative to their 
counterparts DCs.
1.7.2 Key Findings of Essay II
Chapter 4 (Essay II) is an extension of Chapter 3 (Essay I). This chapter uses a unique data set 
to assess whether capital structure theory is portable across sampled countries with different 
institutional characteristics. Chapter 4 has eight major findings. Firstly, the determinants of 
long-term debt ratios between DCs and MCs differ across the sample countries. For DCs 
foreign exchange risk, size and collateral value of assets are the only factors that are consistently 
significant across the sample countries’ DCs. To the contrary, no consistent significant 
determining factors are observed in MCs’ across the sampled countries. Diversification plays 
an important role in explaining short-term debt ratios between DCs and MCs across all sample 
countries. Secondly, the results show that MCs hold significantly less debt (both short-term and 
long-term debt) than DCs in the U.S., while Malaysian MCs hold significantly higher debt (both 
short-term and long-term debt) than their DCs counterparts. Thirdly, country effects show that 
Australia, Japan U.K. and Malaysia hold significantly less long-term debt relative to U.S. firms. 
However, no significant difference is observed in firms’ short-term debt across sampled 
countries. Fourthly, corporations operating under a imputation tax system (Australia and U.K.) 
hold significantly less debt (both short-term and long-term debt) as opposed to firms operating 
under classical tax system countries (U.S., Japan and Malaysia). Fifthly, firms operating in 
common law countries (Australia, U.S., U.K. and Malaysia) have significantly less debt (both 
short-term and long-term debt) than the firms operate in civil law country (Japan). Sixthly, 
industry and time effects are not consistent across DCs and MCs; however, industry and time 
effects across countries supports the hypothesis that industry and time effect is significant, albeit 
variable across countries. Finally, the speed of adjustment confirms that Australian and 
Japanese MCs adjust their long-term debt ratios towards their target level faster than their DCs 
counterparts, while U.K. and Malaysian MCs exhibit the opposite. Furthermore, Australian,
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U.S. and U.K. MCs adjust their short-term debt ratios towards their target level relatively 
quicker than DCs counterparts.
1.7.3 Key Findings of Essay III
Chapter 5 (Essay III) provides evidence regarding the relationship between the dividend payout 
ratios and its determinants (firm-specific, international factors, industry classification and time) 
across 994 Australian DCs and 1254 MCs over the period of 1995 to 2004. In considering 
dividend payout ratios we adopt two definitions -  cash dividends and total dividends. The cash 
dividend payout ratios consists of cash dividends to net earnings while total dividend payout 
ratios consists of both cash dividends and share repurchases to net earnings. This chapter 
considers the effect of multinationality in determining the dividend payout ratios. The 
regression results suggest that the determinants of dividend payout ratios vary across DCs and 
MCs. The results also show that diversification, profitability, firm-specific risk, size, collateral 
value of assets and financial slack are the significant variables that explain the difference in cash 
dividend payout ratios while tax clientele, cash flow variability and financial slack explain the 
difference between Australian DCs’ and MCs’ total dividend payout ratios. The results also 
indicate that diversification, stock return, tax clientele, cash flow variation, profitability, 
company-specific risks, firm size and financial slack variables are significant in explaining 
dividend payout ratios (both cash and total dividend payout ratios) for Australian DCs’. For 
Australian MCs, the determinants of cash dividend payout are tax clientele, profitability, 
collateral value of assets and leverage. In addition to slack variable, similar factors also explain 
the total dividend payout ratios for MCs. Controlling for industry effect and time variation 
effect show that the impacts of industry influence and time affects vary across DCs and MCs; 
however, the initial results remain unchanged.
1.7.4 Key Findings of Essay IV
Chapter 6 (Essay IV) is an extension of Chapter 5 (Essay IV). This chapter investigates a 
comprehensive and comparative relationship between dividend payout ratios and their
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determinants across DCs and MCs for Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia. This chapter 
has four major findings. Firstly, results show that stock return, cash flow variation, profitability 
and age are significant factors in explaining cash dividend payout ratios for DCs across 
countries. Meanwhile tax clientele, cash flow variation and profitability are significant factors 
in explaining cash dividend payout ratios for MCs across countries. These results are sensitive 
to the definition of total dividend payout ratios. Secondly, the determinants that explain the 
difference between DCs’ and MCs’ cash dividend payout ratios across countries are 
diversification (Australia and U.S.), agency costs and average tax ratios (U.K. and Malaysia), 
tax clientele (U.S. and Malaysia) and cash flow variation (Japan and Malaysia). The common 
determinants explaining the difference of DCs’ and MCs’ total dividend payout ratios changes 
but only for U.S. corporations. Determinants that become significant are political risks, stock 
return, profitability and age. Thirdly, controlling for country effects shows that firms operating 
under an imputation tax system (Australia and U.K) and common law environments (Australia, 
U.S., U.K. and Malaysia) pay comparatively higher dividends relative to firms operating in a 
classical tax system (U.S., Japan and Malaysia) and civil law environment (Japan). It results 
also show that MCs operating in an imputation tax system and common law regime pay 
significantly lower dividends relative to the DCs counterparts. Fourthly, Lintner’s (1956) 
model is considered to investigate the difference in speed of adjustment in cash dividends 
towards a target level between DCs and MCs across the five sampled countries. The results 
suggest that MCs in Australia, U.S. and Malaysia adjust their target cash dividend payout ratios 
faster than their DCs counterparts. The opposite holds for Japanese and U.K. MCs.
Finally, sensitivity analysis of alternative measurement proxies of dependent and independent 
variables suggest that the initial findings are robust and reliable. Further, results for test of 
endogeneity indicated a significant endogeneous relationship between leverage and cash 
dividends. Adjusting for endogeneity did not alter the overall conclusion.
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1.8 Outline
The thesis is organised in the following manner. Chapter 2 presents description of data 
collection and the definition of variables used in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 consists of 
Essay /: Capital structure determinants of Australian domestic and multinational corporations. 
Chapter 4 details Essay 2: Capital structure determinants for domestic and multinational 
corporations -  an international comparison. Chapter 5 presents Essay 3: Dividend payout 
determinants of Australian domestic and multinational corporations. Chapter 6 considers Essay 
4: An international study of dividend payout determinants for domestic and multinational 
corporations -  an international comparison. Chapter 7 provides sensitivity analysis while 
Chapter 8 includes a summary and the conclusions of the study.
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- 2 -
DATA
2.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the data set and the collection process employed to study the hypotheses 
developed in Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 respectively. Section 2.2 describes the sources and 
provides a brief overview of the dataset. Section 2.3 presents the sample selection and filtering 
process to obtain a data set that facilitates a valid investigation of the sample of DCs’ and MCs’ 
capital structure and dividend policy across five countries -  Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and 
Malaysia for the period 1995-2004. Section 2.4 to section 2.6 describes the measurement of 
dependent and independent variables. Section 2.7 outlines the sample characteristics. Section 
2.8 investigates the robustness of the data set while section 2.9 provides a summary of the data 
chapter.
2.2 Data Sources and Overview
The theory and practice of business finance suggest that the dividend payout ratio and capital 
structure or long-term debt ratio is not constant within a sector or industry, but depends on 
certain firm characteristic and economic factors. In this study, financial ratios are used as firm 
characteristics. Financial ratios are the most commonly used measures in the analysis of a 
firm’s financial performance.
This study is based on financial data collected from the balance sheet, income statement and 
cash flow statement in a total of 11954 DCs (6036) and MCs (5918) across Australia, U.S., 
Japan, U.K. and Malaysia from 1995-2004. The main sources of data are presented in Table 
2.1. Firstly, the top 500 firms in each stock exchange across five countries are selected from 
each country’s stock exchange. Secondly, Osiris database is employed to identify multinational 
corporations and domestic corporations based on their overseas sales and number of 
international subsidiaries. Thirdly, firm characteristic data is collected from Compustat-Global 
in conjunction with Osiris database. Fourthly, Datastream Advance is used to obtain firms’
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return series. Finally, PRS Handbook is utilised to collect country-specific political risk ratings 
and other financial risk ratings.
The Osiris and Compustat-Global are designed to provide data in a manner that allows 
maximum comparability between one company and another, and between various reporting 
regimes.
Table 2.1
An overview of data sources
D a ta  D e sc r ip t io n D a ta  S o u r c e s
C o u n try  S to c k  E x c h a n g e W o rld w id e  W eb
F irm  S e g m e n ta l D a ta O sir is  D a ta b a se  (B u re a u  o f  V a n d y k e  D a ta  B a n k  G ro u p )
F irm  C h a ra c te r is tic  D a ta C o m p u s ta t-G lo b a l D a ta b a se  (W R D S )
F irm  R e tu rn  S e rie s D a ta s tre a m  A d v a n c e
P o litic a l R isk  R a tin g s P R S  C o u n try  R isk  H a n d b o o k
2.3 Sample Selection and Data Filtering
2.3.1 Sample Selection
Table 2.2 gives a brief overview of sample selection of DCs and MCs across each of the five 
countries (Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia). To fulfil the purpose of this study, a 
sample of 6036 DCs and 5918 MCs are drawn from the five countries’ Stock Exchange-listed
firms over the period of 1995-2004.
Table 2.2
Selection procedures of final sample
This table presents the summary o f total sample selection and the filtering process for all firms. DCs and MCs are domestic 
corporations and multinational corporations respectively while country acronyms o f AU, US JP, UK and ML are Australia, United 
States, Japan, United Kingdom and Malaysia. The first compartment o f the table lists the detailed description o f the data filtering 
process while the second and third compartment contains the data filtering process for DCs’ and MCs’ final sample selection.
Sample Selection Process Number of Observations Number of Observations (MCs)
(DCs)
A l l U S J P U K M L A U U S J P U K M L
Init ia l  S a m p le
3996 8852 4125 6890 3012 2789 6945 2969 6064 3196
a. L e s s  F o re ig n  M u lt in a t io n a ls -690 -3055 -1165 -3156 -1065
b . L e s s  I n v e s tm e n t ,  B a n k , In s u r a n c e  a n d  T ru s t -1485 -3712 -1565 -3145 -715 -478 -1382 -616 -1009 -366
c . L e s s  I n e f f ic ie n t  S a m p le  P e r io d  ( m in im u m  3 y e a rs ) -1112 -2410 -889 -2329 -290 -177 -505 -189 -179 -456
d. L e s s  L a c k  o f  D e ta i le d  R e p o r t in g  o f  R e le v a n t  
I n fo rm a tio n -316 -1130 -455 -489 -112 -129 -289 -99 -112 -214
e. L e s s  D if fe re n t  R e p o r t in g  P e r io d -89 -229 -123 -208 -34 -61 -97 -86 -139 -131
T o t a l  F i n a l  S a m p l e s 9 9 4 1 3 7 1 1 0 9 3 7 19 1 8 6 1 1 2 5 4 1 4 1 7 8 1 4 1 4 6 9 9 6 4
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2.3.2 Selection of Time Period
To test the hypotheses developed in the following four chapters, the sampling period chosen for 
the purpose of this thesis covers the end of financial year from 1995 to 2004. The choice of this 
sample period is appropriate for time series and cross-sectional analysis. The choice of this 
sample period acknowledges that it enables a proper cross-sectional investigation of dividend 
payout and capital structure as it satisfies the definition of DCs and MCs with a sufficient 
number of observations in each year. Moreover, the purpose is also to observe whether any 
dividend payout and capital structure determinants vary their significance levels across time. A 
10-year period is sufficient for this analysis.
2.3.3 Selection of Countries
Financial theory would suggest that in an efficient global capital market the dividend payout 
and capital structure of identical firms in different nations would be the same. Empirically, 
similar firms would trend towards similar financial structures, unless there are still fundamental 
differences in the national capital markets in which they operate and barriers exists to the 
efficient flow of information and capital across countries. Since country differences exist, 
dividends (both cash dividends and total dividends (cash and share repurchase)) and capital 
structures may be different among similar firms in different nations. Therefore, a cross country 
comparison is useful to investigate to what extent the dividend payout and capital structure vary 
across countries. The reasons for selecting the five sample countries for this thesis are briefly 
discussed below.
Five countries were selected because they represent one of five different geographical segments 
namely, Australia from the South Pacific-continent; the U.S. from the American- continent; 
Japan from the Asia-continent; the U.K. from the Europe-continent; and Malaysia from the East 
Asian-continent, which are quite different in their economic and business activities.
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Firstly, the motivation of choosing Australia was mainly due to the lack of previous studies 
investigating the determinants of dividend payout and capital structure on DCs and MCs, and 
also because Australia is regarded as one of the most active and innovative markets for 
securitised debt in the world (World Investment Report, 2005). The fact that corporate debt 
issue increased from $A10 billion in 1996 to $A15 billion in 20 004 certainly demands a closer 
look at Australian firms’ debt and its determinants. Further, the Australian imputation tax 
system impacts both dividend payout and capital structure decision both from firm and 
shareholders’ point of view, which makes Australia an attractive candidate to include in the 
study. Secondly, the reason for selecting the U.S. was purely because the few studies that have 
investigated the U.S. in an older data set with limited periods do not necessarily give a whole 
picture of U.S. DCs’ and MCs’ capital structure and dividend payout. However, it is at least a 
minimum reference to compare the results with the rest of the countries chosen. In addition, 
U.S. capital structure is more sensitive to default risk than that of Japan (Rajan & Zingales, 
1995). This suggests that the expected bankruptcy costs of U.S. firms may be larger than Japan. 
Further, retentions and bond markets are the major sources of finance for U.K. and U.S. firms. 
Thirdly, Japan is chosen since the Japanese firm characteristics are unique in the sense that the 
banks are the dominant source of finance. Further, their legal system and commercial law is 
modelled on the German system. For example, Japan follows the German system of using 
reserves to increase the financial strength of the company. Finally, the sample country of 
Malaysia is chosen because its corporate financial structure is relatively different from the other 
four countries. For example, Malaysian corporations use their income proceeds to finance their 
regular investments. Further, the Malaysian government established the Corporate Debt 
Restructuring Committee (CDRC). The CDRC aims to facilitate voluntary corporate 
restructuring by coordinating voluntary negotiations and responsibilities between creditors and 
corporate debtors. The CDRC also intends to minimise losses to creditors, shareholders and 
other stakeholders, preserve viable business, and implement a comprehensive framework for 
debt restructuring (World Investment Report, 2005). In addition, the Malaysian government
4 Source: Axiss Australia -  Australia’s Debt Securities Market, Executive Briefing, a2a Newsletter, 2003.
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plays a more substantial role in stock market formation and development, by pursuing 
aggressive pro-equity financing policies and placing limitations on debt financing of firms, 
especially from abroad (Singh, 1995).
Choosing these countries highlights the differences in their capital structure and dividend 
payout determinants -  if there are any. For each country, the main stock exchange website was 
used to obtain a sample of all listed companies for each year from 1995 to 2004. The stock 
exchanges selected for each country are:
• Australia: Australian Stock Exchange
• U.S.: New York Stock Exchange
• Japan: Tokyo Stock Exchange
• U.K.: UK Stock Exchange
• Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.
From the sample of firms selected from each exchange for each year, both the Osiris database 
and Compustat-Global database are searched for annual report information. From annual report 
information, segment information is used to determine if the firms reported business activity 
from another country. If business activity was reported from more than the domiciled country, 
it was coded as an MC; if it did not, it was coded as a DC. The number of firms satisfying these 
requirements for each country is represented as the initial sample in Table 2.2.
MCs could have subsidiaries listed on overseas exchanges. For example, a U.S. multinational 
also could be listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. Including this firm as an MC in Australia 
and the U.S. would result in double counting. The technique that is used to identify such MCs 
in foreign multinationals listed on a non-domiciled exchange is to report financial statements in 
the domiciled currency and not the currency of the country where they are listed. Therefore, to 
avoid double counting, firms reporting in a non-domicile currency are excluded as they are 
foreign MCs. The number of firms excluded on this criterion is shown at (a.) in Table 2.2.
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Firms in the financial and regulated industries have dividend payout and capital structures that 
are determined by levels of deposits and financial regulation. Determinants of dividend payout 
and capital structure for these firms are considerably different from other firms, and as a result 
are excluded (Fama & French, 2002; Flannery & Rangan, 2006). Financial organisations 
excluded under this criterion are shown at (b.) of Table 2.2.
A minimum of three years of data was necessary for some variables. Firms with less than three 
years of data for estimation of these variables were excluded. This is shown at (c.) in Table 2.2. 
Also some firms were excluded as the reported figure duration is less than 12 months. Since 
some of the proxies required a full year of observation to be consistent across other variables, a 
full year of reporting was important. This is indicated by (d.) in Table 2.2. Further, we define 
annual observations on the basis of fiscal time (as opposed to calendar time) because sample 
firms use a variety of fiscal year ends across countries.
Finally, two important statistical conditions are also applied so that the final sample size is 
statistically valid to use in the multivariate regressions. The conditions include a reasonably 
large sample selected at random from large populations which is, on average, representative of 
the characteristics of that population. Secondly, it is statistically advisable that large groups of 
data show a higher degree of stability than a smaller data set. Since there are a large number of 
independent variables, a reasonable amount of observations are required to produce reliable and 
unbiased estimates (eg. degrees of freedom). For example, the sample selection was such that it 
allows enough observations in each year (minimum 30 observations to meet the central limit 
theorem) to do a cross-sectional analysis of dividend payouts and capital structure determinants 
between DCs and MCs across five countries across each year. Also, the comparability of data 
does suffer from large differences in observations among the countries. This should not bias the 
results since each country is analysed and compared separately, and for each country the 
number of observations is sufficiently large for parametric comparisons.
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A breakdown and stratification of the sample on a yearly basis is presented in Table 2.3 (Panel 
A) while Table 2.3 (Panel B) illustrates industry distribution. Table 2.3 shows that, overall, the 
numbers of DCs and MCs have doubled from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. The U.K. has 
considerably higher numbers of MCs than the other countries in each year (1469). It is also 
clear that the U.K. has less DCs than other countries (719). Japan and Malaysia have less MCs 
than the other countries. Also Malaysia has twice as much DCs than MCs listed on their stock 
exchange.
Table 2.3
The structure of the final sample over 10 years across 5 countries
Table 2.3 Panel A provides a description of the sample in detail including the number of DCs (Domestic Corporations) and MCs 
(Multinational Corporations) that is available for each country across five countries. The country acronyms of AU, US, JP, UK, and 
ML are Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia respectively. Panel B presents Industry distribution while Panel C provides the 
distribution of sampled countries MCs’ geographic location of subsidiaries.
Panel A -  Sample Distribution across Years
P a n e l A AU U S J P UK ML T o ta l G r a n d
DCs MCs DCs MCs DCs MCs DCs MCs DCs MCs DCs MCs T o ta l
1995 62 72 99 89 52 99 58 157 82 52 353 469 822
1996 67 97 103 127 56 69 63 109 73 66 362 468 830
1997 73 105 105 144 59 79 61 164 90 73 388 565 953
1998 88 112 120 150 88 75 66 121 129 100 491 558 1049
1999 101 125 141 137 105 77 69 142 24 0 108 656 589 1245
2000 109 133 142 146 131 75 76 152 237 106 695 612 1307
2001 133 150 161 119 142 78 72 177 257 97 765 621 1386
2002 121 155 163 162 163 73 79 164 258 119 784 673 1457
2003 125 159 175 173 157 91 82 147 261 122 800 692 1492
2004 115 146 162 170 140 98 93 136 234 121 744 671 1415
T o ta l 994 1254 1371 1417 1093 814 719 1469 1861 964 6038 5918 11956
T o ta l  DCs 
& MCs 2248 2788 1907 2188 2825 11956
Table 2.3 Panel B reports that, generally, both DCs and MCs are either manufacturing or retail 
industries across the five sampled countries. The proportion of DCs that fall in the 
manufacturing sector ranges from 15% to 29%, while MCs range from 15% to 25%. Similarly, 
the proportion of DCs that fall in the retail sector range from 19% to 34% while MCs range 
from 15% to 31% across the countries. However, there is a slight difference in the industrial 
distribution of Australian firms. It is clearly visible that in our total sample of 2248 Australian 
firms, the proportion of mining DCs and MCs are 21% and 25% respectively. In the UK 
however, the majority of the DCs and MCs are in the retail (33% and 31%) and manufacturing 
(23% and 38%) sectors. U.S. DCs and MCs are generally more stratified across different
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industries relative to the other countries. Malaysian sample firms’ industry distribution is 
similar to Australian firms (with an exception of mining industry) where the majority o f the 
DCs and MCs fall in the agricultural, forestry and fishing; building construction and heavy 
construction; manufacturing and retail sectors. It is clearly visible that in our chosen sample 
range, there is an approximate equal distribution of sample selection across industries between 
DCs and MCs.
Panel B -  Sample Distribution across Industries
Table 2.3 Panel B provides the US Standard Industrial Codes classification for five countries' industry distribution of Multinational 
Corporations (MCs) and Domestic Corporations (DCs), including the proportion of total sample. The acronyms for the industries 
are: There are ten industries in the sample and a dichotomous variable is used to capture each of these industries’ effect (except 
INDJi'. Finance, Insurance and Real Estates) on capital structure and dividend payout ratios. The industries are: 
IND_A_AGR1F1SH (agricultural, forestry and fishing); IND B MIN1NG (metal, coal, oil and gas); INDjCjCONSTRUCTN 
(building constructions and heavy constructions); IND_D_MNFCTRNG (manufacturing, food, Tobacco, Textiles, Furniture and 
Fixtures and Papers); IND E TRNSPT CMCTN (Transport, Communication, Electric, and utilities); 1ND_F^WHOLESALE 
(wholesale trade and durable goods); 1ND_G RETAIL (retails), IND_H\ Finance, Insurance and Real Estates) and IND I  SERVIC 
(health, legal, educational, engineering and social).
P a n e l  B A U U S J P U K M L
U S  S I C D C s % M C s % D C s % M C s % D C s % M C s % D C s % M C s % D C s % M C s %
I N D _ A 1 07 11% 121 10% 65 5% 75 5% 61 6 % 3 8 5% 18 3% 5 6 4 % 3 0 4 16% 9 2 10%
I N D _ B 2 11 2 1 % 3 0 8 2 5 % 198 14% 188 13% 8 1% 10 1% 3 6 5 % 4 2 3% 3 0 2% 5 1%
I N D _ C 105 11% 178 14% 133 10% 136 10% 193 18% 3 2 4% 61 8% 113 8% 2 6 8 14% 12 9 13%
I N D J ) 1 4 8 15% 2 0 3 16% 138 10% 2 1 8 15% 3 1 3 2 9 % 2 0 6 2 5 % 179 2 5 % 3 0 7 2 1 % 2 8 4 15% 19 0 2 0 %
I N D _ E 3 3 3% 4 8 4 % 165 12% 2 0 3 14% 145 13% 171 2 1 % 73 10% 15 0 10% 2 2 1% 3 4 4 %
I N D _ F 115 12% 105 8% 201 15% 171 12% 75 7% 145 18% 7 8 11% 2 7 0 18% 2 6 6 14% 19 0 2 0 %
I N D _ G 18 8 19% 191 15% 3 6 4 2 7 % 2 6 6 19% 2 2 9 2 1 % 152 19% 2 3 7 3 3 % 4 5 8 3 1 % 6 3 6 3 4 % 291 3 0 %
I N D J I 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 % 0 0 % 0 0% 0 0 % 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
I N D J 3 6 4% 4 2 3% 41 3% 88 6 % 14 1% 3 2 4% 4 1% 2 7 2% 9 0% 2 6 3%
I N D  J 51 5% 5 8 5% 6 6 5% 7 2 5 % 5 5 5 % 2 8 3 % 33 5% 4 6 3% 4 2 2% 7 1%
T o ta l 9 9 4  100% 1254  100%  1371 100% 1417 1 0 0 %  109 3  10 0 % 8 1 4 100% 71 9 100% 146 9  100% 1861 100% 96 4 100%
Further, MCs’ subsidiaries geographical location is also investigated. The approximate 
distribution of the sampled countries MCs’ subsidiaries are presented in Panel C. It shows that 
the geographic location of subsidiaries of the sampled countries MCs are not distributed evenly 
across continents around the world.
Panel C -  MCs’ Distribution across Continents
S a m p le d  C o u n t r i e s  M C s ’ D i s t r i b u t i o n  a c r o s s  C o n t i n e n t s
N o rth  A m e r ica | S o u th  A m e r ica | P a c if ic  R eg io n E u r o p e | A sia A fr ic a
A u s t r a l i a 1 5 % 6 % 3 0 % 1 0 % 3 5 % 1 2 %
U .S . 1 0 % 6 % 8 % 2 5 % 4 6 % 5 %
J a p a n 2 5 % 3 % 2 0 % 4 0 % 1 2 % 0 %
U .K . 3 2 % 1 4 % 6 % 3 0 % 1 4 % 4 %
M a la y s i a 2 7 % 6 % 2 2 % 3 2 % 1 4 % 2 %
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The distributions of Australian MCs subsidiaries locations are different from Malaysia. It 
shows that the Australian MCs subsidiaries’ locations are heavily concentrated in Pacific region 
and Asia while most of the Malaysian MCs are located in Europe, North America and Pacific 
Region. Also, a high proportion of the countries in Pacific region and Asia are less developed 
nations and countries in Europe, North America are more developed. It is also visible that 
Malaysian MCs subsidiaries are located in more developed nations while Australian MCs are 
distributed in between developed and developing nations around the world. Finally, U.S. MCs 
are predominantly concentrated in Asia and Europe while Japanese MCs more crowded in 
Europe and Asia.
Given the distribution of the sampled countries MCs’ subsidiaries have no strong uniformity, 
the variation in the results will be driven by the MCs’ parent country as well as subsidiaries 
clustering effect in certain continents.
2.4 Measurement of Firm-specific Variables
This study employs several accounting proxies that are used to implement the hypothesis 
outlined in Chapter 3. All of these variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile to avoid 
the influence of extreme observations. Most of the variables are expressed as ratios. The details 
of the proxy measurements are as follows:
2.4.1 Long-term Debt
The dependent variable leverage is defined as the ratio of the book value of long-term debt to 
the book value of long-term debt and market value of equity (Burgman, 1996; Chkir & Cosset, 
2001 ).5
5 Equity is defined as market value o f equity (number o f common shares outstanding multiplied by the year end 
closing price). Book value of debt is defined as the debt written in the financial report. Many studies have used 
value o f debt in measuring leverage (Friend & Lang, 1988; Titman & Wessels, 1988). Bowman (1980) argues that 
even if the market value o f debt is a more accurate measure o f leverage, the use of book value of debt is not expected 
to distort the leverage ratio.
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( 1)Leverage (LTD _ MV:,) =
(Long-term Debtn)
(Long-term Debtn + Market Value o f Equity n)
Alternative measures of debt ratios are also considered. Following Ferri and Jones (1975), 
Michaelas, Chittenden and Potziouris (1999) and Remmers et al. (1975) the following 
measurements are used:
Long-Term debt (LTD_BVit) =
Long -  term Debtu 
Total Assetsn (2)
Total Debt (TOT LTD_BVi:)
(Long term debt + total short term debt)u 
Total Assetsn
(3)
Short term debt (STD_BVn)
(Total short term debt)u 
Total Assets(, (4)
Note that the first two alternative measurements are used in multivariate testing to capture the 
sensitivity of results due to different measurements, while short-term debt is used in univariate 
testing. Also, short-term debt is constructed such that it does not include accounts payable and 
accrued expenses, which may fluctuate seasonably and may not represent ongoing sources of 
short-term financing (Doukas & Pantzalis, 2003).
2.4.2 Dividend Payout
The dependent variable of dividend payout ratios is measured mainly in two different ways. 
The first method is calculated on the basis of cash dividend payments and the second method is 
applied to capture the impact of total dividend payments which is comprised of cash and share 
repurchase activity. Share repurchase is measured as change in treasury stocks. The 
measurements are taken mainly after Grullon and Michaely (2002). Also, Fama and French 
(2001) and Booth et al., (2001) also employed similar measurements:
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Cash Dividend Payments (DIVCjt)  =
Cash Dividend 
Net Earnings n
(5)
Total Dividend Payments (DIVRU) =
Cash DividendIt + Share repurchaseit 
Net Earningsu
(6)
An alternative measurement of dividend payout is also employed in the sensitivity chapter 
which is often used in dividend research:
Cash Dividend Payments (DIVCTAIl) =
Cash Dividendit 
Total Assetu
(7)
2.4.3 Agency Cost
A common measure of agency cost is calculated using research and development plus 
advertising expense scaled by sales (Myers, 1977). Due to a lack of advertising expense data 
and research and development data being available, this thesis instead used the direct agency 
proxy suggested by Alii, Khan and Ramirez (1993) where agency cost is calculated by 
dispersion of shareholders:
Number o f  Shareholders,,
Agency Cost (AGC,,)=  ---------------------------------^  (8)
Total Outstanding Sharesu
2.4.4 Free Cash Flow
The measure of FCF used is that defined by Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and standardised by total 
asset.
r. . .  , „  , EBITU + DEP,, + AMO, , - TAX , - DIV„ - INTFree Cash Flows (FCF ) = ---------------------
Total Asset,
(9)
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Where:
EBIT = earnings before interest and tax and abnormal return
DEP = depreciation expense
AMO -  amortization reported separately
TAX = total tax paid
DIV = total dividends paid on ordinary and preference shares 
INT = net interest expense
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) argue that their cash flow measure captures post-tax cash flow that is 
not distributed to claimants.
2.4.5 Growth
The firm’s growth is calculated as the ratio of market value of equity to book value of assets. 
This proxy has recently been used by Grinstein and Michaely (2005):
Growth (GROW _M Bi t)
Market Value o f Equity,, 
Total Assets.,
( 10)
The firm’s growth is also calculated as the annual percentage change in total assets for last three
years (Jensen, Solberg & Zorn, 1992 & Mehran, 1992). The growth in assets is a direct measure
of current investment and, if investment is persistent, it is also a proxy for expected investment 
(Fama & French, 2002).
Growth (GROW _PTU)
ATotal Assets,, 
Total Assets. t
(Total Assetsl , -  Total Assets\ ) 
Assets(,
( 1 1 )
2.4.6 Non-debt Tax Shields
Following Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), Barton, Hill and 
Sundaram (1989) depreciation charges are used to indicate non-debt tax shields scaled with total 
assets:
29
Total Annual Depreciation Expense, ,
Non — debt Tax Shields (NDTS, ,) =
Total Assets,
( 12)
2.4.7 Profitability
The profitability variable is used to capture past profitability of a firm. The past profitability 
measure is motivated by the firm’s pecking order preferences for raising capital (Myers, 1984). 
There are numerous methods available to measure profitability. The variable chosen for this 
study follows Doukas and Pantzalis (2003)6:
Profitability (PROFlt) = I
s=t- 3
Net Income 
Total Sales
3 (13)
2.4.8 Size
Most studies suggest that firm size is one important factor which affects a firm’s debt policy 
(Scott & Martin, 1975; Ferri & Jones, 1979; Agrawal & Nagarajan, 1990). Total assets are 
considered to be a better proxy for this size effect. The size measure used in this study is as 
follows:7
SIZE,, = Ln(Total Assets, t) (14)
2.4.9 Collateral Value of Assets
This study uses the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (Chittenden, Hall & Hutchinson, 1996; 
Friend & Lang, 1988):
Collateral Value o f Assets (CVA,t)=
Fixed Assets,, 
Total Assets.,
(15)
6 The use o f earnings before interest and taxes prevents the mode o f financing from affecting the firms’ profitability. 
The measure of profitability is a lagged variable because it is past profitability that should be the determinant of the 
current capital structure o f the firm (Titman & Wessels, 1988).
7 Other proxies for size variable include total revenue and market capitalisation (Tosi et al., 2000). These will be 
used in the sensitivity analysis.
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2.4.10 Business Risk
The proxy for business risk is calculated after Bishop et al. (2004):
BETA — De -  geared equity beta = 7 -------—------- 7  (16)
L , g,,q-o
> A /
Where, ßL = OLS regression on previous 52 weeks of returns with the market: 
Rl w = a  + ßj (Rm w) + £j w and R, w =ln(Plw/Piw.i). Where Piw is the stock price at week w. The
market index (Rm,w) used was according to the different stocks total index (e.g. Australia: All 
Ordinaries Index, US: Dow Jones U.S. total market, JP: Nikkei all stock, U.K.: FTSE all shares 
index, and Malaysia: KLSE Composite index).
Dl t = book value of total debt at end of year /;
Ejj = market capitalization of ordinary equity at end of year t\ and 
tc = corporate tax rate.
2.4.11 Stock Return
We use the capital asset pricing model to proxy for stock return and this method is used in 
Black and Scholes (1974):
Stock Return (SRn ) = E(RI) = Rf + ß i[E(Rm)~ R f ]
Where, E(RI) is the expected return of stock i, R f is the risk free rate, ß ; is the firm-specific 
risk, E(Rm ) is the expected return on market. (17)
2.4.12 Bankruptcy Costs or Cash Flow Variability
To calculate bankruptcy costs, several researchers, including Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), 
Chaplinsky (1984) and Lee and Kwok (1988) have used the standard deviation of the first 
difference in earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) for five years scaled by the mean value 
of the firm's total assets, and we use similar measurement for this study with a slight 
modification of scaling by interest expense. The modification is necessary since dividing by
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total assets for too many variables might introduce contemporaneous correlation with other 
variables. This measure is also known as cash flow variability (CFV, ,).
Bankruptcy Costs(BPTCYi ,) 
or Cash Flow Variability (CFVU ) =
Standard Deviation o f  First Difference in EBITi , 
Interest Expenses\ t
(18)
To examine the robustness of the results to the volatility measure utilized, Z-score (Altman, 
1968) is used to capture bankruptcy cost for sensitivity. It combines several financial ratios to 
provide a single measure of overall financial performance in terms of its stability so that in the 
near future the firm will not face any financial distress such as bankruptcy costs. Z-score is 
calculated as follows:
1.2
C u r r e n i  A s s e  i 
C u r r e n t  L i a b i l i t i e s + 1 .4 R e t a i n e d  E a r n i n g s
+  0. 6  *
T o t a l  A s s e t
M a r k e t  Va l u e  o f  E q u i t y  
B o o k  Va l ue  o f  T o t a l  L i a b i l i t y
T o t a l  A s s e t  
S a l e s
+ 3 .3 E B I T
T o t a l  A s s e t
+
T o t a l  A s s e t
(19)
2.4.13 Age
The variable for firms’ age is measured following Michaelas, Chittenden and Poutziouris (1999) 
amongst others.
AGEit = In (age of firm i, in years from date o f incorporation). (20)
2.4.14 Average Tax Rate
ATR is firm i’s effective corporate tax rate, measured as the proportion of tax paid to pre-tax 
income (Twite, 2001):
Tax paidu
ATRi.t Pre - tax income(t
(21)
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2.4.15 Financial Slack
The proxy for financial slack is calculated after Ali, Khan and Ramirez (1993):
SL A C K  C ash +  M arketable securitiesIt 
M arket value o f  equ ity n
2.4.16 Tax Clientele
The proxy tax clientele is calculated after Ali, Khan and Ramirez (1993):
T A X C L I L , ,
Number o f  common shares outstanding^ by institutional shareholders 
Number o f  total shares outstanding lt
(23)
2.5 Measurement of International Environmental 
Variables
2.5.1 Diversification
Empirical measures of the multinationality require a precise specification of the extent of the 
MCs’ transnational network to measure the degree of multinationality. We address this 
omission by defining multinationality after Allen and Pantzalis (1996) by considering the 
‘breadth’ (number of foreign countries in which the MC has operations). Previous studies have 
applied a number of different measurements for this construct. The most commonly used 
measures are the ratio of foreign sales to total sales (Grant, 1987; Tallman and Li, 1996), the 
ratio of foreign assets to total assets (Daniels & Bracker, 1989; Ramaswamy, Galen & William, 
1996), and the number of countries in which a firm has subsidiaries (Tallman & Li, 1996). 
Each of these functional measurements has its own merits and captures different facets of 
foreign involvement. Following Tallman and Li (1996) and Doukas and Pantzalis (2003), this 
thesis measures diversification by the number of subsidiaries operating overseas. However, one 
important issue involved with this measurement is that a firm could have a high degree of
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international involvement, and yet all of its foreign investment could be in a single high-risk 
country. Such a firm would actually be expected to have more and not less business risk due to 
its international activities. Further, the number of foreign countries in which a firm has 
subsidiaries captures the dispersion element encompassing locational costs and benefits of 
capital structure decisions. It could be argued that the magnitude of geographical dispersion 
involves a variety of elements and could be viewed as a multidimensional construct (Sullivan, 
1994), which meets the aim of this analysis.
DIVER\ t = ln(Total numbers o f local and overseas subsidiaries) (24)
2.5.2 Foreign Exchange Risk
Exchange rate movements affect both the cash flows of a firm’s operations and the discount rate 
employed to value these cash flows (Bartov, Bodnar & Kauf 1996).8 Foreign production and 
sales are two important determinants of the exchange rate exposure for any MC, because 
exchange rate fluctuations directly impact on the revenues and production costs of the firm 
through these two channels. This study measures the concentrations of foreign subsidiaries in 
foreign countries through foreign sales. This study proxys foreign exchange risk as follows 
(Wright, Madura & Wiant, 2002):
Foreign Exchange Risk (FXit) =
Total Foreign Sales,, 
Total Salest ,
(25)
2.5.3 Political Risk
This thesis constructs political risk (PR) quite differently than Burgman (1996). His political 
risk measurement is based on the ratio of the number of low political risk countries to the total 
number of countries in which a firm operates. However, this measurement suffers from some
8 Bartov, Madura and Wiant (1996) show that there is an increase in the variability o f equity returns following the 
period of increased exchange-rate variability. The results suggest that the increase in exchange-rate fluctuations is an 
indication of an increase in the riskiness o f the MCs’ cash flows.
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drawbacks.9 Therefore this study follows a different approach. The measurement is explained 
with notational signs as follows:
Let C be the sample of companies and R be the set of different countries from which the 
companies in the sample operate. Let Ic,r be the revenue of company c coming from a particular 
country, r. The sum of revenues for company c from different countries is Sigma Ic,i. Pc,r is 
the proportion of revenue from a particular country relative to the total revenue of company c. 
Notationally this is as follows:
I i C ,1
(26)
For each country in which a company operates, a political risk rating is obtained from the 
Handbook of Country and Political Risk Analysis (Llewellyn, 2001). This is denoted as 
lambda. The political risk rating is then multiplied by the proportion of revenue from that 
particular country relative to the total revenue of the company. This provides a measure of the 
political risk faced by an MC. Notationally this is as follows:
ieR
In addition, about 10% of the MCs’ sample across five countries were filtered into five groups 
after the five continents, namely, Asia, North America, South America, Europe and Africa. It 
was important to segregate them in this manner because few companies’ segmental information 
was based on continent even though in the footnotes the companies mention the country’s name 
but do not provide revenues accordingly. A filtering process was followed to segregate the 
companies into five groups and then each of those segmental revenues was value-weighted 
against total consolidated revenues. Then the weighted average rating was exposed to the 
proportion of foreign revenues.
9 The use o f this measure has three disadvantages. Firstly, the choice of the top 20 countries is somewhat arbitrary. 
Secondly, this measure does not account for the relative involvement of the firm in each foreign country. Thirdly, 
Euromoney does not really provide political risk ratings. Indeed, this magazine establishes country creditworthiness 
ratings which include three broad categories o f factors: analytical indicators (40%) made up of economic risk (10%), 
political risk (15%) and economic indicators (15%); credit indicators (20%) and market indicators (40%). Thus 
political risk directly accounts for 15% of the score assigned to each country.
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2.6 M easurem ent  of Macro  Variables
2.6.1 Country
Zero-one dummy variables identifying the home country of a firm are used for corporations 
from Japan, U.K., U.S., Australia and Malaysia.
Country Dummy (COUNTRY' ,) = 0 or 1 (27)
2.6.2 Industry
To control for industry-specific effects on firms’ capital structure choice, a zero-one dummy is 
employed to separate 10 industries in our analysis. To be consistent in industry effect on capital 
structure across countries, the Dow Jones Global Indexes (DJGI) industry classification is used 
to separate ten industry groups. The DJGI classification is consistent and provides enough 
observations across sample countries for DCs and MCs. Also, the DJGI classification contains 
10 main types of industry which makes the analysis easier, since having too many categories of 
industry classification distorts the adequate sample size within each industry subgroup.
Industry Dummy (INDit) = 1 i f  the firm  falls within a specific industry, otherwise 0
(28)
2.6.3 Taxation System
Zero-one dummy variables identifying the home country of a firm taxation (e.g. imputation vs. 
classical) policy are used for corporations from Japan, U.K., U.S., Australia and Malaysia.
Taxation System (Imputation Tax,,) — 1 if the firm operates within imputation tax regime,
otherwise 0. (29)
2.6.4 Legal System
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Zero-one dummy variables identifying the home country of a firm’s legal regimes (e.g. 
imputation vs. classical) policy are used for corporations from Japan, U.K., U.S., Australia and 
Malaysia.
Legal System (CommonLaw) -  1 if the firm operates within common law legal regime,
otherwise 0. (29)
2.6.5 Time
Zero-one dummy variables identify the individual year effect on firms (DCs and MCs) from 
1995 to 2004 across Japan, U.K., U.S., Australia and Malaysia.
Time (Yr) -  1 if the firm operates in a certain year, otherwise 0. (30)
2.7 Sam ple  Characteristics
Before examining the determinants of capital structure and dividends for DCs and MCs through 
regression analysis, it is worthwhile to investigate the presence of multicollinearity among 
independent variables.
2.7.1 Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics relating to the dependent variables and explanatory variables across four 
essays are presented in Table 2.4. Table 2.4 shows basic sample summary statistics. It shows 
that, on average, the long-term market value of debt for the DCs range between 0.06 (U.K.) to 
0.47 (U.S.) with a standard deviation of 0.18 and 0.36 respectively. Similarly, the average long­
term market debt ratio of MCs across countries ranges between 0.07 (Australia) to 0.34 (U.S.) 
with a standard deviation of 0.18 and 0.33 respectively. More generally, the MCs in Australia, 
U.K. and Malaysia tend to have higher leverage ratios than their DCs counterparts across 
developed and semi-developed countries, especially in the chosen sample countries. This result 
is consistent regardless of long-term debt measurements across countries. However, while the
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magnitude of average short-term debt ratios varies across countries, it shows that the magnitude 
stays similar across DCs and MCs.
The average ratios of dividend-related variables, for example cash dividends (both scaled by net 
profit and total asset) and share repurchase type of dividends payments, show a similar pattern 
to debt as far as difference goes between DCs’ and MCs’ dividend behaviour which has been 
discussed earlier. However, interestingly, the results show that the lowest dividend paying 
country is Malaysia (both DCs and MCs) relative to the other four sample countries, and the rest 
of the sample countries’ DCs and MCs dividend paying ratios are within the range of 30-35% 
with an exception of Australian MCs which appear to pay the highest dividend relative to the 
other four countries’ MCs (0.43 vs 0.28, 0.29, 0.37, 0.18 across U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia 
respectively) in the sample.
On average, U.S. MCs are relatively more diversified across the sampled countries as the mean 
subsidiaries within the U.K. MCs sample have 21 subsidiaries.10 Not surprisingly, the U.K.’s 
MCs are more exposed to foreign exchange risk (0.38) and U.S. MCs are in second order rank 
in terms of geographical dispersion and foreign exposure through foreign sales. Interestingly, 
although U.S. and Australian DCs are more diversified than the other three sample countries, on 
average U.K. DCs are more concentrated in foreign markets through foreign sales (0.17).
On average the Australian, U.S., Japan and U.K. MCs have similar political risk (PR) exposure 
as opposed to Malaysia (83.68, 81.45, 81.64, 83.71 vs. 74.01), implying that Malaysian MCs are 
more prone to political risk than the developed countries’ MCs.
The average cash flow variation proxy that stands for bankruptcy risk appears to be similar for 
DCs and MCs across countries (e.g. both range 0.02 to 0.03) while the beta proxied for firm- 
specific risks seem strong in U.S. MCs and DCs relative to the other four sample countries (0.37
10 Since the diversification is measured as the natural logarithm o f total subsidiaries, it is an easier interpretation by 
taking antilog (exponential o f 3.03) to report the actual average number of subsidiaries.
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and 0.29) as opposed to the MCs and DCs of Australia (0.06 and 0.08), Japan (0.14 and 0.19), 
U.K. (0.08 and 0.14) and Malaysia (0.07 and 0.08). This indicates that firms that originated in 
U.S. are riskier than the firms in the other four sample countries.
The firm-specific risk {BETA) shows that MCs in all sample countries have higher risks than 
DCs, suggesting MCs in any countries are inherently riskier than DCs. The highest firm- 
specific risk is observed in U.S. MCs (0.77) while the lowest firm-specific risk-bearing country 
is Australian MCs and this is because the MCs are usually mining companies which inherently 
are riskier than any other firms across industries.
Altman’s Z-score in Japanese DCs is slightly less than in MCs (4.57 vs. 5.48). However, the 
rest of the sample countries show the opposite with the MCs’ Altman’s Z-scores being slightly 
larger than that of the DCs. U.K. exhibits almost identical average tax ratio (ATR) for both MCs 
and DCs (0.39 vs. 0.39). Noticeably, Australian, Japanese and Malaysian DCs pay higher 
average tax than the MCs counterparts. On average, non-debt tax shields (NDTS) seems to 
produce a relatively similar impact on both MCs and DCs across countries regardless of 
taxation policy (e.g. classical tax system vs. imputation tax system). Meanwhile, the tax 
clientele variable shows that on average the Japanese and U.S. firms have higher ratio of tax 
clientele-based investors relative to other sample countries; however, MCs in U.S. have more 
tax clientele based investors relative to U.S. DCs (0.48 vs. 0.31) and for Japanese firms the 
opposite holds (0.65 for DCs and 0.38 for MCs).
On average, MCs across Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia are more profitable {PROF) 
than DCs (0.02, 0.02, 0.02, 0.03 and 0.03 vs. 0.01, 0.02, 0.01, 0.02, 0.01 respectively). 
Similarly, agency cost of debt is higher for MCs than DCs across all sample countries.
On average the free cash flow {FCF) for DCs varies from 2.010 (Malaysia) to 8.493 (US). 
Further, U.S. MCs hold the highest FCF as indicated by the maximum value of FCF 12.881. 
On average, Malaysian MCs have a relatively volatile growth rate which is indicated by the
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Standard deviation of 0.370. The two measures of growth variables indicate a mix of results 
across DCs and MCs.
It is quite interesting to find that Japanese DCs are larger in size (measured as natural logarithm 
of total assets {SIZE)) compared to Japanese MCs (9.99 vs. 9.65) while the other four countries’ 
MCs are larger than DCs. Similar results hold when size is measures as natural logarithm of 
total revenues. The collateral value of asset (CVA) also show that MCs are the firms which hold 
larger fixed assets to total assets compared to DCs across all sample countries except Japan and 
U.K.. Finally, the age of the firms show that MCs are much more mature in age {AGE) than 
DCs.
In summary, most countries’ debt level and dividend payout ratios determinants across DCs and 
MCs have quite dissimilar average ratios.
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2.8 Robustness of Data
2.8.1 Detection of Multicollinearity
The first step in multivariate analysis is studying the correlations among the variables. 
Correlations among the variables are used as proxies for the determinants of debt ratios and 
dividend payout ratios. Appendix 1 presents the Pearson’s correlation coefficients along with 
their significance level among the various measurements of dependent and independent 
variables that will be employed in the subsequent four chapters. Inspection of the correlation 
matrix presented in Appendix 1 reveals nothing that leads us to be concerned about 
multicollinearity between variables included in the subsequent chapters.
2.8.2 Detection of Outliers
Each of the above defined variables has been plotted against time and outlier, and influential 
observations were detected. Each variable was ranked low to high and a 3 times stronger (e.g. 
Frank and Goyal (2004) only winsorise 0.50% from each tail which as a rule of thumb appears 
poor winsorising procedure) winsorising process is applied in both tails of distribution. This 
serves to replace outliers and the most extremely misreported data.
2.9 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has featured the data collection, proxy measurement and variable construction 
procedures. This included discussion of the sampling period, sample selection and filtering 
process and recognition of all the data sources. The chapter concluded with a brief summary of 
sample characteristics for all the possible proxies. The following chapter will explain the 
literature review, developed hypothesis, and methodology used to analyse the data for capital 
structure and dividend payout ratios across five sample countries.
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THE DYNAMICS OF AUSTRALIAN MCs 
& DCS CAPITAL STRUCTURE
- 3-
3.1 Introduction
Corporate capital structure remains a controversial issue in modem corporate finance. Since the 
seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958), a plethora of research has been undertaken in an 
attempt to identity the determinants of capital structure without controlling for MCs. 
Considerably less research has been undertaken to identify the determinants of capital structure 
for MCs. Lee and Kwok (1988), Burgman (1996), Chen et al. (1997) and Homaifar, Zietz and 
Benkato (1998) are the few major studies that have investigated cross-sectional differences in 
capital structure between U.S.-based MCs and DCs. The major published studies on capital 
structure for Australian firms (not controlling for multinationality) include Allen (1991), 
Chiarella et al. (1992), Pham and Chan (1993), Gatward and Sharpe (1996), Twite (2001) and 
Cassar and Holmes (2003). Akhtar (2005) is the only study that considers Australian MCs. 
However, this chapter improves on Akhtar (2005) both in data and methodology which is 
discussed later.
MCs control substantial amounts of wealth and if capital structure is relevant to firm value then 
understanding the determinants of capital structure and the dynamics of financial structure 
decisions are economically important for MCs. Australian MCs play an important role in the 
Australian economy, both in their own right and an important avenue for the further 
internalisation of the Australian economy. Barriers against international trade are falling and 
corporations are competing at home and abroad. In Australia, internalisation of firms is 
accentuated by the introduction of deregulation and elimination of cross-border restrictions. As 
a result, multinational firms are increasing (World Investment Report, 2005).
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The dynamics of capital structure can be explained through observing the speed of rebalancing 
DCs’ and MCs’ capital structure from year to year. While financial economists have devoted 
considerable attention to empirically testing alternative theories of capital structure, relatively 
little research has focused on explaining the dynamics of a firm’s capital structure in the 
presence of transactions costs. Indeed in most empirical studies it is assumed that the firm’s 
capital structure, when averaged over a three to five year period, is its desired or optimal capital 
structure. This averaging procedure is not only ad hoc and subject to measurement error, but it 
has the further disadvantage of precluding any study of the capital structure adjustment process 
over time. This omission is surprising in light of Myers’s (1984) conjecture that Targe 
adjustment costs’ could possibly explain the wide variation debt in ratios, since firms would be 
forced into long excursions away from their initial debt ratios.
The limited number of empirical studies which have considered capital structure dynamics may 
be classified into two groups depending on whether they utilize cross-sectional or time-series 
data. Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) use cross-sectional data in testing their model of the 
optimal dynamic recapitalization policy of a firm with exogenous investment decisions and in 
the presence of transaction costs. The second group of studies of capital structure dynamics 
utilises pooled time series and cross-sectional data (Taggart 1977; Marcus 1983; Jalilavand & 
Harris 1984). In the presence of adjustment costs (costs that associated in rebalance the 
leverage level to an optimal level from year to year), firms are assumed to gradually adjust their 
debt ratio at a constant rate so as to eliminate deviations between their optimal and actual debt 
ratio. Although Akhtar (2005) is the first author to control for multinationality in capital 
structure determinants using Australian data but the results suffer from not addressing the issue 
of dynamic settings of debt ratio across those two types of firms.
This chapter examines the dynamic settings of the Australian DCs’ and MCs’ debt ratios over 
time. While existing studies have produced a great deal of evidence on the associations between 
capital structure determinants, they have provided little evidence on the dynamics of leverage
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across MCs and DCs.12 This chapter adds to Akhtar (2005) to the extent of including additional 
economic factors which have been recently found to be the most influential determinants (Frank 
& Goyal, 2003) of capital structure choice. Further, this chapter also incorporates additional 
international factors including the non-linearity effect of the depth and breadth of 
multinationality in addition to Akhtar (2005) to fully investigate the capital structure puzzle. 
The motivation for examining leverage dynamics in this study is fourfold. First, it directly 
addresses the determinants of Australian DCs and MCs by using different definitions of debt 
ratios, so that our results are not bias to certain measurement proxy of leverage ratios. 
Secondly, it examines the MCs’ extent of foreign involvement through non-linear relationship. 
Thirdly, it provides insight into the differences in capital structure determinants across DCs and 
MCs. Fourthly, the speed of adjustment is tested within the DCs and MCs framework using 
Lintner’s (19956) model. Finally, the impact of industry effect and time effect on the dynamics 
of capital structure for DCs and MCs is observed. The framework presented here is motivated 
by theoretical studies of leverage.
The results suggest that - after controlling for multinational effects, foreign exchange risk, firm- 
specific risks, average tax rate, size, age, cash dividend payments, free cash flow and growth 
variables are the important determinants for long-term debt across DCs and MCs regardless of 
what the definition of long-term debt ratios is. In explaining short-term debt, the significant 
determinants are bankruptcy risks, firm-specific risks, age and free cash flows. The impact of 
increasing Australian firms’ global association through foreign sales (depth) and number of 
subsidiaries (breadth) show no significant optimal relationship with debt ratios. In relation to 
interaction effects that explain the differences between DCs’ and MCs’ debt ratios, the 
significant interaction factors are diversification and age for long-term debt ratios, and 
diversification, bankruptcy risks and growth for short-term debt. The additional financial 
factors -  credit risks, economic risks and financial risks - have no significant impact on capital
Bowman (1980), Castanias (1983), Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Kim and Sorensen (1986), Friend and Lang 
(1988), Titman and Wesssels (1988), Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989, Mackie-Mason (1990), Jensen, Solberg 
and Zorn (1992), Mehran (1992), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Graham (1996a) and Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997).
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structure irrespective of what definition is used; however, inclusion of these variables improves 
the explanatory power of the model. Industry effects are considered and result show that the 
significance of the original determinants remains unchanged, and some industries became 
significant. Finally, leverage ratios varied significantly over the sample period and this 
variation is explained by the positive partial speed of adjustment, indicating the existence 
benefit outweighing the costs associated with trade-off theory of capital structure in adjusting 
the capital structure towards its target level from year to year. Further, this positive adjustment 
benefit is significantly higher for MCs relative to the DCs. This indicates that Australian MCs 
rebalance their target level faster than DCs.
The chapter is divided into six sections. To contextualise the study, the Australian capital 
market is described briefly in section 3.2. The next section reviews previous studies of capital 
structure literature and identifies the determinants of capital structure. The fourth section 
provides a brief discussion of data collection and detailed description of methodology used to 
investigate the capital structure determinants for Australian DCs and MCs. Section five 
discusses results and section six summarises the key findings and concludes the chapter.
3.2 Australian Capital Market in Brief
ASX has grown to be an important medium for public trading of equity and debt instruments for 
over 1750 listed firms with the market capitalization of US$1030 (A$ 1330) billion at the end of 
2004. This is nearly three times more than ten years ago and more than Australia’s national 
gross domestic product (GDP -  US$611.7 (A$785.24)) billion (World Investment Report, 
2005). While companies in Australia rely heavily on private debt, including bank and non­
bank loans and leasing, this is not the case for public debt (Foster, 1996). In fact, when raising 
funds, a majority of funds are raised in Australia through equity securities.
The introduction in 1987 of a dividend imputation tax system in Australia represented a 
significant change to the tax framework. To the extent that tax incentives influence the use of 
debt financing, changes in tax laws which alter these incentives will lead to changes in corporate
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capital structures. Twite (2001) argues that the Australian imputation tax system provides an 
incentive for firms to: (i) reduce the level of debt financing utilised where this incentive varies 
across firms depending on the firm’s effective corporate tax rate, and (ii) increase the level of 
external equity financing. Most prior studies have examined capital structure choice around 
changes in tax rates, which either increase (or decrease) the relative favourability of debt 
financing. The consequence of dividend imputation is to reduce the preference for debt in the 
financing of Australian operations.
In summary, a tax system which allows interest expenses as deductions may, depending on the 
relationship between corporate and personal taxes, still induce a tax preference. Therefore, the 
gain from leverage will be dependent on the extent to which the Australian imputation systems 
are fully integrated. Under a fully integrated dividend imputation system, corporate tax is 
effectively zero; although corporate tax is incurred, it is offset against personal tax liabilities.
3.3 Theory of Multinational Capital Structure
Intuitively, there are two competing theories that affect the MCs’ capital structure determinants. 
On the one hand, one could argue that diversifying geographically its activities may reduce the 
overall business risk of the firm, the volatility of its cash flows and therefore the associated 
bankruptcy costs. Further, one could also argue that, for large multinational firms, it may be 
relatively more complex to monitor and control local managers in their subsidiaries, which 
could waste the local free cash flows in valueless activities (Jensen, 1986). Further work in this 
area has led to the agency cost and trade-off models which is arguably the most prominent 
capital structure models (Megginson, 1997). The trade-off model is explained on the idea that 
firms choose their optimal mix of debt and equity financing by trading-off the increasing agency 
costs of debt and equity with tax benefits of debt. As firm leverage increases, debt-holder risk 
increases as shareholders and managers maintain control of firm investments. Therefore, debt 
holders are forced to monitor shareholders, and their agents (the managers), as the potential for 
wealth expropriation increases with increases in debt.
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As leverage increases, the debt tax shield and the expected bankruptcy costs increase and 
agency costs decrease (Doukas & Pantzalis, 2003). The literature on capital structure in the 
multinational firm concentrates primarily on whether tax shield, expected bankruptcy and 
agency costs differ between MCs and DCs (Reeb, Kwok & Baek, 1998).
3.3.1 The Impact of Differential Risk Levels on Capital Structure
Different risk level may affect capital structure via a number of channels. Shapiro (1978) 
argues that international diversification leads to a lower volatility of earnings as MCs have cash 
flows imperfectly corrected markets. He posits that international diversification reduces 
bankruptcy risk and enables the MCs to utilise more leverage in their capital structure. The 
underlying notion of this literature is that expected bankruptcy costs is a function of the 
probability and the cost of bankruptcy. The diversification arguments suggest that MCs will 
have a lower probability of bankruptcy costs due to greater usage of debt to gain greater tax 
advantages through multiple tax regimes operations.
The exchange risk and political risk arguments suggest, holding all else constant, that MCs will 
have a greater probability of a wealth loss and financial distress. The implication is that 
political/exchange rate risk would lead MCs to use less debt in their capital structure.
Kwok and Reeb (1998) develop another argument for changes in firm risk with 
internationalization (expanding internationally). Essentially, they argue that when firms in 
developed economies expand into less developed markets this increases the risk of the firm. In 
contrast, when developing economy-based firms expand into more developed markets, this 
leads to a decrease in firm risk. Kwok and Reeb (1998) suggest that exchange rate risk and 
political risk are less important than the impact of market risks. In a general sense, their 
arguments can be viewed as an extension of the diversification theory. The diversification 
argument suggests that different markets have imperfectly correlated returns. Kwok and Reeb 
(1998) extend this argument and hypothesise that these differing levels of risk and return in
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different markets lead to differing impacts on MCs risk with internationalisation, which is based 
on the relative risk of investments in the MCs’ home country and the target country.
The above discussion is essentially concerned with expected bankruptcy cost and depending 
upon the arguments put forward three outcomes on the impact of capital structure are predicted. 
The diversification theory predicts that MCs will be able to use greater levels of debt due to a 
reduction in risk from imperfectly correlated international returns. The cross-border theory 
predicts that firm internationalisation will lead to increased firm risk and a reduction in debt 
usage. The upstream/downstream effect of Kwok and Reeb (1998) predicts that firm changes in 
risk with internationalization are a function of the relative risk of the MCs’ host and target 
countries. Consequently, the optimal capital structure, with internationalization, differs between 
developed and emerging market-based multinationals. Thus, three distinct theories predict 
completely different optimal capital structures for MCs relative to DCs.
The preceding arguments concerning the relative change in expected bankruptcy costs with 
internationalization are all based on the probability of financial distress. A very different 
approach is offered in Reeb (1998), and Armstrong and Riddick (1998). These authors argue 
that MCs will have a higher cost of financial distress relative to domestic firms due to increased 
stakeholder heterogeneity and jurisdictional differences. Their arguments are predicated on the 
idea that multinational firms have operations in multiple legal jurisdictions and that creditors in 
different countries have differential information and remedies. These jurisdictional and 
informational differences increase the costs associated with financial distress. MCs 
bankruptcies must follow local bankruptcy rules rather than the bankruptcy rules of the home 
country (Desai, Foley & Hines, 2004a). There is a remarkable void in the laws governing 
multinational bankruptcies, but respect for the laws of the country in which a firm is operating 
implies that local bankruptcy rules apply to the resolution of insolvency proceedings involving a 
MC’s subsidiary. When creditor protection is weak, borrowers capture most of the surplus from 
successful restructuring and the shortfall between promised and received payment is large. On 
the other hand, if the protection is strong, the shortfall is smaller (Noe, 2006). The MCs can
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strategically exploit conflicts of interest between home country and domestic creditors by using 
the claims of one countries creditors as a wedge to force concessions from the other country’s 
creditors. This ability to strategically choose which claims to renegotiate and which to leave 
outstanding creates valuable renegotiation options for the distressed MC when it chooses to 
borrow in more than one country. The Ceteris paribus, a higher expected cost of bankruptcy 
indicates that MCs should use less debt in their capital structure relative to DCs. This is a 
similar prediction to the cross-border theory.
In summary, the impact of multinationality on a firm’s capital structure due to differential risk 
levels is an empirical question.
3.3.2 The Impact of Differential Taxes on Capital Structure
A key attribute of the environment faced by multinational firms is multiple tax jurisdictions. 
When tax rates differ, firms with subsidiaries located in relatively low-tax countries may benefit 
vis-ä-vis firms in higher-tax locations. To the extent that both sets of firms are competitors in 
international markets, their differential tax status could provide a competitive advantage for the 
firms subject to lower taxes. This suggests that a single-country firm with all its operations in a 
low-tax location could have an advantage over a multinational with operations in both low- and 
higher tax countries (Singh & Hodder, 2000).
On the other hand, firms can use leverage in their capital structures to reduce the “tax bite” on 
corporate earnings (Singh & Hodder, 2000). To the extent that firms can effectively reduce their 
taxes via capital structure decisions, differential tax rates across locations become less 
important. However, the extensive use of leverage can also create problems when earnings are 
uncertain. In these circumstances, borrowing can increase interest tax shields; but it also 
increases costs such as the possibility of losing tax shields as well as agency costs and financial 
distress costs. This tradeoff is analogous to that for a domestic firm; however, for a 
multinational firm, the optimal capital structure can differ across subsidiaries due to differences 
in earnings uncertainty and local tax rates as well as other subsidiary- and country-specific
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characteristics. Further, the firm's capital structure can be characterised not only by the total 
amount borrowed at each subsidiary but also by the currency composition of that debt.1. 
Multinational firms can also mitigate tax differentials and influence the costs of leverage by 
shifting income and/or tax shields across subsidiaries. This could involve sale-and-lease-back 
arrangements, transfer-pricing adjustments, cross-guarantees of subsidiary debt, or a variety of 
other mechanisms. Although shifting income and tax shields can be costly, the benefits for the 
firm may outweigh the costs. Thus, MCs’ capital structure decisions within an environment 
characterized by: uncertainty regarding both earnings and exchange rates, taxes which differ 
across countries, and varying degrees of flexibility for firms to shift income and/or tax shields 
across subsidiaries.
Senbet (1979) derives a capital structure model suggesting that international tax differentials 
play an important role in the MCs’ capital structure decision. Shapiro (1978) posits that MCs 
will tend to use greater debt. These tax arguments suggest that the optimal capital structure for 
the MCs, holding all else constant, will involve greater usage of leverage as the MCs get higher 
tax benefit of debt (Rhee, Chang & Koveos, 1985; Madura & Fosberg, 1990; John, Senbet & 
Sundaram, 1991; Liu & Hsueh, 1993).
MCs’ subsidiaries are generally financed with a mixture of internal debt and equity from the 
parent corporation (Chowdhry & Coval, 1998). The choice between intra-firm or intra-firm 
equity financing for the subsidiary is, to a large extent, influenced by rules on corporate taxation 
in the parent country, it pays to transfer as much funds as possible in the form of interest 
payments to the parent, since these are tax-deductible in the subsidiary country. Thus, income 
generated by the subsidiary gets taxed at the parent rate -  the smaller of the two rates. This 
suggests that the subsidiaries should be financed entirely by intra-firm parent debt. Also, the 
financing of foreign affiliates is likely to be influenced by the effect of local tax rates and capital 
market conditions on the after-tax cost of funds and by the ability of affiliates to obtain
13
The currency composition choice can be viewed as a hedging decision since foreign currency borrowing is 
equivalent to borrowing in the firm's domestic currency plus hedging via a forward contract (or swap) so that the net 
obligation from the two transactions is effectively denominated in the foreign currency.
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resources from parent companies. As a result, affiliate financing illuminates the importance of 
taxes in influencing capital structure, the impact of institutions on financing choices, and the 
workings of internal capital markets. The level and composition of leverage are influenced by 
capital market conditions. In countries with weak creditor rights and shallow capital markets, 
affiliates borrow less externally and more from parent companies. This suggests that internal 
borrowing may substitute for costly external borrowing. The external borrowing is costly in 
environments in which creditor rights are weak and capital markets are shallow and that MCs’ 
subsidiaries substitute parent for external borrowing in response to these costs. Desai, Foley 
and Hines (2004a) find that the capital structure of foreign affiliates and internal capital markets 
of multinational affiliates are financed with less external debt in countries underdeveloped 
capital markets or weak creditors rights, reflecting significantly higher local borrowing costs. 
They further states that MCs appear to employ internal capital markets opportunistically to 
overcome imperfections in external capital markets.
Further, Foley, Hartzell, Titman and Twite (2007) finds that U.S. multinational firms hold cash 
in their foreign subsidiaries because of the tax costs associated with repatriating foreign income. 
Consistent with this argument, firms that face higher repatriation tax burdens hold higher levels 
of cash, hold this cash abroad, and hold this cash in affiliates that trigger high tax costs when 
repatriating earnings. In addition, they also find certain firms, specifically those that are less 
financially constrained domestically and those that are more technology intensive, exhibit a 
higher sensitivity of affiliate cash holdings to repatriation tax burdens.
3.3.3 The Impact of Differential Agency Costs on Capital Structure
Lee and Kwok (1988) suggest that the MCs have greater agency costs relative to domestic 
firms. The agency cost theory is predicated on the idea that it is more difficult to monitor 
managers in the subsidiaries of multinational firms. Lee and Kwok (1988), Burgman (1996) and 
Reeb, Kwok, and Baek (1998) note that monitoring agents in other countries is more difficult 
due to geographical constraints, cultural differences, higher auditing costs, differing legal
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systems, and language differences. Additionally, these national differences increase the 
complexity of such standard tasks as generating multi-country financial statements, hiring 
multi-country auditors and/or multiple auditors, and completing consolidated balance and 
income statements.
The increased monitoring difficulties in the MCs impacts firm capital structure in two ways. 
The first is that it affects the agency cost due to an underinvestment problem. The second effect 
stems from an asset substitution problem. Lee and Kwok (1988) note that the MCs have greater 
real options than domestic firms and the value of these options depends upon future firm 
investments. Myers (1977) suggests that firms with greater real options have a greater potential 
for an underinvestment problem. The underinvestment problem is based on the idea that when 
debt matures after the expiration of the real option, the shareholders may reject positive net 
present value projects because the benefits from the project will accrue mainly to the debt 
holders. Recognising this potential underinvestment problem, debtholders will pay less for a 
firm’s debt. This price reduction is an agency cost and this agency cost increases with increased 
levels of debt usage. The implication is that the MCs will have less incentive to issue debt, 
relative to DCs, as agency costs will be higher due to increased monitoring difficulties.
The MCs also face potentially higher agency cost due to an increased asset substitution problem 
stemming from increased monitoring difficulties (Lee and Kwok, 1988). Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) note that equity holders have an incentive to expropriate wealth from debt holders. The 
wealth expropriation argument is based on the idea that shareholders, as the residual claimants, 
prefer high return (high risk) projects, whereas debtholders prefer lower risk projects with 
returns that are more likely to allow debt payments. Managers acting on behalf of equity 
holders have an incentive to substitute low risk assets for high risk assets. To minimise the 
asset substitution, debtholders include detailed covenants in debt contracts. MCs operations in 
multiple countries increase the difficulty or complexity of designing these contracts and increase 
the difficulty of monitoring firm investments relative to domestic operations. The implication of
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the asset substitution problem is that the MCs will have less incentive to issue debt, relative to 
DCs, as agency costs will be relatively higher.
3.4 Capital Structure and its Determinants
Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that choice of capital structure is irrelevant to firm value 
under a range of assumptions, including a perfect capital market. However, in reality, markets 
are less than perfect and consequently capital structure is relevant to firm valuation. Many 
theories explain variations in capital structure. This subsection focuses on the determinants of 
capital structure as well as definition of capital structure and the various theories put forth to 
explain empirical observations.
3.4.1 Leverage
Cross-sectional tests of capital structure theories examine if debt ratios vary across firms as 
predicted by theory. Two strands can be distinguished. The first is concerned with determining 
which factors are correlated with leverage. This literature is extensive and includes 
contributions by Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Long and Malitz (1985), Titman and Wessels 
(1988), Crutchley and Hansen (1989), Smith and Watts (1992), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and 
Frank and Goyal (2004). Harris and Raviv’s (1991) survey of these studies has also been 
influential. The second strand of this research is concerned with the impact of different 
definitions of leverage debt leverage definition and econometric issues, and includes 
contribution by Myers (1977), Baltagi (2001), Little and Rubin (2002) and Welch (2004),. Also 
included in this strand is debt level versus changes in debt analysis and includes contribution by 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Frank and Goyal (2003, 2004), Fama and French (2004) and 
Leary and Roberts (2004).
3.4.1.1 Leverage Definition
In testing which factors correlated with leverage, it is necessary to define leverage. Many 
different empirical definitions have been used. A key issue has been whether to examine book
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leverage (book value of debt divided by book value of total assets) or market leverage (market 
value of debt divided by book value of total assets). Early empirical work tended to focus on 
book leverage. Myers (1977) argued that managers focus on book leverage because debt is 
better supported by assets in place than it is by growth opportunities. Book leverage is also 
preferred because financial markets fluctuate a great deal and managers are said to believe 
market leverage numbers are unreliable as a guide to corporate financial policy (Frank and 
Goyal, 2005). Further, due to data limitations of market value of leverage, I use book value of 
leverage.
Subsequent literature has given more attention to calculation of debt ratios. While some argues 
book value of long term debt should be scaled by total assets, others argue it should be scaled by 
market value of equity figure. Further, some argues not including short-term debt in the capital 
structure do not give full picture of firms’ debt structure. Given there is no clear consensus as 
to which definition is best, we investigate both long-term and short-term debt. In particular, we 
use three different measurements of long term debt ratios14 and one measurement of short term 
debt ratios15 in my analysis to investigate the Australian firms’ capital structure determinants.
3.4.1.2 Long-term versus Short-term Leverage
Bevan and Danbolt (2002) provide the motivation for using short-term debt. Given the 
predominance of short-term debt in corporate financial structure, they suggest that analysis 
based solely upon long-term debt provide limited insight into explaining capital structure 
decision making. It is further argued by Van der Wijst and Turik (1993), Chittenden and 
Hutchinson (1996), Barclay and Smith (1999) and Hutchinson and Glick (1999) that the 
determinants of leverage based on long-term leverage may mask the significance of short-term 
debt. Further, firms are particularly sensitive to temporary economic downturns that have less
14 LEVERAGE (Long-term debt(LTD)): i) LTD_MVit is measured as book value o f long term debt divided by book 
value of total assets; ii) LTD BVl t is measured as book value o f long term debt to sum of book value of long term 
debt and market value of equity; and TOT LTD BV), is the total debt (including long term and short term) scaled by 
book value o f total assets.
15 LEVERAGE (Short-term debt): STD BVi t is defined as the book value o f short term debt scaled by book value of 
total assets.
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effect on long-term debt but more effect on short-term debt (Chan, Chen and Hsieh, 1999). 
Therefore, short-term debt takes a role in determining capital structure in this chapter.
3.4.1.3 Leverage Change and Speed of Adjustment Costs
Apart from different definition of leverage and what determines a firm’s level of leverage a 
further strand of capital structure research considers changes in leverage. Firstly, leverage can 
change due to an active decision of the firm to issue or repurchase securities. Leverage can also 
change when the firm's operational and financial circumstances change (Shyam-Sunder & 
Myers, 1999; Frank & Goyal, 2003). Fama and French (2004), Leary and Roberts (2004), and 
Frank and Goyal (2004) examine both changes in debt and changes in equity. Changes in debt 
have played an important role in assessing the pecking order theory. This is because the 
financing deficit is supposed to drive debt according to this theory. Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) examine how debt responds to short-term variation in investment and earnings. The 
theory predicts that when investments exceed earnings, debt grows, and when earnings exceed 
investments, debt falls.
Secondly, static trade-off theory predicts a target debt ratio that depends on the tax benefits of 
debt and the costs of financial distress. By relying on adjustment costs, this theory may suggest 
a target adjustment process. Frank and Goyal (2005) find that, on an aggregate basis, the U.S. 
firms’ leverage, as a whole, is quite stable. They argue that either it is caused by mean-reverting 
actions of individual firms or it could be caused by the process of firm entry and exit.
Empirical tests of target adjustments focus on whether firm-level leverage reverts to target. 
Since the target is not observable, it must be estimated or its effects must be imputed. Early 
studies take a long-term average as the target. These early studies estimate target debt ratio as 
the average debt ratios across a sample period. Example include Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982), 
Jalilabvand and Harris (1984), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). The approach assumes that 
firm characteristics that affect leverage remain unchanged over time. However, it is quite 
unlikely that the target changes over time as firm characteristics change. Most recent studies,
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therefore, adopt a two-step procedure in which an equation for the target is estimated first and 
the fitted value is then substituted into the adjustment equation. Contributions to this approach 
include studies by Fama and French (2002), Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001), Korajczyk 
and Levy (2003), and Kayhan and Titman (2004). The target factors are typically taken to be 
the same as factors considered in leverage level.
A speed of adjustment analysis on leverage ratios for Australian DCs and MCs has not been 
considered by Akhtar (2005). Therefore, this aspect of leverage ratios is analysed in this 
chapter.
3.4.2 Additional Foreign Capital Structure Determinants
After reviewing the capital structure determinants, this section introduces some of the recently 
published research on capital structure that is specific to MCs. The added dimensions of 
operating within an international arena induce complexities into the organisational structure of 
MCs, particularly their capital structure decisions within an environment of potentially 
increased exchange rate risks and varied political risks. The beginning of the research on capital 
structure for MCs began with the application of Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theorems in the 
early 1970s (Adler, 1974; Krainer, 1972, 1973; Naumann-Etienne, 1974). Krainer (1972) finds 
that the existence of exchange rate risk and repatriation risk leads to the invalidation of the 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorems which means that the capital structure of MCs’ global 
operating risk exposures is relevant for their valuation (Krainer, 1972).
A firm’s international expansion requires appropriate financing. The ability of MCs to grow 
and expand depends greatly upon their ability to acquire additional capital. An MC’s concern 
about capital structure changes as the degree of its international involvement increases (Chen et 
al., 1997). Recent studies also reveal that MCs tend to possess different norms of capital 
structure according to their country of origin (Agrawal and Narayanan, 1994). The following 
details the main uncertainties and risks involved in determining MCs’ capital structure.
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Therefore, in addition to the above variables, irrespective of an MC’s domicile country, 
determining MCs’ capital structure requires the inclusion of additional factors such as 
multinationality, diversification, political risk and foreign exchange risk (Burgman, 1996; Chen 
et al., 1997; Fatemi, 1984; Lee & Kwok, 1988; Mansi & Reeb, 2002; Wald, 1999).
3.4.2.1 Multinationality
Multinationality of a firm and the effect this has on capital structure is influenced by a range of 
factors that are captured by whether the firm is a multinational or not. Identifying the influence 
of the factors that are attributable to multinationality is beyond the scope of this research. 
However, the impact of these variables is captured in the following analyses through to use of a 
dichotomous variable. Multinationals are coded as unity and zero otherwise. This means that 
the significance of multinationality on capital structure will be ascertained.
3.4.2.2 Diversification
Diversification measures the breadth of firms’ international involvement. It is often argued that 
the international diversification of earnings should enable MCs to sustain a higher level of debt 
than DCs, without increasing their default risk (Shapiro, 1996; Eiteman, Stonehill & Moffett, 
1998). MCs’ expansion is thought to bring significant performance benefits to organisations 
because of a variety of reasons, such as the ability to take advantage of economies of scale 
(Grant, 1987; Porter, 1985) and accelerate new product development and introduction (Barlett & 
Goshal, 1989), the access to wider new technologies, and the opportunity to arbitrage factor 
costs differentials across multiple locations (Grant, 1987). It is further suggested that MCs have 
opportunities to: gain greater returns to intangible resources; use market power; spread their 
market risks; and seek less expensive inputs and less price-sensitive markets (Kim, Hwang & 
Burger, 1993). In addition to the above benefits of geographical diversification, it is also 
argued that the notional increase in debt capacity provides MCs with the opportunity to take 
advantage of increased tax deductions of interest payments.16 Shapiro (1978) argues that
10 Berger and Ofek (1995) document that although diversified firms held greater debt levels, the increased tax shields 
were not economically significant.
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international diversification leads to a lower volatility of earnings as the MCs have cash flows in 
imperfectly correlated markets (Agmon & Lessard, 1977; Chung, 1993; Hughes, Logue & 
Sweeney, 1975; Rugman, 1976). As the degree of risk is a major determinant in a firm’s 
financing decision, international diversification may enhance debt capacity, and thereby raise 
the target debt ratio for MCs. Shapiro (1978) suggests that international diversification reduces 
bankruptcy risk and enables MCs to utilise more leverage in their capital structure. The 
underlying notion of this literature is that expected bankruptcy costs are a function of both the 
probability of bankruptcy and the cost of bankruptcy. The diversification argument suggests 
that MCs will have a lower probability of bankruptcy and have a lower expected cost of 
bankruptcy. A lower expected bankruptcy cost allows for a greater usage of debt to gain greater 
tax shields. Shapiro (1978, 1996) points to corporate international diversification as a factor 
which may be relevant in establishing worldwide capital structures. With subsidiaries in 
different countries, MCs are able to diversify cash flows internationally. Such diversification 
reduces overall bankruptcy risk, which, in turn, enables MCs to be more highly leveraged than 
DCs.
However, while it is believed that there are several gains to be made by venturing into overseas 
markets, it can be argued that continued foreign expansion has a negative effect on minimising 
risks. Erunza, Hogan and Hung (1999) find that the incremental gains from international 
diversification beyond home-made diversification portfolios have diminished over time in a way 
consistent with changes in investment barriers. For example, continued expansion has to 
contend with the increasingly difficult prospect of managing a multicultural, multi-location 
workforce, serving distinctly different customer markets, and navigating through a maze of 
formidable constraints imposed by the number of locations where operations are established. 
This will lead to MCs having both a lower debt ratio and a higher agency cost of debt than DCs 
(Lee & Kwok 1988; Burgman, 1996; Chen et al., 1997; Doukas & Pantzalis, 1997). The reason 
being is that the effect of higher agency costs of debt for MCs incurred as a result of
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international capital and labour market imperfections,17 complexity of international operations 
(cultural diversity arising in varied locations brings with it numerous problems of 
communication, co-ordination, control, and motivation (Kogut & Sing, 1988), and higher 
proportions of intangible assets, exceeds the possible benefits of international diversification 
and leads to lower debt ratios for MCs. In summary, the extent of diversification of 
international operation and the impact this has on firm’s capital structure is unknown.
3.4.2.3 Foreign Exchange Risk
Krainer (1972), examining the applicability of Modigliani and Miller (1958) propositions to a 
bi-national firm, argues that the existence of foreign exchange risk18 is sufficient to cause two 
otherwise identical firms to belong to different risk classes. MCs and DCs that are exposed to 
foreign exchange risk will affect the demand and supply of the firm’s products and prices and 
costs for the firm (Adler & Dumas, 1984). The more sensitive the MCs are to foreign exchange 
rate fluctuations, the greater the expected cost of bankruptcy risks and therefore the lower the 
optimal debt levels. An alternative argument can be stated that the greater the economic foreign 
exchange rate exposure, the greater is the debt level, because if an MC has foreign currency 
denominated income from its foreign affiliates, it can hedge the exchange risk on this income by 
raising foreign currency denominated capital.
17 As firms encompass increasingly broader geographic markets, the costs associated with geographic dispersion 
begin escalating, sometimes quite rapidly, thus leading to eroded profit margins (Geringer, Beamish & Da Costa. 
1989).
18 Foreign exchange risk is the risk that the value of the firm will be adversely affected by a change in foreign 
exchange rates. (Some scholars would argue that such risk is two sided, and that the possibility of an increase in value 
is also a foreign exchange risk). For the purpose of this thesis, which tends to view from the perspective of a business 
manager, only adverse effect in this context will be mentioned. Foreign exchange risk is usually thought of as 
consisting of several components: 1) Transaction risk which is the chance that the value of the outstanding financial 
obligations already incurred will change in value because of an unexpected exchange rate change. 2) Operating risk 
which is the chance that the present value of the firm (or its market value), calculated in terms of the present value of 
expected future operating cash flows, will fall because of an unexpected exchange rate change. 3) Translation risk, 
also called accounting risk, which is the chance that the accounting-derived value of the owner's equity will drop 
because the accounting process of translating and incorporating foreign currency statements of affiliates into a 
consolidated financial statement of the parent will lead to a decrease in reported owner's equity. 4) Interest rate risk 
associated with multinational firms, which is the chance that the home currency equivalent interest costs of servicing 
various forms of foreign currency denominated debt will rise because of an unexpected change in foreign exchange 
rates.
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Empirical studies of foreign exchange exposure mostly fail to detect a significant link between 
exchange rate movements and contemporaneous changes in the financial structure of MCs 
(Jorion, 1990; Bodnar & Gentry, 1993; Ahimud, 1994). Exchange rate risk could affect the 
strategic financing for international expansion of MCs, although early studies suggest that 
exchange risk is irrelevant to the financial leverage decision (Mehra, 1978; Senbet, 1979). 
According to Aliber (1983), the financing costs of corporations in different countries differ 
because of foreign exchange risk, thus affecting the direction of international investment. Choi 
and Prasad (1995) analysed the relationship between foreign exchange risk and corporate 
financing decisions and reported that foreign exchange risk affects significantly a firm’s 
financing decisions for international investments.
It is important that the financial manager consider the impact of exchange rate changes. 
Decisions which appear optimal under one set off future exchange rates may be suboptimal 
under another set of future rates. Initial work by Giddy and Dufey (1975) and Rogalski and 
Vinso (1977) demonstrates that foreign exchange markets are efficient, so explicitly forecasting 
these rates does not appear feasible. Even though end-of-period exchange rates cannot be 
explicitly forecast, this issue needs to be considered in capital structure determination of MCs. 
Since one cannot know for certain what the end-of-period exchange rates will be even under a 
fixed exchange rate regime, there is the risk that the cost of funds will be different from that on 
which the decisions were based.
Exposure to foreign currency risk has become an increasingly important issue to investors and 
financial managers alike with the globalisation of markets, particularly in the wake of the events 
that occurred in the Asian financial markets in the later part of 1997 (Di Iorio & Faff, 2000). 
Although direct exposure (such as transaction and translation exposure) can be effectively 
managed by well-structured hedging strategies, indirect or economic exposure may cause 
significant variability in cash flows for most MCs and DCs. Therefore, foreign exchange 
exposure may be a determinant in firms’ capital structures.
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We capture foreign exchange risk through firms’ overseas sales over total consolidated sales. 
This measurement is also sometimes used to determine the depth of firms’ internationalisation. 
Hoskisson and Kim (1997) and Gomes and Ramaswamy (1999) argue that there might be a 
inverted U relationship between internalisation of a firm and its financing decision. They argue 
that overtime, the positive impact of international financing is out weighted by the costs of 
coordinating a widely dispersed network of international operations. On the other hand, 
Ruigrok and Wagner (2003) finds U-shaped between firms international involvement and 
financing decision. He argues that firms initially experience costly borrowing in international 
environment; however, as firms learns from their international experience over time, their 
borrowing costs go down and international borrowing becomes cheaper. We will test the depth 
of Australian firms’ international involvement (U-shaped or inverted-U shaped relationship) and 
their impact on leverage.
3.4.2.4 Political Risk
According to Jodice (1985), political risk can be defined as changes in the operating conditions 
of a firm that arise out of a political process, either through war, insurrection, or political 
violence, or through changes in government policies that affect the ownership and behaviour of 
the firm. Political risk can be conceptualised as events in the national and international 
environments that can affect the physical assets, personnel, and operations of firms.19 Such 
adverse effects often take place through constraints on the way in which the MCs operate in 
foreign countries. Political risk may be divided into two categories:
Macro political risk, which is the chance that political events in a host country will affect all 
foreign firms in a country, regardless of what they do or what industry they are in.
19 Similarly, Howell and Chaddick (1994) define political risk as political events, decisions, and conditions in a 
country (including those that are social) that result in eventual loss/harm done to a business operating in a foreign 
environment such that money is lost or reduction in profit margin occurs. Thus, the four elements that fall under the 
broad umbrella of political risk are:
(a) governance system of a country (political structure)
(b) nature of particular governors (authority)
(c) response of the population to the government (legitimacy)
(d) nature of society being governed (culture, social phenomenon).
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Micro political risk, which is the chance that political events in a host country will affect only 
firms in a specific industry or a specific firm. Examples might be constraints on petroleum 
firms that do not apply to foreign firms in other countries, or constraints on a specific firm 
because they also do business in a country unfriendly to the host country. Examples of the latter 
would be constraints by Islamic countries against firms doing business in Israel, or constraints 
by China against firms doing business in Taiwan.
Adler and Dumas (1975) discuss the default risk of foreign debts which may arise from the 
inconvertibility of currency, a political risk factor relevant to the MCs’ financing decision. 
Besides the MCs as a whole, the capital structure of a foreign subsidiary may also be affected 
by political risks. Stonehill and Stilz (1969) discuss how foreign affiliates tend to borrow 
heavily in the local market to minimise asset exposure to political risk. In addition, less 
developed countries tend to restrict local borrowing by foreign multinationals (Robock & 
Simmonds, 1989). Strategic partnership in the form of an equity joint venture can also be 
viewed as a means of reducing political risks. However, the relationship between the MCs and 
the host country is asymmetrical and MCs may be unable to prevent the host country’s 
government from changing the contractual base on which the initial investment was first made 
(Sachs, 1983). This means that firms with significant foreign financing, foreign suppliers or 
customers, or other international transactions or assets, are relatively exposed to adverse 
changes in currency controls, capital flow barriers and other laws and regulations that constitute 
political risk. DCs also are exposed to their domicile country’s political instability. It can be 
argued that MCs are relatively more exposed to DCs political risks as MCs have to deal with 
multiple country’s political environment (Burgman, 1996). The implication of political risk for 
MCs’ debt level across sample countries is an empirical question.
3.4.2.5 Credit Risk, Economic Risk and Financial Risk
Understanding of country risk for investors and borrowers is very important given the 
increasingly global nature of investment portfolios. In addition to political risks and foreign 
exchange risks, there exist three other important country risks - namely credit risks, economic
65
risks and financial risks which also play important roles in determining capital structure for DCs 
and MCs (Erb, Harvey and Viskanta, 1996). Therefore these three variables will be also 
investigated in our analysis.
3.4.3 Trade-off Capital Structure Theory
The trade-off theory of capital structure is a theory in the realm of financial economics about the 
corporate finance choices of corporations. Its purpose is to explain the fact that firms or 
corporations usually are financed partly with debt and partly with equity. It states that there is an 
advantage to financing with debt, the tax benefit of debt and there is a cost of financing with 
debt, the costs of financial distress including Bankruptcy Costs of debt and non-Bankruptcy 
costs (e.g. staff leaving, suppliers demanding disadvantageous payment terms, 
bondholder/stockholder infighting, etc). The marginal benefit of further increases in debt 
declines as debt increases, while the marginal cost increases, so that a firm that is optimizing its 
overall value will focus on this trade-off when choosing how much debt and equity to use for 
financing. Trade off theory is broken down into static and dynamic trade-off theories.
3.4.3.1 Static Trade-off Theory
3.4.3.1.1 Bankruptcy Costs
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) formalise the argument that increases in leverage increase the 
probability of bankruptcy and thus increase expected bankruptcy costs. Since debt involves 
commitment of periodic payment, highly leveraged firms are relatively more prone to 
bankruptcy. However, as debt provides a tax benefit in the form of deductibility of interest a 
trade-off exists between the increased benefit of the tax deductibility and the increased cost of 
bankruptcy. The point at which additional leverage generates an increase in expected 
bankruptcy costs that just offset the tax subsidy to the incremental debt defines the optimal 
capital structure.
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It is argued that MCs will have a higher cost of financial distress relative to DCs due to 
increased stakeholder heterogeneity and jurisdictional differences (Armstrong & Riddick, 1998; 
Reeb, 1998). These jurisdictional and informational differences increase the costs associated 
with financial distress. The heterogeneity argument, holding the probability of bankruptcy 
constant, suggests that the MCs should have a higher expected cost of bankruptcy relative to 
DCs. Ceteris paribus, a higher expected cost of bankruptcy indicates that MCs should use less 
debt in their capital structure relative to DCs. On the other hand, it can be argued that MCs 
should have less bankruptcy costs than the DCs since MC exposure to political risk and foreign 
exchange risk can be minimised through international diversification (Lee & Kwok, 1988). 
Given the opportunity for international diversification, overall cash flows of MCs can be more 
stable. Reduction of cash flow variability reduces the probability of bankruptcy and therefore 
the expected bankruptcy costs (Shapiro, 1978).
3.4.3.1.2 Non-debt Tax Shield
Miller and Modigliani (1963) documents that firms gain an advantage in the form of tax 
deductions associated with interest payments on debt. Subsequently, DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980) Mackie Mason, (1990) and Graham, 1996a) formalised a framework whereby tax 
deductions (tax shields), which are not associated with debt, act as substitutes for interest 
deductions such as depreciation, depletion allowances, investment and foreign tax credits. 
These “non-debt tax shields” minimise the use of debt by providing tax advantages similar to 
debt. Consequently, the more non-debt tax shields, the less benefits from tax deduction of 
interest on debt. Therefore an inverse relationship is expected between non-debt tax shields and 
debt levels in a corporate tax environment.20
Robbins and Stobaugh (1972) argue that MCs operate in countries under a variety of tax
structures. These different tax structures may provide benefits to MCs that are not available to
DCs. Because of differences in corporate tax code, depreciation, depletion, and withholding tax
20 Bowen, Daly and Huber (1982), Boquist and Moore (1984), Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Titman and Wessels 
(1988) and Homaifar, Zietz and Benkato (1994) all analysed the association between leverage and non-debt tax 
shields. However, their findings are inconclusive.
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policies across international boundaries, MCs are in a better position to shelter their income 
using non-debt tax shields than DCs. Therefore, non-debt tax shields are expected to be more 
important for MCs relative to DCs.
3.4.3.1.3 Systematic Risk
Business risk refers to the risk associated with the future operations of the business. This is the 
risk that is inherent in the expected net operating income stream generated by the assets of the 
firm (Bishop et al., 2004). Generally, it is expected that there is an inverse relation between 
leverage and business risk potentially due to the associated increase and operational risk 
(Burgman, 1996).
The literature includes substantial information on the potential effects of international 
diversification, but little in the way of risk-reduction through corporate international 
diversification. By calculating the failure-probabilities of MCs and comparing them to DCs, 
Shaked (1986) set out to show that MCs have a lower insolvency-probability than DCs and that 
the systematic risk is lower as well. His results found that the mean insolvency-probability of 
the MCs was significantly lower than that of the DCs, MCs are more capitalized than DCs and 
the average systematic risk (beta) of MCs is significantly lower than that of DCs. Among 
others, Reeb, Kwok and Baek (1998) and Madura (1998) also report the significance of 
systematic risk analysis in determining firms’ financial structure.
3.4.3.1.4 Tax Rate
Under perfect capital markets where taxes and transaction costs are non-existent, the market 
value of a firm is independent of its capital structure (MM, 1958). That is, returns to 
shareholders will be the same regardless of whether the firm is levered or unlevered. Thus, the 
financing choice between debt or equity is irrelevant. However, under more realistic 
assumptions of capital markets (e.g. corporate tax), debt financing has an important advantage 
over equity -  the interest payments of the firms are a tax deductible expense.
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Consistent with the MM (1963) proposition which incorporates corporate income tax benefit, 
Miller and Scholes (1978) show that firms with higher expected tax rates (which is indicative of 
more profitable firms with less volatile earnings) have higher leverage. Mackie-Mason (1990) 
looks into the incremental financing decisions using discrete choice analysis to show how tax 
shields, specifically tax loss carry-forwards and investment tax credits, substantially affect debt 
policy. He concludes that firms with high tax loss carry- forwards are less likely to use debt, 
since firms with loss carry-forwards are unlikely to be able to use interest deductions. On the 
other hand, firms with investment tax credits (which are often profitable and pays taxes) are, on 
average, unaffected by investment tax credits in their decision to issue debt. But when the firm 
nears tax exhaustion, investment tax credits substantially reduce the profitability of it issuing 
debt.
3.4.3.2 Dynamic Trade-off Theory
Dynamic capital structure theory considers the effects of transaction costs on capital structure 
and how capital structure changes through time. This theory explained by firm size and 
collateral value of assets.
3.4.3.2.1 Size
A number of authors have suggested that capital structure may be related to firm size. That is, a 
positive relationship should be observed between capital structure and size. The cost of issuing 
debt and equity securities is also related to firm size. It is thought that the larger the firm, the 
more information that is available on it and the lower the costs caused by information 
asymmetries, ceteris paribus. It is also postulated that transaction costs will be comparatively 
higher for smaller firms than for their larger peers (Smith, 1977). The argument here is that 
firm size can be viewed as a proxy for information asymmetries between the firm and the 
market, indicating a firm’s stability. In turn, this would suggest a positive relationship between 
capital structure and size. Further, Michaelas, Chittenden and Poutziouris (1999) and Smith and 
Warner (1979) argue that the agency conflict between shareholders and lenders may be 
particularly severe for small companies. Lenders can manage the risk of lending to small
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Companies by restricting the length of maturity offered. Larger firms can be expected to have 
more long-term debt relative to smaller firms (Scott & Martin, 1975; Ferri & Jones, 1979; 
Bamea, Haugen & Senbet, 1980; Agrawal & Nagarajan, 1990; Whited, 1992; Stohs & Mauer, 
1996). However, some studies have found mixed evidence. Crutchley and Hanson (1989) and 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) found a significant positive correlation between company size and 
capital structure, while Stohs and Mauer (1996) found the opposite, and Kester (1986) and 
Remmers et al. (1974) found no significant size effect. Barclay and Smith (1995) find the 
correlation between size and capital structure switches, depending upon whether the estimation 
technique is used. However, the results of the research provide sufficient argument to justify 
the inclusion of firm size as a determinant of capital structure, which has a positive impact on 
long-term debt. It remains an empirical question as how firm size impact on MCs capital 
structure.
3.4.3.2.2 Collateral Value of Assets
A firm with valuable collateral assets can often borrow on relatively favourable terms and hence 
have low borrowing costs (Graham, 2000). However, the influence on capital structure is not 
clear. Turning first to those studies that support a positive relationship, Berger, Ofek and 
Yermack (1997), Galai and Masulis (1976), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977) and 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that stockholders of levered firms have an incentive to invest 
sub-optimally, and thus transfer wealth away from a firm’s bondholders to stockholders. If, 
however, debt can be secured against a firm’s fixed assets, and covenants are put in place to 
restrict the use of loaned funds, bondholders have an improved guarantee of repayment, 
depending on the value of the assets used as collateral. Clearly, no such guarantee exists if the 
debt is unsecured. It is argued that the process of selling debt secured against assets with known 
values will reduce the asymmetric information costs of issuing debt. In addition, Scott (1977) 
asserts that a transfer of wealth from unsecured to secured creditors will occur when secured 
debt is used. No formal theory is found in the literature to suggest any difference of DCs and 
MCs collateral value of assets and its influence on capital structure. Therefore, it remains an 
empirical question.
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3.4.3.2.3 Firm's Age
Petersen and Rajan (1994) show that leverage decreases with age of the firm. Although they 
cite agency issues as a potential explanation, age of the firm may also proxy for lower 
information asymmetries. As firms grow older, more information regarding their future viability 
becomes available. Lower information asymmetries imply higher leverage. Bondholders would 
be more likely to lend to firms they know more about than lending to firms they know less 
about. Therefore, given this conflict, we do not hypothesize what effect age has on leverage. 
However, we expect MCs to be older than DCs since firms are generally likely to begin as 
domestic corporations and expand over time to become multinationals.
3.4.4 Pecking Order Capital Structure Theory
The pecking order theory considers the effects of a particular type of transaction cost that is 
caused by information asymmetry and suggests that debt ratios will diverge from trade-off 
optimal ratios in predictable ways. The pecking order theory is mainly divided into two 
categories: adverse selection and agency theory, which are discussed below.
3.4.4.1 Adverse Selection
3.4.4.1.1 Profitability
Under the pecking order theory, firms finance new investments first with retained earnings, then 
with lower risk debt, then with higher risk debt, and finally, under duress, with equity (Fama & 
French, 2001). A more profitable firm is expected to have access to greater internal finances 
and hence will tend to hold less debt in its capital structure. “Profitability” in this context refers 
to past profitability, which determines the level of funds retained and is expected to be 
negatively related to long term debt. Consistent with this theory, Toy et al. (1974), Kester 
(1986), Hasbrouck (1988), Titman and Wessels (1988), Allen (1991), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and Michaelas, Chittenden and Potziouris (1999), Cassar and Holmes (2003) and Akhtar 
(2005) and all find significant negative relationships between leverage ratios and profitability.21
21 However, Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1998) find that market leverage is positively related to profitability.
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MCs pursuing both international and product diversification strategies should be less leveraged 
in so far as MCs tend to be more profitable than DCs (Sambharya, 1995; Broaden & Samii, 
2001). This argument is based on the concept that MCs’ expansion would bring a significant 
increase in profitability to organisations because of a variety of reasons, such as the ability to 
exploit economies of scales (Porter, 1985; Grant, 1987), hasten new product development and 
introduction (Barlett & Ghoshal, 1989), access new technologies and to take advantage of 
arbitrage opportunities in factor cost differentials across multiple locations (Kogut, 1985). 
While it is clear that there are several gains to be made by multinationalisation, it can be argued 
that continued foreign expansion could be accompanied by falling profit growth and negative 
marginal returns beyond some optimal level of activity. The reasons for falling profit growth 
are increasing costs associated with control and coordination of geographically distanced 
subsidiaries, and administrative obstacles encountered in managing culturally dissimilar and 
distinct markets with a variety of unique customer needs. Interestingly, Frank and Goyal (2003, 
2004) argue that the significance of profitability factor is diminishing overtime. Therefore, it 
would be defensible to argue that MCs would have higher (lower) profitability depending on the 
benefit (costs) associated with their global expansion. Following this, a mixed sign is expected 
between capital structure and profitability for MCs.
3.4.4.1.2 Dividends
Myers (1984) acknowledges that the pecking order model does not explain why firms pay 
dividends and how it impacts capital structure. When firms choose to pay dividend, it impacts 
on the payments of debtholders. When firms use excess cash in paying dividends then there is a 
chance that dividend payment activity might put a constrain on the regular debt payments to the 
debt holders. In this instance a negative relationship is expected between dividend and debt. 
Myers (1984) also posits that, in the short-term, dividends are (for unknown reasons) sticky, 
leaving variation in net cash flows to be absorbed largely by debt. Further, the dividend-paying 
firms should have more debt if they are viewed as less risky. However, firms with cash flows in 
excess of investments should pay the difference as dividends, and not rebalance each period by
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issuing debt. Dividend-paying firms are less risky (Easterbrook, 1984). Under the trade-off 
theory, less risky firms should use more debt since they have less chance of paying the 
deadweight bankruptcy costs. Secondly, Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividend-paying firms 
have lower agency costs of equity and this allows firms to raise more equity. If so, then 
dividend payers should have less leverage. Finally, dividend-paying firms are those that 
generate more cash from operations relative to their investment opportunities, and so they 
payout the difference. Such firms would be unlikely to raise more debt since that would incur 
the unnecessary transaction costs. No formal theory is found in the literature to suggest any 
difference of DCs’ and MCs’ dividend payments and their influence on capital structure. 
Therefore, it remains an empirical question.
3.4.4.2 Agency Theory
The agency costs associated with capital structure concern the conflicts of interest between 
managers, stockholders and bondholders.22 The conflicts of interest arise because corporate 
decisions that increase the welfare of one of these groups often reduce the welfare of others. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) use the agency framework to provide a positive analysis of the 
effects of conflicts of interest among stockholders, managers and bondholders on the investment 
and financing decisions of the firm. They argue that viewing the financial structure problem as 
one of determining the optimal quantities of debt versus equity is too narrow. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that the problem involves determining the optimal ownership structure 
of the firm including, the relative quantities of debt and equity held by managers and outsiders 
as well as the details of the debt (short-term, long-term, public, private, convertible, callable, 
and the covenants associated with each) and equity (common stock with unrestricted or 
restricted alienability, the allocation of voting rights and the impact of preferred stock and 
warrants). At its most general level, the capital structure problem involves the determination of 
the entire set of contracts amongst stockholders, bondholders and managers as well as other 
agents in the nexus of contracts, including customers, employees, lessors and insurers. Other
22 Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1977), Warner (1977), Smith and Warner (1979), Fama (1980), Titman 
(1984) and Gilson (1989).
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researchers, for example, Galai and Masulis (1976) discuss claim dilution, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) investigate asset substitution and Myers (1977) examines underinvestment, which are all 
related to the agency cost issue.
MCs are expected to have a higher agency cost of debt than DCs. Monitoring, bonding and 
auditing costs are agency-related and are higher for MCs because of the diversity of 
geographical locations, cultural differences, higher auditing costs, differing legal systems, and 
language differences. Additionally, these national differences increase the complexity of such 
standard tasks as generating multi-country financial statements, hiring multi-country auditors 
and/or multiple auditors, and completing consolidated balance and income statements 
(Burgman, 1996; Reeb, Sattar & Allee, 2001) and complexities of their operations as compared 
to DCs.23 According to Wright, Madura and Wiant (2002), these costs are due to the distance 
and the difference in the corporate and national culture between the parent and the subsidiaries 
as well as the difference in the level of economic development between the parent and the 
subsidiary host countries. Hence debt providers will require higher returns to finance 
geographically diversified firms, which lead to an increase in the costs of debt for these firms 
and therefore a reduction in their leverage.24 Therefore, it is expected that there will be a higher 
negative association between agency cost of debt and the leverage ratio for DCs and MCs.
3.4.4.2.1 Free Cash Flow
Free cash flow (FCF) has important implications for capital structure choice. FCF centres on 
the agency costs resulting from the separation of ownership and control and the incentives that 
managers have to pursue activities that are in the managers’ interest, reducing the profitability 
of the firm for others. Jensen (1986) suggests that managers can limit the agency problems of 
FCF by issuing debt and paying the proceeds to the stockholders. Leverage restricts the use of
23 Simunic (1980) documents a positive association between auditing fees and the degree o f foreign involvement.
24 On the other hand, firms diversifying their operations over many industries with non-perfectly correlated 
performance reach a higher stability of their cash flows which reduces their default risk (Bartov & Bodner, 1996; 
Chung, 1993).
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internal finance generated by the firm by forcing managers to use FCF to meet their 
contractually-specified interest obligations.
Additional leverage leaves less FCF at the discretion of the managers at the same time that it 
increases the level of intensity at which the firm’s activities are monitored. Thus, firms with 
large free cash flows are likely to have higher levels of debt. The association between debt and 
FCF has been empirically supported by the findings of Gardner and Trinca (1992), Agrawal and 
Narayanan (1994), Lowe, Naughton and Taylor (1994), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Jaggi and 
Gul (1999), Hirota (1999), Filbeck and Gorman (2000) and Hall, Hutchinson and Michaelas 
(2000). The theory further suggests that firms with large free cash flows will have higher levels 
of debt, especially when they have low growth opportunities.
According to Eckbo (1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and Smith (1997), two possible 
reactions can be anticipated for transactions that change a firm’s leverage. First, for leverage- 
increasing transactions that tend to reduce FCF, the expected market reaction to such 
announcements should be positive, on average. In such situations’, managers are reducing free 
cash flows in a way that maximises shareholders wealth. Second, for leverage-increasing 
transactions that tend to put more cash in the hands of managers and increase FCF, the expected 
market reaction would be negative, on average. The costs described above are forms of agency 
costs which result from a conflict of interests between managers and stockholders. For MCs, 
the agency problem is more acute; even if managers at a MCs’ headquarters can be given 
incentives to maximise shareholders’ wealth, the managers of foreign subsidiaries may prefer to 
make decisions for their subsidiary that are not maximizing the value of MCs overall. As a 
result, the foreign subsidiary managers are not serving the interests of the shareholders. This 
type of free cash flow problem may be especially pronounced for MCs that conduct a high 
degree of foreign business (Wright, Madura & Wiant, 2002).
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3.4.4.2.2 Growth
Growth opportunities give managers discretion in their choice of future investments. This 
increases the difficulty of managerial activity and raises the agency cost of debt, such as those 
associated with curbing the tendency for equity-controlled firms to affect wealth transfers from 
debt holders to shareholders by investing sub-optimally. Myers (1977) argues that the potential 
for shareholders to undertake actions contrary to the interests of debt holders (e.g. 
underinvestment or diversion of resources) is most extreme for companies whose value is 
predominantly accounted for by growth opportunities. Lenders may thus impose restrictions on 
lending to such companies. Growth companies may also be reluctant to take on debt, if high 
interest rates or restrictive covenants impose constraints on their future decision-making 
process. In support of these predictions, Barclay and Smith (1995), Chung (1993), Titman and 
Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) all find a negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and debt levels.
Further, a negative relationship between debt and growth opportunities is also probable if 
growth opportunities are intangible assets, which are not collateralisable for the purpose of 
borrowing funds (Bradley, Jarrell & Kim, 1984; Kim and Sorenson, 1986; Titman & Wessels, 
1988; Stulz, 1990). The negative relationship supports the agency hypothesis that growth 
opportunities allow greater discretion in investment decisions of the firm. Hence, a firm’s 
borrowing capacity is limited to the extent that their assets are in the form of intangibles or 
unrealised growth opportunities. A number of studies find support for the negative influence; 
conversely, a number of other studies have found a positive dependence. These conflicting 
results may be due to the fact that the growth measure tends to pick up the positive dependence 
between leverage and tangibility.25
Recent empirical evidence indicates that firms with foreign operations have greater growth 
opportunities than firms with only domestic operations (Kim & Lyn, 1986; Titman and Wessels,
25 For example, there is an indirect link between leverage and growth with firms borrowing against plant, machinery 
or other assets when they are required to expand to meet the increase in sales that accompany growth.
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1988; Bodnar & Gentry, 1993). According to Myers (1977), a substantial part of the leverage of 
any DC or MC is accounted for by the present value of future growth opportunities. The value 
of future growth opportunities is realised as far as a firm can exploit imperfections in the 
product and capital markets. Based on this argument, MCs tend to be better positioned than 
DCs. The imperfection provides MCs an opportunity to realise monopoly rents as compared to 
DCs. As noted by Myers (1977), monopoly rents are reflected in the value of the firms’ future 
growth opportunities. Therefore, MCs are expected to have higher future growth opportunities 
than DCs.
3.4.5 Other Issues
There are many factors that are potentially important in capital structure choice that do not fall 
into the traditional capital structure theory or the dynamic capital structure theory. These 
variables have been found to be significant in the determination of MCs’ and DCs’ capital 
structure. They include the type of industry in which the firm is involved, the time of the year 
effect and macroeconomic variables. These are discussed below.
3.4.5.1 Industry Effect
Harris and Raviv (1991) note that firms in a given industry will have similar debt ratios while 
debt ratios vary across industries. There are several reasons for thinking that the industry in 
which a firm operates will have a significant effect on its capital structure. The most basic facts 
concerning industry characteristics and capital structure are that firms within an industry are 
more similar than those in different industries, and that industry tends to retain its leverage ratio 
ranking over time (Bradley, Jarrell & Kim, 1984). The link between capital structure and 
industry may be related to the volatility of earnings. Firms in similar industries may face 
similar volatility of earnings, which ceteris paribus, dictates particular capital structures.
In addition to the industry link with earnings volatility, Hamada (1972), using industry 
membership as a proxy for risk class, found that leveraged beta values within different
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industries varied more than unleveraged beta values. He concluded that there is a relationship 
between the cost of equity and financial leverage. Schwartz and Aronson (1967) document a 
relationship between industry and capital structure across five industries. Harris and Raviv 
(1991) have summarised findings of four studies26 which investigated debt ratios for selected 
industries. The results are in broad agreement and show that drugs, instruments, electronics and 
food industries have consistently high leverage since these industries are involved in product 
and research development. Moreover, regulated industries (telephone, electric and gas utilities 
and airlines) are among the most highly leveraged firms (Bradley, Jarrell & Kim, 1984). 
DeAngelo-Masulis (1980) and Masulis (1983) use the documentation of industry effect as one 
argument for the presence of an industry-related optimal capital structure and imply that it is the 
tax code and tax rate differences across industries that cause the inter-industry similarities in 
debt ratios.
3.4.5.2 Industry Median
In corporate finance theory, in addition to the above factors discussed, some researchers also 
recognise industry median as a powerful explanatory variable to explain the capital structure of 
any firm. Frank and Goyal (2004) argue that some excluded factors, or the factors which are 
sometimes hard to either quantify or measure, have their effects subsumed within the median 
industry factor; which is empirically the single most powerful factor. However, it does not have 
an agreed upon interpretation. Similarly, Mackay and Phillips (2003) provide a recent analysis 
of industry effects on leverage. Unfortunately, median industry leverage does not have a unique 
interpretation on its own but rather has associated links with some other familiar capital 
structure factors. Thus, industry median ratio will be used to control for direct industry impact 
on capital structure in addition to individual industry indicative variables.
26 Bowen. Daly and Huber (1982), Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Long and Malitz (1985) and Kester (1986).
78
3.4.53 Time Factor
Capital structure does not stay constant over time (Bevan & Danbolt, 2002). Korajczyk and 
Levy (2003) suggest that, based on Ross’s (1985) argument, firms whose earnings are highly 
correlated with the level of economic activity are likely to employ less debt in their capital 
structure. This rationale is lent support by the fact that the relative importance of various 
components of long-term debt-related factors changes considerably over time. For example, 
volatile interest rates would reduce the appeal of external borrowing (Doukas & Pantzalis, 
2003). Wright (2004) provides a useful compilation of data about the U.S. corporate sector 
from 1900 onwards. He finds aggregate debt and aggregate equity both grow decade by decade. 
He also suggests while leverage fluctuated during 1900-2002, it stayed within rather narrow 
bounds. This is despite phenomenal changes in many features of the business environment 
during this period. Recently, Frank and Goyal (2005) found that there is a mild stability of 
leverage ratios over the last half century. They suggest debt neither vanishes from corporate 
accounts, nor does it explode to overwhelm equity, and therefore over long periods of time, 
aggregate leverage is stationary. In summary, it is not clear whether the effects of determinants 
on long-term debt are stable across time across countries between DCs and MCs. In any given 
country, the state of the economy does not stay constant indefinitely. As a result a firm’s 
business operation and debt-financing policy is likely to vary to keep pace with the economy. 
During periods of economic recession, major investments that would require long term finance 
may be delayed or cancelled and this would push the long-term debt ratio down. Akhtar (2005) 
found that there is certainly a time impact on DCs’ and MCs’ capital structure. Therefore, in a 
long time-series data analysis, it is essential that we control for time effects and also investigate 
whether the time effect has any significant explanatory power regarding the variation in capital 
structure.
3.5 Data  and  Methodology
The data comprises a sample of both DCs and MCs listed on the Australian stock exchange in 
the past 10 years. To identity time-varying effects, a 10-year period has been selected ending in
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2004. Data for the Australian DCs and MCs of this sample has been collected from the Osiris 
database and WRDS which has been described in the data section (Chapter 4). The sample 
comprises 2248 firms across all industrial sectors. I exclude banks, gold mining companies, 
finance companies and insurance companies from the sample because their operations and 
leverage are quite different from industrial companies. The market value of the shares of all 
companies in the sample comprising the All Ordinaries index is approximately 95%. Apart from 
the novel sample and distinction between domesticity and multinationality of sample firms, the 
method is novel in capital structure research. The sample is biased towards large publicly-listed 
companies, but is not unrepresentative of Australian equity market. The research design follows 
four steps. Firstly, the target level depends on the characteristics of the firms. Therefore, as the 
firm changes, so too will its desired leverage. This idea is captured in Model I by specifying the 
target as a function of the relevant firm characteristics:
LEVERAGE,, =ß0+ ß.DIVER,, + ß2FXit + ß,PRu + ßßPTCYit + ß5BETAu
+ ß6NDTS„+ß1ATRl, +ßsSIZEll+ß9CVAll + ßl0AGE„ + ßuPROF„
+ ßnDIVC„ + ß nFCF„ + ß„GROW _ Model 1
The variables in the models were explained earlier in the data chapter. However, a brief 
description is given below:
DIVER = Diversification
F X = Foreign exchange risk
PR = Political risk
BPTCY = Bankruptcy cost
BETA = Firm specific risk (De-geared beta)
NDTS = Non-debt tax shield
ATR = Average tax rate
SIZE = Total assets
CVA = Collateral value of assets
AG E = Firm’s age
PROF = Profitability
DIVC = Cash Dividend
FCF = Free cash flow
GROW  MB = Growth
In the second step, a pooled sample of MCs and DCs will be regressed using Model II. In 
Model II, an additional variable MULTI t is introduced to capture the total effect of a firm’s
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multinational impact which Model I failed to capture. Note that the depth of mutinationality, 
significance of additional financial variables (credit risk (CR,,) ratings, economic risk (ER,,) 
ratings and financial risk (FR,)), influence of industries and time variation will be tested mainly 
using Model II with slight modification. This modified version of Model II will be reported and 
discussed when particular issue is analysed in the subsequent discussion of results.
LEVERAGE„ = ß0 + ß xMULT„ + ß 2DIVER„ + ß,FXu + ß 4PR„ + ß5BPTCY„
+ ß6BETAi: + ß1NDTS„ + ß,ATR„ + + +
+ ß nPROF„ + ß nDIVC„ + ß ltFCF„ + _ MB,, +c„ Model 11
The third stage introduces interaction variables for multinationality on the determinants of 
international, trade-off and pecking order theory for identifying the significance difference of 
capital structure determinants of leverage for MCs relative to DCs. In other words, if any of the 
coefficients ß ]6 to ß 29 are significant, then the associated variable is significantly explaining 
differences in capital structure between MCs and DCs.
LEVERAGE,, = ß 0+ ß xMULT„ + ß 2DIVER„ + ß3FX„ + ß 4PR„ + ß 5BPTCY„
+ ße BETA,, + ß 1NDTSi, + ßsATR„ + ß 9SIZE„ + ß x0CVA„ + ß uAGE„
+ ß n PROF„ + ß nDIVC„ + ß u FCF„ + ß xfiR O W  _ MB„ + +ßl6M  * DIVER,,
+ ß xlM  * FXRISK', +ß ]SM *  BRISK,, + ß ]9M  * BPTCY„ + ß 20M  * BETA,,
+ ß 2]M  * NDTS„ + ß n M  * MTR" + ß 2,M  * SIZE,, + ß 24M  * CVA„
+ ß 25M  * AGE„ + ß 26M  * PROF„ + ß 21M  * DIVC„ + ß 2&M  * FCF„
+ ß 29M  * GROW _ MB„ + £„ Model III
In the fourth stage, following Graham (1996), Fama and French (2002) and Flannery and 
Rangen (2006), Model IV will be utilised to capture the partial speed of adjustment costs for 
capital structure change and over time for both Australian DCs and MCs. There has never been 
any study done to observe any difference of partial speed of adjustment costs across DCs and 
MCs. ALEVERAGE, is the difference or change of long-term debt between current year and
previous year. L„ denotes the optimal leverage ratio of the ith firm in period t. L„ are the 
estimates of Model I. L„_x is the target leverage level for previous year and v„ is the residuals of
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Model IV. And the notation 5, indicates that when it equals zero then it reflects no adjustment
to the target. If 5, falls between zero and one, then it reflects partial adjustment to the target due
to positive costs of adjustment, and if it equates to one then it indicates a full adjustment to the 
target (adjustment is costless).
A LEV ERA G E = S 0+8 , (Z„* -  Lu_x )+v„ Model IV
3.6 Results and Discussion
Table 3.1 Panel A presents individual yearly long-term and short-term debt ratios (scaled by 
total assets) for Australian DCs and MCs while Table Panel B shows the univariate test of the 
mean difference across short-term, long-term and total debt. The test of the difference in mean 
leverage it shows that Australian MCs have higher short-term, long-term and total debt relative 
to DCs; however, statistically it is not significant. This result is consistent with Akhtar (2005). 
A further analysis of the difference in leverage will be examined later in a multivariate context 
after considering all the determinants discussed earlier. The slope coefficient of M U LTu in 
the following multivariate regressions will capture this effect.
Table 3.1
Yearly debt ratios across DCs and MCs and univariate analysis 
______ _______ Panel (A)______ _______
Y e a r D C s-ST D M C s-S T D D C s-L T D M C s-L T D
95 0.051 0.049 0.020 0.027
96 0.051 0.040 0.013 0.022
97 0.042 0.058 0.048 0.052
98 0.052 0.050 0.048 0.060
99 0.046 0.049 0.087 0.021
00 0.047 0.045 0.081 0.035
01 0.056 0.054 0.100 0.141
02 0.051 0.067 0.109 0.178
03 0.045 0.046 0.059 0.070
04 0.038 0.050 0.054 0.060
Panel (B)
Short-term debt Long-term debt Total debt
Mean t-test Mean t-test Mean t-test
DCs 0.040 0.066 0.106 0.123
MCs 0.041 0 .1 5 3 0.074 0 .5 5 4 1 .2 5 4
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The estimates of Model 1 are presented in Table 3.2. Generally, the results show that indicator 
variables measured the underlying attributes well. The direction of effect for each indicator 
variable is generally in accord with theoretical predictions and consistent with Akhtar (2005). 
The following Table 3.2 tests the capital structure theory on DCs and MCs independently by 
employing the traditional capital structure determinants and additional international capital 
structure determinants across three measures of long-term debt ratios (e.g. market value 
(LTDAEV) and book value (LTD BV), total debt ratios (LTD BV)), and short-term debt ratios 
(STD BV). The adjusted R-suqared appears statistically in satisfactory level for long-term debt 
ratios as it ranges between 33% to 54%; however, this model fails to show a promising results 
for short-term debt.
The results show that DIVER coefficient for DCs is a significant determinant in explaining 
short-term debt ratio but not long-term debt ratio and total debt ratio. This indicates that short­
term debt is positively and significantly (t=2.020) related to Australian DCs to geographical and 
industrial expansion. However, geographical and industrial expansion (DIVER) has 
significantly negative impact on MCs’ long-term, short-term and total debt ratios. This 
indicates that Australian MCs are not achieving much benefit from international expansion 
specially when they raise debt in multiple countries. Further, it can also be argued that to raise 
debt in multiple countries by Australian MCs becomes relatively costly to finance any project 
expansion.
Foreign exchange rate risk (EX) and its impact on DCs’ and MCs’ capital structure is captured 
by the F X coefficient. The coefficient FX suggests that Australian DCs are exposed to currency 
risk fluctuations and subsequently it significantly decreases the ability to raise long-term debt, 
which is indicated by negative significant (t=-2.833, -3.303 and -3.068 across three long-term 
debt measurements) FX coefficients. However, foreign exchange risk does not have prominent 
effect in raising short-term debt in DCs’ capital structure. The effect of exchange rate 
fluctuation in MCs’ long-term and short-term debt remains insignificant which is consistent 
with Akhtar (2005).
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The insignificant coefficient of political risk (PR) indicates that Australian DCs and MCs are 
operating in a safe domestic and international environment and, as a result, raising long-term 
debt and short-term debt are not a major issue to be concerned about in order to manage the 
capital structure. Alternatively, it may also suggest that the proxy we employed for political 
risk is not significantly related to the definitions of long-term debt we employed.
The support of the bankruptcy risk (BPTCY) hypothesis is found for both DCs’ and MCs’ book 
value of short-term debt; however, no significant support of bankruptcy costs is found for long­
term debt. This result is inconsistent with the prior studies (Burgman, 1996; Akhtar, 2005). 
This might be due to the sample period we chose.
The sign of firm-specific risk (BETA) result is consistent with the theory and it shows that DCs 
and MCs both lower their debt capacity due to increased firm-specific risk; however, firm risk is 
generally not statistically significant for long term debt in DCs’; however, is significant for 
DCs’ short-term debt (t=-2.540). MCs’ short-term debt (t=-2.295).
Non-debt tax shield (NDTS) shows a significant positive relationship across three long-term 
debt ratio measurements (t=2.724; 3.125; and t=4.038). This result is inconsistent with previous 
literature (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980). Average tax rate (ATR) has predicted sign and 
significant coefficient to explain DCs’ short term debt ratios (t= 1.651) and MCs’ toptal debt 
ratios (t=l .655).
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SIZE coefficient is positively related to both market value and book value of long-term leverage 
and book value of total leverage measure for both DCs (t=8.415; f=7.663 and t=8.419) and MCs 
(t=3.451; t=4.419 and 3.413). These results are consistent with the trade-off theory of size 
argument that larger firms have higher leverage as they are often thought to be less volatile 
which leads them to be less prone to asymmetric information and hence more debt and less 
equity (Scott & Martin, 1975; Agrawal & Nagarajan, 1990; Cooke, 2001; Fan, Titman & Twite, 
2003). This is not the case when debt is defined as short term debt (scaled with total assets) as 
it is found to be insignificant.
The significant coefficient CVA for DCs supports the trade-off theory of collateral value of 
assets that a firm with more assets can pledge them to support higher debt capacity for long­
term (t=2.123 and t=3.220) and total debt (t=2.414). However, the support of pecking order 
theory is found in DCs’ short-term debt as it is negative and significant (t=-2.130), stating that a 
firm with more assets has a greater worry about adverse selection on those assets on a short term 
period. Interestingly, CVA does not appear to explain any variation of market value or book 
value of long-term leverage or short-term leverage for Australian MCs.
The negative and significant coefficient on the proxy for firm age (AGE) for DCs both long­
term and short-term and total debt (t=-4.021; t=-3.864 and t=-3.305) suggest that, as DCs 
matures over time, they reduce leverage. Interestingly, the effect of AGE has significant 
positive impact on the short-term debt (t=2.255) of Australian MCs’ suggesting the maturity of 
multinational firms requires the usage of more short-term debt to meet any financial constraints. 
The AGE also show a significant positive relationship with total debt for MCs’. The results for 
DCs suggest that as the Australian DCs matures, they no longer require long term debt while the 
results for MCs is consistent to previous literature. MCs’ results suggest that mature firms have 
a good reputation in debt markets and consequently face lower agency costs of debt. A possible 
explanation can be that Australian MCs are mature enough and exploit their creditworthiness in 
the market.
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The coefficient of (PROF) explains the variation of book value of debt (scaled by book value of 
debt and market value of equity) at 1% significance level (t=2.819), supporting the pecking 
order theory of Myers (1977) which predicts that leverage will be negatively related to 
profitability for DCs’ and this is consistent with Allen (1991), Cassar and Holmes (2003) and 
Akhtar (2005) among others. This suggests that Australian DCs avoid costly external financing 
and will rather take the opportunity to use internal financing for any future investment projects. 
However, neither long-term or short-term market value nor book value of leverage indicates any 
significant determination of Australian MCs. Possible explanation for this may be explained by 
the argument that Frank and Goyal (2004) put forward that the importance of profitability is 
declining every decade. Further, Frank and Goyal (2003) argue that during the 1980s and 
1990s, equity markets were more willing to fund currently unprofitable firms with good growth 
prospects. Given that Australian MCs during the 1990s were in a rather aggressive growing 
stage (World Investment Report, 2005), the above argument is clearly supporting the 
insignificance of profitability factors for MCs.
The evidence of significant negative cash dividend payout ratios coefficient DIVC is found in 
DCs (t=-2.560; t=-2.701 and t=-3.657) across long-term debt ratios and total debt ratios. 
Similarly, for MCs, the significant negative coefficient is found for both long-term 
measurements of debt (t=-2.134 and t=-2.004). These results are consistent with Myers (1984).
Agency costs of free cash flow (FCF) are less severe for high growth DCs and MCs (Jensen 
1986) but this again leads to the prediction that high growth firms should have less debt. By 
contrast, the significant short-term debt of MCs (t=3.159) supports the pecking order theory that 
the more profitable MCs are, the less debt they use as they can finance projects from internally- 
generated funds.
The growth variable (GROW MB) is also significant and negatively related to long-term market 
value of leverage and short-term book value of leverage across DCs (t=-2.900 and t=-2.325) and 
MCs. This suggests that there is a need to retain growth options, as in Goyal, Lehn and Racic
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(2002). This interpretation is consistent with static trade-off theory where it predicts a negative 
relation between leverage and growth. This states that high growth DCs and MCs loose more of 
their value when they go into distress. Several agency theories also predict a negative relation 
between leverage and growth. For example, the underinvestment problem is more severe for 
high growth Australian DCs and MCs as the growth opportunities lead these firms to prefer less 
debt. The underinvestment problem arises because DCs and MCs with risky debt have an 
incentive to under-invest in positive net present value projects since shareholders bear the entire 
costs of the project but receive only a fraction of the increase in firm value; part of it goes to 
debt holders (Myers 1977).
Another explanation is the asset substitution problem. It is also more severe for high growth 
Australian DCs and MCs. In high growth firms, it is easier for stockholders to increase project 
risk and it is harder for debt-holders to detect such changes. Thus, debt is more costly for firms 
with high growth opportunities.
The above determinants are also tested on a change of long-term debt ratio and short-term debt 
ratio with the difference of current year and previous year and the results of each explanatory 
factor stay closely similar to the debt level determinants. In order to avoid the repetition of the 
capital structure determinants theory discussed earlier, the results obtained on the change of 
long-term debt are not reported.
The following Table 3.3 attempts to respond whether a firm being a multinational coporation 
has any explanatory power to explicate the variation of capital structure across firms. This table 
documents the results of regression analysis of Model II. A log likelihood ratio test on MULT 
variable is conducted to test the whether inclusion of this variable has any significant impact in 
the model. The result indicates that multinationality MULT is a significant variable in 
explaining capital structure using log likelihood ratio test (LR F-stat=11.25 and t=3.77). The 
positive sign of the coefficient of 0.06 suggests that MCs have significantly higher debt than 
DCs, confirming the univariate results on leverage (see Table 3.1). The multiple regression
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results in Table 3.3 show that multinationality of a firm has significant negative attribute to 
enable MCs to hold less long-term market value of debt and this is indicated by the combined 
effect of intercept (C) and MULT coefficient estimates. However, multinationality issue matters 
significantly (t=2.403) for long-term book value of debt and total debt ((t=2.615). 
Mutinationality is insignificant in explaining short-term book value of debt for Australian firms. 
This result suggests that the investors and debt holders take the multinationality factor into 
account when they value a firm’s debt ratios, to be aware of the risks and benefit it may have in 
the capital structure decision.
Table 3.3
Capital structure determinants and controlling for multinationality in Australian firms
This table reports the results of Model II for Australian firms. There are four dependent variables and fourteen independent 
variables. The dependent variables (L E V E R A G E takes the following four forms: LTD MV LTD BV  , STD B V and 
TOT LTD BV ,j which are measured as book value of long-term debt divided by sum of book value of long-term debt and market 
value of equity; book value of long-term debt divided by book value of total assets; book value of short-term debt divided by book 
vaiue of totai assets; and book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets respectively. Fifteen independent variables 
are measured as: MULTU - multinationality takes a value of 1 (unity) if the corporation is multinational corporations otherwise it is 
0 (domestic corporations). DIVER,,, -  diversification is defined as the natural logarithm of total subsidiaries in home country and 
overseas countries. FXU -  foreign exchange risk is calculated by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales revenue. P R -  political 
risk variable is measured as the proportion of foreign sales to total sales times by the country’s political risk index which is provided 
by PRS Global. B P T C Y - bankruptcy risk is measured as the standard deviation of last five years earrings volatility of firm’s 
earnings before interest and taxes. BETA u -  firm-specific risk is measured as the covariance of firm return index and market index 
divided by variance of market index. ATXu -  average tax is calculated as a ratio of tax expense to total income. NDTS,,t -  non­
debt tax shield is calculated as depreciation expense to total assets. S I Z E -  size variable is measured as natural logarithm of total 
assets. CVA u -  collateral value of assets is measured as the ratio of total fixed assets to total assets. AGEU -  age is defined as the 
natural logarithm of the number of years since it has been incorporated until 2004. PROFu -profitability is defined as the average 
ratio of net income over total sales. DIVC -  dividend payment is a ratio of cash dividend paid to net income (note losses made 
any year has been deleted from sample). F C F -  free cash flow measured after Lehn and Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings 
before interest and taxes, depreciation, amortization minus tax, dividend and interest expense scaled by 10, 000. GROW MB j,, -  
growth is the market value of equity over total assets.
L E V E R A G E  „ = ß 0 + ß , M U L T it + ß 2D I V E R it + ß , F X  „ + ß APR„ + ß SB P TC Yit
+ ß bBETA„  + ß 7N D TS it + ß sATR„  + ß 9S I ZEit + ß l0CVA„  + ß u A G E it
+  ß ]2P ROF„  + ß n D  1VC fl +  ß 14F C F „  +  ß i5G R O W _  M  B  1( +  £ it
Variables
LTD-MV/,, LTD_ BV / STD _BV a TOT LTD BV u
CoefT t-Stat CoefT t-Stat CoefT t-Stat CoefT t-Stat
C - 0.287 -1.749 C - 0.159 - 1.281 0.067 1.633 - 0.148 - 1.159
MULT ü 0.038 1.520 0.038 2.403 b 0.005 0.820 0.048
b
2.615
DIVER i}t - 0.014 - 1.590 - 0.008 - 1.328 - 0.002 - 1.364 - 0.012 -1.728°
F X ü - 0.094 -3.0653 - 0.079 -3.8433 0.003 0.394 - 0.091 -3.9193
P R i, t 0.003 1.418 0.001 0.457 0.000 - 1.045 0.001 0.385
BPTCYü 0.000 1.105 0.000 1.178 0.000 -3.6283 0.000 - 0.009
BETA - 0.209 -2.293 3 - 0.055 - 0.951 - 0.052 -2.306b - 0.068 - 1.051
ATR i t - 0.270 - 1.056 - 0.041 - 0.166 0.185 1.232 0.212 0.940
XD TS 0.003 2.226b 0.004 4J343 0.001 0.929 0.004 3.8533
SIZE 0.074 9.7493 0.056 11.0903 0.001 0.538 0.060 10.6993
CVA u 0.023 0.601 0.054 1.993° - 0.021 -2.021b 0.022 0.752
AGE - 0.035 -2.907b - 0.022 -2.627b 0.006 3.2653 - 0.016 -1.7383
PROF i( - 0.050 -1.866° - 0.030 - 1.370 0.008 0.627 - 0.027 - 0.947
DIVC ijt - 0.093 -3.2083 - 0.075 -3.839b - 0.001 - 0.167 - 0.086 -3.9483
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b b c b
FCF i<( -0.054 -2.431 -0.055 -2.648 -0.012 -1.896 -0.055 -2.616
GROW MB i, -0.009 -3.650* -0.002 -1.989b 0.000 0.331 -0.003 -1.815°
Adj R Sqr 0.309 0.439 0.040 0.414
No. Obs 2248 2248 2248 2248
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
As discussed in the methodology, Table 3.4 further extends Model II and incorporates two 
additional factors - depth (extent of international involvement) and breadth (extent of international 
dispersion) which is measured as FX2 and DIVER2 to investigate if there is an optimal level for 
Australian firms to be disadvantaged of overseas sales, and number of subsidiaries especially 
when firms’ overseas sales and number of subsidiaries increase continuously. The results do not 
suggest any significant optimal level of the volume of foreign sales or numbers of subsidiaries and 
their relationship with any types of debt ratios. However, the explanatory power of this model 
appears plausible.
Table 3.4
Optimal level of foreign involvement in Australian firms
This table reports the variables and expected signs of the capital structure determinants. There are four dependent variables and 
fourteen independent variables. The dependent variables are measured as long-term debt to long-term debt and market value of 
assets which is indicated by LTD_MVU. LTD_BVU , STDBV,,, and TOT LTD BV,,, are measured as long-term debt, short-term 
and total debt to total book value of asset respectively. Sixteen independent variables are measured as: MULT, , - multinationality 
takes a value of 1 (unity) if the corporation is multinational corporations otherwise it is 0 (domestic corporations). D I V E R -  
diversification is defined as the natural logarithm of total subsidiaries in home country' and overseas countries. F X -  foreign 
exchange risk is calculated by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales revenue. FX2 -  multmationality concavity is measured as 
square of foreign sales to total sales. PR,,, -  political risk variable is measured as the proportion of foreign sales to total sales times 
by the country’s political risk index which is provided by PRS Global. BPTCY,,, - bankruptcy risk is measured as the standard 
deviation of last five years earrings volatility of firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. BETA,,, - firm-specific risk is measured as 
the covariance of firm return index and market index divided by variance of market index. ATX,,, -  average tax is calculated as a 
ratio of tax expense to total income. NDTS,,, -  non-debt tax shield is calculated as depreciation expense to total assets. SIZE,,, -  
size variable is measured as natural logarithm of total assets. CVA ,,, -  collateral value o f assets is measured as the ratio of total 
fixed assets to total assets. AGE,,, -  age is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of years since it has been incorporated 
until 2004. PROF,,, -  profitability is defined as the average ratio of net income over total sales. DIVC,,, -  dividend payment is a 
ratio of cash dividend paid to net income (note losses made any year has been deleted from sample). F C F -  free cash flow 
measured after Lehn and Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings before interest and taxes, depreciation, amortization minus tax, 
dividend and interest expense scaled by 10,000. GROW MB,,, -  growth is the market value of equity over total assets.
L E V E R A G E „ = ß 0 + ß . M U L T , ,  + ß 2D I V E R „  + ß , ( D I V E R " ) 2 + ß . F X R I S K  „ + ß s ( F X R I S K  ) 2i( 
+ ß . P R I S K  „ + ß . B P T C Y , ,  + ß ^ B  E T A "  + ß 9N D T S „  + ß ]0A T R ,, + ß u S I Z E t,
+ ß n C V A , ,  + ß n A G  E it + ß u P R O F "  + ß . 5 D I V C il + ß ^ F C F , ,  + ß n G R O W  _ MB, ,  + e
LTD MV u LTDBV i, STD -BV i.t H O LTD BV u
Variables Coeff t-Stat CoelT t-Stat Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat
C -0.25 -1.56 -0.156 -1.264 0.070 1.658° -0.145 -1.134
MULT iit 0.04 1.60 0.035 2.298b 0.004 0.588 0.046 2.444b
DIVER itt -0.02 -1.07 -0.008 -1.316 -0.002 -1.282 -0.012 -1.709°
DIVER2 i t 0.00 0.54 -0.005 -1.416 -0.103 -1.222 -0.011 -1.569
F X u -0.021 -0.19 -0.016 -0.239 0.020 0.712 -0.012 -0.138
FX -0.082 -0.71 -0.072 -1.029 -0.021 -0.675 -0.091 -1.054
PR i,t 0.001 1.30 0.001 0.400 0.000 -1.102 0.000 0.314
BPTCY 4, 0.001 1.13 0.000 1.244 0.000 -3.637a 0.000 0.126
BETA iyt -0.202 -2.03 a -0.043 -0.739 -0.050 -2.243b -0.054 -0.828
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a t r  i>t -0.281 -1.14 -0.045 -0.187 0.184 1.223 0.206 0.910
N D TS itt 0.001 2.18 a 0.003 4.1663 0.001 0.872 0.004 3.5783
SIZE  i( 0.074 9.68 3 0.056 11.1613 0.001 0.508 0.060 10.7873
CVA u 0.031 0.67 0.057 2.110b -0.021 -1.911 0.026 0.884
A G E  ü -0.033 -2.84 3 -0.022 -2.631b 0.006 3.1563 -0.016 -1.738°
PR O F i', -0.052 -1.74 -0.029 -1.349 0.009 0.653 -0.025 -0.914
D IV C i<t -0.090 -3.24 3 -0.075 -3.8873 -0.002 -0.202 -0.086 -3.9923
E C F 'j -0.051 -2.36 3 -0.055 -2.652b -0.012 -1.890C -0.055 -2.623b
G RO tV MB -0.011 -3.43 3 -0.002 -1.796b 0.000 0.366 -0.002 -1.611
Ad) R Sqr 0.335 0.460 0.051 0.436
No. Obs 2248 2248 2248 2248
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
To help explain the difference in leverage between MCs and DCs and to assess the impact of 
individual economic determinants on MCs, Model III is estimated. Table 3.5 presents the effect 
of interaction variables to explain the difference of capital structure determinants across DCs 
and MCs. The adjusted R-squared range is 11% to 57% across different definition of leverage. 
Book value of long-term leverage definition fits the model best and is indicated by higher R- 
square of 51.3%. When the dependent variable is used as short-term book value of debt, the 
model explains quite poorly (Adjusted R-squared=l 1.3%) and this is not surprising as the 
theory developed on capital structure is mainly based on long-term debt not short-term debt.
There is a significant difference in geographical diversification (M  DIVER) between DCs and 
MCs towards their book value of long-term and short-term debt ratio. Results suggest that as 
the Australian MCs become more geographically dispersed, it significantly decreases the ability 
of short-term debt (t=-4.188) and long-term book value (t=-2.463) of debt capacity in their 
capital structure. These results suggest that Australian MCs may not be capturing the 
theoretically predicted benefits of the internalization associated with economies of scale, scope 
and wider learning opportunities (Barlett and Goshal, 1995). Alternatively, coordination costs 
involved in raising debt in different geographical locations may outweigh the benefits.
Table 3.5
Interaction effect for Australian DCs and MCs capital structure determinants
This table reports the variables and expected signs of the capital structure determinants. There are four dependent variables and 
fourteen independent variables. There are four dependent variables and fourteen independent variables. LEVERAGE u takes the 
following four forms: LTD M V L T D  BV u , STD BV u and TOT LTD BV u which are measured as book value of long-term 
debt divided by sum of book value of long-term debt and market value of equity; book value of long-term debt divided by book 
value of total assets; book value of short-term debt divided by book value of total assets; and book value of total debt divided by 
book value of total assets respectively. Sixteen independent variables are measured as: MULTlA - multmationality takes a value of 1 
(unity) if the corporation is multinational corporations otherwise it is 0 (domestic corporations). D I V E R -  diversification is
91
defined as the natural logarithm of total subsidiaries in home country and overseas countries. FX ,, -foreign exchange risk is 
calculated by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales revenue. FX2 -  multinationality concavity is measured as square of foreign sales 
to total sales. PR u -  political risk variable is measured as the proportion of foreign sales to total sales times by the country’s 
political risk index which is provided by PRS Global. BPTCYu - bankruptcy risk is measured as the standard deviation of last five 
years earrings volatility of firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. BETA u - firm-specific risk is measured as the covariance of 
firm return index and market index divided by variance of market index. A T X -  average tax is calculated as a ratio of tax expense 
to total income. N D T S -  non-debt tax shield is calculated as depreciation expense to total assets. S I Z E -  size variable is 
measured as natural logarithm of total assets. CVA u -  collateral value o f assets is measured as the ratio of total fixed assets to total 
assets. AGEi t -  age is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of years since it has been incorporated until 2004. PROFi,, 
-  profitability is defined as the average ratio of net income over total sales. D I V , -  dividend payment is a ratio of cash dividend 
paid to net income (note losses made any year has been deleted from sample). F C F -  free cash flow measured after Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings before interest and taxes, depreciation, amortization minus tax, dividend and interest expense 
scaled by 10,000. GROW MB,,, -  growth is the market value of equity over total assets. The interaction dummy variable is used to 
find the significant difference of the common variables. For example, M_FXU takes the actual value of MCs while it is 0 for the 
DCs.
L E V E R A G E , ,  = ß ,, + ß  XM U L T „ + ß 2D I V E R „  + ß , F X R I S K „  + ß AP R I S K u + ß s B P T C Y „
+ ß 6B E T A „  + ß j N D  TS„ + ß „A T R it + ß 9S I Z E„  + ß l0C VA„ + ß U A G E „
+ ß ]2P R O F „  + ß x, D I V „  + ß XAF C F „  + ß ]SG R O W  _ M B , ,  + + ß i6M * DI VER, ,  
+ ß xlM * F X  R IS K ,, + ß XiM  * P R 1 S K  „ + ß ]9M * B P T C Y , ,  + ß 20M * BETA, ,
+ ß 2XM * N D T S „ + ß 22M * A TR„ + ß  22M * S I Z E „ + ß 2AM * C VA,,
+ ß l s M * A G E „ + ß  26M * P R O F , ,  + ß 21M  * D I V  C „ + ß  2%M * F C  F„
+ ß 29M * G R O W  _ MB, ,  + e „
LTD M V,, LTD BY „ STD _BV a TOT LTD _BV,,
Variables CoefT t-Stat CoefT t-Stat Coeff t-Stat CoefT t-Stat
C -0.164 -0.816 -0.106 -0.771 0.053 1.073 -0.098 -0.664
MULTI,, -0.382 -1.122 -0.193 -0.754 0.040 0.505 -0.197 -0.770
DIVER ijt 0.007 0.576 0.014 1.442 0.006 2.016b 0.013 1.225
EX 1,1 -0.119 -2.803a -0.102 -3.268 a 0.011 1.000 -0.100 -3.035 3
PR i,t 0.002 0.796 0.001 0.338 0.000 -0.202 0.000 0.274
BPTCY i,, 0.000 0.947 0.000 0.086 0.000 -2.6515 0.000 -0.365
BETA i,t -0.141 -1.095 -0.080 -0.922 -0.087 -2.535b -0.110 -1.148
A TR i,t -0.533 -2.31 l b -0.238 -1.442 0.148 1.648 -0.094 -0.525
NDTS i,( 0.003 2.694 0.004 3.092b 0.001 0.948 0.004 3.995a
SIZE i,t 0.073 8325a 0.053 7.580a 0.000 0.220 0.063 8328a
b a b b
CVA i,t 0.100 2.100 0.116 3.185 -0.023 -2.126 0.090 2J88
AGEi,, -0.057 -3.978a -0.038 -3.822a 0.003 1.337 -0.037 -3.2703
PROFut -0.066 -2.789b -0.034 -1.710° 0.004 0.274 -0.044 -1.756°
DIVC i,i -0.092 -2.533 b -0.073 -2.672b -0.005 -0.601 -0.104 -3.618a
ECF i,t -0.040 -2.030b -0.048 -2.428b -0.012 -1.636 -0.046 -2.320b
GROW MB i,t -0.016 -2.869b -0.005 -1.890° -0.003 -2.320b -0.008 -2.682b
M DIVER i,, -0.029 -1.738° -0.029 -2.463 -0.015 -4.188a -0.037 -2.897a
M_FX i,t 0.100 1.603 0.078 1.795° -0.009 -0.626 0.060 1.332
M_PRi,t 0.003 0.744 0.001 0.406 0.000 -0.435 0.002 0.553
M BPTCYi,t -0.001 -1.183 0.000 -0.408 -0.001 -2.954a -0.001 -1.009
M BETA i,t -0.197 -1.021 -0.032 -0.265 0.048 0.985 0.028 0.212
M_A TR i,t 0.223 0.477 0.243 0.609 0.072 0.210 0.620 1.733°
MNDT S  i,t -0.004 -0.470 -0.008 -0.995 0.000 0.066 -0.008 -0.900
MSI ZE i,t -0.012 -0.614 -0.004 -0.337 -0.002 -0.527 -0.024 -1.747°
M CVA i,t -0.134 -1.464 -0.113 -1.879° 0.011 0.486 -0.073 -1.126
MA G E  i,t 0.087 2.7603 0.062 3.1443 0.004 0.974 0.073 3.6213
MP R OF  i,( 0.040 0.520 -0.029 -0.403 0.021 0.757 0.046 0.614
MDI VC i,t -0.035 -0.514 -0.010 -0.214 0.009 0.587 0.038 0.743
MF C F  i,t -0.140 -2.620 -0.052 -1.319 0.001 0.065 -0.060 -1.572
M GROW MB i,t 0.012 1.976° 0.003 1.205 0.005 3.403a 0.009 2.668b
Adj R Sqr 0.402 0.513 0.113 0.570
No. Obs 2248 2248 2248 2248
a, b and c are the Statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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The interaction coefficient of foreign exchange risk M FX produces, interestingly, a mix of 
results in terms of its significant impact across different definition of debt ratio. It appears that 
MCs encounter significantly higher foreign exchange risk (t=l .795) exposure for their long­
term debt (scaled by book value of total assets) and, given the fact that the coefficient is 
positively different than DCs, it suggests that foreign exchange exposure has positive impact. 
This mean that when Australian MCs raises debt in multiple foreign countries, it takes 
advantage of the exchange rate moving in their favour when it comes to pay pack to the debt 
holders. The long-term debt ratio (scaled by book value of long-term debt and market value of 
equity) also suggests similar arguments; however, the relationship is not statistically significant. 
Interestingly, the foreign exchange exposure of MCs for short-term debt does not move in their 
favour and therefore the relationship is negative, implying as foreign exchange risk increases, it 
disfavours raising short-term debt in MCs’ capital structure than DCs’.
The significant negative (t=-2.954) interaction coefficient of MCs firm risk (M BPTCY) 
indicates that MCs’ bankruptcy risk is a significant determinant of short-term debt. That is, if 
there is an increase in firm-specific risk in general, it introduces a greater negative shock in the 
MCs short-term debt which in turn reduces the short-term fundraising capacity in MCs’ capital 
structure. Impact of bankruptcy risk in MCs does have negative impact in their long-term debt; 
however, the relationship remains insignificant across different long-term debt definitions.
No apparent significant relationship is observed in the interaction variable of average tax ratios 
(M ATR) between long-term and short-term debt. However, it appears that MCs’ ATR has 
significantly different implication for total debt (t= 1.733). Results show that the benefit of 
higher average tax rate for Australian MCs is significantly increase their total debt capacity 
relative to their counterpart DCs.
Similarly, the significant (t=-l .717) interaction of size variable (M SIZE) on total debt suggests 
that as MCs become larger due to increase in assets, it has significant negative impact on total
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book value of debt. This indicates that as MCs become larger and when they require any 
external funds for financing purposes, then issuing debt becomes costlier than issuing equity.
MjCVA representing the slope difference of collateral value of assets in explaining the MCs’ 
capital structure indicates that it has significant negative impact (t=-l .879) in explaining the 
book value of long-term debt but not market value of long-term debt or book value of short­
term debt.
The interaction variable of age variable (M AGE) shows that there is a significant difference in 
explaining MCs’ long-term debt ratio. This suggests that the attribute of MCs’ maturity enables 
them to hold significantly higher debt (t=2.760; t=3.144) level relative to DCs regardless of how 
long-term debt ratios is defined at 1% significance. This age also conveys a signal of credit 
ratings, which means that over years as Australian MCs increase their creditworthiness in the 
debt market, it prepares MCs to afford higher long-term debt in their capital structure.
The insignificant interaction variable on profitability (M PROF) and dividend payments 
{M DIVC) suggests the issue of pecking order theory of financing internally and raising debt to 
meet the required level of dividend payment to keep a smooth dividend payment policy are not 
significantly different between DCs and MCs. Consequently, these two interaction variables do 
not have any significant explanatory influence to explicate the difference of capital structure 
across DCs and MCs.
While the results show the free cash flow of agency costs of MCs is significantly different (t=- 
2.620) from DCs counterparts, it only matters in explaining market value of MCs’ debt. It 
indicates that as the free cash flow or excess cash increase, it increases the agency problem of 
debt and therefore minimises the long-term debt (scaled by sum of long-term debt and market 
value of equity) capacity.
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The interaction of (M GROW MB) coefficient shows that Australian MCs experience 
significantly higher growth opportunities than DCs and this growth opportunity explains 
marginally significant portion of long-term debt scaled by by sum of long-term debt and market 
value of equity (t=l.97) and highly significantly to explain short-term debt (f=3.403). The 
positive relationship signifies that Australian MCs rely on external funding in their growth 
process.
Table 3.6 attempts to investigate further implications of international exposures that MCs 
encounter while operating in the international arena by considering Australian MCs’ subsidiary 
located countries’ credit risk (CR) ratings, economic risk (ER) ratings and financial risk (FR). 
The following table uses a sample of DCs and MCs based on 2003-2004 data as the data for 
those additional risks are available for only for those two particular years.
Results show that none of the additional international variables has its own unique explanatory 
power to explain the capital structure with any empirical economic theory; however, the 
inclusion of these additional three factors improved the model significantly. For example, in 
Table 3.3 the adjusted R square across different leverage measurements range between 4% to 
41% while in Table 3.6, the adjusted R square range between 7% to 68%.
Table 3.6
The effect of additional international capital structure determinants for Australian DCs and MCs -
credit risk, economic risk and finance risk
This table reports the variables and expected signs of the hypotheses. There are four dependent variables and fifteen independent 
variables. There are four dependent variables and fourteen independent variables. There are four dependent variables and fourteen 
independent variables. LEVERAGE ,,, takes the following four forms: LTD M V u, LTD BV  ,,, , STD BV  ,,, and TOT LTD_BV ,,, 
which are measured as book value of long-term debt divided by sum of book value of long-term debt and market value of equity; 
book value of long-term debt divided by book value of total assets; book value of short-term debt divided by book value of total 
assets; and book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets respectively. The independent variables are measured in 
the following manner: MULT,,, -  multinationality takes a value of 1 (unity) if the corporation is multinational otherwise it is 0 
(domestic corporations). DIVER,,, -  diversification is defined as the natural logarithm of total subsidiaries in home country and 
overseas countries. FXU -  foreign exchange risk is calculated by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales revenue. PR, , -  political 
risk variable is measured as the proportion of foreign sales to total sales times by the country’s political risk index which is provided 
by PRS Global. CR,,, -  credit risk is measured as the sum all the firm’s subsidiaries countries’ credit risk ratings exposed to the 
proportion of each sale that a subsidiary' makes overseas. ER,,, -  economic risk and FR/t, -  financial risk is measured in the same 
manner as CR,,, by altering the ratings for ER,,, and FR,, respectively. BETA,,, -  firm-specific risk is measured as the covariance of 
firm return index and market index divided by variance of market index. BPTCY,,, - bankruptcy risk is measured as the standard 
deviation of last five years earrings volatility of firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. ATX,,, -  average tax is calculated as a 
ratio of tax expense to total income. NDTS,,, -  non-debt tax shield is calculated as depreciation expense to total assets. SIZE,,, -  size 
variable is measured as natural logarithm of total assets. CVAU -  collateral value o f assets is measured as the ratio of total fixed 
assets to total assets. AGE,,, -  age is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of years since it has been incorporated until 
2004. PROF,,, -  profitability is defined as the average ratio of net income over total sales. DIVC.,, -  dividend payment is a ratio of 
cash dividend paid to net income (note losses made any year have been deleted from sample). FCF,,, -  free cash flow measured 
after Lehn and Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings before interest and taxes, depreciation, amortization minus tax, dividend and 
interest expense scaled by 10,000. GROW MB,,,- growth is the market value of equity over total assets.
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LEVERAGE„ = ß 0 + ß xMULTit + ß 2DIVERit + ß . F X R I S K + ß APR„ + ß,CR„ + ß 6ERit + ß 7FRit 
+ ßsBPTCY,, + ß 9BETAu + ß ]0 NDTSU + /M ™ ,, + ß 12S/Z£„ + J31SCK4,
+ j314ZG £(, + ß lsPROFu + ß ]6DIVC„ + /5I7FCF„ + ß ]%GROW _ MZ?„ + e4l
V a r ia b le s
L T D .M V  4 , L T D B V  4 , S T D B V , , T O T  L T D  BV 4 ,
C oefT t-S ta t C oefT t-S ta t C oelT t-S ta t C oefT t-S ta t
C -0 .161 -0 .0 6 6 -1 .4 2 5 - 1 . 0 2 0 -0 .1 4 9 -0 .3 8 9 -0 .1 3 4 -0 .0 8 7
M U L T 0 .1 0 3 1.739° 0 .0 8 4 1.957b 0 .0 0 6 0 .4 2 2 0 .0 9 7 2.244a
D IV E R  i t -0 .0 3 4 -1 .1 8 9 -0 . 0 1 1 -0 .5 9 4 0.000 - 0 . 0 1 2 -0 .0 0 8 -0 .4 2 3
F X U -0 .1 5 9 -0 .9 6 4 -0 .1 0 9 -1 .1 1 9 0 . 0 1 1 0.251 -0 .1 5 7 -1 .6 0 9
PRut 0 .0 0 4 0.551 0 .0 0 8 1.663° 0 .0 0 3 1.325 0 .0 0 7 1.255
C R i , , 0 .0 0 7 0 .105 -0 .0 3 7 -1 .3 1 7 -0 .0 0 4 -1 .1 9 0 -0 .0 2 3 -0 .631
ERu -0 .0 1 5 -0 . 1 0 2 0 . 1 0 1 1 .614 0 .0 0 5 0 .411 0 .0 3 8 0 .4 4 6
F R  i,l -0 .0 0 3 -0 .1 2 4 -0 .0 1 4 -1 .0 7 6 0 .0 0 3 0 .7 5 3 -0 .0 0 5 -0 .3 4 7
B P T C Y ü 0.000 0 .0 4 0 0.000 0 .031 -0 . 0 0 1 -2.584b - 0 . 0 0 1 -1 .3 7 9
B E T A 4, -0 .071 -0 .3 8 2 0 .0 7 5 0 .9 1 4 -0 .0 7 5 -1 .5 9 4 - 0 . 0 2 0 -0 .2 0 7
A  T R  i,t -0 .2 9 2 -0 .5 4 6 -0 .0 2 6 -0 .0 7 8 -0 .1 6 2 -0 .7 8 5 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 1 6
N D T S i}t -0 .0 7 8 -2.230b -0 .0 5 5 -2.562b 0 . 0 0 1 1 .544 -0 .0 5 5 -2.741
S I Z E 0 .0 6 8 3366a 0 .0 5 6 5.8873 0.000 0 .0 7 4 0 .0 5 5 5.327s
C V A  Ut -0 .1 6 7 -1.9893 -0 .1 1 9 -2.407b -0 .0 0 7 -0 .2 6 3 -0 . 1 2 0 -2.144S
a g e  i^ f -0 .0 2 9 -0 .7 9 6 0 . 0 0 1 0 .0 2 8 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 1 2 2 -0 .0 1 3 -0 .6 2 8
P R O F i, , -0 .0 3 7 -0 .5 3 0 -0 .0 1 4 -0 .3 7 6 0 .0 1 4 0 .4 7 7 0 .0 4 7 1 .027
DIVCi,t -0 .0 3 3 -0.481 -0 .0 1 8 -0 .5 0 8 -0 .0 0 8 -0 .3 4 6 -0 .0 4 0 -0 .9 1 0
P C F  u -0 .1 0 6 -0 .9 8 0 -0 .1 7 8 -7.1163 - 0 . 0 1 1 -0 .7 6 8 -0 .1 9 0 -6.793S
G R O W  M B 4, -0 .0 2 5 -2.087b -0 .0 0 8 -1 .5 6 4 -0 .0 0 4 -1 .3 2 6 - 0 . 0 1 0 -1.851°
A d j  R  S q r 0 .2 4 9 8 0 .6 8 9 3 0 .0 7 1 0 0 .6141
N o. O bs 545 545 545 545
a, b and c are the Statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
It has long been known that median industry leverage is an extremely powerful and robust 
predictor of corporate leverage. In the following Table 3.7, it shows that after controlling for 
industry median ratio and industry dummy variable, the majority of the explanatory variables 
sign and significance level stays the same across different long-term debt ratios except short­
term debt. For example, the factors chosen for Model I are extremely stable no matter which of 
the industry related control variables are used.
As discussed earlier, firms within an industry share exposure to many of the same forces and 
such forces will be lead to similar trade-offs. Furthermore, product market competition creates 
pressure from firms to mimic the leverage ratio of other firms in the industry. The median 
industry ratio suggests that this factor significantly explains total debt (t=2.676). Controlling for 
industry dummy revealed an interesting outcome across long-term debt and short-term debt. It 
shows that firms that belong to agriculture and fisheries, construction, manufacturing, wholesale 
and retail hold significantly higher short-term debt (t=2.144; t=2.617; t=4.131; t=3.885 and
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t=3.541 respectively). It also shows that firms that are members o f the manufacturing, transport 
and service industry hold significantly higher (t=4.274; t=2.013 and 3.904) long-term debt 
respectively.
Table 3.7
Industry effect on Australian firms’ capital structure
This table presents the sensitivity of industry level leverage for both DCs and MCs. Note that among the initial five sets of models, 
only Model II is applied. The table provides the US 2-digit SIC codes industries for categories. This table reports the variables and 
expected signs of the capital structure determinants. There are four dependent variables and fourteen independent variables. There 
are four dependent variables and fourteen independent variables. The dependent variable (LEVERAGE u ) takes the following four 
forms: LTD MV u, LTD BV u , STDJ3V u and TO TLTD B V  ,,, which are measured as book value of long-term debt divided by 
sum of book value of long-term debt and market value of equity; book value of long-term debt divided by book value of total 
assets; book value of short-term debt divided by book value of total assets; and book value of total debt divided by book value of 
total assets respectively. Sixteen independent variables are measured as: MULT,,, - multinationality takes a value of 1 (unity) if the 
corporation is multinational corporations otherwise it is 0 (domestic corporations). DIVER,,, -  diversification is defined as the 
natural logarithm of total subsidiaries in home country and overseas countries. FX,,, -  foreign exchange risk is calculated by the 
ratio o f foreign sales to total sales revenue. FX: -  multinationality concavity is measured as square of foreign sales to total sales. 
PR,,, -  political risk variable is measured as the proportion of foreign sales to total sales times by the country’s political risk index 
which is provided by PRS Global. B P T C Y -  bankruptcy risk is measured as the standard deviation of last five years earrings 
volatility of firm’s earnings before interest and taxes BETA,,, -  firm-specific risk is measured as the covariance of firm return index 
and market index divided by variance of market index. ATXU -  average tax is calculated as a ratio of tax expense to total income. 
NDTS,,, -  non-debt tax shield is calculated as depreciation expense to total assets. SIZE,,, -  size variable is measured as natural 
logarithm of total assets. CVA,,, -  collateral value o f assets is measured as the ratio of total fixed assets to total assets. AGE,,, -  
age is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of years since it has been incorporated until 2004. PROF,,, -  profitability is 
defined as the average ratio of net income over total sales. DIVC ,,, -  dividend payment is a ratio of cash dividend paid to net 
income (note losses made any year have been deleted from sample). FCF ,,, -  free cash flow measured after Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989) is the sum of earnings before interest and taxes, depreciation, amortization minus tax, dividend and interest expense scaled 
by 10,000. GROW,,, -growth is the market value of equity over total assets. Industry median (IND_MEDIAN is calculated as 
the ratio of long-term debt to total assets for each industry. The acronyms for the industries are: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
(IN D A A F F  ,.,); mining (1NDBM1N,,,); Construction (IN D C  CON,.,); Manufacturing (IND D M NF,,,); Transportations, 
Communications and Electricity (INDEfTCE ,.,); Wholesale Trade (IND F WHL ,.,); Retail Trade (INDGRET,,,) and Service 
( INDHSER, , ) .
LEVERAGE,, = ß 0 + ß xMULTu + ß 2DIVER„ + ß ,FXR!SKu + ß APRISKit + ß.BPTCY,, + ß bBETAu 
+ ß 7NDTS„ + ß^A TR,, + ß 9SIZEu + ß l0CVAu + ß nAGEu + ß n PROF„ + ß u DIVC„ 
+ ß lAFCF„ + ß „GROW _ M B it + ß„IND  _ MEDIAN + 0 17£  I N D t + eu
Variables
LTD .M V /., LTD B V ( , STD B V / , TOT_ LTD B V , ,
CoefT t-Stat CoefT t-Stat CoefT t-Stat CoefT t-Stat
C -0.414 -2.44S3 -0.226 -1.926b 0.043 1.096 -0.201 -1.646
M U LT  i t 0.024 0.910 0.028 L842b 0.004 0.637 0.024 1.407
DIVER i t -0.011 -1.307 -0.005 -0.941 -0.002 -1.036 -0.004 -0.629
F X  i t -0.100 -3.5063 -0.080 -4.0983 0.000 0.040 -0.092 -4.3543
PR D 0.003 1.498 0.001 0.426 0.000 -1.066 0.000 0.174
BPTCY i,, 0.000 2.210b 0.000 1.668C 0.000 -2.8503 0.000 1.458
BETA u -0.238 -2.603b -0.100 -1.719° -0.051 -2.312b -0.164 -2.5533
ATRi,t -0.199 -0.769 -0.011 -0.045 0.208 1.321 0.278 1.347
NDTSi' , 0.004 1.633 0.004 4.0383 0.001 1.100 0.005 2.4493
SIZE fr 0.071 9.4303 0.052 11.7063 0.001 0.459 0.051 10.4493
CVA i,, 0.078 1.502 0.111 2.690b -0.012 -1.083 0.125 2.8933
AGE t^ -0.034 -2.9793 -0.015 -1.994b 0.004 2.3073 -0.006 -0.730
PROF itt -0.053 -2.0403 -0.028 -1.449 0.006 0.449 -0.026 -1.098
DIVC j j -0.102 -3.27S3 -0.078 -3.9123 -0.006 -0.779 -0.088 -4.1053
FCF u -0.051
b
-2.355 -0.050 -2.472 b -0.013 -1.9523 -0.050 -2.4983
GROW  MB itt -0.010 -3.9083 -0.004 -2.730b 0.000 0.375 -0.005 -2.7943
IN D M E D IA  Nit, 0.004 0.106 0.021 1.210 0.014 1.192 0.057 2.6763
IND_A_AFFi<t 0.139 1.887b 0.040 1.213 0.026 2.144b 0.014 0.357
IND_B_MINit, 0.053 1.347 0.007 0.273 0.018 1.848° -0.019 -0.617
I N D C C O N it, 0.028 0.872 0.036 1.686° 0.055 2.617b 0.097 2.9143
IND_D_MNFitt 0.157 4.5003 0.083 4.2743 0.034 4.1313 0.107 4.2483
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c b a a
I N D E T C E i j 0.090 1.646 0.077 2.013 0.022 1.997 0.125 2.975
l N D F W H L i t 0.130 1.591 0.018 0.694 0.065 3.885** 0.079 1.931b
I N D G R E T l t 0.038 0.858 0.010 0.327 0.040 3.5413 0.017 0.385
I N D H S E R j , 0.084 2.8493 0.078 3.904a 0.008 1.001 0.061 2.513
A d j R  S q r 0.387 0.469 0.067 0.569
No. Obs 2248 2248 2248 2248
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (two tailed test).
Table 3.7 confirms that regardless of any capital structure theory and justification of using any 
particular variable, the first 14 variables explain the capital structure the most for all firms. The 
other variable also appears significant by its own right but on a cumulative basis they do not add 
much significant value to the model. Therefore, the cost of adjustment model uses the very first 
proposed model’s estimates.
The results in Table 3.8 confirm the traditional view in corporate finance that both Australian 
DCs and MCs strive to maintain an optimal capital structure that balances the costs and benefits 
associated with varying degrees of financial leverage (Leary & Roberts, 2005; Fama & French, 
2002; Baker & Wurgler, 2002). Table 3.8 is divided into four segments in order to investigate 
the speed of adjustment costs across Australian MCs and DCs employing market value of long­
term debt and book value of long-term debt; short-term debt and total debt across five years 
starting from 2000.2' The results suggest that both DCs and MCs experience the presence of 
adjustment costs at different rates across years which results in shocks having a persistent effect 
on both market value of debt ratios and book value of debt ratios. The speed of adjustment costs 
for DCs in Panel A (market value of debt) range between -3% to 38% over five years while on 
average it is 12% per year. Similarly, the speed of adjustment costs for market value of MCs’ 
debt fall in the range o f -1% to 36%. We further conduct a non-parametric test (Table 3.10) to 
test whether there is a significant difference across Australian DCs’ and MCs’ speed of partial 
adjustment costs across different definitions of debt ratios. It reveals that generally, on average, 
Australian MCs have higher positive adjustment costs (the benefit of cost of adjustment towards 
optimal level debt ratio outweighs the risks associated with the adjustments towards optimum) 
of market and book value of long-term debt, but not book value of short-term and long-term
21 I was unable to do speed o f adjustment costs analysis across the whole sample period due to lack of matched panel 
data and lag data availability during 1995-1999 across the independent and explanatory variables.
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debt than, their DCs counterparts. However, the majority of the results in mean difference of 
different measures of debt ratios between DCs and MCs are not significantly different at any 
conventional statistical significance level, except the speed of adjustment costs of long-term 
book value debt of MCs are significantly higher than DCs at 10% significance level. Further, 
an interesting result can be spotted in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.9 where it shows that both types of 
Australian firms (MCs and DCs) have a common tendency of adjusting in larger proportion of 
their book value of short-term debt every year than the long-term debt. Further, a highly 
significant result of the benefit of adjustment towards optimum level of long-term and short­
term book value of debt difference is also observed. This suggests that in order to rebalance the 
short-term debt in the capital structure, Australian DCs are in a better position to exploit the 
advantage of local debt market than the MCs, as the benefit of rebalancing the short-term debt 
outweighs the costs of adjustment.
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Figure 3.1
Speed of adjustment costs across different debt for MCs and DCs over 1995-2004.
Speed of Adjustment costs for Australian DCs debt 
target ratio accnoss 1999 - 2004
□ DCs - LTDMV 
■ DCs - LTD BV
□ DCs - STDBV
□ DCs - TD BV
Speed of Adjustment costs for Australian MCs debt 
target accross 1999 - 2004
□ MCs-LTD 
■ MCs-LTD
□ MCs-STD
□ MCs-TDJ
Table 3.9
t-test of adjustment costs across Australian MCs and DCs over 5 years capital structure
Four dependent variables are used in this table. LTD_M\'n is measured as the ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt and market 
value of equity; LTD BV, , is measured as the ratio of long-term debt to book value of total assets and STD_BVj t is measured as 
short-term debt to total assets. The coefficients of adjustment costs across five years have been reported and a t-test is conducted to 
investigate whether there is significant difference in adjustment costs between DCs and MCs.
LTD MV u LTD BV u STD BV , j TO TLTD BV u DCs BV MCs BV
DCs MCs t-test DCs MCs t-test DCs MCs t-test DCs MCs t-test LTD STD t-test LTD STD t-tes
2004 0.037 0.023 -0.014 0.011 0.273 -0.9 0.136 -0.74 -0.014 0.273 0.011 -0.895
2003 0.387 0.197 0.017 0.376 0.794 0.789 0.243 0.473 0.017 0.794 0.376 0.789
2002 0.11 0.353 0.094 0.206 0.793 0.957 0.222 0.490 0.094 0.793 0.206 0.957
2001 -0.03 0.119 0.087 0.562 0.434 0.82 0.118 0.110 0.087 0.434 0.562 0.820
2000 0.121 -0.010 0.045 0.002 0.466 0.336 0.198 -0.01 0.045 0.466 0.002 0.336
Mean 0.125 0.138 0.132 0.046 0.231 1-69C 0.552 0.401 0.423 0.184 0.064 0.53 0.046 0.5524.778 0.231 0.401 0.4;
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
The above results support the findings of Leary and Roberts (2005) and Flannery and Rangen 
(2006) put forward that debt levels do not stay constant year to year. They argue that many 
studies wrongly assumed debt level stay constant over time and therefore the adjustment costs 
are zero. Their results confirm that debt levels do not stay constant over time and my results 
further confirm this for both DCs and MCs. This result indicate that assuming the debt level 
stays constant and therefore the adjustment costs is zero could certainly lead to obtain bias 
results. Therefore, in the previous literature, failing to adjust for adjustment costs in their 
analysis of capital structure determinants gives a warning of careful interpretation.
101
Table 3.10 presents a univariate regression that tests the overall time effect on leverage to 
investigate the effect of time on leverage. The result shows that over 10 years from 1995 to 
2004 long-term leverage is statistically positive and significant across DCs and MCs for market 
value of debt (t=2.490 and 1=2.964). However, although I observe a positive linear relationship 
with the incremental time effect for both DCs and MCs, MCs have no apparent significant 
relationship across any long-term and short-term debt. Interestingly, time trend reveals that 
short-term book value of debt has been on average declining.
Table 3.10
Time variation on capital structure for Australian DCs and MCs
Three dependent variables are used in this table. LTD_M\'l t is measured as the ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt and market
value of equity; LTD BV, , is measured as the ratio of long-term debt to book value of total assets, and STD BV, , is measured as 
short-term debt to total assets. Independent variable of Yr is a categorical incremental value; for example, if the dependent variables 
are from 1995 then it is coded as 1 and it increases to 10 as the year proceeds.
LEV ERA G E t , = C + ß iTi me i , + £,,
LTD_MV ,, r s 1BV „ STD BV n
DCs MCs DCs MCs DCs MCs
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat CoefT t-stat Coeff t-stat CoefT t-stat
c
F
-10.497 -2.476 -18.099 -2.955 3 -9.655 -2.237 b -11.280 -1.554 1.118 0.628 -1.218 -0.637
Y r i.t 0.005 2.490 b 0.009 2.9643 0.005 2.253 b 0.006 1.567 -0.001 -0.602 0.001 0.663
No. of Obs 994 1254 994 1254 994 1254
Ad j R-sqr 0.0068 0.0073 0.0002
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Although not reported, a further analysis of individual year effects on determinants has also 
been investigated to identify whether time effect has any significant variation in capital structure 
determinants. When an individual yearly regression is ran, it is found that the determining 
factors vary across years for both DCs and MCs but the variation of capital structure 
determining factors across years are more prominent in MCs’ capital structure.
3.7 Summary and Conclusion
The primary objective of the research reported in this paper was to enhance our understanding 
about the determinants of Australian domestic and multinational corporations by using a unique 
dataset. The findings in this chapter reconfirm the determinants that have been investigated in
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Akhtar (2005), and in addition, some interesting insight into capital structure determinants is 
also revealed.
The results indicate that after controlling for multinational effects, foreign exchange risk, firm- 
specific risks, average tax rate, size, age, cash dividend payments, free cash flow and growth 
variables are the significant determinants for long-term debt across Australian DCs and MCs 
regardless of what definition of long-term debt ratios is employed. The multinationality is a 
significant factor in explaining long-term debt ratios. In explaining short-term debt, the 
significant determinants are bankruptcy risks, firm-specific risks, age and free cash flows. The 
impact of increasing Australian firms’ global association through foreign sales (depth) and 
number of subsidiaries (breadth) show no significant optimal relationship with debt ratios. In 
relation to interaction effects that explain the differences between DCs’ and MCs’ debt ratios, 
the significant interaction variables are diversification and age for long-term debt ratios and 
diversification, bankruptcy risks and growth for short-term debt. The additional financial 
factors -  credit risks, economic risks and financial risk have no significant impact on capital 
structure decision; however, inclusion of these variables largely improves the explaining power 
of the model. Industry effects are considered and some industries became significant in 
explaining capital structure. Finally, the capital structure varied significantly over the sample 
period. This variation is explained by the positive significant speed of adjustment, indicating 
the possible existence of positive net benefit in annual adjustment of the capital structure 
towards their target level. Further, results also suggests that MCs in Australia adjust their target 
levels of debt faster relative to their counterparts DCs. The table below provides a summary of 
the hypothesis and results of this chapter.
Table 3.11
Summary of Hypotheses and Results
Hypot
hesis
Description Proxy Expected
Sign
Rejected H0 (Supporting Hft
1 H I  o : T h e re  is  n o  s ig n i f i c a n t  d i f fe r e n c e  
b e tw e e n  M C s  ’ a n d  D C s  ’ d e b t  r a t io s  in  
A u s tr a l ia .
U n iv a r ia te
T es t
+ / - F a il  to  re je c t  H 0. It s u g g e s t  th a t  
A u s tr a l ia n  M C s  d o  n o t  h a v e  
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  h ig h e r  s h o r t- te rm , lo n g  
te rm  a n d  to ta l  d e b t  th a n  D C s .H I  / :  T h e re  is  a  s ig n i f ic a n t  d i f fe r e n c e  
b e tw e e n  M C s  ’ a n d  D C s  ’ d e b t  r a t io s  in  
A u s tr a l ia .
2 H 2 0 : T h e re  is  n o  s ig n i f i c a n t  r e la tio n s h ip  
b e tw e e n  M C s  ’ l e v e l  o f  m u l t in a t io n a l i ty
M U L T it + / - H 0 is  re je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  F f  fo r  
M C s  in  A u s tr a l ia  ( u s in g  L T D  B V
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a n d  d eb t ratios. a n d  T O T  L T D BV) in  T a b le  3 .3 . 
T h is  s u g g e s t  th a t  A u s tr a l ia n  M C s  
h o ld  s ig n if ic a n t ly  h ig h e r  lo n g  te rm  
a n d  to ta l  b o o k  v a lu e  o f  d e b t  th a n  
D C s .
H 2 ,:  There is a s ig n ific a n t re la tio n sh ip  
b e tw een  M C s  ’ lev e l o f  m u ltin a tio n a lity  
a n d  d eb t ratios.
3 A H 3 A 0 : There is no  s ig n ific a n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the leve l o f  
d ivers ifica tio n  a n d  d eb t ra tio s f o r  D C s ’ 
a n d  M Cs.
D IV E R i, + /- H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  f f  fo r  
A u s tr a l ia n  D C s  (S T D  Z?F) a n d  M C s  
(L T D  M V , L T D  B V , S T D  B V  a n d  
T O T L T D B V ) .  T h e  n e g a t iv e
s ig n if ic a n t  c o e f f ic ie n t  o n  th e
d iv e r s if ic a t io n  s u g g e s ts  th a t
A u s tr a l ia n  M C s  h a v e  h ig h e r
b a n k r u p tc y  r is k  d u e  to  u n d iv e r s i f ie d  
c a s h  f lo w s  ( T a b le  3 .2 )
H 3A j : There is s ig n ific a n t re la tio n sh ip  
b e tw een  the leve l o f  d ivers ifica tio n  a n d  
d eb t ra tio s f o r  D C s  ’ a n d  M Cs.
3 B H 3 B 0 : There is no  s ig n ific a n t d ifferen ce  
b e tw een  the leve l o f  d ivers ifica tio n  a n d  
M C s ’ d eb t ratios.
M _ D IV E R iit + /- H 0 is  r e je c te d  fo r  M C s  in  A u s tr a l ia  
s u g g e s t in g  th a t  A u s tr a l ia n  M C s ’ 
d iv e r s if ic a t io n  s ig n if ic a n t ly  r e d u c e s  
d e b t  h o ld in g  c a p a c ity  r e la t iv e  to  
D C s . ( T a b le  3 .5 )
H 3 B , : There  is s ig n ific a n t d ifference  
b e tw een  the leve l o f  d ivers ifica tio n  a n d  
M C s ’ d eb t ratios.
4 A H 4 A 0 : There  is n o  sig n ific a n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e en  the  leve l o f  fo re ig n  
e xch a n g e  risk  a n d  d e b t ra tio s f o r  D C s ’ 
a n d  M C s.
F X i>t + /- H 0 is  r e je c te d  fo r  D C s  in  A u s tr a l ia  
s u g g e s t in g  th a t  th e  f o re ig n  e x c h a n g e  
r is k  is  d e tr im e n ta l  fo r  D C s  c a p i ta l  
s t ru c tu re .  ( T a b le  3 .2 )
H 4A  j : There is a  s ig n ific a n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e en  the  leve l o f  fo re ig n  
exch a n g e  risk  a n d  d e b t ra tio s f o r  D C s ’ 
a n d  M Cs.
4 B H 4 B 0 : There is no  s ig n ific a n t d ifferen ce  
b e tw een  the leve l o f  fo re ig n  exch a n g e  
risk  a n d  M C s  ’ d e b t ratios.
M _ F X Ut + /- H 0 is  r e je c te d  fo r  M C s  in  A u s tr a l ia  
in  e x p la in in g  L T D  B V . It s u g g e s ts  
th a t  M C s ’ f o re ig n  e x c h a n g e  r i s k  a c ts  
in  fa v o r  a n d  a s s is t  to  in c r e a s e  th e i r  
b o o k  v a lu e  o f  d e b t. ( T a b le  3 .5 )
H 4 B i : There is s ig n ific a n t d ifferen ce  
b e tw een  the leve l o f  fo re ig n  exch a n g e  
r isk  a n d  M C s ’ d eb t ra tios.
5 A H 5 A 0 : There is n o  sig n ifica n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e en  the leve l o f  
p o litic a l r isk  a n d  d e b t ra tio s  f o r  D C s ' 
a n d  M C s.
P R i, + /- F a i ls  to  re je c t  H 0 fo r  b o th  D C s  a n d  
M C s  in  A u s tr a l ia .  T h is  s u g g e s ts  
th a t  th e re  is  n o  s ig n i f ic a n t  p o l i t ic a l  
r is k  th r e a t  to  e i th e r  o f  th o s e  tw o  
ty p e s  o f  f irm  th a t  c a n  im p a c t  o n  
th e i r  c a p i ta l  s tru c tu re .
H 5A  i : There is a  s ig n ific a n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the  leve l o f  
p o lit ic a l  r isk  a n d  d e b t ra tio s f o r  D C s  ’ 
a n d  M C s.
5 B H 5 B 0 : There is n o  s ig n ific a n t d iffe ren ce  
b e tw een  the leve l o f  p o litic a l r isk  a n d  
M C s  ’ d e b t ratios.
M _ P R ,t + /- F a ils  to  r e je c t  H 0 b e c a u s e  th e r e  is  n o  
s ig n if ic a n t  d i f fe r e n c e  is  o b s e rv e d  
b e tw e e n  D C s  a n d  M C s  p o l i t ic a l  r is k  
e x p o s u re  in  e x p la in in g  c a p ita l  
s t ru c tu re .  (T a b le  3 .5 )
H 5 B / : There is s ig n ific a n t d ifference  
b e tw een  the leve l o f  p o litic a l r isk  a n d  
M C s ’ d e b t ratios.
6 A H 6 A 0 : There is n o  sig n ifica n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e en  the  leve l o f  
b a n k ru p tcy  r isk  a n d  d e b t ra tio s f o r  D C s ’ 
a n d  M C s.
B P T C Y j, H 0 is  r e je c te d  fo r  b o th  D C s  a n d  M C s  
in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  H ] in  e x p la in in g  
th e i r  s h o r t  te rm  d e b t  ( S T D  B V ) . 
T h is  s u g g e s t  th a t  b a n k r u p tc y  r is k  
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  r e d u c e s  b o th  D C s ’ a n d  
M C s ’ s h o r t  te rm  d e b t  r a t io s .  ( T a b le  
3 .2 )
H 6A  i : There is a  s ig n ific a n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the  leve l o f  
b a n k ru p tcy  r isk  a n d  d e b t ra tio s f o r  D C s  ’ 
a n d  M C s.
6 B H 6 B 0 : There is no  s ig n ific a n t d ifference  
b e tw een  the leve l o f  fo re ig n  exch a n g e  
risk  a n d  M C s  ’ d e b t ra tios.
M  B PTC Yj', - /+ H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  H j. 
T h is  s u g g e s ts  th a t  A u s tr a l ia n  M C s  
h a v e  s ig n if ic a n t ly  h ig h e r  m a g n i tu d e  
o f  n e g a t iv e  b a n k ru p tc y  r is k  w h ic h  
d e c re a s e s  th e  le v e ra g e  r a t io  re la t iv e
H 6 B , : There is s ig n ific a n t d ifferen ce  
b e tw een  the leve l o f  fo re ig n  exch a n g e
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risk a nd  M Cs ’ debt ratios. to  D C s . ( T a b le  3 .5 )
7 A H 7A 0 : There is no significant 
relationship betw een the level o f  firm  's 
beta risk and  debt ratios fo r  D Cs ’ and  
MCs.
B E T A ], H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  H , in 
e x p la in in g  s h o r t  te rm  d e b t  fo r  D C s  
a n d  lo n g  te rm  d e b t  fo r  M C s . T h is  
s u g g e s ts  th a t  a s  f irm  r is k  in c re a s e s , 
it  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  d e c r e a s e s  D C s ’ s h o r t  
te rm  d e b t  r a t io s  a n d  M C s  lo n g  te rm  
b o o k  v a lu e  o f  d e b t  h o ld in g  ra tio s . 
(T a b le  3 .2 )
H7A i : There is a significant 
relationship betw een the level o f  firm  's 
beta risk and  debt ratios fo r  D C s ' and  
MCs.
7 B H 7B 0 : There is no significant difference  
between the level o f  firm  's beta risk and  
M C s ’ deb t ratios.
M B  E T A  it - /+ F a i ls  to  r e je c t  H 0 b e c a u s e  th e re  is  n o  
s ig n i f ic a n t  d if fe r e n c e  is  o b s e rv e d  
b e tw e e n  D C s  a n d  M C s  f irm  s p e c if ic  
r is k  in  e x p la in in g  d e b t  ra tio s . 
(T a b le  3 .5 )
117B j : There is significant difference  
betw een the level o f  firm  's beta risk and  
M Cs ’ debt ratios.
8 A H 8A 0 : There is no significant 
rela tionship  betw een the level o f  firm  's 
average tax and  debt ratios fo r  D Cs ’ and  
MCs.
A  T R it + H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  H , in  
e x p la in in g  L T D  M V  a n d  S T D  B V  
fo r  D C s  a n d  T O T L T D B V  fo r  
M C s . T h is  s u g g e s t  th a t  a v e ra g e  ta x  
ra t io  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  a s s is t  in
in c r e a s in g  D C s  s h o r t  te rm  d e b t  a n d  
M C s ’ to ta l  b o o k  v a lu e  o f  d e b t;  
h o w e v e r ,  it s ig n if ic a n t ly  d e c re a s e s  
D C s ' lo n g  te rm  b o o k  v a lu e  o f  d eb t.
H8A / :  There is a significant 
relationship betw een the level o f  firm  's 
average tax and  debt ratios fo r  D Cs ’ and  
MCs.
8 B H 8B q : There is no significant difference  
between the level o f  firm  's average tax 
an d  M C s ' debt ratios.
M A  TR t , + /- H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  H] in 
e x p la in in g  T O T  L T D  B V  fo r  M C s. 
T h is  s u g g e s ts  th a t  A u s tr a l ia n  M C s ’ 
e x p e r ie n c e  a  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  h ig h e r  
a v e r a g e  ta x  r a t io  a n d  it a s s is ts  to  
in c re a s e  th e i r  d e b t  r a t io s .  (T a b le  
3 .5 )
H 8 B / : There is significant difference  
between the level o f  firm  's average tax 
an d  M C s ’ debt ratios.
9 A H 9A 0 : There is no significant 
rela tionship  betw een the level o f  non 
debt tax sh ie ld  and  debt ratios fo r  DCs ’ 
an d  MCs.
N D T S it H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  H i in  
e x p la in in g  D C s ’ d e b t  r a t io s .  T h is 
s u g g e s ts  th a t  n o n  d e b t  ta x  sh ie ld  
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  a s s is t  in  in c re a s in g  
D C s  lo n g  te rm  d e b t  r a t io s .  (T a b le  
3 .2 )
H9A j : There is a significant 
rela tionship  betw een the level o f  non 
debt tax sh ie ld  an d  debt ratios fo r  DCs ’ 
and  MCs.
9 B H 9B 0 : There is no significant difference  
betw een the level o f  non debt tax shield  
an d  M C s ’ debt ratios.
M _ N D T S it - /+ F a ils  to  r e je c t  H 0 b e c a u s e  th e re  is  n o  
s ig n i f ic a n t  d if fe r e n c e  is  o b s e rv e d  
b e tw e e n  D C s  a n d  M C s  n o n  d e b t ta x  
s h ie ld  in  e x p la in in g  d e b t  ra tio s . 
( T a b le  3 .5 )
H 9Bi : There is significant difference  
betw een the level o f  non debt tax sh ield  
a nd  M C s ' debt ratios.
lO A H 10A 0 : There is no significant 
rela tionship  betw een the level o f  size an d  
debt ratios fo r D C s ’ and  MCs.
S IZ E ] , + H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  H , in 
e x p la in in g  D C s ’ a n d  M C s ’ d e b t 
r a t io s .  T h is  s u g g e s ts  th a t  A u s tr a l ia n  
D C s  a n d  M C s ’ s iz e  o f  th e i r  to ta l  
a s s e ts  a s s is t s  to  in c re a s e  th e i r  d e b t 
r a t io s .  (T a b le  3 .2 )
H10A i : There is a significant 
rela tionship  betw een the level o f  size a nd  
debt ratios fo r  D C s ' and MCs.
lO B H 10B 0 : There is no significant 
difference between the level o f  size and  
M Cs ’ debt ratios.
M S I Z E ] , + /- R e je c t  H 0 b e c a u s e  th e r e  is  a  
s ig n i f ic a n t  d if fe r e n c e  e x is t  b e tw e e n  
D C s ’ a n d  M C s ’ to ta l  a s s e ts  in  
e x p la in in g  to ta l  d e b t ra tio s . (T a b le  
3 .5 )
H I  OB] : There is significant difference 
betw een the level o f  size and M C s ' debt 
ratios.
11A H I 1A0 : There is no  significant 
rela tionship  betw een the level o f  
co lla tera l value o f  assets and debt ratios
E V A ], + H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  H) in 
e x p la in in g  D C s ’ d e b t  ra tio s . T h is  
s u g g e s ts  th a t  th e  h ig h e r  m a g n itu d e
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fo r  DCs and MCs. o f  A u s tr a l ia n  D C s  c o lla te r a l  v a lu e  o f  
a s s e ts  a s s is ts  to  in c re a s e  th e i r  d e b t 
r a t io s .  ( T a b le  3 .2 )
H l 1A i : There is a significant 
relationship between the level o f  
collateral value o f  assets and debt ratios 
fo r  D Cs and  MCs.
1 IB H I IB ,,: There is no significant 
difference between the level o f  collateral 
value o f  assets and M Cs ’ debt ratios.
M C V A it +/- R e je c t  H 0 b e c a u s e  th e re  is  a  
s ig n i f ic a n t  d if fe r e n c e  e x is t  b e tw e e n  
D C s  a n d  M C s  c o l la te ra l  v a lu e  o f  
a s s e ts  in  e x p la in in g  b o o k  v a lu e  o f  
lo n g  te rm  d e b t  ra tio s . (T a b le  3 .5 )
H l  I B ,  : There is significant difference  
between the level o f  firm  's collateral 
value o f  assets and M Cs ’ debt ratios.
12 A H 12A0 : There is no significant 
relationship between the level o f  age and  
debt ratios fo r  DCs and MCs.
A G E ,, + /- H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  F f  in  
e x p la in in g  D C s ’ a n d  M C s ’ d e b t 
r a t io s .  T h is  s u g g e s t  th a t  a s  th e  
A u s tr a l ia n  D C s  m a tu re , it
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  re d u c e s  th e i r  d e b t  
r a t io s  w h i le  th e  o p p o s i te  h o ld s  fo r  
M C s . ( T a b le  3 .2 )
H12A j : There is a significant 
relationship between the level o f  age and  
debt ratios fo r  D Cs and MCs.
12B H 12B 0 : There is no significant 
difference between the level age and  
M Cs ’ debt ratios.
M A G E , , + /- R e je c t  H 0 b e c a u s e  th e re  is  a  
s ig n i f ic a n t  d if fe r e n c e  e x is t  b e tw e e n  
D C s  a n d  M C s  f irm  m a tu r ity  o r  a g e  
in  e x p la in in g  d e b t r a t io s  a n d  a s  th e  
M C s  m a tu r e s  it a s s is ts  th e m  to  
in c r e a s e  d e b t  ra tio s . (T a b le  3 .5 )
H l  2 B , : There is significant difference  
between the level o f  age and M C s ' debt 
ratios.
1 3A H I 3A0 There is no significant 
relationship between the level o f  
profitab ility  and  debt ratios fo r  DCs and  
MCs.
P R O F ,, H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  H , in  
e x p la in in g  D C s ’ d e b t  ra tio s . T h is  
s u g g e s ts  th a t  a s  th e  p ro f i ta b i l i ty  
in c re a s e s  in  A u s tr a l ia n  D C s , it 
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  r e d u c e s  th e i r  d e b t 
r a t io s  a s  th e y  f in a n c e  it th r o u g h  
in te r n a l ly  g e n e ra te d  fu n d s . (T a b le  
3 .2 )
H13A i : There is a significant 
relationship between the level o f  
profitab ility  and  debt ratios fo r  DCs and  
MCs.
1 3 B H13 B0 : There is no significant 
difference between the level o f  
profitability  and  M Cs ’ debt ratios.
M _ P R O F „ + /- F a i ls  to  r e je c t  FI0 b e c a u s e  th e re  is  n o  
s ig n i f ic a n t  d if fe r e n c e  is  o b s e rv e d  
b e tw e e n  D C s  a n d  M C s  p ro f i ta b i l i ty  
f a c to r  in  e x p la in in g  d e b t  r a t io s .  
(T a b le  3 .5 )
H 1 3 B j : There is significant difference 
between the level o f  profitability  and  
M Cs ’ debt ratios.
14A H I 4 A 0 : There is no significant 
relationship between the level o f  cash  
dividend a nd  debt ratios fo r  D Cs ’ and  
MCs.
D IV C „ H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  F f  in  
e x p la in in g  b o th  D C s ’ a n d  M C s ’ 
d e b t  ra tio s . T h is  s u g g e s ts  th a t  a s  th e  
c a s h  d iv id e n d  p a y m e n t  in c re a s e , it 
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  re d u c e s  th e i r  d e b t  
r a t io s  a s  th e  d iv id e n d  p a y m e n ts  
im p o s e  a  c o n s tra in t  o n  th e  
a v a i la b i l i ty  o f  c a sh . ( T a b le  3 .2 )
H14A j : There is a significant 
relationship between the level o f  cash  
dividend and  debt ratios fo r  D Cs ’ and  
MCs.
14B H 14B 0 : There is no significant 
difference between the level o f  cash 
dividend and  M Cs ’ debt ratios.
M D I V C i , + F a i ls  to  re je c t  Ff0 b e c a u s e  n o  
s ig n i f ic a n t  d i f fe r e n c e  is  o b s e rv e d  
b e tw e e n  D C s  a n d  M C s  c a s h  
d iv id e n d  p a y o u t  r a t io s  in  e x p la in in g  
d e b t  ra tio s . (T a b le  3 .5 )
H 1 4 B i : There is significant difference 
between the level o f  cash dividend and  
M C s ’ debt ratios.
1 5 A H 15A 0 : There is no significant 
relationship between the level o f  free  
cash flo w  and  debt ratios fo r  D Cs  ’ and  
MCs.
P C F „ + H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  F f  in  
e x p la in in g  D C s ’ a n d  M C s ’ d e b t  
r a t io s .  T h is  s u g g e s ts  th a t  an  in c re a s e  
in  f re e  c a s h  f lo w s  r e d u c e s  th e  d e b t  
r a t io s .  (T a b le  3 .2 )H I 5A i : There is a significant 
relationship between the level o f  free  
cash flo w  and  debt ratios fo r  DCs  ’ and  
MCs.
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15B H 1 5 B 0 : There is n o  s ig n ific a n t  
d ifference  b e tw een  the lev e l o f  fre e  cash  
flo w  a n d  M C s ' d eb t ratios.
M F C F , + R e je c t  H 0 b e c a u s e  th e re  is 
s ig n i f ic a n t  d i f fe r e n c e  is  o b s e rv e d  
b e tw e e n  D C s  a n d  M C s  f re e  c a s h  
f lo w  f a c to r  in  e x p la in in g  M C s ’ lo n g  
d e b t  ra tio s . (T a b le  3 .5 )
H 1 5 B , : There is s ig n ific a n t d iffe ren ce  
be tw een  the leve l o f  fre e  c a sh  f lo w  a n d  
M C s ' d eb t ratios.
16A H 1 6 A 0 : There is no  s ig n ific a n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the  lev e l g ro w th  
a n d  d eb t ra tio s  fo r  D C s  ’ a n d  M Cs.
G R O W M B i , H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  H ] in  
e x p la in in g  D C s ’ an d  M C s ’ d e b t 
r a t io s .  T h is  s u g g e s ts  th a t  an  in c re a s e  
in  g r o w th  r e d u c e s  th e  d e b t  ra t io s  a n d  
it is  c o n s is te n t  w ith  th e  th e o ry  th a t  
w h e n  f i rm s  in  g ro w th  m o d e , f i rm s  
b e c o m e  v o la t i le  a n d  th e re fo re  le s s  
d e b t  is  k e p t. (T a b le  3 .2 )
H 16A  i : There is a  s ig n ific a n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the  lev e l g ro w th  
a n d  d eb t ra tio s  f o r  D C s  ’ a n d  M Cs.
16B H 1 6 B 0 : There is no  s ig n ific a n t  
d ifference  betM’een  the lev e l o f  g ro w th  
a n d  M C s ’ d e b t ratios.
M
G R O W M B i t
+ /- R e je c t  H 0 b e c a u s e  th e re  is 
s ig n i f ic a n t  d i f fe r e n c e  is  o b s e rv e d  
b e tw e e n  D C s  a n d  M C s  g ro w th  
f a c to r  in  e x p la in in g  M C s ’ lo n g  d e b t 
r a t io s .  T h is  s u g g e s ts  th a t  A u s tr a l ia n  
M C s ’ g ro w th  o p p o r tu n it ie s  a re  
h ig h e r  th a n  th e i r  D C s  c o u n te r p a r ts  
w h ic h  e n a b le  th e m  to  h o ld  le s s  
m a r k e t  v a lu e  o f  d e b t. (T a b le  3 .5 )
H 1 6 B i : There is s ig n ific a n t d ifferen ce  
be tw een  the leve l o f  g ro w th  a n d  M C s ’ 
d eb t ratios.
17 H I  70 : There is n o  s ig n ific a n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  M C s ’ m a g n itu d e  o f  
m u ltin a tio n a lity  a n d  d eb t ratios.
F X 2 a n d  
D I V E R 2
+ /- F a i ls  to  re je c t  H 0 b e c a u s e  th e re  is  n o  
s ig n i f ic a n t  r e la t io n s h ip  e x is ts  in  
c la im in g  th e  o p tim a l le v e l o f  
m u l t in a t io n a l i ty  fo r  A u s tr a l ia n  M C s . 
( T a b le  3 .4 )
H I  70 : There is s ig n ific a n t re la tio n sh ip  
b e tw een  M C s ’ m a g n itu d e  o f  
m u ltin a tio n a lity  a n d  d eb t ratios.
18 H 1 8 0 : There  is n o  s ig n ific a n t in d u stry  
e ffec t on  d e b t ratios.
CR,,„ E R i t 
a n d  F R  t
+ /- R e je c t  H 0 b e c a u s e  th e re  is 
s ig n i f ic a n t  f in a n c ia l  r is k  e f fe c t  
fo u n d  in  e x p la in in g  b o th  D C s ’ a n d  
M C s ’ d e b t  ra tio s . (T a b le  3 .6 )
H I  8 / : There  is a s ig n ific a n t in d u stry  
e ffec t on  d eb t ratios.
19 H 1 9 A 0 : There is n o  s ig n ific a n t in d u stry  
e ffec t on  d eb t ratios.
i m , t + /- R e je c t  H 0 b e c a u s e  th e re  is  
s ig n i f ic a n t  in d u s try  e f fe c t  fo u n d  in  
e x p la in in g  b o th  D C s ’ a n d  M C s ’ 
d e b t  ra tio s . (T a b le  3 .5 )
H I  9A i : There is a s ig n ific a n t in d u stry  
e ffec t on  d eb t ratios.
2 0 H 2 0 B 0 : There is n o  s ig n ific a n t tim e  
e ffec t on  d eb t ra tio s  fo r  D C s a n d  M C s.
Ö in  M o d e l  I V  
a n d  Y r ,
+ /- R e je c t  H 0 b e c a u s e  th e re  is 
s ig n i f ic a n t  t im e  e f fe c t  fo u n d  in  
e x p la in in g  b o th  D C s ’ a n d  M C s ’ 
d e b t  ra tio s . (T a b le  3 .8 , 3 .9  a n d  
3 .1 0 )
H 2 0 B i : There is s ig n ific a n t tim e e ffec t 
on  d eb t ra tio s f o r  D C s a n d  M C s.
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CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF MCs AND DCs 
-  AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
- 4 -
4.1 Introduction
A contentious issue in finance over the past 50 years has been that of the determinants of 
corporate capital structure.28 Specifically, despite the general level of interest in capital 
structure determinants in both the business and academic worlds, there have been little research 
done thus far on MCs in cross-country comparison. While a few international studies have been 
undertaken to investigate the cross-sectional difference between DCs and MCs during the 
1990’s (Lee & Kwok, 1988; Burgman, 1996; Chen et al., 1997; Homaifar, Zietz & Benkato, 
1998) and cross country capital structure differences (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; McClure, 
Clayton & Hofler, 1999; Wald, 1999),29 little research has been undertaken that compares the 
determinants of capital structure between DCs and MCs across countries. Therefore, this study 
will investigate the determinants of DCs’ and MCs’ capital structures across five countries, 
drawing mainly on traditional capital structure theories,'0 dynamic capital structure theories,21’22 
international capital structure theories.
How MCs manage their corporate financial requirements and what determines corporate capital 
structure for DCs and MCs across countries has been an issue of strong interest for a long time
28 Throughout this chapter capital structure, debt ratio and leverage have been used interchangeably. Capital structure 
of a firm in this chapter is usually represented by the ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt and market value of 
equity which is most often referred, as leverage or debt ratio (Lee and Kwok, 1988). Also, in this chapter we briefly 
look at other two long-term debt ratios and short-term debt ratio which were discussed in Chapter 3.
29 These studies provide evidence for the G-7 countries to (U.S., U.K., Canada, France, Italy, Germany and France) 
capital structure difference at firm-level in general.
30 See, for example, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Booth and Smith (1986), 
Brennen and Kraus (1987), Titman and Wessels (1988), Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989), Makie-Mason (1990), 
Prowse (1990) and Harris and Raviv (1991).
31 Donaldson (1961), Hall and Weiss (1967), Akerlof (1970), Gale (1972), Baker (1973), Carleton and Silberman 
(1977), Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984), Long and Malitz (1985), Kester (1986), Fischer, Heinkel and 
Zechner (1989), and Chang and Rhee (1990).
’2 A third theory of capital structure choice based on debt maturity is beyond the scope of this thesis. Debt maturity in 
relation to capital structure is discussed by Bamea, Haugen & Senbet Bamea et al. (1980), Flannery (1986) and 
Robbins and Schatzberg (1986).
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specially given that multinational firms hold substantial amounts of wealth in many countries 
and the liberalisation and globalisation certainly warrants a thorough investigation of MCs’ 
capital structure. In addition, the increased importance of ‘globalised markets’ with global 
competition suggests that the determinants of MCs’ capital structure are becoming increasingly 
important. Further, obtaining an understanding of the determinants of capital structure and the 
differences between DCs’ and MCs’ capital structure is of interest to academics, politicians, 
shareholders and financiers.
This study examines the capital structure and the determinants of capital structure of 6038 DCs 
and 5918 MCs across Australia, the U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia. These countries are 
characterised by different taxation systems (e.g. imputation tax system vs. classical tax system 
and civil law vs. common law) and financial system, which may have impact on capital 
structure decisions. Both cross-sectional and time variations in capital structure are explored for 
DCs and MCs across countries. This study has eight major findings. Firstly, the determinants 
of long-term debt ratios between DCs and MCs differ across the sample countries. Foreign 
exchange risk, size and collateral value of assets are the only factors that are consistently 
significant across the sample countries’ DCs. In contrast, no consistent factors are observed in 
MCs’ long-term debt ratios determination across the sample countries. Diversification plays an 
important role in explaining short-term debt ratios between DCs and MCs across all sample 
countries. Secondly, the results show that MCs hold significantly less debt than DCs in the U.S. 
while Malaysian MCs hold significantly higher debt than Malaysian DCs counterparts. Thirdly, 
country effects show that DCs and MCs in all sample countries hold significant positive 
relationship with short-term debt over time. However, Australia, Japan U.K. and Malaysia hold 
significantly less long-term debt relative to U.S. firms. Fourthly, firms that operate under the 
imputation tax system (mainly Australia and U.K.), hold significantly less short-term and long­
term debt as opposed to firms those operate under classical tax system. Fifthly, firms that 
follow common law have significantly less short-term debt and significantly higher long-term 
debt than the DCs and MCs in civil law countries. Sixthly, industry effect indicates that the 
industries impact on capital structure is not similar across DCs and MCs; however, industry
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affect across countries support the hypothesis that industry effect is significant and varies across 
countries. Seventhly, both time variation and the determination of capital structure vary across 
DCs and MCs. Finally, the speed of adjustment confirms that Australian and Japanese MCs 
adjust their long-term debt ratios towards their target level faster than their DCs counterparts, 
while U.K. and Malaysian MCs exhibit the opposite. Furthermore, Australian, U.S. and U.K. 
MCs adjust their short-term debt ratios towards their target level relatively quicker than DCs 
counterparts.
The paper is divided into six sections. A brief overview of MCs’ and DCs’ financial structure 
across countries is presented in section 4.2. The subsequent section 4.3 presents the impact of 
multinationality and assesses previous studies of capital structure. Section 4.4 discusses the 
international cross country capital structure theory. Section 4.5 provides discussion of the 
results while section 4.6 summarises the key findings and concludes the paper.
4.2 A Brief Overview of MCs’ and DCs’ Financial 
Structure across Countries
The determinants of capital structure have captured academic thought for many decades, 
particularly since Modigliani and Miller (1958). If optimal capital structures do exist and if 
these structures maximise firm value, obtaining an understanding of the determinants of capital 
structure is important in order to understand the way firms maximise value. MCs control 
considerable assets and some control more assets than those controlled by some countries. For 
example, Table 1.1 presents the market value, total sales and total asset value long-term and 
short debt of DCs and MCs across Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia respectively in 
2004 in their local currency. It shows that differences exist in terms of firms’ market value 
across countries. For example, Australian, Japanese and Malaysian MCs have 3, 5 and 3 times 
more market value of equity than their domestic counterparts while U.S. and U.K. MCs have 5 
and 2 times lower market value relative to their DCs. Sales figure and total assets figure of DCs 
remained lower than MCs across all countries, suggesting DCs are smaller in size in holding net 
worth of financial market wealth in any country. It is interesting to see how long-term debt
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(scaled by long-term debt and market value of equity) and short-term debt ratios (scaled by total 
assets) are used by DCs and MCs across different countries. For example, long-term debt is 
used heavily by MCs in Australia, U.S., U.K. and Malaysia, and the usage of long-term debt is 
more than double relative to DCs in those countries. However, an exception is Japan. Japanese 
DCs hold relatively more long-term debt in their capital structure than MCs which indicates that 
although Japanese DCs and MCs get financial assistance from their financial institutions and 
government (Ozawa, 1978); however, the international involvement of Japanese MCs may 
distorts the assistance that’s provided by a bank-based financial market system. Further, the 
level of short-term debt of Australian, U.S., U.K. and Malaysian MCs capital structure are at 
least three times more than DCs. Japan is unique in this regard. Japanese DCs use slightly 
more short-term debt as they do for long-term debt relative to MCs. Note that the results are 
very similar across all years, even though Table 4.1 figures are based on 2004 financial end year 
data.
Table 4.1
Firm values and capital structure across 5 sampled countries
The following table shows the amount of market value, total sales and total assets that MCs and DCs hold across Australia (AU), 
United States (US), Japan (JP), United Kingdom (UK) and Malaysia (ML) in 2004. The figures are in millions and expressed in the 
country’s local currency.
A ll U S J P U K M L
D C s M C s D C s M C s D C s M C s D C s M C s D C s M C s
M a rk et V a lu e 666 2342 155775 31440 248673 520085 3304 1828 672 2370
S a le s 745 1940 8089 14245 112392 119577 527 1477 502 1564
T o ta l A sse ts 882 2412 8684 18514 124207 128893 553 1814 1001 3149
L o n g -ter m  D eb t 221 535 2511 4062 24532 21419 110 349 223 562
S h o r t-te r m  D eb t 34 136 207 1311 18946 18058 21 123 93 281
S a m p le 99 4 1254 1371 1417 1093 8 1 4 7 1 9 1469 1861 9 6 4
Table 4.2 further looks at how much each of the five countries’ MCs involved in foreign direct 
investments (FDI) and it shows that, in the ranking, U.S. is the highest while Japan is the second 
highest and U.K., Australia and Malaysia are ranked after one another accordingly in the FDI 
abroad ranking list. The table also shows that over the years the FDI fluctuated in all those 
countries. This demands an investigation of FDI abroad impact and MCs’ capital structure 
determinants.
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Table 4.2 was an attempt to enhance Table 4.1. MCs usual mode of foreign entry is 
through foreign direct investment. The purpose of Table 4.2 was to show how the MCs 
in the chosen sample countries expanded abroad through FDI across time and whether 
the intensity of foreign involvement had much impact on capital structure determinants. 
It is generally argued that as the foreign involvement increases in an international 
environment, MCs will be more prone to international risk exposure which is captured 
by the foreign sales. In addition, MCs are believed to have a different capital structure as well 
as capital structures determinants relative to their DCs due to their international involvement. 
This leads to hypotheses development followed by model selection that incorporates these 
determinants as the function of capital structure for DCs and MCs.
4.3 Mulinationality and Modigliani & Miller 
Capital Structure Theory
Modigliani and Miller (1958) provide a starting point for the discussion of capital structure 
choice, regardless of the degree of multinationality of a firm. Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) 
discussion is limited from practical application by restrictive assumptions.'3 Theoretically, 
according to Modigliani and Miller (1958), capital structure choice is irrelevant to firm value. 
However, in reality, capital structure choice may be relevant to firm value.
According to Modigliani and Miller (1963), in the presence of taxes and the tax deductibility of 
interest payments (under the assumption that debt is default-free), firms are expected to be 
financed entirely by debt. However, since borrowing increases the likelihood of bankruptcy, 
and bankruptcy is costly, an optimal capital structure represents a level that balances the tax 
advantage of debt against the different costs associated with financial distress (Haugen & 
Senbet, 1978; Scott, 1976; Titman, 1984).
”  Modigliani and Miller (1958) made the following assumptions: a) Securities issued by companies are traded in a 
perfect capital market; this is a frictionless market in which there are no transaction costs and no barriers to the free 
flow o f information, b) There are no taxes, c) Companies and individuals can borrow at the same interest rate, d) 
There are no costs associated with the liquidation or reorganisation of a company in financial difficulty, e) 
Companies have a fixed investment policy so that investment decisions are not affected by financing decisions.
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Borrowing, in addition to increasing bankruptcy costs, affects the likelihood of conflicts among 
equity holders, managers and debt holders. Agency problems resulting from debt emanate from 
conflicts between equity and debt holders due to the incentive of firms maximising their equity 
value instead of their total value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In this framework, equity holders 
of a leveraged firm are willing to invest in highly risky projects. If the investment is successful, 
the equity holder will achieve a high return and the firm will be solvent, but if it fails the firm 
will go bankrupt, and the debt holder will take over the firm and receive a value lower than the 
debt value.'4 According to Harris and Raviv (1990), equity holders prefer a firm to continue its 
current operation, even in liquidation. This means that debt financing reduces the costs of the 
conflicts to equity holders by giving the firm’s debt holders the option of liquidation in the 
event of low cash flow. However, debt holders require information about the firm’s prospects 
to be able to make liquidation decisions.
A theory of firms’ capital structure is important to both researchers and managers, but no single 
theory completely explains the observed variation in capital structure (Shapiro, 1978; Agmon & 
Lessard, 1977). Empirical evidence shows that a firm’s capital structure is affected by several 
firm-related characteristics including growth, earnings volatility, profitability, and non-debt tax 
shield (Friend & Lang, 1988; Titman & Wessels, 1988; Smiths & Watts, 1992; Gaver & Gaver, 
1993; Homaifar, Zietz & Benkato, 1994). However, the majority of these studies have not 
considered the effect of these characteristics on a firm being a multinational corporation. The 
capital structure of MCs has been examined by Hughes, Logue and Sweeney (1975), Shapiro 
(1978), Michael and Shaked (1986), Fatemi (1988) and Lee and Kwok (1988) amongst others, 
but theories of capital structure for MCs are lacking.
Most empirical evidence on capital structure is based on U.S. firms. Studies based on the 
experience of a single country may not represent the effects of diversity of economic tradition
’4 In other words, the common stock in leveraged firms may be considered as a call option, written by debt holders. 
According to Black-Scholes’ (1973) formula, riskier projects increase the value of the option (shift value from the 
debt-holders to equity holders). Debt holders anticipate the probability of this event when writing the debt contracts 
and will respond by demanding a higher interest.
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and financial system across different countries on corporate capital structures (differential tax 
system, distinct bankruptcy and agency code, different accounting regulations and also different 
industry-specific characteristics). Companies operating under English-speaking economies 
(mainly U.S., U.K. and Australia) are known to have lower level of leverage than firms in non- 
English-speaking economies, (for example, Japan and Malaysia).35 Agency costs and indirect 
bankruptcy costs are especially known to be higher in English-speaking countries due to the 
lack of long-term relationships between firms and creditors and of lack long term objectives of 
business management (Borio, 1990; Edward & Niber, 2000).
The intent of this chapter is to provide additional empirical analysis on capital structure 
literature across DCs and MCs in different economies. The studies that investigate the capital 
structure of corporations across different countries are somewhat dated, use limited data, or 
have a narrow focus on firm types (Lee & Kwok, 1988; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Burgman, 
1996; McClure, Clayton & Hofler, 1999; Booth et al., 2001). Therefore, this thesis investigates 
the different financial and institutional traditions of DCs and MCs in Japan, U.K., U.S., 
Australia and Malaysia. This helps to ascertain whether different financial and institutional 
traditions do impact on capital structure decisions. Secondly, the data for most of the previous 
studies do not cover the period through the 1990s when there were important developments in 
the globalisation of financial markets (McClure, Clayton & Hofler, 1999), especially when 
barriers to entry to many countries were removed and it provided firms with the opportunity for 
global expansion. Thus, this thesis examines whether there are systematic differences in the 
determinants of capital structure between DCs and MCs across countries, and whether there are 
additional, uniquely international factors that may help to explain the capital structure choice of 
MCs. Thirdly, given the problems potentially encountered by firms as they attempt to establish 
optimal global financial structures, it is important to determine whether financial norms and 
practices vary across countries. Therefore, this study investigates the country-driven 
institutional factors that are believed to affect capital structure for both MCs and DCs across
35 Antonios, Yilmaz and Krishna (2002).
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Japan, U.K., U.S., Australia and Malaysia.'*’ These countries represent different financial 
structures and traditions. The U.K. and U.S. are known to follow the English tradition where 
there are large numbers of publicly-listed companies, and hostile takeovers owing to agency 
conflicts are common (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; McClure, Clayton & Hofler, 1999). Japan 
follows a tradition where corporate decisions and restructuring are made through the 
involvement of banks and financial institutions (Wald, 1999). On the other hand, Malaysia is 
known to follow the Latinic tradition where corporate ownership structure can be characterised 
by family control, financial holdings, state ownership, cross-shareholdings, and where agency 
problems are internalised (Booth et al., 2001). Financial theory would suggest that in an 
efficient global market the capital structure of identical firms in different nations would be the 
same (McClure, Clayton & Hofler, 1999). If international market imperfection existed through 
the 1990s, capital structures and costs may be different among similar firms in different nations, 
and business advantages (or disadvantages) may provide profits (or costs) to firms incorporated 
in different countries. Fourthly, the industry effect on DCs’ and MCs’ capital structure is 
considered. Lastly, the relationship between financial structure and overseas operation 
especially for MCs has led in recent years to the development of a considerable literature that 
underlies its time-variant effects (Bemanke & Gertler, 1989; Greenwald & Stiglitz, 1993). Thus 
an intention of this chapter is to update the literature by shedding light on the role of these 
financial and institutional traditions on capital structure decisions across countries. The focus of 
this chapter is on answering the following questions:
• Does capital structure differ significantly between DCs and MCs and across countries, 
legal regimes and different tax regimes?
• Do additional international factors explain MCs capital structure decisions across 
countries?
• Are the predictions of conventional capital structure determinants improved by knowing 
the nationality of DCs and MCs?
36 This aspect allows this thesis to compare the results with research obtained for US firms and to help explain any 
differences.
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• Does industry play a significant role in determining DCs’ and MCs’ capital structure?
• Is capital structure of DCs and MCs time variant? Are the factors that affect cross- 
sectional variability in individual countries capital structures similar across countries for 
both MCs and DCs ?
• Final tests attempt to explain the speed of adjustment towards the target level of debt:
o Do DCs and MCs long term leverage return to its target across countries (speed 
of adjustment or mean reversion effect)?
o Do DCs and MCs short-term leverage return to its target across countries 
(speed of adjustment or mean reversion effect)?
The above questions are important, because institutional factors such as tax rates and business 
risk, profitability and growth can result in different financing patterns in DCs’ and MCs’ capital 
structure across countries, which then show up in firm-level data as well as aggregate data. 
Therefore, it is believed that the additional information and efficiency that can be extracted 
from a time series and cross-sectional data set can considerably improve the understanding of 
the relevance of financial market imperfections in different economies and will allow a better 
understanding of the determinants of firms’ capital structure.
4.4 International Cross-country Capital Structure 
Theory
The aspects that have been previously indicated as determinants of capital structure have been 
extended by studies of cross-country comparisons. In this respect, we highlight the work of 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) whose first objective was to investigate whether the capital structure 
in the G-7 countries is related to factors similar to those appearing to influence the capital 
structure of U.S. firms. Although firms have a fairly similar capital structure across the G-7 
countries,37 Rajan and Zingales (1995) find several differences. They argue that the institutional 
characteristics that affect capital structure are: tax code, bankruptcy laws, state of development 
of bond markets and patterns of ownership. In a more descriptive paper on differences in
’7 G-7 countries are Japan, France, United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and Italy.
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capital structure across the G-7 countries, McClure, Clayton and Hofler (1999) obtain empirical 
results that support significant differences. In another recent paper, Wald (1999) investigates 
the firm characteristics that affect capital structure in France, Germany, Japan, U.K. and U.S. 
As with Rajan and Zingales (1995), he finds similar firm factors across countries, but also some 
significant differences. The explanation of these differences, according to Wald (1999), is that 
institutional features may be significant determinants of capital structure.
In line with the analysis of the above papers on cross-country comparisons, it is also likely that 
domicile country effects impact on capital structure (McClure, Clayton & Hofler, 1999). This 
includes different tax codes, bankruptcy codes and agency costs which could have a differing 
influence on capital structure for MCs compared with DCs across countries. Financial theory 
would suggest that in an efficient global capital market the capital structure (and costs) of 
identical firms in different nations would be the same. Empirically, similar firms would trend 
towards similar financial structures and costs, unless there are still fundamental differences in 
the national capital markets in which they operate and barriers exist to the efficient flow of 
information and capital across countries. Since market imperfection exists, actual capital 
structure may be different among similar firms in different nations, and business advantages (or 
disadvantages) may provide profits (or costs) to firms incorporated in different countries. For 
example, firms in developing countries are much more highly leveraged than their counterparts 
in developed countries, which means the link between the corporate sector and the financial 
system is more important than in developed countries. Further, there is also some weak 
evidence that larger countries have higher debt (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny -  hereafter, LLSV 1997).
The financial manager of the MCs is faced with various tax structures, changing exchange rates, 
barriers to capital flows, and the possibility of financial market segmentation (Kombluth and 
Vinso, 1982).38 The manager must be concerned not only with fund flows, but also with the
38 Some preliminary work of Solnik (1974) and Pogue and Solnik (1975) attempts to determine the impact of such 
international factors on the pricing of the securities of the MCs.
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risk that the value of these flows will change owing to changing exchange rates. Finally, the 
manager must be concerned with operating under widely differing governmental policies.
If it is assumed that the goal of management is to maximise the value of the firm, it can be 
shown that it is necessary to obtain financing at the lowest cost. For MCs, which have access to 
funds in many countries, this goal would be consistent with minimising the cost of capital for 
the consolidated MCs. However, market imperfections and differing governmental policies 
dictate a consideration of the financial structures of the individual subsidiaries. Therefore, it has 
been observed by Stonehill and Stitzel (1969) and others that the same industry will have 
different capital structures in different countries since governments across countries can tax, 
regulate, or otherwise influence future earnings which vary from the MCs’ domicile country.
Further, the decade of the 1980s has seen the increasing globalisation of product and capital 
markets and therefore the previously identified national capital structure differences based on an 
older data set and a limited number of nations may no longer be valid. Therefore, it is important 
that this study investigates country effect as a determinant on capital structure for both DCs and 
MCs.
4.4.1 Legal Regime
According to La Porta et. al (2000) there are two alternative legal regimes -  a common-law 
system based on judicial precedent and a civil-law system based on formal codes. They argue 
that the type of legal regime a country adopted at the time continues to affect its economic 
performance in dramatic ways. They find that countries whose legal systems are based on civil 
law have systematically weaker environments for business than those whose legal systems are 
based on Anglo-American common law: Common-law countries offer external suppliers of 
finance, whether shareholders or creditors, better protection to debt and equity holders than 
countries with legal systems based on civil law (La Porta et. Al, 2000, 2000). Under the Anglo- 
American system of common law, legal rules can evolve in accordance with businesses’ needs. 
On the contrary; however, common law codes are revised relatively infrequently and, as a
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result, their provisions are likely to become increasingly outmoded as the economy develops 
(Posner 1973; Priest 1977; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 2002). Further, civil law codes 
were creations of highly interventionist government's intent on consolidating their power over 
society, whereas the English common law was shaped by parliament’s struggle to limit the 
power of the king and so was more concerned with restraining government and protecting 
individual rights (La Porta et. al, 2000). They further conjectured that the differences in the 
nature and effectiveness of financial systems around the world can be traced in part to the 
differences in investor protections against expropriation by insiders, as reflected by legal rules 
and the quality of their enforcement. La Porta et. al (2002) presented evidence indicating that 
legal rules protecting creditors and investors and the quality of enforcement differ greatly and 
systematically across countries. Common law countries offer creditors stronger legal 
protections against managers. They have the highest incidence of no automatic stay on assets; 
with two exceptions, they guarantee that secured creditors are paid first; they frequently 
preclude managers from unilaterally seeking court protection from creditors; and they have far 
and away the highest incidence of removing managers in reorganization proceedings. However, 
the U.S. is actually one of the most anticreditor common law countries because it permits 
automatic stay on assets, allow unimpeded petition for reorganisation, and lets managers keep 
their jobs in reorganisation (La Porta et. al, 2000). Law differs a great deal across countries, 
and in particular those countries differ because they come from different legal families. 
Relatively speaking, common law countries protect investors the most, civil law countries 
protect investors the least (La Porta et. al, 2000).
4.4.2 Tax Regime
The impact of taxes on corporate financial decision-making has been the focus of extensive 
research since Modigliani and Miller (1958). In a world with only corporate taxes and no 
personal taxes, the tax deductibility of interest within the corporation creates a clear preference 
for debt in the corporate capital structure. With both corporate and personal taxes, the 
preference for debt is less obvious and will depend upon the rates of tax on interest, dividends 
and capital gains as well as the tax rules governing tax arbitrage. The empirical evidence on the
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influence of corporate taxes on capital structure choice is conflicting and inconclusive. Recent 
work by MacKie-Mason (1990) and Graham (1996) suggests that the failure of earlier studies to 
find a relationship between capital structure decisions and taxes can in part be attributed to the 
proxies used to estimate the firms’ marginal tax rate. Graham (1996) finds that high tax rate 
firms issue more debt than low tax rate firms. Givoly et. al (1992) examine the cross-sectional 
relationship between corporate taxes and capital structure changes. They find evidence 
consistent with both corporate and personal taxes affecting capital structure decisions. In an 
international setting, Collins and Sekely (1983) find no significant relationship between the 
corporate tax rate and cross country differences in capital structures. However, Sekely and 
Collins (1988) do find a significant country influence on capital structure.
4.4.3 Other Issues
In addition to industry influence in capital structure determination, macroeconomic conditions 
may play a role in determining capital structure as it induces time-series and cross-sectional 
heterogeneity in firm behaviour. For example, time variations in macroeconomic conditions, 
such as changes in relative pricing of asset classes, and the risk that stems from market factors 
that affect most firms, such as inflation, recessions, high interest rates, can lead a given firm to 
choose different capital structures at different points in time, other things being equal (Broaden 
and Samii, 2001).
Capital structure choices vary over time and across firms. For example, aggregate equity issues 
vary pro-cyclically and aggregate debt issues vary counter-cyclically for firms that access public 
financial markets (Korajczyk & Levy, 2003). Meanwhile, firms that exhibit higher degrees of 
financial constraints do not exhibit these pronounced counter-cyclical debt issue patterns.39 
They further suggest that a negative relationship exists between macroeconomic variables and 
leverage which seems to be consistent with the pecking order theory. In a graphical time series
39 Specifically, Choe et al. (1993) show that aggregate seasoned primary equity issues are pro-cyclical and debt 
issues are counter-cyclical. Korajczyk et al. (1990) show that aggregate equity issue are positively related with 
equity market performance. Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) show that aggregate net debt issues (public and private) 
increase for large firms but remain flat for small firms following recessions associated with a monetary contraction. 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that aggregate net short-term debt is more stable over the business cycle for small 
firms.
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of leverage ratio (debt to asset) analysis, they showed that there is a systematic peak, in 
corporate leverage ratios that occurs during economic downturns over the last 50 years on U.S. 
data. However, a trade-off model would imply pro-cyclical leverage, since during expansions 
(when the equity market is performing well, expected bankruptcy costs are lower, firms are 
more likely to have taxable income to shield, and firms have more free cash) debt should be 
more attractive.
The 1997 Asian crisis is the 4lh international financial crisis. The Asian crisis of 1997, despite 
prompt and concerted action by developing countries, industrialised countries, and international 
organisations to contain it, quickly and ferociously spread to North Asian, Latin, and Eastern 
European economies to varying degrees. In fact, this Asian crisis pushed one-third of the globe 
into recession during 1998 (World Investment Report, 2005). The crisis has raised a variety of 
questions not only about the future of the region’s economy, but also about the impact of the 
crisis on MCs and the world economy. Countries are increasingly connected by trade and 
investment, so a downturn in one hurts exports and investment of another. Countries also 
compete against one another. Most domestic borrowers, for example, were unhedged against 
exchange rate risk, making them increase their foreign debt load significantly when a borrowing 
country’s exchange rate changes dramatically (Kim and Haque 1997).
4.5 Data and Methodology
This chapter use 6038 DCs and 5918 MCs across Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia 
over 1995-2004. The sample has been explained in detail in Chapter 2. The following five 
models have been employed to investigate the capital structure determinants for DCs and MCs 
across countries.
4.5.1 Model I
Leverage (L)(it)= ß 0+ Y^ß\X International factors(i,t) + Tradeoff _factors(i,t) + I  A* + eFirm _peckingoreder(i,t) (i,t)
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Model I represents the multivariate regression for DCs’ and MCs’ long-term debt ratios 
determinants across the five sample countries. Model I assumes that DCs’ and MCs’ leverage 
ratios are determined by three international factors (diversification, foreign exchange risks and 
political risks), seven trade-off theory related factors (bankruptcy risks, non-debt tax shield, 
beta, average tax ratios, size, collateral value of assets and age) and four pecking order related 
factors (profitability, cash dividends, free cash flows and growth). The purpose of this model is 
to estimate the target long-term debt level of DCs and MCs independently. Also, this model is 
different from the subsequent models in a sense that Model I independently determines the 
explanatory factors for DCs and MCs. Further, this model does not make any assumption about 
the distribution of DCs and MCs observations. This model is performed on a sample of 6038 
DCs and 5918 MCs companies across Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia
4.5.2 Model II
Leverage (L)(it) — ß0 + /J, MULTl t ß  2 ^  InternationalJactors(i.t) + ^  ß 3 ^  Tradeoff _ factors (i,t)
^  i ß 4 ^ F i r m  _  peckingorder(i.t) it)
Model II is a slight modification of Model I and uses a pooled sample of DCs and MCs. The 
common fourteen variables are similar to Model I except ß xMULTit . This additional factor
of ß^MULTu is introduced to identify whether being a multinational firm has any additional
explanatory power to determine the capital structure. Even though Model I directly captures the 
effect of the MCs related issues, there are other factors (e.g. inflation, interest-rates, 
subsidiaries’ geographical related issues, economic growth, market efficiency etc.) that may 
also explain the MCs capital structure which our dataset is unable to create any variables to 
capture. Therefore, the variable ß xMULTu attempts to incorporate any additional information 
for MCs’ debt payouts that is not captured by using Model I. Therefore, after pooling the 
sample of DCs and MCs, the additional variable /J, MET, 7^ , takes a value of unity when the 
corporation is a multinational, otherwise it is 0 (DCs). Further, with slight modification, this
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model is also used to test industry influence and time effect in adding industry and time dummy 
variables.
4.5.3 Model III
Leverage ( L ) ^ —ß 0 +  ß] M U L T j t ß  2 ^ InternationalJactors(i,t) ^  ß l -^Tradeoff factors (i,t)
ß 4 ^ Firm_peckingorder(i,t) MULTj t ^  j ßs^ InternationalJactors(i,t)
+ MULTj t *  ^  ß6X Tradeoff factors(i,t) +  MULL] t *  ^  ß l^ Firm peckingorder(t,t) *& (U)
Model III is a further extension of Model II. Model III adds additional interacting dummy 
variables for each of the fourteen common explanatory variables. The purpose of this model is 
to differentiate the significance of slope difference in each of the common fourteen variables 
between DCs and MCs. This model is designed to encapsulate additional information, which is 
the difference of DCs and MCs debt ratio level determinants explanatory power to verify the 
payouts level decision (the justification of variable differences between DCs and MCs are 
discussed in Chapter 3).
4.5.4 Model IV
The final equation of the multivariate model is as follows:
Leverage (L)m=ß0 + ß t International Factors(i.t) + Tradeoff Factors (i,t) + lA -rFirm _  pecktngordt
+ La*<Country _ Dymmy(i,t) + TaxSystem(i.t) + YMi ■X-PLegal Regimes(i,t) c'(it)
For an intensive investigation for leverage and its determinants for DCs and MCs across sample 
countries, we apply regression modelling technique. Generally, there is no consensus model of 
leverage behaviour. In its absence, this section fits the data to some alternative models that 
include MCs’ effect. Theoretical research shows that leverage is influenced by firm, industry 
and country factors. The determinants include international, trade-off and pecking order theory 
factors, which are discussed in details in Chapter 3. Further, industry factors include industry 
regulations, growth levels, profitability and risks. Leverage is also influenced by taxation 
policy, legal systems and broader economic conditions that are country-specific. In relation to
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the determinants of leverage for MCs, very little is known. The number and size of MCs has 
grown substantially over the past few decades and the effect these organisation have on leverage 
is unfamiliar.
4.5.5 Model V
Model V is developed following Lintner’s (1956) model. This model will be emploed to test 
the speed of adjustment of target level of debt for DCs and MCs across countries. The 
framework for the test of leverage is as follows:
L E V E R A G E ,, -  L E V E R A G E ,,.y = y 0 + Y\ (LE V E R A G E j  -  LEV ERA G E i t l ) + eit
In Model V the target level LEVERAGE" is obtained using Model I for DCs and MCs to test
behaviour of leverage over the period of 1995-2004. This is to test whether DCs and MCs have 
leverage targets and does leverage return to its target. The partial adjustment framework of 
Model V and Model I nests the trade-off theory, firms have leverage targets and they move 
toward the targets every period. The fitted values from Model I are estimates of the targets
(LEVERAGE^), and the speed of adjustment coefficienty ] in Model V and measures how 
adjustment costs slow the movement of leverage towards its target.40 The parameter y, may be 
interpreted in terms of the relative cost being away from the optimal leverage and the cost of 
recapitalisation (adjusting). The adjustment rate coefficient y ] depends on the ratio of the
marginal cost of being away from the target to the marginal cost of adjustment. Obviously, the 
higher the adjustment cost, the slower the rate of adjustment. A full adjustment will occur if the
40 To get a better idea of how y, works, I present the following: Wheny,= 0 then it reflects no
adjustment to the target; when 0<y, < 1 then it reflects partial adjustment to the target due to a positive
cost of adjustment and when y,= l then it reflects a full adjustment to the target (ie., the adjustment is 
costless).
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cost of adjustment is too low or the cost of being away from the target is too high. Further, 
firms will not adjust their debt toward the target level of leverage if the cost of being away from 
the target leverage is zero.
The simple pecking order theory predicts that in the estimate of model V the speed of 
adjustment, y x, is indistinguishable from zero, whereas the trade-off model says it is reliably
positive for firms in general. Model V will be employed for both short-term debt and long-term 
debt across DCs and MCs.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 General Overview of MCs’ and DCs’ Difference in Capital 
Structure
Table 4.3 provides details of the average annual level of the various types of leverage for the 
five countries for each year from 1995 to 2004. From this table a number of trends in leverage 
can be seen and it is also shown that different types of debt ratios vary considerably between 
DCs and MCs across countries.
Over the period of 1995 to 2004, Australian MCs’ short-term debt range between 0.049 to 0.067 
and long-term debt ratio (LTD MV) in MCs slightly increased to 0.178 in 2002 and gradually 
declined in the following years. The long-term debt ratio (LTD BV) for Australian MCs also 
shows a similar pattern. However, total debt for MCs increased over the years from 0.127 to 
0.134 during 1995 to 2004 and this is to the increase in the book value of debt. Debt maturity 
shows a strong increase during 1997 to 2004 with a range of 0.297 to 0.715. For DCs, the 
short-term debt falls rapidly 2002 onwards while the long-term debt ratios (LTD_MV) 
increased in year 2002 and takes a sudden reduction to 0.059. DCs’ long-term debt (LTD_MV) 
and total debt had a similar pattern during this 10 year time period (e.g. 0.044 to 0.072 and 
0.053 to 0.096). Overall, the average short-term debt, book and market value of long-term debt
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and total debt for DCs are lower than MCs. Further, Table 4.3 also shows that debt maturity for 
Australian MCs is slightly lower than its DCs.
U.S. DCs showed an upward movement in short-term debt during 1995 (0.036) to 2000 (0.042), 
however, then it started declining until 2004 (0.016). During this 10-year period U.S. MCs 
maintained higher short-term ratios relative to U.S. DCs. Interestingly, U.S. DCs show higher 
market value of long-term debt ratios than MCs and a similar pattern is also observed for the 
book value of long-term debt. The increase of long-term debt ratios is due to an increase in the 
holding of short-term debt. U.S. DCs’ and MCs’ debt maturity shows a parallel directional 
increasing pattern from 2001 to 2004.
Japanese DCs’ and MCs’ short-term debt decreased over the period of 1995 to 2004 from 0.134 
to 0.092 and 0.137 to 0.082 respectively. The long-term market value of debt ratios for DCs 
also decreased from 0.264 to 0.185 for the same period. MCs on the other hand had no regular 
upward or downward trends; however, the MCs’ long-term book value of debt ratios had a 
consistently downward movement over the 10 years period from 0.215 to 0.156. As for debt 
maturity, no apparent upward or downward movement is observed.
No particular trend or pattern is observed for U.K. DCs and MCs long-term debt ratios. The 
short-term debt ratios for U.K. DCs shows a declining trend from 1995 (0.073) to 1999 (0.64) 
and a sudden rise in 2000 (0.074), then a sharp consistent decline until 2004 (0.038). Also, for 
MCs’ it shows a sharp decline in short-term debt ratios after 2000 onwards.
Malaysian DCs and MCs exhibit a mixed pattern for both short-term debt ratios and long-term 
debt ratios. Over the 10-year period the DCs indicate a net increase of debt maturity from 0.365 
in 1995 to 0.539 in 2004 while MCs also experience a net increase of debt maturity from 0.504 
to 0.711 from 1995 to 2004. Overall, Malaysian MCs show higher debt maturity than their 
counterpart DCs.
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Table 4.3
5 sampled countries’ capital structure across 10 years
Table 6 displays the average of different types o f debts from 1995 to 2004. In the first column, the acronyms o f  AU, US, JP, UK 
and ML are Australia, United States, Japan, United Kingdom and Malaysia respectively. The debt ratios are measured as long-term 
debt to long-term debt and market value of assets which is indicated by LTD_MVU. LTD_BVU , STD_BVU and TOT LTD BV,, are 
measured as long-term debt, short-term and total debt to total book value o f  asset respectively. Debt maturity is calculated as long- 
term debt over total debt (Fan et al,, 2003).__________________________________________________________________________________
D C s M C s
S h o r t  T e r m L o n g  T e r m L o n g  T e r m T o t a l  B o o k D e b t S h o r t  T e r m L o n g  T e r m L o n g  T e r m T o t a l  B o o k D e b t
B o o k  D e b t M a r k e t  D e b t B o o k  D e b t B o o k  D e b t M a r k e t  D e b t B o o k  D e b t
Y e a r s R a t i o s R a t i o s R a t io s D e b t  R a t i o s M a t u r i t y R a t i o s R a t i o s R a t i o s D e b t  R a t i o s M a t u r i t y
A U  -  9 5 0 .051 0 .0 2 0 0 .0 4 4 0 .0 5 3 0 .3 0 5 0 .0 4 9 0 .0 2 7 0 .1 1 6 0 .1 2 7 0 .6 7 5
A U - 9 6 0 .0 5 1 0 .0 1 3 0 .0 4 3 0 .0 5 7 0 .3 2 8 0 .0 4 0 0 .0 2 2 0 .0 7 5 0 .0 8 5 0 .4 5 4
A U  -  9 7 0 .0 4 2 0 .0 4 8 0 .0 4 5 0 .0 5 6 0 .3 8 0 0 .0 5 8 0 .0 5 2 0 .0 6 3 0 .0 9 3 0 .2 9 7
A l l  -  98 0 .0 5 2 0 .0 4 8 0 .0 4 5 0 .0 8 4 0 .4 5 2 0 .0 5 0 0 .0 6 0 0 .0 5 6 0 .0 7 8 0 .3 6 8
A U  - 9 9 0 .0 4 6 0 .0 8 7 0 .0 6 3 0 .1 2 9 0 .4 5 8 0 .0 4 9 0 .021 0 .0 3 5 0 .0 6 2 0 .3 5 1
A U  -  0 0 0 .0 4 7 0 .081 0 .0 6 4 0 .1 0 7 0 .3 7 6 0 .0 4 5 0 .0 3 5 0 .0 6 4 0 .0 8 8 0 .4 0 6
A U  - 01 0 .0 5 6 0 .1 0 0 0 .0 8 8 0 .1 2 6 0 .5 6 4 0 .0 5 4 0 .141 0 .1 3 7 0 .1 6 2 0 .6 0 3
A U  - 02 0 .0 5 1 0 .1 0 9 0 .1 0 3 0 .1 3 9 0 .7 0 0 0 .0 6 7 0 .1 7 8 0 .1 2 2 0 .1 8 5 0 .7 0 5
A U  -  03 0 .0 4 5 0 .0 5 9 0 .0 6 5 0 .0 9 7 0 .6 6 8 0 .0 4 6 0 .0 7 0 0 .0 9 4 0 .1 2 3 0 .6 8 8
A U - 0 4 0 .0 3 8 0 .0 5 4 0 .0 7 2 0 .0 9 6 0 .7 2 6 0 .0 5 0 0 .0 6 0 0 .1 0 4 0 .1 3 4 0 .7 1 5
U S - 9 5 0 .0 2 8 0 .4 1 2 0 .2 7 9 0 .3 0 7 0 .8 9 7 0 .0 3 6 0 .3 0 8 0 .2 0 9 0 .2 4 6 0 .8 1 7
U S - 9 6 0 .0 3 0 0 .4 2 7 0 .2 6 7 0 .2 9 7 0 .9 0 4 0 .0 3 6 0 .2 8 2 0 .1 9 9 0 .2 3 5 0 .831
U S  -  9 7 0 .0 2 6 0 .4 1 8 0 .2 9 6 0 .3 2 2 0 .9 0 3 0 .0 3 6 0 .2 6 9 0 .2 1 3 0 .2 5 0 0 .8 4 7
U S - 9 8 0 .0 2 7 0 .4 2 3 0 .2 9 3 0 .3 2 0 0 .9 0 0 0 .0 4 0 0 .3 1 4 0 .2 3 5 0 .2 7 4 0 .8 4 5
U S - 9 9 0 .0 3 1 0 .5 2 1 0 .2 9 2 0 .3 3 0 0 .9 0 1 0 .0 4 0 0 .3 3 7 0 .2 3 9 0 .2 7 8 0 .8 3 2
U S - 0 0 0 .0 3 6 0 .4 9 7 0 .2 9 0 0 .3 2 6 0 .8 9 1 0 .0 4 2 0 .3 4 7 0 .2 3 4 0 .2 7 7 0 .8 2 3
U S - 0 1 0 .0 2 7 0 .5 3 0 0 .3 0 7 0 .3 3 4 0 .9 1 5 0 .0 3 1 0 .371 0 .251 0 .2 8 2 0 .8 7 0
U S - 0 2 0 .0 2 5 0 .5 5 9 0 .3 0 4 0 .3 2 8 0 .9 2 0 0 .0 2 0 0 .4 2 7 0 .2 6 5 0 .2 8 6 0 .9 2 0
U S - 0 3 0 .0 1 6 0 .4 5 8 0 .2 7 8 0 .2 9 4 0 .9 4 0 0 .0 1 5 0 .3 6 4 0 .2 5 6 0 .2 7 0 0 .9 3 5
U S - 0 4 0 .0 1 8 0 .4 1 7 0 .2 7 4 0 .2 9 2 0 .9 2 4 0 .0 1 6 0 .3 3 0 0 .2 2 8 0 .2 4 4 0 .9 3 5
J P  - 9 5 0 .1 3 4 0 .2 6 4 0 .2 1 8 0 .3 4 8 0 .6 1 8 0 .1 3 7 0 .151 0 .2 1 5 0 .3 5 2 0 .6 1 7
J P  - 96 0 .1 3 5 0 .2 5 8 0 .2 0 1 0 .3 2 9 0 .5 9 7 0 .1 3 8 0 .1 7 5 0 .2 0 7 0 .3 5 3 0 .5 9 7
J P  -  9 7 0 .1 4 2 0 .3 5 2 0 .201 0 .3 6 3 0 .5 3 7 0 .1 4 2 0 .2 2 3 0 .2 0 0 0 .3 5 1 0 .5 8 9
J P  -  9 8 0 .1 3 7 0 .2 9 5 0 .231 0 .3 6 1 0 .5 9 1 0 .1 3 9 0 .2 0 2 0 .2 0 8 0 .3 5 0 0 .5 8 1
J P  - 9 9 0 .1 2 7 0 .3 1 8 0 .2 5 7 0 .3 9 0 0 .6 2 0 0 130 0 199 0 2 0 3 0 .3 3 7 0 .6 0 0
J P - 0 0 0 .1 2 7 0 .2 7 8 0 .2 2 4 0 .3 4 2 0 .6 0 2 0 .1 2 3 0 .1 9 5 0 .1 8 6 0 .3 1 5 0 .5 7 1
J P - 0 1 0 .1 2 6 0 .2 5 4 0 .2 1 6 0 .3 3 1 0 .5 9 3 0 .1 2 6 0 .2 0 2 0 .1 8 4 0 .3 1 4 0 .5 7 8
J P  -  0 2 0 .1 2 1 0 .2 3 1 0 .2 0 5 0 .3 0 8 0 .611 0 .1 1 7 0 .2 1 2 0 .1 8 7 0 .2 9 5 0 .6 1 1
J P  -  0 3 0 .1 0 1 0 .2 1 3 0 .1 9 5 0 .2 7 9 0 .6 4 5 0 .1 0 2 0 .1 3 3 0 .1 4 5 0 .2 4 9 0 .5 2 1
J P  -  0 4 0 .0 9 2 0 .1 8 5 0 .1 8 8 0 .2 6 8 0 .6 3 2 0 .0 8 2 0 .1 0 9 0 .1 5 6 0 .2 4 4 0 .6 1 4
U K - 9 5 0 .0 7 3 0 .0 8 9 0 .1 1 3 0 .1 6 7 0 .5 4 9 0 .0 7 0 0 .0 5 7 0 .0 9 3 0 .1 4 2 0 .5 3 4
U K  - 9 6 0 .0 7 0 0 .1 0 9 0 .0 9 9 0 .1 4 9 0 .4 5 4 0 .0 6 0 0 .0 7 7 0 .0 8 5 0 .1 2 9 0 .5 8 1
U K  - 9 7 0 .0 6 9 0 .1 5 4 0 .1 0 2 0 .1 5 3 0 .5 9 9 0 .0 6 5 0 .0 9 7 0 .0 9 3 0 .1 4 1 0 .6 1 6
U K  - 9 8 0 .0 6 1 0 .0 6 1 0 .1 2 4 0 .1 5 1 0 .6 0 4 0 .0 6 7 0 .1 3 6 0 .0 9 9 0 .1 3 8 0 .5 9 5
U K  - 9 9 0 .0 6 4 0 .0 6 5 0 .0 7 0 0 .0 9 8 0 .5 1 7 0 .0 6 5 0 .1 4 6 0 .1 0 5 0 .1 4 7 0 .6 1 2
U K  - 0 0 0 .0 7 4 0 .0 5 7 0 .0 5 7 0 .1 0 7 0 .4 5 7 0 .0 6 9 0 .1 4 0 0 .0 9 0 0 .1 2 9 0 .4 9 2
U K - 0 1 0 .0 6 8 0 .0 6 6 0 .0 7 0 0 .0 9 9 0 .5 3 5 0 .0 6 8 0 .1 5 4 0 .1 0 5 0 .1 4 3 0 .5 4 6
U K - 0 2 0 .0 6 0 0 .0 4 7 0 .0 7 2 0 .0 9 8 0 .5 6 0 0 .0 5 1 0 .1 1 0 0 .0 8 0 0 .1 0 6 0 .4 9 0
U K  - 03 0 .0 3 5 0 .0 1 6 0 .0 4 0 0 .0 5 1 0 .6 2 3 0 .0 3 6 0 .0 4 6 0 .0 7 1 0 .0 9 2 0 .6 1 6
U K  - 0 4 0 .0 3 8 0 .0 1 2 0 .0 3 0 0 .0 5 6 0 .4 3 0 0 .0 3 7 0 .0 5 9 0 .0 6 6 0 .0 8 3 0 .5 3 5
M L - 9 5 0 .1 0 4 0 .0 5 2 0 .0 8 0 0 .1 7 9 0 .3 6 5 0 .1 0 7 0 .1 3 3 0 .1 3 5 0 .2 3 6 0 .5 0 4
M L - 9 6 0 .1 2 0 0 .0 6 8 0 .1 0 7 0 .2 2 2 0 .4 2 5 0 .1 0 6 0 .1 7 8 0 .1 6 6 0 .2 3 6 0 .5 2 3
M L - 9 7 0 .1 4 0 0 .3 0 4 0 .1 0 7 0 .2 4 4 0 .4 2 6 0 .1 4 3 0 .4 2 3 0 .1 4 7 0 .2 9 3 0 .4 3 7
M L - 9 8 0 .1 4 6 0 .2 7 7 0 .1 2 5 0 .2 7 8 0 .4 3 2 0 .1 4 4 0 .4 1 8 0 .1 4 7 0 .2 8 4 0 .4 9 9
M L - 9 9 0 .1 3 6 0 .2 3 6 0 .1 2 0 0 .2 5 9 0 .4 3 4 0 .1 2 5 0 .3 7 5 0 .1 5 5 0 .2 8 4 0 .5 2 0
M L - 0 0 0 .1 2 5 0 .2 8 8 0 .1 2 3 0 .2 4 9 0 .4 3 8 0 .1 2 4 0 .3 8 9 0 .1 5 1 0 .2 6 8 0 .5 0 2
M L - 0 1 0 .1 1 7 0 .2 9 9 0 .1 3 2 0 .2 5 8 0 .5 1 1 0 .1 0 7 0 .3 8 3 0 .1 3 9 0 .2 5 5 0 .4 9 8
M L - 0 2 0 .1 1 0 0 .3 4 2 0 .141 0 .2 5 0 0 .5 3 1 0 .1 1 0 0 .3 7 7 0 .1 3 1 0 .2 4 8 0 .5 5 9
M L - 0 3 0 .0 7 9 0 .1 7 4 0 .1 3 3 0 .2 2 2 0 .5 6 3 0 .0 6 2 0 .2 6 9 0 .1 6 0 0 .2 3 6 0 .7 0 7
M L - 0 4 0 .1 0 2 0 .2 6 1 0 .1 3 7 0 .2 4 3 0 .5 3 9 0 .0 8 5 0 .3 3 2 0 .1 5 6 0 .2 4 3 0 .7 1 1
A summary of Table 4.3 is provided in Table 4.4 for the period of 1995-2004. Table 4.4 shows 
that on average U.S. firms (both DCs and MCs) hold the least amount of short-term debt (0.026
128
and 0.031) among the other four sample countries’ DCs and MCs. On the contrary, Japanese 
DCs use slightly a higher proportion of short-term debt (0.125) than the MCs (0.124) and the 
proportion of short-term debt for Japanese DCs and MCs are relatively higher compared to the 
other four countries. Interestingly, U.S. and Japanese DCs and MCs hold a higher proportion of 
long-term market and book debt ratios than the other three countries. To conclude, the most 
likely reason for both the greater and lesser averages of long-term debt ratios is the stability of 
the firms’ financial needs and the state of the firms’ financial and operating positions. Further, 
the fluctuations of the various types of debt may be due to the stability of debt markets and the 
state of optimism of the national economy in all five countries (Michaelas, Chittenden & 
Potziouris, 1999; Mohamad, 1995). Figure 4.1 is the graphical representation of Table 4.4.
Table 4.4
Average annual capital structure across 5 sampled countries: 1995-2004
Table 4 displays the annual average o f different types o f  debts from 1995 to 2004. In the first column, the acronyms o f AU, US, JP, 
UK and ML are Australia, United States, Japan, United Kingdom and Malaysia respectively. The measurements o f different types 
o f debt were discussed in Table 4.3.
D Cs M C s
S h o r t Term L ong T erm L ong  T erm T ota l B ook D ebt S h o rt T erm L on g  T erm L on g  Term T o ta l B ook D ebt
B ook  D ebt M arket D ebt B ook  D ebt B ook  D ebt M a rk et D ebt B ook  D ebt
R atios R atios R atios D ebt R atios M a tu r ity R atios R atios R atios D ebt R atios M a tu r ity
A U 0 .0 4 8 0 .066 0.071 0 .1 0 6 0 .5 7 4 0.051 0 .0 7 4 0 .0 9 2 0 .123 0 5 67
us 0 .0 2 6 0 .4 6 9 0 .288 0 .315 0 .9 0 9 0.031 0 .3 3 7 0 .233 0 .265 0 .8 6 6
JP 0 .125 0.261 0 .213 0 .3 3 0 0 .605 0 .1 2 4 0 .1 8 0 0 .1 8 8 0 .315 0 .5 8 8
U K 0 .063 0.061 0 .082 0 .1 2 0 0 .533 0 .0 5 9 0 .0 9 7 0 .0 9 0 0 .1 2 7 0 .5 6 8
M L 0 .1 2 0 0 .2 4 2 0 .1 2 4 0 .2 4 7 0 .4 7 4 0 .113 0 .3 3 4 0 .1 4 8 0 .2 6 0 0 .5 4 9
Figure 4.1
Debt structure across 5 countries: 1995-2004
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Figure 4.2
Comparison of DCs’ and MCs’ long-term debt across 5 countries over 10 years
Average Long Term Debt ratio for A ustralian DCs and 
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Figure 4.1 depicts that MCs of Australia, U.S. and U.K. use comparatively less short-term debt 
than Japanese and Malaysian and this is similar to DCs. The book value of long-term debt of 
Australian DCs is low while DCs in the U.S. have high book value of long-term debt. 
Australian DCs and MCs have comparatively lower total debt than that of the four countries. 
Overall, there seems to be a symmetrical behaviour of debt to maturity between DCs and MCs.
A further graphical elaboration of Table 4.4, especially the market value of long-term debt 
(which is the main focus of this chapter), is presented in Figure 4.2. Figure 4.2 displays the 
trend of long-term debt ratios for DCs and MCs over the last 10 years. It shows that on average 
long-term debts for DCs and MCs move in similar direction in U.S., Japan and Malaysia. 
However, DCs and MCs in Australia do not show similar trend. The graph also depicts that in 
most cases DCs have more debt than MCs and this is consistent with Lee and Kwok (1988) and 
Doukas and Panzalis (2003). It also reveals that over 10 years (1995-2004) debt ratios varied 
across countries for both DCs and MCs, and this may be due to time-variant factors (Love & 
Wickramanyaake, 1996). This result is consistent with Homaifar, Zietz and Benkato’s (1998) 
argument that firms adjust the debt ratios over time due to macroeconomic issues and 
fluctuations in corporate income tax.
4.6.2 Analytical Discussion of DCs’ and MCs’ Difference in Capital 
Structure
Figure 4.3 presents a direct graphical comparison of average long-term and total debt ratios 
comparison for sample countries DCs and MCs. Table 4.5 illustrate t-tests results to investigate 
if capital structures are different between DCs and MCs (Panel A) and also whether different 
legal constitutions and different tax system impacts capital structure (Panel B). Figure 4.3 
indicates that a similar pattern is observed between DCs and MCs across countries for both 
long-term debt ratios and total debt ratios. Australian, U.K. and Malaysian MCs hold higher 
debt ratios than the DCs while U.S. and Japanese MCs demonstrate the opposite.
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Figure 4.3
Average long-term and total debt ratios between DCs and MCs across 5 countries
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However, Figure 4.3 fails to show any significant relationship and therefore a test is conducted 
to tease out more about the capital structure behaviour between DCs and MCs across countries 
and the results are presented in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5
Mean equality t-test for DCs’ and MCs’ capital structure for 5 sampled countries
PANEL A
AU US JP UK ML
DCs MCs DCs MCs DCs MCs DCs MCs DCs MCs
Short-term debt
Mean 0 .0 4 0 0.041 0 .0 4 7 0 .0 5 0 0 .1 5 3 0 .1 6 0 0 .0 5 0 0.051 0 .1 5 4 0 .1 4 9
t-test 0 .153 1.132 1.473 0 .031 0 .4 5 2
Long-term debt
Mean 0 .0 6 6 0 .0 7 4 0 .4 6 9 0 .3 3 7 0.261 0 .1 8 0 0 .0 9 7 0.261 0 .2 4 2 0 .3 3 4
t-test 0 .5 5 4 10.670a 6.612a 13.5963 5.2013
Total debt
Mean 0 .1 0 6 0 .123 0 .3 1 5 0 .265 0 .3 3 0 0 .315 0 .1 2 0 0 .1 2 0 0 .2 4 7 0 .2 6 0
t-test 1.254 8.7163 1.956b 0 .8 0 9 1.128
Sample 994 1254 1371 1417 1093 814 719 1469 1861 964
PANEL B
Type of Firms Common Law Civil law Classical Tax Imputation Tax
DCs MCs DCs MCs DCs MCs DCs MCs DCs MCs
Short-term debt
Mean 0 .1 1 2 0 .0 9 0 0.101 0 .0 6 0 0 .1 5 3 0 .1 6 0 0 .1 2 0 0 .0 9 5 0 .0 4 8 0 .053
t-test 9.0663 15.3283 1.473 9.6813 1.083
Long-term debt 
Mean 0 .2 5 5 0 .223 0 .2 5 4 0 .2 4 2 0.261 0 .1 8 0 0 .2 7 9 0 .243 0 .0 7 8 0 .0 8 6
t-test 5.3463 1.679b 6.6123 5.3503 0 .7 2 0
Total debt
Mean 0 .2 5 8 0 .2 4 8 0 .2 4 0 0 .2 1 9 0 .3 3 0 0 .315 0 .2 7 6 0 .2 6 3 0.121 0.121
t-test 2.6263 4.7723 1.9563 3.1273 1.287C
Sample 994 1254 1371 1417 1093 814 719 1469 1861 964
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 4.5 shows that on average the short-term debt for MCs in Australia, U.S., Japan and 
U.K.’s MCs’ have relatively higher than DCs (Panel A) over 10-years period; however, no 
significant relationship is observed. DCs’ and MCs’ debt ratios are significantly different from 
each other across U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia (t=10.67; 6.61; 13.60 and 5.20 respectively). 
While the U.S. and Japanese MCs hold significantly less long-term debt in their capital structure 
relative to DCs, U.K. and Malaysia shows contradictory results indicating DCs have less debt 
than MCs and it is significant at the 1% level. However, in Australia the difference of capital 
structure between DCs and MCs remains insignificant. The results for U.S. and Japan are 
consistent with Lee and Kwok (1988), Burgman (1996), Chen et al. (1997), Homaifar, Zietz and 
Benkato (1998) and Doukas and Pantzalis (2003), suggesting MCs carry less debt than DCs. 
However, other research have suggested that MCs should be able to support more debt in their 
capital structures than DCs, arguing that MCs operate in several less than perfectly correlated 
economies and that this geographic diversification should translate into lower earnings 
volatility, and hence a lower probability of bankruptcy (Butler, 1999). Table 4.5 show that MCs 
have significantly less debt than DCs across the countries of U.S. and Japan suggest that either 
international diversification does not lead to a reduction in overall business risk. Further, Panel 
B also shows that MCs hold lower short-term, long-term and total debt ratios relative to DCs 
counterparts regardless of countries of origin (t=9.066; 5.346; 2.626). Results also show that 
DCs in common law countries hold higher short-term, long -term and total debt ratios relative 
to MCs in common law countries (t=l 5.328; t= l.679; 4.772). Similar results also hold for DCs 
operating under civil law regime specially for long-term and total debt (t=6.612; t=l .956). 
Further, DCs operating under classical tax regime appears to hold higher short-term, long-term 
and total debt ratios than their MCs counterparts (t=9.681; t=5.350; t=3.127). Given univariate 
tests do not control for any company-specific factors or any external operational exposures, we 
conduct further formal tests. Therefore, in section 4.6.3 a comprehensive and formal test would 
be undertaken by incorporating the possible long-term debt ratio determining factors that 
discussed earlier in this chapter and also Chapter 3.
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4.6.3 Regression Analysis and Corresponding Hypothesis 
4.6.3.1 DCs’ and MCs’ Capital Structure Determinants
In order to explain the individual capital structure determinants and their impact on MCs and 
DCs, the proposed models’ regression analysis result is discussed in this section.
Diversification is one of the aspects of any firm becoming larger with an expectation that it 
would reduce the operational risk. The evidence in Table 4.6 suggests that diversification 
strategy is not efficiently launched by any of the sample countries. For example, the result of 
negative and significant diversification {DIVER) suggests that Malaysian DCs (t=-1.93) and 
MCs across Australia (t=-2.17), U.S. (t=-2.98) and Malaysia (t=-2.05) fail to diversify properly, 
and as a result diversification reduces the ability to increase long-term debt level. These results 
are consistent with Burgman (1996), Chen et al. (1997), Doukas & Pantzalis (1997) and Lee and 
Kwok (1988). Our result suggest that as firm expands, the costs of expansion outweighs the 
benefit which leads to the support of agency cost argument.
While the negative and significant relationship of foreign exchange risk {FX) with long-term 
leverage for DCs is found across Australia (t=-2.93), U.S. (t=-2.73), and Japan (t=-2.40), it is 
positive and significant for U.K. and Malaysian DCs (t=1.66 and t=2.18). Interestingly, no 
apparent significant results are found for the MCs across the sample countries. Although the 
result is a mixed evidence across DCs and MCs, it is consistent with the theory that because 
DCs’ operation is very locally-focused, it is difficult to avoid the exposure for Australian, U.S. 
and Japanese DCs. Our results are consistent with Adler and Dumas (1984) and Aliber (1983).
The effect of political risk {PR) on the long-term debt policy produces mixed results but it 
significantly affects U.K. MCs (t=4.30). The result suggests as the U.K. MCs’ subsidiary 
countries become safer, it significantly increases the long-term debt capacity, which is 
consistent with the political risk and capital structure theory (Stonehill and Stilz, 1969; 
Burgman, 1996)
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Significant negative bankruptcy risk (BPTCY) for DCs in U.K. and Malaysia suggests that as 
the volatility of cash flows increase, they significantly reduces the long-term debt capacity. As 
for MCs, only Malaysian MCs should be aware of increases in bankruptcy risk which is induced 
by the nature of volatile business operation as it would significantly (t=-3.61) reduce long-term 
debt capacity. These findings are consistent with the arguments by Friend and Lang (1988), 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Opler and Titman (1994) and Thies and Klock (1992) that too 
much long-term debt may cause financial distress due to a lack of periodic debt repayments, 
which in turn is due to unstable earnings. Further, this also may be due to investors’ perception 
that there is a greater probability of bankruptcy and their observation that the firms’ earnings are 
more volatile - thus they demand higher premium from the firms, which discourages the use of 
debt in firms.
The firm-specific risk {BETA) and debt argument is supported by the negative coefficient with a 
1% significance level across U.S. and Japanese DCs (t=-6.00 and t=-3.67). The negative and 
significant impact of firm-specific risk is also observed in MCs across Australia (t=-2.45), U.S. 
(t=-4.25), Japan (t=-4.10) and U.K. (t=-3.68). These findings are consistent with the arguments 
by Burgman (1996), Reeb, Kwok and Baek (1998) and Madura (1998) that as the 
undiversifiable risk increases, it significantly reduces the long-term debt capacity.
Non-debt tax shield {NDTS) does not have an expected sign of negative coefficient for both 
DCs and MCs for the majority of the sample countries. This suggest that as the tax deduction 
(tax shields) increase due to increase in non-debt related items (e.g. depreciation, depletion 
allowances, investment and foreign tax credits), NDTS significantly reduces long-term debt. 
These results are consistent with DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Mackie Mason (1990) and 
Graham (1996a).
Average tax rate (ATR) coefficient for Australian DCs (t=-2.29) and is consistent with the 
imputation theory that under an imputation tax system firms are unable to take advantage of 
interest deduction, and therefore firms prefer to issue less debt and more equity. However, it is
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interesting to see that U.S. firms employ significantly less debt for both DCs (t=-2.53) and MCs 
(t=-l 1.60). A possible explanation is that to receive the full tax benefit of leverage, a firm 
needs to use 100% debt financing. In our sample, since this situation was not considered in 
collecting data, it is possible that the A TR coefficient is not fully capturing the tax effect. This 
finding is consistent with Mackie-Mason (1990).
Consistent with the size argument, the (SIZE) coefficient in the long-term debt and short-term 
debt has a highly significant positive coefficient (t=8.35, 7.73, 25.32 3.75 and 14.84) for 
Australian, U.S., Japanese, U.K. and Malaysian DCs respectively (t=3.53, 9.41, 24.31, 8.16 and 
2.01 for the same five countries respectively) suggesting that larger firms tend to be in a better 
position to hold relatively more debt and therefore are less likely to go bankrupt (Ferri & Jones, 
1979; Whited, 1992; Stohs & Mauer, 1996). Importantly it also implies that the larger the firm 
size, the less the debt-related transaction costs, which therefore enables them to hold more debt.
Collateral value of assets (CVÄ) has a consistently positive sign of coefficient across all sample 
countries DCs and MCs. Among the five sample countries, CVA is found to be a highly 
significant determinant of capital structure at 1% significance level for all countries’ DCs 
(t=2.20, 5.39, 4.83, 3.60 and 5.54). Similarly, MCs of U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia have 
highly significant impact on long-term debt level (t= 10.85, 7.2, 3.26 and 2.15 respectively). 
This result suggests that assets that serve as collateral provide an explicit guarantee over debt, 
which assists firms to borrow on relatively favourable terms at minimal borrowing costs (Rajan 
& Zingales, 1995; Berger, Ofek and Yermack, 1997; Graham, 2000). This significant positive 
relationship also suggests that tangible assets acting as collateral for loans can be used to reduce 
agency costs of long-term debt.
The maturity of a firm indicated by age (AGE) is consistent with the theory that as a firm 
matures and lasts longer in the market it gives positive signals to the lenders, and therefore it 
significantly increases the borrowing capacity of long-term debt ratios for DCs of Japan 
(t=4.12) and U.K. (t=3.37) and MCs of U.K. (t=2.37). Interestingly, Australian DCs and U.S.
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MCs show that a firm’s maturity is significant and negatively related to long-term debt (t=-4.03 
and t=-7.38). It may suggest that as firms mature as domestic firms in the Australia, they lose 
creditworthiness gradually due to lack of satisfactory performance. This result is similar to 
Petersen and Rajan (1994).
Under pecking order theory, Myers and Majluf (1984) predict that leverage will be negatively 
related to profitability (PROF) because firms prefer to obtain financing through internally- 
generated funds, with external debt, and finally with equity. The relationship of profitability 
and long-term debt indicates that pecking order theory holds significantly across all DCs 
(t=-2.47, -2.42, -9.35 and -3.50) and MCs of U.S. (t=-10.24), Japan (t=-3.63) and U.K. (t= 
-1.81). This suggest that firms with improved profitability are better able to avoid costly 
external financing and would rather take the opportunity to use internal financing since these 
firms have less of a need to access lending from markets, which is usually costly. The sign of 
the parameter is consistent with Myers (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984), Friend and Lang 
(1988), Titman and Wessels (1988) Chiarella et al. (1992), Allen (1993) and Wald (1999).
The pecking order theory predicts that firms with stable cash dividend (DIVC) policies use 
leverage to support shortfalls in dividend funding. The support of this theory is found in U.S. 
for both DCs (t=4.59) and MCs (2.79). However, the DCs and MCs of both Australia (t=-2.62 
and t=-2.20) and Malaysia (t=-8.99 and -5.36) and MCs of Japan (t=-1.76) present a negative 
and significant relationship with long-term debt. This result is inconsistent according to the 
pecking order theory but consistent with trade-off theory. This negative significant relationship 
can be interpreted from the agency theory point of view. For example, when a firm has excess 
cash available in hand, instead of wasting the excess cash in investing low profitable projects 
they can instead pay dividends and as a result it can put constraints on leverage as there is less 
availability of cash to finance any project with internally-generated profits. So, dividend 
payment is negatively related with leverage, suggesting it assists to minimise the agency costs 
of equity as dividend payment increase. This evidence is found explaining the long-term 
leverage in DCs in Australia (t=-2.62) and Malaysia (t=-8.99) and MCs across Australia (t=-
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2.20), Japan (t=-1.76) and Malaysia (t=-5.36). This results supports the arguments of 
Easterbrook (1984).
A firm with high level of free cash flow (FCF) is less likely to experience agency cost of debt 
within the firm as FCF is expected to reduce agency costs of debt within the firm by enabling 
the firm to use the firm’s extra cash flow for interest payments associated with long-term debt. 
The FCF control variable for agency costs shows a mixed result across DCs and MCs across 
countries. For example, while Australian DCs have significant and negative coefficient (t=- 
1.93), Japanese DCs have significant positive coefficients (t=4.66). Similarly, Australian and 
Malaysian MCs have negative and significant relationships (t=-3.59 and -3.32) while U.S. and 
Japanese MCs have positive coefficients (t= 12.44 and 6.24). The positive and significant 
coefficients for Japanese DCs and MCs of U.S. and Japan suggest that FCF contributes to 
minimise the agency problem of debt. This is consistent with Gardner and Trinca (1992), 
Lowe, Naughton and Taylor (1994), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Hirota (1999) and Hall, 
Hutchinson and Michaelas (2000). Alternatively, Australian DCs and MCs of Australia and 
Malaysia experiencing negative and significant FCF coefficients suggest that managers invest 
sub-optimally where the return is quite poor, or engage in self-interested behaviour as they hold 
excess FCF, instead of paying excess cash to the shareholders as a dividend to mitigate the 
agency problem.
The growth variable (GROW MB) captures the future investment position of a firm and its 
impact on long. While the growth coefficient to explain long-term debt for DCs is supported 
across Australia (t=-2.60) and U.S. (t—2.29), this argument is also supported for MCs across 
Australia (t=-1.84) and Malaysia (t=-1.80). This result is consistent with Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Kim and Sorenson (1986), Stulz (1990) and Titman and Wessels (1988) who argue that 
firms with greater growth should use less debt to avoid under-investment costs related to debt- 
overhang problems. Further, this negative relationship supports the Myers (1977) pecking order 
theory which means it is consistent with agency and tax-based theories that predict a negative 
relationship with long-term debt. On the other hand, there is also significant positive
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relationship observed for DCs across U.K. (t=3.15) and Malaysia (t=2.28) and this contradicts 
Myers (1977) growth opportunity hypothesis. Nevertheless, the observed positive coefficient 
simply implies that growth opportunities add value for the MCs while they expand and grow 
through borrowing. Further, this increase in growth adds values since the investments attract 
positive NPV.
Further, short-term debt ratio determinants across countries are investigated and results are 
presented in Table 4.7. Note that very little research investigates the determinants of short term 
debt, therefore, our results make very little references in the following discussions.
Table 4.7 shows that diversification {DIVER) is an important determining factor for short-term 
debt across the DCs of Australia (t=2.02), U.S. (t=2.22), Japan (t=1.97), U.K. (t=2.54) and 
Malaysia (t=1.99). Interestingly, diversification is negatively related to determine Australian 
MCs short-term debt (t=-4.23) while it is positive and significantly related to determine capital 
structure for the rest of the sample countries (U.S.: t=1.65, t=3.36, t=l .67 and t=2.04). 
Although there is no capital structure theory of how diversification should impact on short-term 
debt, it is important to know that diversification’s impact on long-term debt and short-term debt 
is distinctive. Overall, diversification does assist to increase short-term debt for the majority of 
both DCs and MCs across countries except for Australian MCs.
Foreign exchange exposure (FX) does not appear to be a major concern in raising short-term 
debt across the majority of the DCs and MCs in the sample countries except for U.S. (t=l .95) 
and Japanese (t=-2.17) DCs and Malaysian MCs (t=-2.15). It shows that foreign exchange 
exposures significantly reduce the capacity to raise short-term debt for Japanese DCs and 
Malaysian MCs.
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The impact of political risk (PR) for the short-term debt, it shows that MCs and DCs in Japan 
has a significant negative impact (DCs: t=-3.52 and MCs: t=-3.09). A possible explanation for 
this is that usually both DCs and MCs are insured against political risk and, obviously on a short 
term period, if a country’s political environment becomes safer it does not necessarily mean the 
firm can recover the insurance costs.
Bankruptcy risk (BPTCY) on short-term debt appears more prominent across the DCs of 
Australia (t=-2.66), U.K. (t=-5.80), Malaysia (t=-2.67) and MCs of Australia, U.S., U.K. and 
Malaysia (t=-3.63; -1.78, -1.76 and -5.80) respectively.
The impact of firm risk {BETA) control the short-term debt more notably for Australian (t=- 
2.54) and U.S. (t=-2.69) DCs and U.S. (t=-6.23) and U.K. (t=-5.060) MCs. In these countries, 
as the firm-specific risk increases it disables the capacity to take short-term debt in firms’ 
capital structure.
The average tax rate (ATR) implication is negative and significant in explaining capital structure 
for DCs in U.S. (t=-2.03) and Malaysia (t=-2.78) and MCs in Japan (t=-6.81) and Malaysia (t=- 
3.24). Australia’s average tax rate has a positive effect on short-term debt which increases the 
benefit of raising debt in a short periods. This may suggest that imputation tax have little effect 
on short-term debt.
Non-debt tax shields {NDTS) have positive impact on short-term debt for DCs in U.S. (t=2.74) 
and MCs in Japan (t=2.22). However, a negative significant impact of NDTS is also observed 
for MCs in U.S. (t=-8.35).
The size variable in the regressions have highly significant positive coefficients for MCs across 
U.S. (t=4.69) and U.K. (t=3.36). This suggests that the greater the firm size the higher the 
leverage and this supports Cook (1991) and Smith (1977). A negative and significant size effect 
is observed for DCs in U.K. (t=-5.46) and Malaysia (t=-6.34).
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The significant positive coefficient on the collateral value of assets variable (CVA) for firms in 
general is found only for MCs in Japan (t=5.87) which supports the idea that higher collateral 
value of assets increases the debt capacity. However, majority of the DCs and MCs across 
sample countries show that CVA has a significant negative impact on short-term debt ratios.
Maturity of firms (.AGE) is found to be a significant factor for all sample countries MCs (t=2.25, 
t=7.00, t=2.03 and t=2.57) except for Malaysia. AGE variable generally has, highly positive 
statistical power to explain short-term debt.
The pecking order theory of Myers (1977) predicts that leverage will be negatively related to 
profitability. The results provide strong support for this with negative and highly significant 
coefficient on the profitability variable (PROF) for DCs in U.S. (t=-1.88), Japan (t=-6.02), U.K. 
(t=-l .84) and Malaysia (t=-8.48) and MCs in Japan (t=-4.47).
Proponents of the pecking order theory believe that firms with generous dividend policies use 
leverage to subsidise shortfalls in dividend funding in short term and therefore a positive 
relationship would be expected. The evidence of this is supported for DCs (t=6.04) and MCs in 
U.S. (t=6.93). On the other hand, a negative relationship would suggests that the short-term 
debt is too costly to subsidise shortfalls in dividends in the short term period, and the results for 
consistently significant negative coefficients in Table 4.7 suggest this argument across DCs in 
Japan (t=-5.18) and Malaysia (t=-3.31) and MCs in Japan (t=-4.85) and U.K. (t= 1.81).
The agency costs of free cash flow (FCF) has expected negative sign for DCs in U.S. (t=- 
12.92). It is also found that the agency problem of free cash flow is not prominent in other 
sample countries.
Growth (GROW MB) variable is negative and consistent with the theory that, when firms are in 
their short term growth stage and if the growth (e.g. expansion or major project investments) is 
financed through external debt may result a negative impact on debt level, especially when net
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present value of new projects are negative. The statistical support of this theory is found for 
DCs in Australia and U.S. (t=-2.32, t=-6.19) and MCs in Japan (t=-3.51).
Overall, the determinants for short-term debt for DCs and MCs across sample country suggest 
that there is a similarity of factors that explain long-term debt and short-term debt.
4.6.3.2 Multinationality Hypothesis
In order to test whether multinationality has a significant influence on capital structure (both 
long-term and short term debt) determination, Model II is used (results presented in Table 4.8) . 
An additional variable for MCs is included to capture the multinationality effect on debt level 
for both short-term debt and long-term debt. In this model, the entire samples of DCs and MCs 
have been pooled while the common fifteen variables are kept consistent. Although for the 
interpretation purpose Model I is used earlier to investigate separately the impact of each 
explanatory variable on DCs’ and MCs’ capital structure thoroughly, it does not reveal any 
information about the impact of multinationality of a firm on long-term and short-term debt 
ratio after controlling for relevant theories. A Wald test is conducted to examine whether a pool 
sample can be used to put the DCs and MCs sample together from this point of our subsequent 
analysis. For the combined data set of DCs and MCs, the chi square test statistics take a value 
of 3.83 for 14 degrees of freedom, which translates into p-value of 0.120. This value suggests 
that parameters homogeneity failed to reject at a statistical level well beyond any conventional 
level.
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The result in Table 4.8 (Panel A) suggests that the effect of the multinationality coefficient has a 
mixed level of significance and direction across countries for long-term leverage. For example, 
for Australia, Japan, Great Britain and Malaysia the coefficient is positive. However, from a 
statistical point of view it is only significant for U.S. (t=-5.14) and Malaysia (t=2.41). The 
direction of negative significance level for U.S. and positive significance level for Malaysia 
supports the international costs of capital theory that multinational corporations that originated 
in developing countries but have subsidiaries in developing countries will have higher debt, and 
multinationals in developed countries having subsidiaries in relatively lower developed 
countries will have lower debt ratio (Shapiro, 1996). This is because it is easier and cheaper to 
raise debt in established countries where transaction cost is low, there is less chance of 
bankruptcy as established economies assists to have smooth earnings, and cost are lower to raise 
long-term debt due to easier access to long-term debt. On the other hand, when I investigated 
the effect of multinationality on short-term debt (Panel B), it appears that the relationship of
Table 4.8
Testing of multinationality effect on long-term and short-term debt across 5 sampled countries
This table reports the variables and expected signs of the hypotheses. There two dependent variables and fifteen independent 
variables. The following model is utilised:
Leverage(L)(it)— ß0 +ßx MULTt ß2Xlnlematlonal\jactors(il) + ^ jß3XTradeqg-_facton(ut)
ß^Firm nechm’orderCu) ~^ (^lt)
There are two dependent variables (LEVERAGE,,) takes the following four forms: LTD M V and S T D B V ,, which are measured 
as book value of long-term debt divided by sum of book value of long-term debt and market value of equity; and book value of 
short-term debt divided by book value of total assets. Sixteen independent variables are measured as: M U L T -  multinationality 
takes a value of 1 (unity) if the corporation is multinational corporations otherwise it is 0 (domestic corporations). The variables are 
measured in the following manner: The independent variables are measured in the following manner: DIVER u -  diversification is 
defined as the natural logarithm of total subsidiaries in home country and overseas countries. F X -  foreign exchange risk is 
measured as a ratio of foreign sales to total sales. PR u  -  political risk variable is measured as the proportion of foreign sales to 
total sales times by the country’s political risk index which is provided by PRS Global. BPTCY-bankruptcy risk is measured as 
the standard deviation of last five years earrings volatility of firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. B E T A -  firm-specific risk is 
measured as the covariance of firm return index and market index divided by variance of market index -  market model. NDTS,, 
(Non-debt Tax Shield) is calculated by total annual depreciation expense over total assets. ATXu -  average tax is calculated as a 
ratio of tax expense to total income. SIZE u -  size variable is measured as natural logarithm of total assets. CVA u -  collateral value 
of assets is measured as the ratio of total fixed assets to total assets. AGE u -  age is defined as the natural logarithm of the number 
of years since it has been incorporated until 2004. PROF u -  profitability is defined as the average ratio of net income over total 
sales. DIVC it -  dividend payout ratios is a ratio of cash dividend paid to net income (note losses made any year has been deleted 
from sample). AGC,, is defines as is the natural logarithm of total shareholders. FCFU~ free cash flow measured after Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings before interest and taxes, depreciation, amortization minus tax, dividend and interest expense 
scaled by 10,000. GROW, , -  growth is the market value of equity over total assets, a, b and c are the statistical significance level 
for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Panel A A H U S J P G B M Y A L L
L T D  M V C o e f f t-S ta t C o e f f t-S ta t C o e f f t-S ta t C o e f f t-S ta t C o e f f t-S ta t C o e f f t-S ta t
C - 0.25 - 1.57 0.05 0.36 - 0.86
a
- 6 .3 5 - 0.65
a
- 5.01 - 0.06 - 0.53 0.12
a
2.31
M U L T 0.04 1.58 - 0.08
a
- 5.14 0.03 1.59 0.02 1.21 0.06
a
2.41 - 0 .06
a
- 6 .07
D IV E R - 0.01 - 1.34 - 0.02
a
- 3.02 0.00 - 1.08 - 0.01 - 1.56 - 0.03
a
- 2.58 0.00
a
1.77
F X Ut - 0 .09
a
- 3 .10 - 0.06
a
- 2.48 - 0.02 - 0.80 0.01 0.42 0.07
a
2.04 0.02 1.37
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PR i,t 
BPTCY i't 
BETA i<t 
ATR j't 
NDTSUt 
SIZE u  
CVA itt
a g e  h
PROF iyt 
Divert 
FCF i<t
GROW MB l(,
No. of Obs 
Adj R-sqr
0.00 1.36
0.00 0.92
- 0 .20
a
-2.22
- 0.28 - 111
0.00
a
2.41
0.07
a
9.72
0.03 0.68
- 0.03
a
-2.83
- 0.05
a
-1.76
- 0.09
a
-3.21
- 0.05
a
-2.36
- 0.01
a
-3.60
2248
0.31
0.00 - 0.41
0.00 - 0.44
- 0.26
a
-7.44
- 2.80
a
-8.79
0.00
a
10.02
0.06
a
11.80
0.39
a
11.60
- 0.04
a
-6.97
- 0.68
a
-3.65
0.09
a
4.35
0 .00
a
8.44
0.00 - 1.50
2788
0.30
0.00 - 0.28
0.00 1.40
- 0.29
a
-6.09
- 0.37
a
-1.87
0.01
a
2.08
0.09
a
35.08
0.28
a
8.17
0.07
a
5.10
- 1.77
a
-6.21
- 0.06
a
-2.73
0.02
a
4.83
0.00
a
2.41
1907
0.52
0.01
a
3.57
0.00
a
-3.70
- 0.29
a
-3.91
- 0.13 - 1.62
0.00 - 1.62
0.06
a
9.13
0.16
a
4.68
0.03
a
4.01
- 0.07
a
-2.39
- 0.01 - 0.32
- 0.01 - 1.51
0.00
a
2.93
2188
0.22
0.00 - 0.84
0.00 - 1.69
- 0.11 - 1.09
- 0.85
a
-2.35
0.00 1.33
0.09
a
15.12
0.18
a
5.49
0.00 - 0.32
- 0.40
a
-3.68
- 0.29
a
-10.17
0.01 1.14
0.00 1.18
2825
0.19
0.00
a
-2.60
0.00
a
3.12
- 0.16
a
-6.41
- 0.79
a
-6.08
0.00
a
3.30
0.06
a
37.32
0.28
a
16.72
- 0.05
a
-12.06
- 0.25
a
-7.12
- 0.03
a
-2.73
0.00
a
8.37
0.00
a
-6.05
11956
0.24
P anel B Al! LIS J P GB MY ALL
STD  B V CoefT t-Stat CoelT t-Stat CoefT t-Stat CoefT t-Stat CoelT t-Stat CoefT t-Stat
a a a
c 0.02 0.31 - 0.01 - 0.20 0.28 4.25 0  01 0.17 0.27 5.16 0.30 14.13
b b a
MIJ L I i t 0.02 1.05 - 0.01 -2.26 0.01 1.84 0.00 - 0.56 0.00 0.44 0.02 4.79
b b a a
DIVER 0 .00 - 1.02 0.00 2.53 0.00 2.00 0.01 3.05 0.01 3.11 0.00 1.37
b a a
FXi,t - 0.01 - 0.88 0.01 2.15 - 0.04 -2.97 0.01 0.82 0.01 0.65 - 0.03 -5.51
PRi,, 0.00 - 0.26 0.00 1.16 0 .00
ä
-4.19 0 .00 0.83 0.00 - 0.12 0.00 -10.03 8
b a a b a
BPTCYü 0 .00 -1.78 0.00 3.33 0.00 0.05 0.00 -5.34 0.00 -2.56 0.00 -3.53
a b a
BETA ut 0.01 0.21 - 0.06 -7.30 - 0.01 - 0.62 - 0.06 -2.14 0.02 0.37 -0  09 -11.28
b b b a
A TR n 0.30 1.20 - 0.09 -1.96 0.44 2.05 - 0.11 -1.99 - 0.13 - 0.61 - 0.18 -3.00
a b b a
NDTSi,, 0.00 1.26 0.00 25.17 0.00 2.68 0.00 0.86 0.00 2.07 0.00 5.58
b a a a
SIZE M 0.01 2.21 0.01 5.22 0 .0 0 - 1.12 0 .0 0 - 0 .90 - 0.01 -4.64 0 .0 0 8.43
b a b b a
CVA Ut - 0.03 -1.88 - 0.04 -6.97 0.05 2.59 0.02 1.92 - 0.02 - 1.23 0.02 2.73
a a a
AGE u 0.01 1.44 0.01 4.35 0.03 5.20 0.00 1.38 0.00 - 0.34 0.02 11.68
b a a a
PROFit 0.01 0.38 - 0.02 -1.87 - 0.88 -7.25 - 0.02 - 1.04 - 0.31 -6.51 - 0.11 -4.84
C a a a a
DIVC it - 0.02 -1.68 0.03 7.94 - 0.06 -6.05 0.00 - 0.39 - 0.08 -6.82 - 0.03 -7.79
a b a
PCF if 0.00 - 0.24 0.00 -7.71 0.00 0 .68 0 .00 - 1.05 - 0.01 -2.39 0.00 -2.97
a a a a
GROW MB n 0.00 - 0.69 0.00 -3.21 0.00 -2.96 0.00 5.71 0.00 1.57 0.00 2.88
No. of Obs 2248 2788 1907 2188 2825 11956
Adj R-sqr 0.04 0.10 0.19 0.05 0.22 0.17
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
multinationality with short-term debt stays similar to long-term debt (e.g. positive) for Australia, 
U.S., Japan and Malaysia but not for U.K. (e.g. negative and insignificant). Although, the 
direction is found to be consistent for both long-term and short-term debt, it is only significant 
across U.S. (t=-2.26) and Japan (t= 1.84). Further, Table 4.8 (Panel B) shows that while U.S. 
MCs have significantly lower (t=-2.26) short-term debt than their DCs in their capital structure, 
U.K. on the other hand has lower short-term debt ratio as well but the relationship is not 
statistically significant. Disregarding country differences, results shows that MCs has
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significantly (t=4.79) higher short-term debt while MCs has significantly (t=-6.07) lower long­
term debt ratio in their capital structure compared to DCs. MCs holding significantly less long­
term debt ratio than their domestic counterparts is consistent with Lee (1986), Fatemi (1988) 
and Lee and Kwok (1988).
4.6.3.3 Do the Capital Structure Determinants Vary?
The theoretical studies based on international environmental factors predict that MCs will have 
lower debt ratios than DCs (Burgman, 1996; Shapiro, 1978). As noted earlier, the major 
determinants of a firm’s debt ratio include firm-specific factors. Each of those factors therefore, 
will be tested to investigate whether there is a significant difference between DCs’ and MCs’ 
firm-specific factors that may contribute to the difference in their debt ratios in addition to the 
MCs’ international factors (e.g. diversification, foreign exchange risk and political risk). Model 
III attempts to differentiate the significant difference between DCs’ and MCs’ debt levels (Table 
4.9). The adjusted R2 shows that the model provides a reasonable explanation, as the values 
range between 22% (U.K.) and 36% (Australia).
The common determinants of the coefficients’ significance level and sign remain relatively 
unchanged across countries. Since the aim of this model is to identify the significant slope 
differences, the original coefficients and their significance will not be discussed. This is to 
avoid repetition since similar results were discussed earlier.
The significant diversification (M DIVER) of MCs’ interaction slope for Australia (t=-2.27) and 
U.S. (t=-2.02) suggests that increases in geographical diversification significantly reduces MCs’ 
long-term debt holding capacity then their DC counterparts. This appears more prominent in 
Australian MCs and U.S. MCs. It can be argued that the cause of this is due to MCs being 
originated in developed countries and therefore, as their expansion increases to developing or 
underdeveloped countries, it diminishes the benefit of diversification (Shapiro, 1996).
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The interaction variable of foreign exchange (M_FX) exposure for Japanese MCs is 
significantly different than DCs (t=2.37). This significant and positive difference of foreign 
exchange exposure for Japanese MCs suggests that the Japanese MCs have better management 
of international risks on their assets and liabilities and, as a result, Japanese MCs benefit from 
such exposure.
The interaction of political risk (M PR) exposure is significantly different for MCs across Japan 
(t= 1.92); U.K. (t=2.15) and Malaysia (t=1.65). This positive and significant interaction of 
political risk slope difference explains that the MCs across Japan, U.K. and Malaysia are well 
aware of the volatile political environment of their subsidiaries’ locations and they are well 
protected from any volatile political movements through insurance policy (Shapiro, 1996). 
Therefore, if the political environment of the MCs in those countries becomes safer, then it 
would significantly increase their long-term debt.
The significant and negative interaction variable of firm risks (M BPTCY) across Japan (t=- 
3.34) and Malaysia (t=-3.57) suggests that the cash flow volatility between DCs and MCs varies 
significantly in those two countries and the impact of this relationship has negative effect on 
long-term leverage. This evidence also states that bankruptcy of MCs across these two 
countries are significantly different compared to DCs and this minimises the capacity to hold 
onto long-term debt in the MCs’ capital structure.
The slope difference of firm risk (M BETA) coefficient of MCs is significantly different from 
DCs across U.S. (t=2.61) and Malaysia (t=2.21), and the implication of this result on MCs 
capital structure at least for those two countries is positive. This means that as the firm risk 
increases, MCs can manage it better and can take advantage of it as they have access to multiple 
countries operational environment relative to DCs, and consequently it assists them to have 
higher debt than DCs.
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The significant difference of average tax slope (M ATR) coefficient across U.S. (h=-4.85), Japan 
(t=-4.60), U.K. (t=2.64) and Malaysia (t=-2.61) suggests that as there is an increase of average 
marginal tax rate, it decreases MCs debt-holding capacity more than the DCs. This also 
implies that MCs that originated in those countries in my sample are not quite capable of 
internalising the tax advantage of multiple countries’ tax regimes especially where their 
subsidiaries are located.
The significant interaction of non-debt tax shield (M  NDTS) variable for MCs across Japan (t=- 
1.85) and Malaysia (t=2.26) suggests that the Malaysian MCs have better ability to shelter their 
income from taxation than their DCs counterparts. However, Japanese MCs do not experience 
the same benefit as Malaysian MCs, instead, as far as tax shield goes Japanese MCs suffer from 
any increase in non-debt tax related items.
While the significant interaction of size (M SIZE) variable across Japanese (t=-2.27) and 
Malaysian (t=-4.22) MCs appears to have significantly different and negative relationship with 
long-term debt relative to DCs, U.K. MCs on the other hand appear to have a significantly 
different positive relationship with debt compared to DCs. This result suggest that while U.K. 
multinationals’ size significantly enables them to have higher debt ratios relative to their DCs, 
size for Japanese and Malaysian MCs have significantly negative impact and as a result it 
prevents their MCs holding higher debt ratio than DCs. Further, the significant difference of 
MCs’ collateral value of assets (MjCVA) supports the idea that as the fixed assets of MCs 
increases, it significantly increases the long-term debt holding capacity for MCs than DCs.
The results of the interaction of MCs’ age variable (M AGE) suggests that when a firm matures, 
it significantly reduces U.S. (t=-3.28) and Japanese (t=-2.37) MCs’ debt ratio. On the contrary, 
a positive significant interaction of age coefficient of age variable suggests it significantly 
increase (t=2.30) Australian MCs debt ratios.
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The interaction profitability (M PROF) variable for MCs is found to be significantly different 
from their DCs counterparts across U.S. (t=-5.73) and Japan (t=3.54). This evidence suggest 
that pecking order theory plays a vital role in explaining MCs’ capital structure than DCs in 
U.S., while trade-off theory of profitability plays an important role in explaining Japanese debt 
ratio.
Dividend payments (M DIVC) MCs’ interaction variable is negative and significant across U.S. 
(t=-2.19) and Malaysia (t=-2.12). This result indicates that as dividend payment increases, it 
significantly reduces the long-term debt ratio relative to DCs in U.S. and Malaysia.
MCs’ interaction of free cash flow (M_FCF) is found significant across Australia (t=-2.67), 
Japan (t=-4.58) and Malaysia (t=-3.44). This suggests that as the excess free cash flow 
increases, it results in a significant decrease in the MCs’ capital structure relative to DCs.
The results for the interaction variable support MCs having a significantly different growth 
opportunities relationship with debt level relative to DCs across Australia (t=l .87), Japan 
(t=2.73) and Malaysia (t=-2.06). The negative significant difference of growth impact on 
leverage reveals several features about MCs in Malaysia, as a relatively large proportion of their 
intangible assets cannot support a high leverage ratio. Further, a firm with greater growth 
opportunities might have a lower debt ratio due to fear that debt holders might pass up valuable 
investment opportunities. This is also related to the under-investment problem which seems to 
be intensified when firms are in financial distress. Positive significant coefficient, on the other 
hand, implies that the growth opportunities require more long-term debt to take advantage of 
any long-term investment opportunities.
Table 4.9
Interaction effect to identify the difference of capital structure determinants across 5 sampled
countries DCs and MCs
This table reports the variables and expected signs o f the capital structure determinants. The dependent variable LEVERAGE (L)a,j 
is measured as long-term debt to long-term debt and market value o f assets which is indicated by LTD M V u. Sixteen independent 
variables are measured as: MULT,,, -  multinationality takes a value o f 1 (unity) if the corporation is multinational corporations 
otherwise it is 0 (domestic corporations). DIVER u -  diversification is defined as the natural logarithm o f total subsidiaries in home 
country and overseas countries. FX u -  foreign exchange risk is measured as a regression coefficient o f trade-weighted index and
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this is obtained by regressing individual firms return against market index and trade-weighted index on a yearly basis using weekly 
frequency data. FX2 - multinationality concavity is measured as square of foreign sales to total sales. PR ,, -  political risk variable 
is measured as the proportion of foreign sales to total sales times by the country’s political risk index which is provided by PRS 
Global. BPTCY u - bankruptcy risk is measured as the standard deviation of last five years earrings volatility of firm’s earnings 
before interest and taxes. B E T A -  firm-specific risk is measured as the covariance of firm return index and market index divided 
by variance of market index. A T X -  average tax is calculated as a ratio of tax expense to total income. N D T S -  non-debt tax 
shield is calculated as depreciation expense to total assets. SIZE -  size variable is measured as natural logarithm of total assets. 
C V A -  collateral value o f assets is measured as the ratio of total fixed assets to total assets. AGE,fl -  age is defined as the natural 
logarithm of the number of years since it has been incorporated until 2004. PROFu -  profitability is defined as the average ratio of 
net income over total sales. D I V C -  dividend payment is a ratio of cash dividend paid to net income (note losses made any year 
has been deleted from sample). FCF u -  free cash flow measured after Lehn and Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings before 
interest and taxes, depreciation, amortization minus tax, dividend and interest expense scaled by 10,000. GROW,,, -  growth is the 
market value of equity over total assets. The interaction dummy variable is used to find the significant difference of the common 
variables. For example, M_FX takes the actual value of MCs while it is 0 for the DCs.
Leverage (L)(it)=ß0 + ßx MULTl +Yjß2Xi
^ ^ j ß '4 X F irm _ peckmgon 
+  M U L T "  * ' ^ J ß 6X Tradeof f  factors(ij)
+ EatTradeoff _ factors(i,t)Internationalfactors(i,t)
j f i r  eck rder (i,t)  ^ L L J L T - t ß 5 X j nIemall()nai'ffactors(i,t)
cMULTj * 'g ß 1X A-pFirm peckmgorder (i,t)  (it)
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
LTD M V u A l l US JP GB MY A L L
Variable Coeff t-Stat CoefT t-Stat Coeff t-Stat CoefT t-Stat CoefT t-Stat CoefT t-Stat
C - 0.11 - 0.56 0.30 1.33 - 0.77
a
- 3 .6 7 - 0.23 - 0.91 - 0.03 - 0.27 0.25
a
4 .0 0
b b a
M U LT iit - 0.56 - 1.62 - 0.59 - 1 .9 9 - 0.03 - 0.13 - 0.59 - 1 .9 5 - 0.07 - 0.24 - 0.31 - 2 .7 1
DIVER iit 0.01 0.93 0.00 0.19 - 0.01 - 1.42 - 0.01 - 0.52 - 0.03 - 1 .9 3 0.03
3
7 .8 3
a a b c b
F X Ut - 0.12 - 2 .9 0 - 0.11 - 2 .7 4 - 0.22 - 2 .4 0 0.08 1 .6 7 0.08 2 .1 7 0.03 1.46
PR id 0.00 0.72 0.00 - 1.29 0.00 - 1.51 0.00 0.15 0.00 - 1.36 0.00
3
- 4 .5 2
a a b
B P T C Y u 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.77 0.00 3 .3 3 0.00 - 3 .6 3 0.00 - 2 .0 8 0.00 1.10
a a c a
BETA Ut - 0.14 -111 - 0.38 - 6 .01 - 0.30 - 3 .6 7 - 0.23 - 1 .6 6 - 0.16 - 1.53 - 0.16 - 3 .8 6
b b b a a
ATR i t - 0.53 - 2 .2 6 - 1.04 - 2 .5 3 0.38 1 .7 0 - 0.64 - 2 .9 3 - 0.60 - 1.56 - 0.90 - 6 .0 4
b b
N D T S i<t 0.00 2 .6 2 0.00 0.60 0.01 2 .4 1 0.00 - 0.62 0.00 1.23 0.00 0.78
a a a a a a
SIZE j j 0.07 8 .2 5 0.06 7 .7 4 0.10 2 5 .3 5 0.04 3 .7 9 0.09 1 4 .7 9 0.06 2 6 .2 1
b a a a a a
CVA u 0.11 2 .1 8 0.26 5 .4 0 0.20 4 .8 4 0.23 3 .6 4 0.19 5 .5 2 0.27 1 2 .6 7
A
a a a a
-0  06 - 3 .9 9 -0.01 - 1.43 0.08 4 .1 2 0.05 3 .41 -0.01 -0.94 -0.04 - 6 .7 1
P R O F ü
b b a a a
- 0.06 - 2 .4 4 - 0.30 - 2 .4 2 - 3.01 - 9 .3 6 - 0.06 - 1.48 - 0.36 - 3 .4 9 - 0.23 - 5 .9 9
b a a a
DIVC i f - 0.09 - 2 .5 9 0.17 4 .5 9 - 0.02 - 0.63 - 0.07 - 1.45 - 0.26 - 8 .9 7 - 0.06 - 3 .6 3
F C F ijt - 0.04 - 1.91 0.00 1.53 0.65
3
4 .6 7 - 0.02 - 1.36 0.01 1.18 0.00 1.51
b b a b a
GRO W  MB u - 0.01 - 2 .5 7 0.00 - 2 .2 9 0.00 - 0.42 0.00 3 .1 8 0.00 2 .2 8 0.00 - 3 .6 7
b b a
M  DIVER 4, -0 04 - 2 .2 7 - 0.02 - 2 .0 2 0.01 1.31 - 0.01 - 0.54 0.00 - 0.15 - 0.05 - 9 .1 3
M F X  i t 0.09 1.49 0.08 1.62 0.23 2 .3 7 - 0.08 - 1.42 - 0.05 - 0.72 - 0.03 - 1.08
b b c a
M -P R id 0.00 0.96 0.00 1.12 0.01 1 .9 2 0.01 2 .1 5 0.01 1 .6 5 0.00 2 .9 0
M  BPTCY Ut 0.00 - 0.93 0.00 - 1.12 0.00 - 3 .3 4 0.00 0.86 - 0.02
ä
- 3 .5 7 0.00 1.59
M  BETA itt - 0.23 - 1.16 0.20
D
2.6 1 0.06 0.64 - 0.11 - 0.66 0.58 2 .2 1 0.01 0.24
a a b b
M_A TR i j 0.31 0.68 - 2.47 - 4 .8 5 - 2.16 - 4 .6 0 0.63 2 .6 4 - 2.32 - 2 .6 1 0.15 0.65
b b
M N D T S  i't - 0.01 - 0.56 0.00 - 0.51 - 0.01 - 1 .8 5 0.00 0.16 0.02 2 .2 6 0.00 0.00
b b a
M S I Z E  ijt - 0.01 - 0.55 0.01 0.84 - 0.01 - 2 .2 7 0.03 2 .4 3 - 0.06 - 4 .2 2 0.00 - 0.69
M  CVA i<t - 0.15 - 1.61 0.19 2 .9 8 0.28
3
3 .5 2 - 0.09 - 1.25 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.34
b a b c
M A G E  U 0.08 2 .3 0 - 0.04 - 3 .2 8 - 0.07 - 2 .3 7 - 0.03 - 1.59 0.05 1.60 - 0.01 - 1 .7 9
M  PROF i j 0.02 0.28 - 1.04
3
- 5 .7 3 1.71
3
3 .5 4 - 0.01 - 0.19 0.04 0.10 - 0.07 - 0.86
b b a
M D I V C  i t - 0.04 - 0.58 - 0.10 - 2 .1 9 - 0.03 - 0 .6 8 0.09 1.44 - 0.18 - 2 .1 2 0.06 2 .7 4
b a a
MFCF^t - 0.14 - 2 .6 7 0.00 - 1.44 - 0.64 - 4 .5 8 0.01 0.37 - 0.24 - 3 .4 4 0.00 - 1.42
b a b
M  GRO W  M B i%t 0.01 1 .8 7 0 00 1.01 0.00 2 .7 3 0.00 - 0.98 - 0.02 - 2 .0 6 0.00 - 1.45
No. o f  Obs 2248 2788 1907 2188 2825 11956
Adj R-sqr 0.36 0.34 0.54 0.23 0.22 0.25
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
4.6.3.3 Country Hypothesis
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Distinguishing cross-country DCs’ and MCs’ debt ratio determinants has some advantages over 
a single country’s DCs and MCs debt ratio comparison. As mentioned earlier, a direct country 
effect comparison can reveal linkages between institutional differences and empirical results 
about the capital structure of DCs and MCs. The previous Model II will be used in this section 
again with a slight alteration of the silencing constant in the regression in order to investigate 
the average effect of every sample countries influence on the short-term and long-term debt 
ratios for DCs and MCs. It is assumed here that the previous literature on capital structure does 
not vary from country to country and hence on average the debt level determinants would be 
similar. However, in reality, they might be different due to different tax, bankruptcy and agency 
laws. Therefore, a direct country effect test will be carried out later. A direct country effect and 
debt ratio test was carried out earlier in Table 4.5. Therefore, additional five dummy variables 
were introduced to control for country effect. This would capture a consistent magnitude of 
country effect (indicated by the country dummy variable coefficient on each variable).
The results indicate two important aspects. Firstly, all the sample countries’ dummy reports 
significant positive coefficients (t=4.27; 4.90; 8.42; 4.39 and 8.59) respectively to explain short­
term debt. Secondly, four out of five sample countries state significant negative relationship 
with long-term debt and they are Australia, Japan, U.K. and Malaysia (t=-3.54; -6.13; -1.75 and 
-3.09). The result for short-term debt suggests that the magnitude of country dummy variables 
coefficients is similar across Australia (0.12), U.S. (0.13) and U.K. (0.12). However, for long­
term debt the magnitude of country dummy coefficients ranges from -0.10 to -0.41. While the 
positive coefficients suggests that the net effect of the fifteen variables at fixed level would 
increase by the magnitude of positive coefficients, the negative coefficients on the other hand 
suggest that the long-term debt explanatory variables on a fixed level would decrease by the 
proportion of the magnitude across fifteen variables for those five countries. As it is indicated 
in the table, among those five countries, U.K. has the lowest significant negative influence on 
debt ratio.
152
When a additional dummy variable is used in Model II to capture the effect of imputation tax 
system and multinationality on short-term debt and long-term debt, it shows that firms operating 
under the imputation tax system appears to have negative and highly significantly relationship 
in explaining both short-term debt (t=-6.27) and long-term debt (t=-3.54) ratios and this is 
presented in Table 4.10. This result is an evidence of Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) wrong 
assumption that financing choice between debt or equity is irrelevant under any tax regime and 
therefore returns to the shareholders will be the same regardless of whether the firm is levered 
or unlevered. Under a realistic assumption, where corporate tax and debt financing have an 
important advantage over equity, the interest payments of the firm are tax deductible. The 
results in our investigation suggest that as the average tax rate increases for firms operating 
under the imputation tax system, those firms will employ less long-term and short-term debt. 
Further, MCs that are operating under the imputation tax regime employs even less long-term 
debt. This evidence is consistent with the theory that, under a classical tax system, debt is 
preferred over equity due to double taxation benefit on interest expense on debt and under 
imputation tax system debt is preferred less as tax claim on interest deductibility is only once 
(Bishop et al., 2003). Out of five sample countries, Australia has been a purely imputation tax 
country over the whole sample period, while U.K. was recognised as an imputation tax regime 
country for only 1995-1997. Given the result predominantly captures the effect of Australian 
imputation tax system on debt, a little caution is necessary in interpreting the results as it might 
not be a good representative of imputation tax effect on debt around the world. Nevertheless, 
the results indicate that DCs in imputation tax regimes use less short-term debt than MCs. On 
the other hand, holding all other things constant, MCs in imputation tax regimes hold 
significantly less long-term debt than DCs. This is an indication that firms in imputation tax 
regimes may prefer equity when raising external funds as the investors’ benefit more on the 
capital gains tax of equity investment than the interest benefit on interest expense. Secondly, 
investors with longer holding periods or with accrued losses face a lower tax rate on equity 
income, which as a result decreases the effective tax advantage of debt.41 This evidence is
41 With regard to the capital gains tax rate, we assume that investors paid capital gains taxes every year. But unlike 
taxes on interest income or dividends, which are paid annually, capital gains taxes are paid only at the time the
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consistent with Twite (2001). Further, it also implies that high tax rates with more volatile 
earnings results in a negative relationship.
The legal regimes also appear to be a highly significant explanatory variable in explaining the 
short-term and long-term debt across DCs and MCs. Results show that firms in general hold 
significantly lower short-term debt relative to civil law countries (t=-15.02) and significantly 
higher for long-term debt (t=28.02). This result suggest that creditors operating under common 
law regimes have better protection against their lending and therefore firms are able to raise 
more long-term debt relative to firms operating under civil law legal regime (La Porta et. Al, 
2000). Further, MCs operating under common law countries, and the impact of this unique 
legal regime on capital structure decision for MCs are also captured. Results show that MCs in 
common law countries hold significantly higher short-term debt relative to DCs (t=1.90) but 
hold significantly lower long-term debt relative to DCs (t=-2.43). This implies that MCs in 
common law countries raise more short-term debt to meet financial obligations through 
financing internationally. Given, this evidence is found for the first time, therefore, no reference 
is made in relation to MCs debt raising activities in common law countries.
Table 4.10
Country, tax system and legal regimes effect in determining capital structure
This table reports the variables and expected signs of the hypotheses. There are two dependent variables and a total of twenty two 
independent variables. The following model is utilised:
Leverage (L)(u)—ß 0 + ß } MUL Tit ß 2X i n ternalional J ac iors(i,l) ^  ß i ^  T radeoff _ fa cto rs(i,t)  ^  ß 4^Firm _ peckingorder(i,i
E ft* country dum m y (i,t) E/m-Tax System (i,t) "*■ / L  ß l ^ Legal _Regim es(i,t) 6 (it)
There are two dependent variables. The dependent variables are measured as long-term debt to long-term debt and market value of 
assets which is indicated by LTD MV u and S T D B V , , is the short-term book value debt scaled by total asset respectively. The 
independent variables are measured as: MULL, -  multinationality takes a value of 1 (unity) if the corporation is multinational 
corporations otherwise it is 0 (domestic corporations). The variables are measured in the following manner: The independent 
variables are measured in the following manner: DIVER,, -  diversification is defined as the natural logarithm of total subsidiaries in 
home country and overseas countries. FX u -  foreign exchange risk is measured as a ratio of foreign sales to total sales. P R -  
political risk variable is measured as the proportion of foreign sales to total sales times by the country’s political risk index which is 
provided by PRS Global. B P T C Y -  bankruptcy risk is measured as the standard deviation of last five years earrings volatility of 
firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. B E T A firm -specific  risk is measured as the covariance of firm return index and market 
index divided by variance of market index -  market model. NDTS (Non-debt Tax Shield) is calculated by total annual 
depreciation expense over total assets. A T X -  average tax is calculated as a ratio of tax expense to total income. SIZE,, -  size 
variable is measured as natural logarithm of total assets. CVA -  collateral value o f assets is measured as the ratio of total fixed 
assets to total assets. AGE u -  age is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of years since it has been incorporated until 
2004. PROF u -  profitability is defined as the average ratio of net income over total sales. D I V C -  dividend payout ratios is a 
ratio of total cash dividend paid to net income (note losses made any year has been deleted from sample). AGC,., is defines as is the
investor sells the stock and realise the gain. Deferring the payment of capital gain taxes lowers the present value of 
the taxes, which can be interpreted as a lower effective capital gains tax rate. For example, given a capital gains tax 
rate of 15% and an interest rate of 6%, holding the asset for 10 more years lowers the effective tax rate this year to 
(15%)/( 1-0610) = 8.4%. Also, investors with accrued losses that they can use to offset gains face a zero effective 
capital gains tax rate. As a consequence, investors with longer holding periods or with accrued losses end up paying 
a lower tax rate on equity income, which in turn reduces the tax advantage of debt.
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natural logarithm of total shareholders. F C F -  free cash flow  measured after Lehn and Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings 
before interest and taxes, depreciation, amortization minus tax, dividend and interest expense scaled by 10,000. GROWu -  growth 
is the market value of equity over total assets. Note that this table has incorporated an indicative dummy for the first three proposed 
models to control for average country effect on each explanatory factor, a, b and c are the statistical significance levels for 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively._____________ _____________ _______________ _____________ ______________ _______________
S T D B V L T D  M V S T D  B V L T D  M V S T D  B V L T D  M V
V a r ia b le C o e lT  t - S t a t C o efT t - S t a t C o e fT t - S t a t C o e fT t - S t a t C o e fT t - S t a t C o e fT t - S t a t
a 5 ~ a a
C 0.28 3 .0 8 0.09 1 .7 0 0.48 2 .5 1 -0.56 - 1 0 .3 7
a a a b b
M U L T  u 0.00 0.64 -0.02 - 1 .8 9 0.02 4 .8 3 -0.06 - 6 .0 4 0.01 1 .9 0 -0 .02 - 2 .4 3
a a c a b
D I V E R  i j 0.01 8 .3 6 -0.01 - 4 .3 8 0.00 1.18 0.00 1 .6 9 0.00 4 .4 9 -0.01 - 2 .0 3
a a b b
F * i , t 0.00 -0.23 -0.04 - 3 .1 7 -0.03 - 5 .4 1 0.02 1.42 -0.01 - 2 .6 4 -0.03 - 2 .5 0
b a b a a
P R  i,t 0.00 - 2 .2 0 0.00 0.81 0.00 - 8 .3 4 0.00 - 1 .7 0 0.00 - 1 3 .4 8 0.00 2 .8 5
a a a a a
B P T C Y Ut 0.00 - 2 .5 4 0.00 3 .0 9 0 .00 - 3 .4 8 0.00 3 .1 1 0.00 - 2 .8 6 0.00 3 .1 6
a a a a a a
B E T A  u -0.04 - 4 .3 6 -0.34 - 1 2 .6 7 -0 .10 - 1 2 .1 3 -0.17 - 6 .7 3 -0.05 - 6 .8 2 -0.28 - 1 1 .5 9
b a a a a a
A  T R  i j -0.13 - 2 .2 8 -0.78 - 6 .1 3 -0.18 - 3 .0 5 -0.80 - 6 .1 5 -0.19 - 3 .3 9 -0.73 - 5 .9 5
a a a a a a
N D T S  j't 0.00 7 .3 7 0.00 4 .8 3 0.00 5 .9 5 0 .00 3 .1 5 0 .00 7 .2 5 0 .00 4 .4 6
b a a a a
S I Z E  i t 0.00 - 1.71 0.08 4 .8 7 0.00 6 .3 9 0.06 4 .7 4 0.00 -0 .90 0.08 5 .4 7
a a a a a a
C V A  4 , 0.02 3 .3 1 0.25 5 .7 0 0.02 2 .7 7 0.28 6 .7 7 0.02 3 .9 1 0.25 1 5 .9 3
a a a a a a
A G E U 0.01 4 .4 6 -0.02 - 3 .7 3 0.02 1 .5 5 -0.05 - 2 .1 4 0.01 4 .7 2 -0 .02 - 3 .7 0
a a a a a a
P R O F I , , -0 .10 - 4 .8 3 -0.28 - 7 .0 8 -0.11 - 4 .8 9 -0.25 - 7 .1 5 -0 .10 - 4 .6 8 -0.27 - 6 .9 5
a a a b a a
D I V C  iyt -0 .02 - 5 .2 9 -0.04 - 3 .7 2 -0.03 - 7 .3 5 -0.03 - 2 .5 1 -0.03 - 7 .5 8 -0.04 - 3 .5 4
b a a a a a
F C F  i j 0.00 - 2 .0 5 0.00 6 .7 9 0.00 - 2 .9 9 0.00 8 .4 1 0.00 - 2 .3 9 0.00 7 .0 0
a b a a
G R O W  M B  4 , 0 .00 - 1.51 0.00 - 3 .3 0 0.00 2 .5 7 0.00 - 6 .0 0 0.00 - 1.08 0 .00 - 3 .4 0
C O U N T R  Y _ A  U S 0.12
ä
4 .2 7 -0.24 - 3 .5 4
C O U N T R Y U S A 0.13 4 .9 0  3 -0 .10 - 1.54
C O U N T R Y J P N 0.23 8 .4 2  2 -0.41 - 6 .1 3
C O U N T R Y  G B R 0.12 4 .3 9  3 -0 .12 - 1 .7 5
C O U N T R Y M Y S 0.21 8 .5 9  3 -0.19 - 3 .0 9  8
I M P U T A  T I O N  T A X -0.03
H
- 6 .2 7 -0.04
2
- 3 .5 4
C O M M O N L A  W -0.07 - 1 5 .0 2 0.27 2 8 .0 2  3
N o .  o f  O b s 11956 11956 11956 11956 11956 11956
A d j  R - s q r 0.22 0.30 0.17 0.24 0 .20 0 .29
However, the above analysis does not necessarily show direct institutional differences which 
were proxied by various debt level determinants across countries. As discussed earlier, agency, 
bankruptcy and tax laws are different across countries (Antonios, Yilmaz & Krishna, 2002); 
however, previously no formal test has been conducted to capture this effect. The interaction 
dummy variable is used to find the significant difference of the common 14 variables across five 
countries. For example, DIVER*CNTRY takes the actual value of a country while it is 0 for the 
other four countries. This procedure is followed for both DCs and MCs using Model 1 and the 
results are presented in Table 4.11. The regressions are estimated on the pooled sample of all 
DCs and the pooled sample of all MCs using interactive country dummy variable on each 
independent variable so that it permits the coefficients on each independent variable to differ 
across countries in the sample. The reason for conducting such regressions is to investigate 
whether the firm-specific factors across countries reveal a country-specific institutional effect
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on debt ratios. It is believed that factors would vary across countries since firms are at different 
stages of maturity in their business cycle.
The results in Table 4.11 present an empirical result since they reveal a direct institutional 
difference across countries that impacts on capital structure determinants. The results suggest 
that among the five sample countries of DCs, the geographical diversification (DIVER*CNTRY) 
significantly lowers the long-term debt ratio across DCs in Australia, U.K., Japan and Malaysia 
(t=-2.21; -2.61; -3.14 and -7.60) and only Japanese MCs’ geographical diversification 
significantly assists to raise higher long-term debt (t=3.37).
The foreign exchange interaction variable (FXjCNTRY) suggests that Australian and U.S. DCs 
are almost equally exposed to foreign exchange exposure as far as long-term debt is concerned. 
The negative significant impact of foreign exchange exposure on long-term debt is observed in 
Australia (t=-4.45), U.S. (t=-4.45) and Japan (t=-2.16). As for Malaysian DCs; however, 
foreign exchange risks have a significantly positive relationship with long-term debt ratio 
compared to the other four countries. Among the five sample countries’ MCs, only U.K. MCs 
have significantly different slope of FXjCNTRY and have a negative impact of foreign 
exchange exposure to long-term debt (t=-2.40).
In Australia and Malaysia, the results show that the slope difference of political risk has a 
different impact on long-term debt across DCs (insignificant but positive relationship for 
Australia: t=1.25 and insignificant but negative relationship for Malaysia) and MCs (significant 
and negative relationship for Australia: t=-1.74 and significant and positive for Malaysia). In 
the rest of the three countries the determining sign and significance level is similar across DCs 
and MCs (U.S.: t= l.67 for DCs and t=4.58 for MCs; Japan: t=-9.01 for DCs and t=-5.53 for 
MCs; U.K.: t=-2.13 for DCs and t=-4.93 for MCs).
In the traditional static trade-off theory and pecking order theory, the results suggest that 
average tax rate, non-debt tax shield, profitability, collateral value of assets, free cash flow and
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growth opportunities for Australian DCs are significantly different from other countries’ DCs. 
Among those six significant explanatory factors, the first three assist to increase long-term debt 
significantly (t=1.65; 1.79; -3.59; 4.14) while the last three significantly reduce the long-term 
debt capacity. On the other hand, the traditional explanatory variables for Australian MCs that 
are significantly different from the rest of the sample countries are collateral value of assets (t=- 
4.36), age (t=2.88), profitability' (t=2.61), dividend payments (t=-2.27), free cash flow (t=-3.88) 
and growth (t=-2.52).
In terms of the interaction variables effect of traditional capital structure variables and their 
impact on U.S. firms, it show that only dividend payments is positive and highly significant 
(t=7.91) to explain the long-term debt ratio for U.S. DCs relative to the other four countries’ 
DCs in the sample. The result also suggests that the positive and significant interactive 
variables are bankruptcy costs, collateral value of assets and dividend payments (t=3.63; 5.10; 
2.75 respectively) while the negative interactive variables are average tax rate, age and 
profitability (t=-l 1.61; -3.16 and -8.91 respectively) which differentiates U.S. MCs’ capital 
structure determinants relative to the other four countries.
As for Japanese DCs, the significant different country slope coefficients are firm risk (t=3.23), 
marginal tax rate (t=3.83), non-debt tax shields (t=2.30), size (t=2.30), age (t=3.60), profitability 
(t=-8.70) and free cash flow (t=4.74). And for MCs on the other hand, average tax rate (t=- 
2.41), size (t=2.87), collateral value of assets (t=3.49), profitability (t=-2.99) and free cash flow 
(t=6.51) variables are significantly different relative to the other four countries MCs. The 
negative significant relationship of the slope variables suggests decrease of debt capacity while 
positive significant country slope coefficients suggests assisting increase in debt.
The significant slope difference of country variable for U.K.’s DCs are bankruptcy risk, size and 
free cash flow (t=-3.84; 2.35 and -1.87 respectively) and positive explanatory variables are age, 
profitability and growth (t=6.42; 3.24 and 3.54). For U.K. MCs, the significant slope country 
variables are firm risk (t=-1.91), bankruptcy risk (t=-3.01), average tax rate (t=9.51), non-debt 
tax shield (t=-2.83), collateral value of assets (t=-6.02), age (t=9.15) and profitability (6.64).
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Lastly, the coefficients that significantly reduce holding long-term debt for Malaysian DCs 
relative to other countries are firm risk (t=-2.06), size (4.71), collateral value of assets (t=-1.92), 
age (t=3.20), profitability (t=-2.07), dividend payment (t=-8.74) and growth (t=2.03). In 
contrast, Malaysian MCs have the following variables significantly different relative to the other 
four countries which have increasing and decreasing effects: the increasing effects of variable 
are firm risk (t=-3.72), bankruptcy risk (t=2.04), average tax rate (t=-2.93), non-debt tax shield 
(t=2.23), size (t=-1.85), age (t=3.39), dividend payment (t=-6.05), free cash flows (t=-3.32) and 
growth opportunity (t=-l .96).
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4.63.4 Industry Hypothesis
In this section, industry effect across the countries is tested for DCs and MCs. The purpose here 
is to see whether each country’s industry has on average a similar effect on debt ratio in DCs 
and MCs using Model I and incorporating the dummy variables to control for industry- related 
issues.
The results suggest that Australian DCs do not experience any significant impact by industry 
characterisation with an exception of firms that belong to the construction industry (t=-1.65). 
Similarly, no notable significance difference is observed for Australian MCs either except for 
MCs firms that belong to the manufacturing industry (t=2.62). In the U.K., DCs that are in the 
agriculture, forest and fishing and mining industries have significantly higher debt than the rest 
of the industries (t=6.53 and 1.66) and DCs within transportation and communication industries 
have significantly less debt (t=-2.15). As for Japanese MCs, except for MCs that are in the 
mining industry, the rest of the industries have significantly positive and higher debt ratio across 
construction, manufacturing, transport and communication, wholesale, retail and services 
(t=3.48, 4.23, 3.66, 3.85, 2.34 and 1.90 respectively). U.K. DCs that are in the mining industry 
appear to have significantly less debt (t=-1.88) while DCs in the transport and communication 
industry have significantly higher long-term debt (t=2.63). The U.K. MCs that are in 
agricultural, forest and fisheries, manufacturing, transport and communication have a 
significantly positive impact on long-term debt (t=2.78, 3.71 and 3.52 respectively). Finally, in 
Malaysia, among nine industries, most industries have a significant negative relationship except 
for a few. For example, industries that have negative and significant relationship with debt are 
agricultural, forest and fisheries (t=-2.82), mining (t=-7.14) and retail (t=-2.28) while positive 
and significant relationships of industries are construction (t=3.71) and transport and 
communication (t=3.19). Interestingly, no obvious significant relationship is observed between 
Malaysian MCs’ industry categorisation and debt. Lastly, it can be concluded that controlling 
for industry affect across countries and also across firms supports the industry hypothesis 
(Bradley, Jarrell & Kim, 1984). Further, most of the independent determinants coefficients 
signs and level of significance remained unchanged.
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4.6.3.5 Time Hypothesis
Table 4.13 presents the overall time effect on capital structure across five countries. The table 
shows the effect of time on leverage for DCs and MCs across 10 years. Table 4.13 shows a 
univariate regression (Panel A) that tests the overall time effect to investigate whether time has 
any significant effect on leverage. The result in Panel A shows that over time leverage 
decreases significantly for both Japanese DCs (t=-5.17) and MCs (t=-1.80). The positive 
significant results for DCs are: across Australia (t=1.93), U.S. (t=3.92), U.K. (t= 1.66) and 
Malaysia (t=6.68) and for MCs across Australia (t=2.29), U.S. (t=3.92) and Malaysia (t= 1.66). 
This result suggests that, overall, time has significant impact on DCs’ and MCs’ leverage, and 
the trends are similar across any countries’ DCs and MCs.
A further analysis of individual year effects has been investigated to identify whether time effect 
has any significant variation in capital structure determinants, which might cause leverage to 
vary over time. In order to investigate whether capital structure determinants are time-sensitive, 
a regression is conducted using Model I and controlling for year effect. This is presented in 
Panel B. If the determinants stay similar across years, then no year should produce any 
significant negative or positive relationship. It shows that over time the significance of each 
explanatory variable varies across years and across countries and also across DCs and MCs. 
For example, Australian DCs debt ratio determinants increased significantly in recent years 
(t=l.73 and t— 1.72). However, the determinants for Australian MCs fluctuated across years but 
the relationship is insignificant. Further, the results also indicate that MCs’ capital structure 
determinants across countries do not vary significantly as much as DCs’ determinants capital 
structure varies. For example, in 2003, U.S. MCs’ year coefficient had a significant positive 
impact while Japanese MCs have negative and significant relationship with long-term debt (t=- 
3.10) and other MCs across countries had no significant impact on the capital structure 
determinants.
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4.6.3.6 Speed of Adjustments
The results in Table 4.14 attempt to investigate the speed of adjustment costs across countries 
and across firms following Leary and Roberts (2005) who argue that firms in general strive to 
maintain an optimal capital structure that balances the costs and benefits associated with varying 
degrees of financial leverage (Fama and French, 2002; Baker & Wurgler, 2005). The 
interpretation of the results will not make any attempt to find support of my empirical findings 
in this table since no prior literature has investigated the difference of speed of adjustment in 
capital structure decision across DCs and MCs. Further, there is no past literature investigating 
the difference of speed of adjustment across countries. However, the empirical findings here 
will be discussed within the context of traditional and international capital structure theories of 
risks and benefits of rebalancing debt levels towards targets. It is presumed that the speed or 
portion of debt level will be rebalanced towards target faster if the benefit outweighs the costs 
(e.g. bankruptcy, agency costs, tax, foreign exchange risks and political risks etc.). In the 
univariate and multivariate analysis we have shown that DCs’ and MCs’ debt level varies across 
countries, and speed of adjustment will be a further indication of holding higher (benefit) or 
lower (costs) debt holding capacity across DCs and MCs within each country and across 
countries to show which types of firm or country are able to internalise the debt associated costs 
and benefits faster.
The results in Table 4.14 suggest that Australian and Japanese MCs have a tendency of 
adjusting the leverage level towards target more than their DCs counterparts (0.19 and 0.27 
versus 0.17 and 0.23). On the other hand, U.K. and Malaysian MCs appears to adjust their 
leverage level towards their target at a lower proportion than their DCs, and it is indicated by the 
coefficients (0.08 and 0.17 versus 0.19 and 0.26). Meanwhile, U.S. firms (both MCs and DCs) 
manage to rebalance their leverage level on average by 18% towards target level.
A further and yet similar testing is conducted on short-term debt across firms (DCs and MCs) 
and countries to investigate whether there is any evidence that DC and MCs across countries 
have a tendency of long-term debt more than short-term debt and vice versa. The results
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indicate that Australian, U.S. and U.K. MCs have a tendency of adjusting the target short-term 
debt ratios in a relatively faster than DCs (0.68, 0.31 and 0.39 versus 0.59, 0.24 and 0.38). 
Also, Panel A and Panel B in Table 4.14 show that DCs and MCs in Australia, U.S., U.K. and 
Malaysia adjust their short-term debt relativelty more faster than their long-term debt. In 
contrast, Japan is an exception in a sense that the DCs and MCs in Japan has tendency of 
adjusting long-term faster than short-term debt.
4.7 Summary and Conclusion
Chapter 4 is an extension of Chapter 3 and this study uses a unique data set to assess whether 
capital structure theory is portable across countries with different institutional characteristics. 
Therefore, this study investigates the capital structure and the determinants of capital structure 
of 6038 DCs and 5918 MCs across Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia. These countries 
are characterised by different financial systems and traditions which may have impact on capital 
structure decisions. Both cross-sectional and time variations in capital structure are explored. 
Eight major focal points have been explored. Firstly, the determinants of long-term debt ratios 
between DCs and MCs differ across the sample countries. Foreign exchange risk, size and 
collateral value of assets are the only factors that are consistently significant across the sample 
countries’ DCs. To the contrary, no consistent profound factor(s) is observed in MCs’ long­
term debt ratios determination across the sample countries. Diversification plays an important 
role in explaining short-term debt ratios between DCs and MCs across all sample countries. 
Secondly, the results show that MCs hold significantly less debt than DCs in the U.S. while 
Malaysian MCs hold significantly higher debt than the DCs counterparts. Thirdly, country 
effects show that DCs and MCs in all sample countries hold significant positive relationship 
with short-term debt. However, Australia, Japan U.K. and Malaysia hold significantly less 
long-term debt relative to U.S. firms. Fourthly, firms that belong to the imputation tax system 
(mainly Australia and U.K.) hold significantly less short-term and long-term debt as opposed to 
firm classical tax system. Fifthly, firms that follow common law have significantly less short­
term debt and significantly higher long-term debt than the DCs and MCs in civil law countries.
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Sixthly, when industry effects are considered, the results show that they are not consistent 
across DCs and MCs; however, industry affect across countries support the hypothesis that 
industry effect is significant and varies across countries. Seventhly, both time variation and the 
determination of capital structure vary across DCs and MCs. Finally, the speed of adjustment 
confirms that Australian and Japanese MCs adjust their long-term debt ratios towards their 
target level faster than their DCs counterparts, while U.K. and Malaysian MCs exhibit the 
opposite. Furthermore, Australian, U.S. and U.K. MCs adjust their short-term debt ratios 
towards their target level relatively quicker than DCs counterparts. Table 4.15 presents the 
summary of hypotheses and results of this chapter.
Table 4.15
Summary of Hypotheses and Results
Hypot
hesis
Description Proxy Expecte 
d Sign
Rejected H0 (Supporting Hd
1 HI  o : There is no  sig n ifica n t d ifferen ce  
b e tw een  M C s ' a n d  D C s ’ d eb t ra tio s in  
A ustra lia .
U n iva ria te  Test + /- H 0 is re jec ted  in U S , Jap an , U K  and  
M alaysia . It su g g ests  th a t M C s in 
U S , Japan  and U K ’s have  
sig n ifican tly  h ig h e r d eb t ra tio s  than  
D C s w h ile  the  o p p o site  h o ld s fo r 
M alay sian  M C s. (T ab le  4 .5 )
H I i : There is a  s ig n ifica n t d iffe ren ce  
be tw een  M C s ' a n d  D C s  ’ d eb t ra tio s  in  
A ustra lia .
2 H 20 : There is no s ig n ifica n t re la tio n sh ip  
b e tw een  M C s ' leve l o f  m u ltin a tio n a lity  
a n d  d eb t ratios.
M U L T hl + /- M u ltiv a ria te  te s t fu rth e r  c o n firm s 
the  u n iv aria te  tes t fo r U S and  
M alaysia . H 0 is re jec ted  fo r M C s in 
U S  and  M alaysia . (T ab le  4 .8 )H 2 p  There is a s ig n ifica n t re la tio n sh ip  
be tw een  M C s ' leve l o f  m u ltin a tio n a lity  
a n d  d eb t ratios.
3A H 3 A 0 : There  is no  sig n ific a n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the leve l o f  
d ivers ifica tio n  a n d  d eb t ra tio s  f o r  D C s ’ 
a n d  M Cs.
D IV E R ij +/- H 0 is re jec ted  fo r D C s in M alay sia ; 
and  M C s in A u s tra lia  and  U S . It 
su g g est th a t d iv ers ifica tio n  
sig n ifican tly  red u ces th e ir  d eb t 
ra tio s . (T ab le  4 .7 )H 3A i : There is s ig n ifica n t re la tio n sh ip  
be tw een  the leve l o f  d ivers ifica tio n  a n d  
d eb t ra tio s f o r  D C s  ’ a n d  M C s.
3B H 3 B 0 : There is no  sig n ific a n t d ifferen ce  
b e tw een  the leve l o f  d ivers ifica tio n  a n d  
M C s ’ d eb t ratios.
M D I V E R j , +/- H 0 is re jec ted  in A u s tra lia , U S  and 
M alay sia . It su g g ests  th a t M C s that 
b e lo n g s  to  the  th ese  th ree  co u n tries , 
d iv ers ifica tio n  co sts  o u tw e ig h s  the  
b en efits  a sso c ia ted  in ra is in g  d eb t 
and  th ere fo re  M C s w ill h ave  less 
d eb t ra tios. (T ab le  4 .9 )
H 3 B ] : There is s ig n ifica n t d ifferen ce  
be tw een  the leve l o f  d ivers ifica tio n  a n d  
M C s ’ d eb t ratios.
4A H 4 A 0 : There  is no  s ig n ifica n t  
re la tio n sh ip  be tw een  the leve l o f  fo re ig n  
exch a n g e  risk  a n d  d eb t ra tio s  f o r  D C s ’ 
a n d  M Cs.
F X it +/- H 0 is re jec ted  in all five sam ple  
co u n tries . T h is  su g g ests  th a t fo re ign  
ex ch an g e  risk s ac t as a h e d g in g  too l 
th a t a ssis ts  in m in im is in g  th e  risk  
asso c ia ted  th ro u g h  ex ternal 
bo rro w in g . F o re ig n  e x ch an g e  risk  
fa v o u rs  U K  and  M alay sian  M C s 
w h ile  it d isfav o u rs M C s in 
A u s tra lian , U S and  Japan . (T ab le
H 4A  i : There is a s ig n ific a n t  
re la tio n sh ip  be tw een  the leve l o f  fo re ig n  
exch a n g e  risk  a n d  d eb t ra tio s  f o r  D C s ’ 
a n d  M Cs.
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4 .7)
4B H 4 B 0 : There  is no  sig n ifica n t d ifferen ce  
b e tw een  the leve l o f  fo re ig n  exchange  
risk  a n d  M C s ’ d e b t ratios.
M _ F X „ + /- H 0 is re jec ted  in Japan . It su g g ests  
th a t Jap an ese  M C s fo re ign  ex ch an g e  
risk  ex p o su re  w o rk s as a b e tte r 
h e d g in g  too  th a t o u tw e ig h s  the  
b en efits  asso c ia ted  in ra is in g  debt 
than  the  D C s. (T ab le  4 .9 )
H 4 B ! :  There  is s ig n ific a n t d ifference  
be tw een  the leve l o f  fo re ig n  exchange  
risk  a n d  M C s  ’ d e b t ratios.
5A H 5 A 0 : There is no  sig n ifica n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the leve l o f  
p o lit ic a l  r isk  a n d  d eb t ra tio s f o r  D C s ' 
a n d  M C s.
P R i , + /- H 0 is re jec ted  fo r M C s in U K . It 
show s th a t po litica l risk  fac to r acts 
in fav o u r fo r U K  M C s to  increase  
d eb t ra tio s. (T ab le  4 .7 )
H 5A  i : There is a  s ig n ifica n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the leve l o f  
p o lit ic a l  r isk  a n d  d eb t ra tio s f o r  D C s  ’ 
a n d  M Cs.
5B H 5 B 0 : There  is no  s ig n ific a n t d ifferen ce  
b e tw een  the  leve l o f  p o litic a l r isk  a n d  
M C s  ’ d e b t ratios.
M P R , , + /- H 0 is re jec ted  in Japan , U K  and 
M alaysia . T h is  su g g ests  th a t 
po litica l risk  ass is ts  in in creas in g  
ex te rnal b o rro w in g  fo r M C s in 
Japan , U K  and  M alay s ia  th an  th e ir 
D C s. (T ab le  4 .9 )
H 5 B i : There  is s ig n ific a n t d ifference  
b e tw een  the  leve l o f  p o litic a l r isk  a n d  
M C s  ’ d e b t ratios.
6A H 6 A 0 : There is no  sig n ific a n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the  leve l o f  
b a n k ru p tcy  r isk  a n d  d e b t ra tio s f o r  D C s ’ 
a n d  M C s.
B P T C Y it H 0 is re jec ted  fo r D C s in U K  and 
M alay s ia  and  a lso  M C s in M alaysia . 
(T ab le  4 .7 )
H 6A  i : There is a  s ig n ific a n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the  leve l o f  
b a n k ru p tcy  r isk  a n d  d eb t ra tio s f o r  D C s ’ 
a n d  M Cs.
6B H 6 B 0 : There  is no  sig n ifica n t d ifferen ce  
b e tw een  the  lev e l o f  fo re ig n  exchange  
risk  a n d  M C s ’ d e b t ratios.
M  B P T C Y , , H 0 is re jec ted  in Jap an  and  
M alaysia . T h is  su g g est th a t M C s in 
Japan  and  M alay s ia  h ave  h ig h e r 
m ag n itu d e  o f  n eg a tiv e  ban k ru p tcy  
risk  w h ich  d ecreases  th e  leverage  
ra tio  re la tiv e  to  D C s. (T ab le  4 .9 )
H 5 B , :  There is s ig n ific a n t d ifference  
b e tw een  the  lev e l o f  fo re ig n  exchange  
risk  a n d  M C s  ’ d e b t ratios.
7A H 7 A 0 : T here  is no  s ig n ific a n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the  leve l o f  firm  ’s 
be ta  risk  a n d  d eb t ra tio s  f o r  D C s ’ a n d  
M Cs.
b e t a , , H 0 is re jec ted  fo r D C s in U S and  
Japan  and  M C s acro ss  all sam ple  
coun tries . T h is  su g g est th a t as firm  
risk  increases , it s ig n ifican tly  
d ecreases firm s d eb t ra tio s. (T ab le  
4 .7 )
H 7A  i : There is a  s ig n ific a n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the  leve l o f  firm  ’s  
be ta  r isk  a n d  d eb t ra tio s  f o r  D C s ’ a n d  
M Cs.
7B H 7 B 0 : There is n o  s ig n ific a n t d iffe ren ce  
b e tw een  the leve l o f  firm  ’s  be ta  r isk  a n d  
M C s ’ d eb t ratios.
M B  E T A , , H 0 is re jec ted  fo r M alay s ia  only . 
T h is  su g g est th a t as firm  risk  fo r 
M alay sian  M C s is s ig n ifican tly  
d iffe ren t from  D C s w h ich  en ab les 
M C s to  ho ld  h ig h e r d eb t th an  D C s. 
(T ab le  4 .9 )
H 7 B i : There  is s ig n ific a n t d ifference  
be tw een  the  lev e l o f  f irm  ’s  be ta  r isk  a n d  
M C s ’ d e b t ratios.
8A H 8 A 0 : There is n o  s ig n ific a n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the  leve l o f  firm  ’s  
avera g e  ta x  a n d  d e b t ra tio s  f o r  D C s  ’ a n d  
M C s.
a t r „ + H 0 is re jec ted  fo r all sam ple  
c o u n tries  D C s ex cep t M alay s ia  and 
fo r M C s in U S , Jap an  and M alaysia . 
(T ab le  4 .7 )
H 8A  i : There  is a s ig n ific a n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the  leve l o f  firm  ’s 
avera g e  ta x  a n d  d eb t ra tio s  f o r  D C s  ’ a n d  
M Cs.
8B H 8 B 0 : There is n o  s ig n ific a n t d ifferen ce  
b e tw een  the  leve l o f  f irm  's average  tax  
1 a n d  M C s  ’ d e b t ratios.
M A  T f f , + /- H 0 is re jec ted  in fav o u r o f  the  H] fo r 
all sam p le  c o u n tr ie s  ex cep t 
M alaysia . T h is  su g g ests  th a t M C s
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H 8B  / ; There is s ig n ific a n t d ifference  
b e tw een  the leve l o f  firm  ’s  average  tax  
a n d  M C s ’ d e b t ratios.
in  U S , J a p a n . U K  a n d  M a la y s ia  
e x p e r ie n c e  a  s ig n if ic a n t ly  d if fe r e n t  
a v e ra g e  ta x  ra tio  a n d  it a s s is ts  th e m  
to  in c re a s e  U K  M C s ’ d e b t  r a t io s  b u t 
d is f a v o u r s  U S , J a p a n  a n d  M a la y s ia n  
M C s . ( T a b le  4 .9 )
9 A H 9 A 0 : There is no  sig n ifica n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the leve l o f  non  
d e b t tax  sh ie ld  a n d  d eb t ra tio s f o r  D C s ' 
a n d  M Cs.
N D T S j , H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  H ] in  
e x p la in in g  D C s ’ d e b t  r a t io s  in 
A u s tr a l ia  a n d  J a p a n  w h ile  M C s ’ 
d e b t  ra t io s  in  U S  a n d  U K . T h is  
s u g g e s ts  th a t  n o n  d e b t  ta x  s h ie ld  
s ig n if ic a n t ly  a s s is t  in  in c re a s in g  
lo n g  te rm  d e b t  r a t io s  fo r  a b o v e  D C s  
a n d  M C s  a c c e p t  M C s  in  U K . (T a b le  
4 .7 )
H9A j : There is a  s ig n ifica n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the leve l o f  non  
d eb t tax sh ie ld  a n d  d eb t ra tio s f o r  D C s ’ 
a n d  M C s.
9 B H 9B 0 : There is n o  s ig n ific a n t d iffe ren ce  
b e tw een  the leve l o f  non  d eb t tax sh ie ld  
a n d  M C s ’ d e b t ratios.
M _ N D T S itl -/+ R e je c t  H 0 fo r  J a p a n  a n d  M a la y s ia  
b e c a u s e  a  s ig n if ic a n t  d i f fe r e n c e  is 
o b s e rv e d  b e tw e e n  D C s ’ a n d  M C s ’ 
n o n  d e b t ta x  s h ie ld  in  e x p la in in g  
d e b t  ra tio s . ( T a b le  4 .9 )
H 9 B / : There is s ig n ific a n t d ifferen ce  
b e tw een  the leve l o f  non  d eb t tax sh ie ld  
a n d  M C s ’ d eb t ratios.
lO A H 1 0 A 0 : There is n o  s ig n ifica n t 
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the leve l o f  s ize  a n d  
d eb t ra tio s  fo r  D C s ’ a n d  M Cs.
S I Z E it + H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  H i in  
e x p la in in g  D C s ’ a n d  M C s ’ d e b t 
r a t io s  a c ro s s  a ll s a m p le  c o u n tr ie s .  
T h is  s u g g e s ts  D C s ’ a n d  M C s ’ s iz e  
o f  th e i r  to ta l  a s s e ts  a s s is ts  to  
in c re a s e  th e i r  d e b t  ra tio s . (T a b le  
4 .7 )
HIOA i : There is a  s ig n ifica n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the leve l o f  s ize  a n d  
d eb t ra tio s  f o r  D C s ’ a n d  M Cs.
lO B H 1 OBo : There is n o  sig n ifica n t  
d iffe re n ce  b e tw een  the leve l o f  size  a n d  
M C s ’ d e b t ratios.
M _ S I Z E iit + R e je c t  H 0 b e c a u s e  th e re  is  a  
s ig n if ic a n t  d if fe r e n c e  e x is t  b e tw e e n  
D C s ’ a n d  M C s ’ to ta l  a s s e ts  in 
e x p la in in g  to ta l  d e b t  r a t io s  in J a p a n , 
U K  a n d  M a la y s ia . (T a b le  4 .9 )
H l O B j : There is s ig n ific a n t d ifference  
b e tw een  the leve l o f  s ize  a n d  M C s ’ d e b t  
ra tios.
11A H I 1A0 : There is n o  sig n ifica n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the leve l o f  
c o lla te ra l va lue  o f  a sse ts  a n d  d eb t ra tio s  
f o r  D C s ’ a n d  M Cs.
C V A i j + H 0 is  re je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  H ] in 
e x p la in in g  D C s ’ d e b t  r a t io s  in  a ll 
s a m p le  c o u n tr ie s  D C s  a n d  M C s  
( e x c e p t  M C s  in M a la y s ia ) .  (T a b le  
4 .7 )H l  1A i : There is a  s ig n ifica n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the leve l o f  
c o lla te ra l va lu e  o f  a sse ts  a n d  d eb t ra tio s  
f o r  D C s ’ a n d  M C s.
1 IB H I 1B0 : There is n o  sig n ifica n t  
d iffe re n ce  b e tw een  the leve l o f  c o lla te ra l  
va lu e  o f  a sse ts  a n d  M C s ’ d eb t ratios.
M _ C V A it + R e je c t  H 0 fo r  U S  a n d  J a p a n  b e c a u s e  
th e r e  is  a  s ig n if ic a n t  d i f fe r e n c e  e x is t  
b e tw e e n  D C s  a n d  M C s  c o l la te ra l  
v a lu e  o f  a s s e ts  in  e x p la in in g  d e b t 
r a tio s . (T a b le  4 .9 )
H I l B t : There is s ig n ific a n t d ifference  
b e tw een  the  leve l o f  firm  ’s  c o lla tera l 
va lu e  o f  a sse ts  a n d  M C s ' d eb t ratios.
12A H I 2 A 0 : There is n o  sig n ifica n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the  leve l o f  age  a n d  
d eb t ra tio s fo r  D C s ’ a n d  M Cs.
A G E , , +/- H 0 is  re je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  H j in 
e x p la in in g  D C s" d e b t  r a t io s  in 
A u s tr a l ia ,  J a p a n  a n d  U K . A ls o , M C s  
d e b t  ra t io s  in  U S  a n d  U K . (T a b le  
4 .7 )
H12A j : There is a  s ig n ific a n t  
re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  the  leve l o f  age  a n d  
d e b t ra tio s  fo r  D C s ' a n d  M Cs.
12B H I 2 B 0 : There is n o  s ig n ifica n t  
d iffe re n ce  b e tw een  the leve l age  a n d  
M C s ’ d eb t ratios.
M _ A G E it + R e je c t  H 0 b e c a u s e  th e r e  is  a  
s ig n if ic a n t  d i f fe r e n c e  e x is t  b e tw e e n  
D C s  a n d  M C s  f irm  m a tu r ity  o r  a g e  
in  e x p la in in g  d e b t  r a t io s  in 
A u s tr a l ia ,  U S  a n d  J a p a n . (T a b le  
4 .9 )
H 1 2 B j : There is s ig n ific a n t d ifference  
b e tw een  the leve l o f  age  a n d  M C s ’ d eb t 
ratios.
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13 A H l 3A0 : There is no significant 
relationship between the level o f  
pro fitab ility  a nd  debt ratios fo r  D Cs  ’ and  
MCs.
p r o f , , + /- H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  H i in  
e x p la in in g  D C s ’ d e b t r a t io s  in 
A u s tr a l ia ,  U S , J a p a n  a n d  M a la y s ia  
a n d  M C s  in  U S , J a p a n  a n d  U K .
T h is  s u g g e s ts  th a t  a s  th e  p ro f i ta b i l i ty  
in c re a s e s ,  it  s ig n if ic a n t ly  r e d u c e s  
th e i r  d e b t r a t io s  a s  th e y  f in a n c e  it 
th ro u g h  in te rn a l ly  g e n e ra te d  fu n d s . 
(T a b le  4 .7 )
H13A i : There is a significant 
relationship between the level o f  
pro fitab ility  an d  debt ratios fo r  D C s ' and  
MCs.
13B H I 3B 0 : There is no significant 
difference betw een the level o f  
pro fitab ility  and  M Cs ’ debt ratios.
M  P R O F ,, + /- F a i ls  to  r e je c t  H 0 b e c a u s e  th e re  is  n o  
s ig n if ic a n t  d i f fe r e n c e  is  o b s e rv e d  
b e tw e e n  D C s  a n d  M C s  p ro f i ta b i l i ty  
f a c to r  in  e x p la in in g  d e b t r a t io s  in  
U S  a n d  J a p a n . (T a b le  4 .9 )
H 13Bj : There is significant difference  
between the level o f  profitability and  
M C s ' debt ratios.
14 A H 14A 0 : There is no significant 
relationship betw een the level o f  cash  
dividend and  debt ratios fo r  D Cs  ’ and  
MCs.
D IV C j, H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  H ] in  
e x p la in in g  b o th  D C s  ( in  A u s tr a l ia  
a n d  U S )  a n d  M C s  ( in  A u s tr a l ia ,  U S  
a n d  J a p a n )  d e b t  ra tio s . T h is  s u g g e s ts  
th a t  a s  th e  c a s h  d iv id e n d  p a y m e n t  
in c re a s e , it s ig n if ic a n t ly  re d u c e s  
th e i r  d e b t r a t io s  a s  th e  d iv id e n d  
p a y m e n ts  im p o s e  a  c o n s t r a in t  o n  th e  
a v a i la b i l i ty  o f  c a s h . ( T a b le  4 .7 )
H14A ] :  There is a significant 
relationship betw een the level o f  cash  
dividend and  debt ratios fo r  D C s ' and  
MCs.
14B H I 4B0 : There is no significant 
difference betw een the level o f  cash 
dividend and  M Cs ’ debt ratios.
M D I V C , , + R e je c t  H 0 b e c a u s e  s ig n if ic a n t  
d i f fe r e n c e  is  o b s e rv e d  b e tw e e n  D C s  
a n d  M C s  c a s h  d iv id e n d  p a y o u t  
r a t io s  in  e x p la in in g  d e b t  r a t io s  fo r  
U S  a n d  M a la y s ia .  (T a b le  4 .9 )
H 14B ! :  There is significant difference  
between the level o f  cash d ividend and  
M C s ’ debt ratios.
15 A H 15A 0 : There is no significant 
relationship betw een the level o f  free  
cash flow  an d  debt ratios fo r  D Cs  ’ and  
MCs.
F C F ,, + H 0 is  r e je c te d  fo r  D C s  in  A u s tr a l ia  
a n d  J a p a n . H 0 is  re je c te d  fo r  M C s  in  
th e  A u s tr a l ia ,  U S  a n d  J a p a n . T h is  
s u g g e s ts  th a t  F C F  in c re a s e s  th e  
a g e n c y  c o s ts  a n d  th e r e fo r e  h a s  a  
s ig n if ic a n t  n e g a t iv e  r e la t io n s h ip  
w ith  d e b t  ra tio . (T a b le  4 .7 )
H I 5A i : There is a significant 
relationship betw een the level o f  free  
cash flow  a nd  debt ratios fo r  D Cs  ’ and  
MCs.
15B H 15B 0 : There is no significant 
difference betw een the level o f  free cash  
flo w  and  M Cs  ’ debt ratios.
M _F C F ', + R e je c t  H 0 a c r o s s  fo r  A u s tr a l ia ,  J a p a n  
a n d  M a la y s ia . T h is  r e s u l t  is  
c o n s is te n t  w ith  th e  e x p e c te d  
o u tc o m e  m e n t io n e d  in  th e  
h y p o th e s is .  (T a b le  4 .9 )
H 1 5 B i: There is significant difference  
between the level o f  free cash flo w  and  
M Cs ’ debt ratios.
16A H 16A 0 : There is no significant 
relationship betw een the level o f  free  
cash flo w  a n d  debt ratios fo r  D Cs ’ and  
MCs.
G R O W M B i , H 0 is  r e je c te d  in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  H i in  
e x p la in in g  D C s ’ ( in  A u s tr a l ia ,  U S , 
U K )  a n d  M C s ’ ( A u s tr a l ia  a n d  
J a p a n )  d e b t  r a t io s .  T h is  s u g g e s ts  
th a t  an  in c re a s e  in  g ro w th  re d u c e s  
th e  d e b t  r a t io s  a n d  it is  c o n s is te n t  
w ith  th e  th e o ry  th a t  w h e n  f i rm s  in  
g ro w th  m o d e , f i rm s  b e c o m e  v o la t i le  
a n d  th e r e fo r e  le s s  d e b t  is  ra ise d . 
( T a b le  4 .7 )
H I  6A i : There is a significant 
relationship between the level o f  free  
cash flo w  a nd  debt ratios fo r  D Cs ’ and  
MCs.
16B H 16B 0 : There is no significant 
difference betw een the level o f  free cash  
flo w  and  M C s ' debt ratios.
M
G R O W M B i ,
+ /- R e je c t  H 0 b e c a u s e  th e re  is  
s ig n if ic a n t  d i f fe r e n c e  is  o b s e rv e d  
b e tw e e n  D C s  a n d  M C s  g ro w th  
f a c to r  in  e x p la in in g  M C s ’ d e b t  
ra tio s . T h is  e x is ts  in  A u s tr a l ia ,  
J a p a n  a n d  M a la y s ia . (T a b le  4 .9 )
H 1 6 B j : There is significant difference  
between the level o f  free cash flo w  and  
M Cs ’ debt ratios.
1 7A H I 7A0 : There is no significant country C O U N T R Y  S a R e je c te d  H 0 a s  th e  r e s u l t  in d ic a te s
173
effect on debt ratios. m p le  country ? i t th a t  c o u n try  e f fe c t  e x is ts  in  
e x p la in in g  d e b t  r a tio s . ( T a b le  4 .1 0 )H I 7A i : There is significant country  
effect on debt ratios.
17B H I 7B0 : There is no significant 
difference am ong the explanatory  
variables o f  debt ratios across countries.
V ariab lesix_C O
U N T R Y
R e je c te d  H 0 fo r  b o th  D C s  a n d  M C s  
s u g g e s t in g  th a t  th e re  is  a  s ig n if ic a n t  
d if fe r e n c e  a m o n g  th e  e x p la n a to ry  
v a r ia b le s  o f  D C s  a n d  M C s . (T a b le  
4 .1 1 )
H l 7 B i : : There is significant difference  
am ong the explanatory variables o f  debt 
ratios across countries.
17C H I 7C0 : There is no significant 
relationship betw een Comm on Law  
Regim e and  C ivil law Regim e in 
explaining firm s  ' debt ratios
C O M M O N  LA R e je c te d  H 0 a s  th e  re s u l t  in d ic a te s  
th a t  c o u n tr ie s  o p e r a t in g  in  c o m m o n  
la w  re g im e  h a v e  s ig n i f ic a n t  n e g a t iv e  
im p a c t  o n  s h o r t  te rm  d e b t  a n d  
s ig n if ic a n t  p o s i t iv e  im p a c t  o n  lo n g  
te rm  d e b t. (T a b le  4 .1 0 )
H I 7C0 : There is significant relationship  
between Com m on Law Regim e and  C ivil 
law Regim e in explaining firm s  ' debt 
ratios
17D H I 7D0 : There is no significant 
relationship betw een Im putation Tax 
System  and  C lassical Tax System  in 
explaining firm s  ’ debt ratios
IM P U T A T IO N  
_  T A X it
R e je c te d  H 0 in  f a v o u r  o f  th e  
a lte rn a t iv e . R e s u l ts  s u g g e s ts  th a t  
f i rm s  o p e r a t in g  u n d e r  im p u ta t io n  ta x  
s y s te m  h o ld s  s ig n if ic a n t ly  le s s  s h o r t  
te rm  d e b t  a n d  lo n g  te rm  d e b t.
( T a b le  4 .1 0 )
H I 7Dt : There is significant relationship  
between Im putation Tax System  and  
C lassical Tax System  in explaining firm s  ' 
debt ratios
18 H 18A 0 : There is no significant industry  
effect on debt ratios fo r  D Cs and  MCs.
I N D , +/- M ix e d  r e s u l t s  a c ro s s  c o u n tr ie s  an d  
a c r o s s  D C s  a n d  M C s . ( T a b le  4 .1 2 )
H18A i : There is a significant industry  
effect on debt ratios fo r  DCs an d  MCs.
19A H 19A 0 : There is no significant time 
effect on debt ratios fo r  D Cs and  MCs.
Y r , + /- M ix e d  r e s u l t s  a c ro s s  c o u n tr ie s  an d  
a c r o s s  D C s  a n d  M C s . ( T a b le  4 .1 3 )
H19A j : There is significant time effect 
on debt ratios fo r  D Cs and  MCs.
19B H 20B 0 : D ebt ratio determ inants do not 
have certain yea r  effect fo r  DCs and  
MCs.
Yr<t_ D u m m y + /- M ix e d  r e s u l ts  a c ro s s  c o u n tr ie s  a n d  
a c r o s s  D C s  a n d  M C s . ( T a b le  4 .1 3 )
H 2 0 B , : D ebt ratio determ inants do have 
certain year effect.
2 1 A H 21A0 : There is no significant 
relationship betw een speed  o f  adjustm ent 
an d  target debt ratios fo r D Cs and MCs.
L itn e r 's  1 956  
M o d e l
+ /- R e je c te d  H 0 a n d  s u g g e s t  th a t  
L i tn e r ’s 1 9 5 6  s h o w s  a  s ig n if ic a n t  
r e la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  d e b t  r a t io s  a n d  
s p e e d  o f  a d ju s tm e n t .  ( T a b le  4 .1 4 )H21A ] : There is significant relationship  
between speed  o f  adjustm ent and  target 
debt ratios fo r  D Cs and  MCs.
2 1 B H 21B 0 : There is no significant variation  
in speed  o f  adjustm ent and debt ratios 
between D Cs and  MCs.
L itn e r 's  1 956  
M o d e l
+ /- R e je c te d  H 0 a n d  c o n c lu d e  th a t  
A u s tr a l ia n  a n d  J a p a n e s e  M C s  a d ju s t  
th e i r  lo n g  te rm  d e b t  r a t io s  to w a rd s  
th e i r  ta rg e t  le v e l f a s te r  th a n  th e ir  
D C s  c o u n te r p a r ts ,  w h ile  U K  an d  
M a la y s ia n  D C s  e x h ib i t  th e  o p p o s i te .  
F u r th e r ,  A u s tr a l ia n , U .S . a n d  U K  
M C s  a d ju s t  s h o r t  te rm  d e b t  ra t io s  
to w a r d s  th e i r  ta rg e t  le v e l re la t iv e ly  
q u ic k e r  th a n  D C s  c o u n te rp a r ts .  
( T a b le  4 .1 4 )
H 2 1 B j : There is significant variation in 
speed  o f  adjustm ent and  debt ratios 
between D Cs and MCs.
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DIVIDEND POLICY OF AUSTRALIAN
MCs AND DCS
- 5 -
5.1 Introduction
Theoretically, it is often argued that international diversification of earnings should enable 
multinational corporations (MCs) to maintain higher dividend payouts than domestic 
corporations (Hines, 1996). Corporations use cash dividends and share repurchases as the two 
main methods to distribute cash to shareholders. While each method has received considerable 
attention in the academic literature, fewer studies have examined the determinants of cash 
dividends and cash dividends and share repurchases within the multinational corporations 
framework. In particular, little is known about what factors determine the choice between cash 
dividends and cash dividends and share repurchases across MCs and DCs and what, if any, 
information investors infer from these decisions.
Factors that have been identified as determinants of dividend policy could differ substantially in 
both domestic and multinational corporations. In a world where there is uniform taxation, fixed 
and stable exchange rates, perfect capital markets, and no barriers to the transfer of capital, then 
the financial decision for MCs should be the same as those for DCs. In such a situation, funds 
would be raised and distributed by the cheapest sources and flow to wherever they are needed. 
Such a world does not exist in practice. Given MCs operate in more than one country, financial 
manager of MCs’ should be aware of the impact of different tax structure, legal structure, 
changing exchange rates, barriers to capital inflows and segmented capital markets on dividend 
payments (Vinso, 1982). Thus the MCs’ manager should be concerned about the availability of 
profit and factors that influence the distribution of profit as a dividend to the shareholders.
Secondly, managers express a strong desire to avoid dividends cuts, except in extraordinary 
circumstances. However, beyond maintaining the level of dividends per share, payout policy is 
a second-order concern; that is, increases in dividends are considered only after investment and
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liquidity needs are met (Brav et al., 2005). In contrast to Lintner (1956), they find that the 
target payout ratios is no longer the pre-eminent decision variable affecting payout decisions 
because of the recent development of share repurchase types of dividend payments across 
corporations and their growing importance over the last two decades. Given the dividend 
payout ratios has become a growing concern in the last decades, especially in the U.S., and 
given Australia closely follows U.S. in many aspect of financial markets and no research has 
been conducted in Australia, it demands an investigation to test the determining factors for both 
cash and cash and share repurchase in Australia.
Share repurchases were virtually nonexistent when Lintner (1956) and Modigliani and Miller’s 
(1961) conducted their research, so it is not surprising that these authors ignore repurchases. 
Consistent with Modigliani and Miller’s irrelevance theorem, and in contrast to decisions about 
preserving the level of the dividend, Brav et al. (2005) find that managers make repurchases 
decisions after investment decisions. Many executives view share repurchases as being more 
flexible than dividends, and they use this flexibility in an attempt to time the market by 
accelerating repurchases when they believe their stock price is low. Companies are likely to 
repurchase when good investments are hard to find, when their stock’s float is adequate, and 
when they wish to offset option dilution.
While some evidence exists that share repurchases are used to reduce excess cash holdings 
(consistent with Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis), Brav et al. (2005) do not find 
evidence that managers use payout policy to attract a particular investor clientele that could 
monitor their actions (Allen et al. 2000). Executives believe that dividends are attractive to 
individual investors but that cash dividends and share repurchases are equally attractive to 
institutions. In general, most executives say that they do not use payout policy as a tool in an 
attempt to alter the proportion of institutions among other investors.
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We could argue that if we just look at the sources and uses of funds identity, share repurchases 
and cash dividends should be a substitute payout method, holding all other things constant. 
However, firms can always adjust their sources of funds, and therefore it is possible that 
dividends and share repurchases are determined independently. For example it is possible that 
dividends are determined together with investment, as Miller and Rock (1985) suggest, and that 
repurchases are determined independently. In summary, current theories do not provide a 
unique prediction on what the relation should be between dividends and share repurchases and 
therefore the determinants. It is clear that the question of the extent to which dividends and 
repurchases are substitute and their determinants and multinationality in Australia are the 
central issues, which have important implications for many of the existing theories.
The above discussion us an inspiration to investigate the determinants of cash dividends and 
share repurchase within the frame work of DCs and MCs as this issue has never been 
considered before. The above issues will be addressed by considering the factors that determine 
both cash dividends (a narrow definition of dividend) and cash and share repurchase (a broader 
definition of dividend) for MCs and DCs which includes firm-specific and international factors.
This chapter investigates the above issues in a sample of Australian multinational and domestic 
corporations by incorporating the suggested determinants in the prior dividend policy literature 
and multinational theory. In considering dividend payout ratios we adopt two definitions -  cash 
dividends and total dividends. The cash dividend payout ratios consists of cash dividends to net 
earnings while total dividend payout ratios consists of both cash dividends and share 
repurchases to net earnings. The determining factors found to be important for DCs are 
diversification, stock return, tax clientele, cash flow variation, profitability, company-specific 
risks, firm size and financial slack. The determining factors to explain MCs’ dividend payout 
ratios are tax clientele, profitability, collateral value of assets and leverage. Further, the 
common factors that explain the difference between DCs’ and MCs’ dividend payout ratios vary 
between cash dividend payments and cash and share repurchase payments. In explaining cash 
dividend payout ratios, diversification, profitability, firm-specific risk, size, collateral value of
177
assets and financial risks are the explanatory factors, while for tax clientele, cash flow 
variability and financial slack explain the difference of cash and share repurchase payout ratios 
between DCs. Industry and time factors are considered and it shows that the only industry that 
has any significant relationship with dividend payout ratios is the transportation and 
communication industry, while time effect shows that on average dividend payout for Australia 
decreased over time.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 5.2 describes the sample and presents
summary statistics. Section 5.3 explains the theories of dividend payout. Section 5.4 discusses 
industry and time issues affecting dividend payout ratio. Section 5.5 presents data and models 
descriptions. Section 5.6 discusses the findings of the regression results and the last section 5.7 
concludes the chapter.
5.2 Importance of Multinationality and Dividend 
Payouts
5.2.1 Uniqueness of Operational Activities
Holding all other things constant, MCs’ operational risks are deemed to be different from DCs’ 
as they operate in an international environment. One can argue that foreign exchange risk and 
political risk of the MCs’ subsidiaries may lead the total business risk to be higher (Burgman, 
1996). For example, MCs are exposed to additional risk including political risk and foreign 
exchange risk, which would not exist in a domestic market (Bae and Noh, 2001). Monitoring, 
bonding and auditing costs are agency-related and are higher for MCs because of the diversity 
of geographical locations, cultural differences, higher auditing costs, differing legal systems, 
and language differences. Additionally, these national differences increase the complexity of 
such standard tasks as generating multi-country financial statements, hiring multi-country 
auditors and/or multiple auditors, and completing consolidated balance and income statements 
(Burgman, 1996; Reeb, Sattar & Allee, 1998) and there are complexities of their operations as 
compared to DCs. According to Wright, Madura and Wiant (1997), these costs are due to the 
distance and the difference in the corporate and national culture between the parent and the
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subsidiaries as well as the difference in the level of economic development between the parent 
and the subsidiary host countries. Hence, these characteristics of MCs may limit the amount of 
dividend that MCs can pay out to shareholders. On the other hand, Michel and Shaked (1986) 
evaluate the differences in financial characteristics and performance between MCs and DCs. 
Their results show that while DCs have superior risk-adjusted, market-based performance to 
MCs, MCs are more capitalized and less riskier than DCs; the average standard deviation of 
stock returns and the average systematic risk (beta) of DCs are significantly higher than those of 
MCs. Hines (1996) argues that in the 1980s U.S. corporations paid dividends at very high rates 
out of their after-tax profits, and that an unusually high fraction of those profits came from 
foreign profits (non-U.S.) sources. Further, Hines (1996) argued that multinationals pay higher 
dividends than domestic counterparts and their findings suggest MCs pays 3 times higher than 
DCs. So, the risk and the benefit of diversification may have more of an impact on MCs’ 
dividend policy than their domestic counterparts.
5.2.2 Different Tax Regime
MCs operate in multiple countries which means its income is earned in different types of tax 
environment. For example, imputation tax system encourages companies to pay more dividends 
to the shareholders since it is less taxable than the capital gains. As for MCs, if they are paying 
higher tax for their earnings in overseas countries then paying dividends out of profit might be 
costly. Therefore, MCs will pay fewer dividends. However, alternatively, it can also be argued 
that if subsidiaries pay less tax from the profit they make overseas which makes them far more 
in a better position to pay dividends, an MC will have a higher dividend policy.
A dividend imputation system allows corporate taxes paid by companies to be allocated to 
shareholders by way of imputation credits. These credits are included in the taxable income of 
eligible shareholders who are then entitled to a tax rebate equal to the tax credit included in their 
income. This effectively eliminates corporate tax and means that taxes are really only levied at 
the personal level. While corporations face the same statutory tax rate they can have different 
effective tax rates and levels of franking. This arise because (a) depreciation expenses and
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investment allowances are tax deductible, and (b) any foreign income on which corporate tax 
has been paid in the foreign country is not part of the imputation system.
The Australian system is close to being a fully integrated system for domestic (resident) 
shareholders. In particular, the existence of a mixture of investors who face different tax 
regimes contributes to the system not being fully integrated. Imputation tax credits are confined 
to dividends paid by resident companies (from that have domestic corporate tax attached) 
directly or indirectly to resident individuals. Foreign and tax-exempt investors are excluded 
from the system. For foreign investors the Australian tax system is a classical tax system 
whereby corporate tax levied in addition to any personal taxes. Although tax-induced 
clienteles may be identified, these preferences do not necessarily produce any predictable 
variations in dividend policies across firms. The tax trade-off associated with receiving 
investment returns in the form of dividends and capital gains depends on the investor’s tax rate. 
Although firms may seek to target clientele, matching their dividend policy to the clientele’s 
preferences. Other firms may seek to attract another clientele. Therefore, it would be expected 
that differences in dividend policies would be driven by factors other than taxes (Bishop et ah, 
2004).
Multinational companies based in Australia that source the majority of their equity from abroad 
and have major shareholders, as non-residents, o f which there may only be a small number, will 
not be as affected by the current imputation system. Any bias of the nature discussed above will 
generally affect smaller businesses that wish to expand, or continue expanding, into 
international markets. These firms are forced to source all their funds domestically and therefore 
require a higher pre-tax return on their investment in order to raise the necessary amount of 
capital. The introduction of the imputation system in Australia has largely helped to develop 
and maintain one of the highest share ownership rates in the world.42 To that end the system has 
largely been successful.
42 http://www.acci.asn.au/text files/issues papers/Economv/EY27.pdf
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Returns to shareholders derived from foreign source income are, however, currently subject to 
double taxation. This double taxation of shareholder income in turn affects the cost of capital 
paid by firms. The lack of credits for foreign company tax paid to shareholders produces a 
situation where the pre-tax return for foreign investments must be higher than domestic 
investments in order to attract investors. In essence, the imputation system has led to a 
preference towards investing in firms with domestic income only, rather than in firms that earn 
both international and domestic income. There therefore exists at the shareholder level a bias 
towards domestic firms.
5.2.3 Easier Capital Market Access
MCs are relatively in a better position to get access to international capital markets to raise debt 
than the DCs due to their international operation. This means that in a bad economic year in the 
home country, MCs can borrow money overseas at a favourable rate to maintain the dividend 
policy with the shareholders, which indicates MCs should have higher dividends than DCs 
(Hines Jr., 1996).
5.3 The Determ inants of D ividend  Policy
For nearly four decades, researchers have been grappling with the “dividend puzzle” to 
understand the determinants of dividend policy. Most studies focus on U.S. firms. We expand 
the investigation by studying dividend policy for Australia where the taxation system is so 
different from the U.S. and also the advancement of the capital market and the economy 
advancement are comparatively different. We measure the relationship between dividend 
payouts and 18 different international and firm-specific variables. We also investigate industry 
and timing differences.
5.3.1 Multinationality
Michael and Shaked (1986) evaluate the differences in financial characteristics and performance 
between MCs and DCs. Hines (1996) argues that in the 1980s U.S. corporations paid dividends
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at very high rates out of their after-tax profits, and that an unusually high fraction of those 
profits came from foreign profits (non-U.S.) sources. Multinationality of a firm is comprised of 
multiple aspects of risks and benefits in operating multiple countries. There is no universal 
measurement to capture all these international risks and benefits for MCs and their impact on 
dividend payout ratios. Therefore this chapter will use a dichotomous variable to confine the 
impact of multinationality on dividend payout ratios.
5.3.2 Diversification
MCs generally hold more diverse business operations across countries than the DCs. These 
diverse operations in different countries often assist MCs to minimise operational cash flow 
risks and all other financial risks due to imperfections that exist across countries around the 
world. Therefore, intuitively, MCs should have relatively higher diversification benefits than 
the DCs and therefore it should enable MCs to pay higher dividend payouts relative to DCs 
Hines (1996). The diversification in this context indicates the breadth of firms operation in 
international environment. While diversification enables MCs to pay higher dividend payouts, 
in contrast, MCs are exposed to additional risk including political risk and foreign exchange 
risk, which would not impact on a domestic market to that extent (Bae and Noh, 2001). These 
characteristics of multinationals may limit the amount of dividend that MCs can pay out to 
shareholders.
5.3.3 Foreign Exchange Risk
MCs and DCs that are exposed to foreign exchange risk will affect the demand and supply of 
the firm’s products and prices and costs for the firm (Adler & Dumas, 1984). The more 
sensitive the MCs are to foreign exchange rate fluctuations, the greater the chance of price 
fluctuations, which ultimately shocks the profit level figures and cash flows where dividends 
usually get distributed. The greater the fluctuations of cash flows, the more the expected cost of 
bankruptcy risk increases and consequently leads to generating less profit and therefore the 
lower the dividend payment to its shareholders.
182
5.3.4 Political Risk
Jodice (1985) suggest that political risk can be defined as changes in the operating conditions of 
a firm that arise out of a political process, either through war, insurrection, or political violence, 
or through changes in government policies that affect the behaviour of firms and their financial 
decisions. Political risk can be conceptualised as events in the national and international 
environments that can affect the profit level, physical assets, personnel, and operations of firms. 
Such adverse effects often take place through constraints on the way in which the MCs operate 
in foreign countries.
Kim and Mei (1994) suggest that political risk has a significant impact on firms profitability. 
Market volatility increases during political election and transition periods. Bailey and Chung 
(1995) also document that political risk can have a significant effect on firms profit level and 
profit distribution to its shareholders. This means that firms with significant foreign financing, 
foreign suppliers or customers, or other international transactions or assets are relatively 
exposed to adverse changes in currency controls, capital flow barriers and other laws and 
regulations that constitute political risk. Depending on firms earnings exposure to political risks 
in the domicile country and foreign countries, it will affect firms dividend payments.
5.3.5 Agency Costs
The principal agent problem is that managers may pursue their own goals at the cost of 
obtaining lower profits for the owners (stockholders). Consequently, agency costs are incurred 
by shareholders to insure that the manager acts in the best interests of shareholders who are not 
actively involved in the management of the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, 1986; Fama, 1980; 
Crutchley & Hansen, 1989).
There are many ways of reducing agency costs. Dividend payments serve as one means of 
monitoring or bonding management performance. Greater dividend payments to shareholders 
may force the firm both to raise capital by selling new shares and to go to the capital market
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more frequently. Agency costs are reduced as a result of the increased scrutiny the capital 
market places on the firm (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986).
Rozeff (1982) attempt to find an empirical relationship between agency costs and dividend 
policy and the findings suggests that: i) if a firm has a high percentage of insider stock 
ownership, it will pay a small dividend (a lower dividend payout ratio) to reduce agency costs; 
and ii) if a firm has a greater number of shareholders, it will pay high dividends (a higher 
payout ratio) to reduce agency costs. Further, it is also argued that an optimal dividend policy 
may exist even after tax considerations are ignored. According to this argument, increased 
equitable dividend payments reduce the volume of funds over which management has 
discretionary control; thus the costs of agency are reduced, but the transaction costs of external 
financing increase. Therefore, there is an optimal dividend payout which minimises the sum of 
these opposing costs. Lloyd, Jahera and Page (1986), Dempsey and Laber (1992), Schooley and 
Barney (1994), Hansen et al. (1994), Rao and White (1994), Moh’d et al. (1995), and Holder et 
al. (1998) support Rozeff s (1982) original findings.
As Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest, managers can allocate resources to activities that 
benefit them privately, but that are not in shareholders’ best interest. Easterbrook (1984) views 
dividend payments as a potential solution to agency conflicts. Dividend payments force 
managers to raise funds in the external financial markets and thus subject managers to scrutiny 
by outside professionals such as investment bankers, lawyers, and public accountants. 
Recognising the monitoring value of external financial markets, shareholders will insist that 
managers pay dividends. Also, Jensen (1986) points out that managers have incentive to grow 
their firms beyond optimal size as growth increases managers’ power by increasing the 
resources under their control. Dividend payouts can be used to reduce discretionary cash under 
managers’ control that could be wasted in negative NPV projects.
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5.3.6 Free Cash Flows
Prudent managers working in the shareholders’ best interests should invest in all profitable 
opportunities. Management and owner separation affords corporate managers the temptation, 
however, to consume or otherwise waste surplus funds. The inefficient use of funds in excess 
of profitable investment opportunities by management was first recognised by Berle and Means 
(1932). Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis updated this assertion, combining market 
information asymmetries with agency theory. The funds remaining after financing all positive 
net present value projects cause conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. 
Dividend and debt interest payments decrease the free cash flow available to managers to invest 
in marginal net present value projects and managers’ perquisite consumption (Myers, 1987, 
1990).
5.3.7 Past and Future Growth
In general, the growth of a firm depends on: (i) the amount of resources retained and reinvested 
in the firm; and (ii) the rate of return that is earned on the retained resources. If a firm were 
experiencing substantial success and rapid growth, the firm would require large additions of 
capital. Therefore, growth firms may expect to pursue a low dividend payout policy since 
investments and dividends are linked through the firm’s cash-flow identity.43
Many studies have suggested a negative relationship between the growth (investment) 
opportunities of a firm and its dividends. For example, Rozeff (1982) and Schooley and Barney 
(1994) find that dividend payout ratio is negatively related to both past growth revenues and 
predicted growth revenues of the firm. It is found that higher growth rates in past and future 
revenues require more funds to sustain growth; thus firms with more growth opportunities pay 
lower dividends in order to finance further growth.
43 In general, the greater the amount o f investment during the period, the smaller the dividend or the greater the new 
equity issued.
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Using industry-level data, Smith and Watts (1992) also discover that various measures of 
growth opportunities are negatively related to corporate dividend policy. Meanwhile, Gaver 
and Gaver (1993), using firm-level data, find an inverse relationship between investment 
(growth) opportunity and dividend policy. Using firm-level data in the U.K., Adedeji (1998) 
observes a negative interaction between dividend payout and investment. La Porta et al. (2000), 
using firm-level data from 33 countries, also find that high-growth firms make lower dividend 
payouts than low-growth firms.
Using the over-investment argument, Jensen (1986) argues that if a firm has more growth 
options than other firms, it will have lower free cash flow and will pay lower dividends.44 
Consistent with the overinvestment argument, Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Howe et al. 
(1992), and Denis et al. (1994), using Tobin’s Q as an indicator of a firm’s growth (investment) 
opportunities, find a negative relationship between Tobin’s Q and dividend payment. Thus, 
their result is consistent with the findings of previous studies, which report a negative 
relationship between growth opportunities and dividends.
Firms with many good investment opportunities have high cash needs, which may lead them to 
payout a low fraction of earnings to shareholders as dividends. If this is the case, a negative 
relationship is expected between investment opportunities and payouts. Alternatively, some 
argues that the relationship between investment opportunities and dividend is in fact positive 
(Brav et al., 2005). Survey evidence suggests that firms are highly reluctant to cut dividends, 
and increase dividends only when sustainable higher earnings are expected (Lintner, 1956; Brav 
et al., 2005). This argument suggests that only firms with a variety of good investment projects 
pay high dividends today because the cash flows earned from future projects support high 
dividends in the future. Given these two conflicting hypotheses on the relation between 
investment opportunities and dividend payments, it is left to empirical tests to determine which 
is indeed the more accurate.
44 According to Jensen’s (1986) argument (or over-investment hypothesis), a dividend increase by a firm with free 
cash flow problems will reduce the extent of over-investment, and will increase the market value of the firm. 
Similarly, a dividend decrease by such a firm will have the opposite result.
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5.3.8 Stock Return
In the prior literature it has been documented that higher stock returns are associated with 
higher dividends, independently of whether income is taxed more or less heavily than capital 
gains (Litzenberger & Ramaswamy, 1979, 1982; Bajaj & Vijhs, 1990; Morgan & Thomas, 
1998). Recently, this evidence is further documented by McManus, Gwilym & Thomas (2004). 
Lamont (1998) finds that stock return has a significant positive relationship with dividend 
payout ratios. We follow the Black and Scholes (1974) approach where they stated the effect in 
terms of the price of the company’s shares, or in terms of the expected return on the company’s 
shares, where return is defined as both capital gains and dividends. For example, if we believe 
that increasing a company’s dividend will increase the price of its shares, then we can say this in 
either of two ways either increasing the dividend will increase the price of a company’s shares 
or increasing the dividend will reduce the expected return on a company’s shares. From MCs’ 
point of view it remains an empirical question as to how stock return explains the dividend 
payout ratios for MCs.
5.3.9 Average Tax Rate
Australia operates under the imputation tax system, where dividends may have franking credits 
attached to them that allow shareholders to claim the tax paid at the company level as a credit 
against their personal income tax liability. The system effectively removes the double taxation 
of dividend income that occurs under the classical tax system. Companies engaging in off- 
market (sometimes referred to as equal access) repurchase programs in Australia have generally 
sought a ruling from the Tax Commissioner, the result of which has been that a proportion of 
the buyback price can be designated as a fully-franked dividend, and the remainder is defined as 
a capital amount. This structure may have tax advantages for shareholders such that they are 
willing to sell shares back to the company at a price that is below the market price; shareholders 
gain from the imputation credits attaching to the dividend component of the buyback and may 
also gain from capital gains tax credits. It is an empirical question to see the impact of 
imputation tax on the dividend policy for Australian MCs and DCs.
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5.3.10 Tax Clientele
The tax clientele argument postulates that investors in low tax brackets prefer high dividend­
paying stocks when compared to investors in high tax brackets. (Brennan, 1970; ; Elton & 
Gruber, 1970; Long, 1978; Litzenberger & Ramaswamy, 1979; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; 
among others). Early investigations of the tax clientele effect were indirect tests of the tax 
clientele argument and have been criticised by Miller and Scholes (1982) because of their 
extreme sensitivity to the definition of dividends.
Most recent studies have documented that clienteles may not depend on taxes alone. While 
Chaplinsky and Seyhun (1990) find that tax-deferred and tax-exempt dividend recipients 
accounted for half of all dividends in 1979, significant dividends were still subject to taxes. 
Sterk and Vandenberg (1990) find a preference for cash dividends despite the elimination of 
different tax rates between capital gains and dividend income in 1986. DeAngelo (1991) argues 
that an equilibrium consistent with dividend payout may exist even in the presence of tax 
systems that favour capital gains. Brennan and Thakor (1990) also present an equilibrium 
model where dividends exist for small distributions despite the preferential tax treatment of 
capital gains. In this paper, the clientele effect is tested differently by incorporating the tax 
status of the firm’s major stockholders. Institutional investors are either tax-exempt, can defer 
taxes on dividend received, or pay taxes on the dividends received from another corporation. 
Consequently, if the tax clientele argument is valid, a positive relationship is expected between 
institution holdings, and dividend payout ratio.
There is no theory that has been developed in regards to how MCs should respond to tax 
clientele effect but it may be argued that since MCs operate in more than one tax regime, 
depending on the exploitation of tax advantage a positive sign will indicate that MCs’ investors 
are better off than DCs’ investors in maximising the tax advantage, and therefore would prefer 
high dividends.
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5.3.11 Volatility of Cash Flows
Firms facing high levels of cash-flow uncertainty are likely to pay low dividends, fearing cash 
shortfalls in the future. In order to fund profitable future investment projects, firms with high 
cash-flow uncertainty will choose to hoard cash today by keeping dividends payments low. 
Moreover, firms with unstable cash flows may have to resort to external financing more often. 
In general, external funds are more expensive than internal funds, but this is yet truer for firms 
with high cash-flow uncertainty; these firms generally have low credit ratings, a result of a 
volatile cash-flow streams, and thus must pay premium interest to raise money. Firms with high 
cash-flow uncertainty will thus pay lower dividends because of their greater need to rely on 
internal funds (Pettit, 1972; Asquith & Mullins, 1983; Miller & Rock, 1985). Based on this 
discussion, it is expected that dividend payouts will be negatively related to cash-flow volatility. 
This argument echoes survey evidence by Brav et al. (2005). They report that more than two- 
thirds of chief financial officers of dividend-paying firms say that the stability of future cash 
flows is an important factor affecting dividend decisions.
5.3.12 Profitability
Fama and French (2001) document that the probability that a firm pays dividends is positively 
related to profitability and size and negatively related to growth. The intuition is that higher 
profitability and greater size imply a greater capacity to distribute cash, whereas greater growth 
indicates superior investment opportunities, thus a stronger incentive to retain cash. More 
profitable firms are expected to hold less debt, since it is easier and more cost effective to 
finance internally and consequently pay higher dividends. MCs have better opportunities than 
DCs to earn more profit mainly due to having access to more than one source of earnings and 
better chances to have favorable business conditions in particular countries (Kogut, 1985; 
Barlett & Ghoshal, 1989). Consequently, MCs being more profitable than DCs are expected to 
have higher dividend payout than DCs after controlling for the other variables.
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5.3.13 Firm-specific Risk
It is often argued that a firm with more systematic risk (beta)45 tends to adopt a policy of setting 
a relatively low payout ratio. Consistent with this argument, Rozeff (1982), Lloyd (1985), Bajaj 
and Vijh (1990), Schooley and Barney (1994), Dyl and Weigand (1998) and others discover an 
inverse relationship between dividend and security beta.
For example, Rozeff (1982) argues that, since higher beta is a reflection of the presence of 
higher operating and financial leverage, a firm will tend to pay lower dividend when it has a 
higher beta coefficient. Bajaj and Vijh (1990) argue that dividend increases are associated with 
increases in stock return because the percentage change in a stock price is typically much 
smaller than the percentage change in its dividend. Thus, the authors expect and find a decrease 
(increase) in security beta after a dividend increase (decrease). Dyl and Weigand (1998) also 
find that both the total risk and the systematic risk of a sample of dividend-initiating firms are 
significantly lower the year following the announcement of dividend payments. The decrease in 
total risk is more pronounced especially for the large firms, and the decrease in beta is more 
pronounced for the smaller firms.
Similar to the systematic risk, Beaver et al. (1970), Michael and Shaked (1986), Bar-Yosef and 
Huffman (1988), Glen et al. (1995), and others argue that the uncertainty of a firm’s earnings 
may lead it to pay lower dividends because the existence of large fluctuations in earnings 
materially increase the risk of default. Further, if firm’s follow a policy of dividend 
stabilization, firms with greater volatility in earnings will set a low payout ratio, which can be 
maintained even in the face of a relatively serious or prolonged decline in earnings.
5.3.14 Size
Research by Lloyd, Jahera and Page (1985) and Vogt (1994) indicates that firm size plays a role 
in explaining the dividend payout ratio of firms. They find that larger firms tend to be more
45 A firm's security beta represents its level of systematic risk.
190
mature and thus have easier access to the capital markets, which reduces their dependence on 
internally-generated funding and allows for higher dividend payout ratios. It is argued that 
firms that are large have greater access to capital markets and they can easily able to switch 
between debt and equity and take advantage of lower transaction costs, which allows for more 
stable and possibly higher dividend payments of the firm. Hence a positive relationship is 
expected between the size and dividend payout ratio (Ali, Khan & Ramirez, 1993).
5.3.15 Collateral Value of Assets
Shareholders may expropriate wealth from bondholders by paying themselves dividends. 
Bondholders try to contain this problem through restrictions on dividend payments in the bond 
agreement. However, fewer restrictions are placed on the firm if debt can be collateralised as 
the borrower is restricted to use the funds to specific projects. Hence, a positive relationship is 
expected between dividend and dividend payout ratios.
5.3.16 Firm Maturity
Dividends tend to be paid by mature, established firms, plausibly reflecting a financial lifecycle 
in which young firms face relatively abundant investment opportunities with limited resources 
so that retention dominates distribution, whereas mature firms are better candidates to pay 
dividends because they have higher profitability and fewer attractive investment opportunities. 
Fama and French (2001), Grullon et. al (2002), and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) all 
advance lifecycle explanations for dividends that rely, implicitly, on the trade-off between the 
advantages (e.g. flotation cost savings) and the costs of retention (e.g. agency costs of free cash 
flow). The trade-off between retention and distribution evolves over time as profits accumulate 
and investment opportunities decline, so that paying dividends becomes increasingly desirable 
as firms mature. The literature offers only a rough empirical idea of the characteristics that 
differentiate firms that pay dividends from those that do not. Most notably, Fama and French 
(2001) find that firms with current high profitability and low growth rates tend to pay dividends, 
while low profit/high growth firms tend to retain any profits.
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5.3.17 Long-term Debt
There are two alternative hypotheses that predict no abnormal dividend payments after debt 
issue. First, the debt covenant hypothesis predicts that firms will decrease or not increase 
dividends after debt issues. Kalay (1982) shows that debt contracts restrict dividend payments 
directly and indirectly. It is found that the stockholders of leveraged firms choose to pay 
dividends under debt contracts.
Consistent with the debt covenant hypothesis, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990), Jensen et al. 
(1992), and Long et al. (1994) find an inverse relationship between dividends and debts. 
However, Denis (1990), Gupta and Rosenthal (1991), Smith and Watts (1992), Mougoue and 
Mukherjee (1994), and Adedeji (1998) find positive relationship between the leverages of a firm 
and its dividends.
The second hypothesis, the reputation hypothesis, also predicts no abnormal dividend payments 
after debt issues. On the basis of asymmetric information between the insiders of the firm and 
the outsider debt-holders, John and "Nachman (1985) develop a model which shows the 
importance of reputation in controlling costs. They suggest that firms are willing to maintain 
their reputation for the following reasons: (i) although a firm may attempt to transfer wealth 
from shareholders to bondholders, this can occur only in one period, not in a multi-period 
world; (ii) the higher-rated debt (bonds of reputable firms) carry less restrictive constraints in 
the bond covenants on maximum payouts or minimum investment than those of lower-rated 
debt. Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) examine the reputation hypothesis, and find no 
evidence of wealth redistribution from bondholders to stockholders, but do find evidence in 
favour of the reputation argument.
Long et al. (1994) test both the debt covenant and reputation hypotheses. Using a sample of the 
firms’ dividend payout ratios, straight debt, and convertible debt from 1964 to 1977, their 
findings do not support the debt covenant argument, but do support the reputation argument.
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They conclude that reputation is the most plausible explanation why firms do not transfer 
wealth from bondholders to stockholders though dividend policy.
Firms trade-off dividend payments with fixed financial charges. A highly leveraged firm would 
tend to lower its dividend payout ratio because of high fixed financial commitments. On the 
other hand, increased indebtedness leads to increased contacts with external financing sources, 
which results in closer monitoring and an increased dividend payout.
5.3.18 Financial Slack
This chapter also considers examining the relationship between financial slack and dividend 
payout. In order to undertake profitable investments, firms may prefer to increase their 
financial slack rather than pay higher dividends. A high financial slack causes payout ratio to 
become lower, exacerbating the cash flow problems. The pecking order theory seeks to explain 
why management prefers to build financial. Asymmetry of information between investors and 
management makes external financing more difficult to obtain. Thus management prepares for 
future financial risks and business opportunities by accumulating internal funds whose use is 
not restricted. Therefore, financial slack is expected to be inversely related to dividend payout 
ratio.
5.4 The Dividend  Policy  and Oth er  Issues
5.4.1 Industry
Industry-specific factors affect a firm’s dividend policy (Baker & Powell, 2000). Although 
variation in dividend payouts among firms appear to be affected by firm-specific variables such 
as investment requirements and earnings variability, Lintner (1953) hypothesises that dividend 
policy also is influenced by an industry effect. This effect could be interpreted as common 
correlations with determinants of dividend payout by firms in the same industry, but Lintner 
suggests an effect of dividend leadership analogous to price leadership or wage leadership. 
Such an industry effect, if it exists, presumably stands apart from other firm-specific variables
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that affect payout decisions of the member firms within an industry and causes them to have 
varying dividend policies (Dempsey, Laber and Rozeff, 1993). Some evidence suggests that 
there is significant variation in dividend payout ratios among industries (Michael, 1979; Baker, 
1988).
Richardson, Tuna and Wysocki (2002) confirm that industry' affiliation is a strong determinant 
of corporate cash holdings, acquisitions, R&D and capital expenditures, leverage policy and 
dividend and share repurchase policy. Several studies specifically examine the potential effect 
of industry affiliation on dividend policies. Research by Michel (1979) and Baker (1988) 
among others suggests a positive relationship exists between industry classification and 
dividend policy.46 Rozeff (1982) concludes, however, that a company’s industry does not help 
to explain its dividend payout ratio. Although firms within the same industry tend to have 
similar dividend payouts, Rozeff attributes the apparently significant industry effect found in 
other studies to the fact that other variables are often similar within a given industry. His 
conclusion does not apply to utilities since he intentionally excluded regulated companies 
because their regulators’ status may affect their dividend policies. Survey research by Baker, 
Farrelly and Edelman (1985) examine differences in determinants of dividend policy among 
three industry groups -  manufacturing, wholesale/retail, and utilities. Their results show that 
the responses of the three groups differ significantly among eight of the fifteen determinants of 
dividend policy examined in their study. Soter, Brigham and Evanson (1996) note the 
economic environment for utilities has been changing over time. Due to regulators’ actions, the 
utility industry has become a riskier place in which to operate and invest. In the current world, 
utilities find themselves increasingly subject to competition. For the purpose of our analysis, I 
exclude financial companies as these firms may have different considerations in establishing 
their investment and dividend policies.
46 Rozeff (1982) concluded that a company’s industry does not help to explain its dividend payment ratio. This 
conclusion may not apply to utilities because he intentionally excluded regulated companies from his sample.
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The one and zero dummy variable will be used in the proposed models to capture the effect of 
industry in both domestic and multinational corporations’ dividend payout policy. Further, 
industry dummies are included in the regression to account for differences in asset structure, 
accounting practices, government regulation, and competitiveness each may affect corporate 
governance of dividend payments and firm valuations (Dumev and Kim, 2005). Given the prior 
studies have been conducted in most U.S. and other European countries, it would be worthwhile 
to see the impact of industry in the Australian corporations context.
5.4.2 Timing
It is important to examine the effects of time-varying information and determinants on the cash 
dividend payout and cash dividend and share repurchases. Firstly, time series evidence of 
dividend policies is relatively more plausible than cross-sectional evidence as time series 
analysis captures the dynamic changes of dividend payout policy across time. Secondly, it 
would provide evidence on the robustness of the disappearing puzzle. Thirdly, it allows 
conducting a further test of the time dependence variable changes. For example, when 
investment and dividend payment is primarily financed with internal funds, worsening 
conditions should not have as larger an impact as when external funds account for the bulk of 
financing. Since this only happens in financial markets which are imperfect (i.e. if internal and 
external funds are not perfect substitutes), the differential impact should be stronger when 
financing frictions are more prevalent (Braun and Larrain, 2005). In order to capture year effect 
(e.g. business cycle shocks or economic downturn), a dichotomous one and zero variable will be 
used for each year.
5.5 Data and Methodology
We gather data from the Osiris database and Compustat-Global for the period of 1995 to 2004 
and this is outlined in details in Chapter 2. The sample consists of 1254 Australian MCs and 
994 Australian DCs.
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The following three main regression models are proposed to test the determinants and 
multinationality effect on different measure of dividend payout ratios. For example, Model 1 
attempts to explain the determinants of DCs and MCs independently so that a direct comparison 
can be made in terms of the explanatory power of each determining factors between those two 
types of firms. Model II attempts to isolate the multinationality effect which is believe to 
capture any unique factors that exist but we could not capture within the capacity of this 
research even after considering the factors that is believe to explain to the best (e.g. 
diversification, foreign exchange risk, political risks). Thirdly, Model III endeavours to 
distinguish the difference across the explanatory variables between DCs and MCs. The test of 
industry influence and time influence on dividend payment behaviour is also investigated by 
extending model II. The main three models are presented below:
5.5.1 Modell
Where:
DIVC* = Cash dividend (* represents that total dividend (comprised of cash dividend 
and share repurchase) also use same regression)
= Diversification 
= Foreign exchange risk 
= Political risk 
= Agency Costs 
= Free cash flow
= Growth for market to book value 
= Growth for past 
= Stock return 
= Average tax rate 
= Tax Clientele 
= Cash flow variation
DIVER
FX
PR
AGC
FCF
GROW MB 
GROW_PT
SR
ATR
TAXCLTL
CFV
PROF
BETA
NDTS
SIZE
CVA
AGE
LTD
=  Profitability
= Firm specific risk (De-geared beta) 
= Non-debt tax shield 
= Total assets 
= Collateral value of assets 
= Firm’s age 
= Long-term debt 
= Financial SlackSLACK
196
5.5.2 Modelll
D 1 V C = ß 0 + ß.MULT,,  + ß 2DIVER, , + ß 3FX, ,  + ß 4PR,,  + ß sAGC, ,  + ß bFCF, , + ß 7GROW _MB, ,  
+ ß , GROW PT,,  + ß 9SR,,  + ß l0ATR,,  + ß uTAX _ CLTL,,  + ß nCFV,,  + ß [3PROF,,
+ ß^BETA,,  + ß l5S!ZE,t + ß l(tCVAi t + ß ]7AGE, , + ß n LTD,,  + ß l9SLACK, ,  + £,,
5.5.3 Model III
D 1 V C , ;  = ß 0 + ß XMU L T, , + ß 2DIV E R , , + j8 3F J f (>f + /?4F F , ,  + ß . A G C , ,  + /?6FCF,, ,
+ ß 7G RO W _ A/F, ,  + ß ^ G R O W  _ PT, ,  + ß 9S F , ,  + ß i0ATR, ,  + ß n TAX _ C L T L , ,
+ / ^ C F F , ,  + ß X3P R O F „  + ß u BETA, ,  + ß XiSIZE,,  + ß XiCVAtJl + ß xlA G E u  + £ , , 1 7 7 )  
+ ß l9S L A C K ,, + ß 20M _ DIVER, ,  + ß 2IM _ F Z , ,  + ß 22M _ F F , ,  + ß 23M _ ^ G C , ,
+ ß 24M _ F C F , , + ß 25M G R O W  _ MB, ,  + ß 2bM G R O W  _ PT, ,  + ß 21M _ SR, ,
+ ß 2%M _ A TR,,  + ß 29M _ TAX _ CL TL,,  + ß i0M _ C F V ,, + ß 3IM _ PROF, ,
+ ß 32A7 _ BETA, ,  + ß i3M _ SIZE, ,  + ß 3AM _ CVA,, + ß 35M _ ^ G F , ,  + ß 3(>M _ LTD,  
+ ß 31M _ S L ACK,  , + e , ,
5.6 Regression  Results
5.6.1 Australian DCs and MCs Dividend Payout Determinants
The analysis is based on level which allows for a more direct interpretation of the results and 
avoids some measurement issues that exist in the change analysis (Nissim and Ziv, 2001).
Table 5.1 shows the application of dividend payout (cash dividend and total dividend payout 
ratios) and the explaining capacity of the determinants across Australian DCs and MCs 
employing Model I where it does not assume the distribution of DCs’ and MCs’ dependent and 
independent variables to be similar.
The regression analysis presented in Table 5.1 indicates four sets of regression results across 
DCs and MCs for both cash dividend payout ratios (DIVC,,) and total dividend payout ratios 
(DIVR,,). Results show that the first determining factor of diversification (DIVER, ,) of firms 
has negative and highly significant impact on DCs’ cash dividend payout decision (t=-4.40). 
Similarly, DIVER,, factor for DCs also show a significant and negative (t=-2.76) relationship in 
explaining cash and share repurchase payout ratios (broader definition of dividend). This
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suggest that when Australian DCs expand in terms of number of active subsidiaries in different 
geographical locations within the local country, it decreases both cash and total dividend 
payments to shareholders.. However, no significant relationship is found with diversification of 
MCs and type of dividend payment modes (e.g. cash dividend or total dividend). This suggests 
that MCs’ expansion both nationally and internationally has no significant impact on dividend 
payout decision.
A weak and significant positive relationship is found in foreign exchange risk (FX,,) for DCs in 
explaining total dividend payout ratios (t=1.69). This results suggest that when the exchange 
rate fluctuates, the Australian DCs are in a better position relative to MCs, as it appears that the 
variation in foreign exchange rate favours the DCs’ increase in the dividend payment method 
through share repurchase rather than just cash dividends. And this may be due to DCs 
maintaining the value of their share within the firm and not letting their share value 
unnecessarily inflate in the market. No apparent significant relationship is observed in MCs’ 
FX, , variation and its impact on cash dividend payments or share repurchases activities.
Prior literature suggests that dividends can be used in reducing agency problems between 
managers and stockholders. For example, the payment of dividends reduces the discretionary 
funds available to managers for perquisite consumption and helps address the 
manager-stockholder conflict (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Easterbrook, 1984; Crutchley & 
Hansen, 1989). While the direct measure of agency costs is used here (ratio of number of 
shareholders to total outstanding shares) to capture the agency problem between stockholders 
and managers, no perceptible evidence is found in either of Australian DCs or MCs. Similarly, 
the free cash flow (FCF, ,) of agency costs shows that there is an inefficient use of funds in 
Australian firms which decreases significantly their cash dividend payments capacity across 
DCs and MCs; however, this relationship is not significant. This result suggest that the funds 
remaining after financing all positive net present value projects cause conflicts of interest 
between managers and shareholders almost identically between DCs and MCs. This implies 
that the managers of Australian DCs and MCs use the excess cash flow to maximize their own
198
wealth by spending on unnecessary managerial expenses at the cost of shareholders by not 
paying cash dividends to their shareholders on time. This result is inconsistent with Jensen 
(1986) who finds that free cash flow positively and significantly affects dividend payout ratios 
higher levels of free cash flow will have higher agency costs and need higher dividends payout 
ratios to reduce those agency costs.
Two proxies for growth factors are used to explain the variation in cash and cash and share 
repurchase for Australian DCs and MCs. While GROW MB,, captures the future growth 
opportunities, GROW PT,, attempts to confine historical growth rate and its determining power 
to explain dividend increase or decrease across Australian DCs and MCs. An insignificant 
impact of future growth opportunities is experimented within explaining both DCs’ and MCs’ 
cash dividend payments and this finding is a contradiction with prior literature and pecking 
order theory (Rozeff, 1982; Lang & Litzenberger, 1989; Gaver & Gaver, 1993; Brav et al., 
2005).
GROW PT,, attempts to capture DCs’ and MCs’ past growth rate when deciding how much of 
its earnings it needs to retain (for growth), and how much to give away as dividends. As the 
evidence shows past growth has weak negative insignificant impact on MCs’ cash dividend 
payments, similarly, no significant relationship is detected for DCs’ cash dividend payments.
The significant and positive influence of stock return (SR,,) in explaining cash dividend 
payment for Australian DCs (t=3.03 and t=3.04) suggest that as the stock return increases the 
dividend payment increases as a result, especially when investors require a premium to hold 
high return stocks when dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains tax. Further, this 
evidence is consistent with Bajaj and Vijh’s (1990) argument that dividend increases are 
associated with increases in stock return because the percentage change in stock price is 
typically much smaller than the percentage change in its dividend. However, stock return has 
no significant relationship to determine Australian MCs’ cash dividend and cash and repurchase 
type of dividend payout ratio. This is consistent with Black and Scholes (1974).
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The tax clientele (TAX CLTL,,) coefficient appears to be positive and significant in explaining 
cash dividend payout ratios for both DCs (t=2.15) and MCs (t=3.05) and also cash and share 
repurchase mode of dividend payout ratios across DCs (t=1.94) and MCs (t=3.59). This result 
is consistent with DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) 
among others. This result finds support for the tax clientele arguments where it states that as the 
institutional holdings increase, the cash dividend payment increases proportionately, as the 
institutional shareholders of Australian DCs and MCs are enable to take higher tax advantage as 
they fall in the low tax bracket.
The signalling theory of DCs and MCs is captured by using a proxy for cash flow variability 
(CFV,,). The negative and significant findings of CFVl t explains cash dividend payout for DCs 
(t=-4.33). The results demonstrate that firms with high volatile future cash flows pay 
significantly lower cash dividends. The existence of signalling theory result in Australian DCs 
is consistent with Pettit (1972), Asquith and Mullins (1983) and Miller and Rock (1985). No 
apparent significant relationship is found to explain MCs dividend payout ratios.
Profitability (PROF,,) factor is found with expected positive sign and significant for both DCs 
(t=3.35 and t=3.24) and MCs (t=1.89 or t=1.71) which is consistent with Fama and French’s 
(2001) argument that higher profitability implies greater capacity to distribute cash - thus a 
stronger incentive to retain cash. The result also indicates that it is easier and more cost 
effective to finance internally and consequently pay higher dividends.
Although it is often argued that firms with higher systematic firm beta tend to adopt a policy of 
setting a relatively low payout ratio (Rozeff, 1982; Schooley & Barney, 1994), the evidence 
found in this analysis is contradictory evidence as the beta coefficient is positive and highly 
significant for explaining DCs (t=2.67 and t=2.48) across cash and cash and share repurchase. 
A possible explanation for this result can be argued from the financing costs point of view. For 
example, Rozeff (1982) uses beta as proxy for external financing costs to maintain dividend
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payout, and possibly the positive significant result attempts to suggest that as the systematic 
risks of Australian DCs increases the cash dividend payout also increases since the costs of 
external financing outweigh the benefit of maintaining stable dividend payout to shareholders. 
Nevertheless, to explain Australian MCs’ cash or non cash dividend payout is not influenced by 
firm risk for the sample selected in this study.
The coefficient of firm size is significant and in the hypothesized direction to explain Australian 
DCs’ and MCs’ cash dividend payout and cash and share repurchase (t=4.37 and t=4.49; t=1.67 
and t=2.22). This indicates that as the Australian DCs become larger, it significantly increases 
the capacity to have higher payout ratio. This evidence also suggest that as the DCs become 
larger it gets easier for them to get access to capital markets to raise funds and are therefore less 
dependent on internal funds enabling them to pay higher dividends, which is consistent with 
Holder, Langrerhr and Hexter (1998).
The debt covenant hypothesis predicts that firms will decrease dividends after debt issue and the 
findings of our result support this theory which is consistent with DeAngelo and DeAngelo 
(1990) and Jensen et al. (1992). The inverse and significant relationship between debt and 
dividend payout ratios of cash and cash and share repurchase for MCs is negative and 
significant (t=-2.51 or t=-2.44), suggesting that as the debt ratio increases, the cash dividend 
payment decreases due to high fixed financial commitments. However, long-term debt does 
not show any statistical significant relationship to determine Australian DCs dividend payout 
ratios.
Finally, managerial considerations of financial slack (SLACK,,) predicts a negative and 
significant results for Australian DCs (t=-3.65 and t=-2.78) only to explain cash dividend 
payments. The result indicate that in order to be able to retain the ability to undertake profitable 
investments, DCs may prefer to increase their financial slack rather than pay higher cash 
dividends. Interestingly, this result only holds for MCs’ cash and share repurchase payout ratios 
but not cash payout ratios.
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Table 5.1
The determinants of cash dividends and total dividends for Australian DCs and MCs
This table reports the results of OLS regression (Model I) to obtain the parameters and t-statistics accordingly for the sample of 
2248 (994 DCs and 1254 MCs separately) listed companies in the Australian Stock Exchange over 10 years to 2004. The adjusted 
R squared indicates the model’s goodness of fit.
D 1 V C ,  ;  = ß 0 + ß , D I V E R , , + ß 2F X , ,  + ß 2P R , t + ß . A G C , ,  + ß i F C F , , + ß bG R O W  _ M B , ,
+ ß . G R O W  _ PT, ,  + ß ^ S R , ,  + ß 9A T R , , + ß xJ A X  _ C  L TL, , + ß u C F V , ,  + ß n P R O F , ,
+ ß n B E T A , , + ß ^ S I Z E , , + ß ]5C V A , , + ß X6A G E , ,  + ß xlL T D , , + ß ^ S L A  C K ,,  + e , ,
* indicates that this model uses two different measurement of dividend payout ratios which is explained below.
Two dependent variables have been employed and they are: DIVC„ (cash payout ratios) is calculated using cash dividend paid to 
net earnings and DIVR„ (cash and share repurchase dividend payout ratios) is calculated as cash plus change in treasury stock 
scaled by net earnings. DIVER,, (diversification) is the total number of subsidiaries that any firm has within their domicile country 
and overseas. FX,, (foreign exchange risk) is calculated by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales revenue. PR,,, (political risk) is 
the sum of all the MCs subsidiaries countries' political risk ratings exposed to the proportion of each sale that a subsidiary makes 
overseas. AGC,,, (agency cost) is the natural logarithm of total shareholders. FCF„ (free cash flow) measured after Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings before interest and tax plus depreciation plus amortization plus tax paid minus dividend paid 
and minus interest expense and then it was scaled by 10000 so that the magnitude of this variable is compatible with other 
measurements. Two growth measures have been used in this study namely GROW MB „ (market value of equity to book value of 
asset) which is measured as market value of asset to book value of asset. And secondly, GR O WP T „ (past growth) which is 
measured as the change in total assets over total assets. SR,., (stock return) is measured as expected return of individual corporations 
by using CAPM. ATR,., (average tax ratios) is calculated as total tax paid per annum scaled by net profit. TAX CLTL ,,, (tax 
clientele) is the ratio of number of common shares outstanding by the institutional shareholders to number of total shares 
outstanding. CFV,,, (cash flow variation) is the standard deviation of the first difference in earnings before interest and taxes, scaled 
by mean value of interest expense. SIZE „ is the natural logarithm of total asset. CVA (collateral value of assets) is the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets. AGE,,, is the natural logarithm of the age of the firm in years from date of incorporation. LEVERAGE,,, is 
the ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt plus market value of equity. SLACK,,, (financial slack) is measured as the sum of cash 
balances and marketable securities scaled by the market value of equity .
DCs MCs
DIVC,., DIVR,, DIVC,, DIVRu
CoefT t-Stat CoefT t-Stat CoefT t-Stat CoefT t-Stat
C -0.15 -0.46 -0.28 -0.81 -0.69 -1.36 -0.89 -1.47
DIVER„ -0.08 -4.40 * -0.06 -2.76* -0.02 -1.13 -0.03 -1.60
FXU 0.05 0.75 0.14 1.69c - 0.11 -1.35 -0.10 -1.01
PRu 0.00 0.82 0.00 1.07 0.01 1.62 0.01 1.27
AGC^ t 0.02 1.00 0.02 0.92 0.06 1.41 0.06 1.43
FCF„ -0.01 -0.79 0.00 -0.35 -0.03 -0.69 -0.01 -0.21
GROWMB,,, 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.49
GROWPT,,, -0.01 -1.39 -0.01 -1.15 -0.05 -0.59 -0.06 -0.59
SR 0.03 3.03“ 0.03 3.04“ 0.01 0.69 0.01 0.85
ATR,,, 0.00 -0.39 0.00 -0.51 0.05 0.58 0.07 0.70
TAXCLTL,, 0.57 2.15“ 0.52 1.94 b 1.15 3.05“ 1.50 3.59“
CFV„ -4.39 -4.33“ -4.24 -4.20“ -1.32 -0.53 0.23 0.09
PROFij 0.04 3 3 5 “ 0.03 3.24“ 0.24 1.89 b 0.22 1.71c
BETA„ 0.47 2.67“ 0.46 2.48“ -0.01 -0.05 0.45 1.85
SIZE,, 0.07 4.37* 0.07 4.49“ 0.04 1.67c 0.07 2.22b
CVA,., 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.26 -2.24b -0.21 -1.63
A GE„ -0.03 -1.54 -0.03 -1.30 0.02 0.48 0.03 0.52
LTDU -0.14 -1.62 -0.12 -1.37 -0.34 -2.51b -0.35 -2.44b
SLACK„ -3.21 -3.65“ -6.19 -2.78“ -0.40 -0.64 4.64 2.05b
Adj R-sqr 0.45 0.45 0.42 0.45
No. of Obs 994 994 1254 1254
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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5.6.2 Effect of Multinationality on Dividend Payout
To assess the impact of multinationality, the dichotomous variable for multinationality (MULTU) 
is introduced into Model 1. A Likelihood Ratio (LR) test is performed to assess the significance 
of this variable. The results indicate that multinationality is a significant variable in both cash 
and non-cash dividend payment determination (LR F-stat=5.02 with prob=0.004 and F- 
stat=36.08 with prob=0.000 respectively). The positive sign on the coefficient indicates that 
MCs have significantly higher dividend payout activities than DCs. To help explain the 
difference in dividend payout between DCs and MCs and to assess the impact of individual 
economic determinants on MCs, Model 2 was estimated.
Table 5.2 presents the effect of multinationality (MULTi,,) of Australian firms on cash dividend 
payments and share repurchase activities. The positive direction of the MULTU coefficients 
(0.02 for cash dividend payout ratios and 0.04 for cash and share repurchase type dividend 
payout ratios) is consistent with the international theory that Hines (1996) developed. He 
documents that U.S. multinational firms paid higher dividends from after tax profit relative to 
DCs because the unusual high fraction of those profits came from foreign profits (non-U.S. 
sources). However, this result does not have any significant impact in explaining Australian 
MCs’ decision payment decisions relative to DCs counterparts. A possible explanation of this 
might be the fact that Australian MCs’ diversification benefit and tax benefit in operating in 
multiple countries do not outweigh the risks (e.g. foreign risk, expropriation and economic 
risks) that they encounter. Further, the result is different for Australian MCs as opposed to US 
MCs (eg., not paying higher dividends than DCs counterparts) because Australian MCs have not 
fully exploited the benefits of international operation. Also Australian DCs can take full 
advantage of franking credits (profits earned domestically) but Australian MCs cannot 
take full advantage of franking credits as a significant proportion of their profits are 
earned overseas. Further, Australian MCs are in their early age of being multinational relative 
to US firms and given Australian MCs are in their growing phase, it will take time to fully 
realise the techniques and strategies to minimize the costs and maximize the benefit in an
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effective manner which will eventually enable to pay significantly higher dividends than their 
DCs counter parts.
However, the adjusted R2 suggest that construction of the model is explaining about 39% of the 
cash dividend payment and 41% of share repurchase activities between DCs and MCs. The rest 
of the determining factors maintain the expected signs and significance level as in the earlier 
table.
Table 5.2
The effect of multinationality on cash dividend and total dividend in Australian firms
This table reports the results of OLS regression (Model II) to obtain the parameters and t-statistics accordingly for the sample of 
2248 (994 DCs and 1254 MCs separately) listed companies in the Australian Stock Exchange over 10 years to 2004. The adjusted 
R squared indicates the model’s goodness of fit.
D I V C , * = ß 0 + ß , MU L T , ,  + ß 2D I V E R , , + ß 3F X ,,  + ß , P R , ,  + ß SA G C , ,  + ß bF C F , t + ß . G R O W  _  MB, ,  
+ ß %G R O W  _ P T , ,  + ß 9S R, , + ß l0AT R , , + ß u TAX  _  GL TL, , + ß xlCFV,_,  + ß ]2P R O F ,,
+ ß\ *BP P-4,., + ßis SI ZE, , + ß i6C VA, , + ß n A GE,  t + ß n L TD , , + ß l9SLA C K ,,  + e , ,
* indicates that this model uses two different measurement of dividend payout ratios which is explained below.
Two dependent variables have been employed and they are: D I V C (cash payout ratios) is calculated using cash dividend paid to 
net earnings and D1VR ,,, (cash and share repurchase dividend payout ratios) is calculated as cash plus change in treasury stock 
scaled by net earnings. Multinationality (MULT,,) effect is measured where it takes a value of 1 when a corporation is a 
multinational otherwise it is 0. D IV E R (diversification) is the total number of subsidiaries that any firm has within their domicile 
country and overseas. FXif, (foreign exchange risk) is calculated by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales revenue. PR ,,, (political 
risk) is the sum of all the MCs subsidiaries countries’ political risk ratings exposed to the proportion of each sale that a subsidiary 
makes overseas. A G C (agency cost) is the natural logarithm of total shareholders. F C F (free cash flow) measured after Lehn 
and Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings before interest and tax plus depreciation plus amortization plus tax paid minus dividend 
paid and minus interest expense and then it was scaled by 10000 so that the magnitude of this variable is compatible with other 
measurements. Two growth measures have been used in this study namely G R O W M B (market value of equity to book value of 
asset) which is measured as market value of asset to book value of asset. And secondly, G R O W P T (past growth) which is 
measured as the change in total assets over total assets. SRU (stock return) is measured as expected return of individual corporations 
by using CAPM. ATR ,,, (average tax ratios) is calculated as total tax paid per annum scaled by net profit. TAX CLTL u (tax 
clientele) is the ratio of number of common shares outstanding by the institutional shareholders to number of total shares 
outstanding. CFV,,, (cash flow variation) is the standard deviation of the first difference in earnings before interest and taxes, scaled 
by mean value of interest expense. S I Z E is the natural logarithm of total asset. CVA u (collateral value of assets) is the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets. AGEU is the natural logarithm of the age of the firm in years from date of incorporation. LEVERAGE,, is 
the ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt plus market value of equity. SLACK, , (financial slack) is measured as the sum of cash 
balances and marketable securities scaled by the market value of equity. Model II incorporates a dummy variable in addition to 
common eighteen variables to capture multinationality. For example, other attributes: inflation, interest rates, restrictions on the 
quantity of amount DCs and MCs can borrow overseas, debt market efficiency and borrowing costs to finance dividend payments 
which FX, PR and DIVER do not capture.
DIVC,., DIVRu
CoefT t-Stat CoefT t-Stat
c - 0.14 - 0.54 - 0.27 - 0.97
MULT,, 0.02 0.56
a
0.04 0.81
a
DIVER,., - 0.04 -3.93 - 0.05 -3.56
FXU - 0.03 - 0.48 0.01 0.10
PRi,. 0.00 1.24 0.00 1.01
b
AGQ, 0.03 1.57 0.03 1.77
FCFo -0 0 1 - 0.97 0 .00 - 0.44
GROW MBu 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.92
GROW PTU - 0.01 - 0.69
a
- 0.01 - 1.02
a
SR,, 0.03 3.53 0.03 3.62
ATR,., 0.00 0 .20
a
0 .00 0.34
a
TAXCL TL,j 0.84 3.80
a
0.95 4.10
a
CFV,', - 4 .58 -5.12 - 3.88 -4.39
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P R O F u 0.04
a
4 .47 0.03
a
3.84
B E T A i,, 0 .00 0.01 0.25 1.60
S I Z E « 0.05
a
4.39 0.07
a
4 .96
C V A if, - 0.03 - 0.54 - 0.01 - 0.15
A G E i ,, - 0.02 - 1.52 - 0.01 - 0.86
l t d ,, - 0.17
a
- 2 .59 - 0 .19
a
- 2.66
S L A C K * - 0.89 - 0.84 - 0.19 - 0.06
A d j  R -s q r 0 .39 0.41
N o . o  f  O bs 2248 2248
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
5.6.3 Interaction Effect on Slope Coefficients and Dividend Payout
Although no significant relationship is detected in Model II for the effect of firms’ 
multinationality in determining dividend payments, nevertheless it is interesting given the LR 
result indicated this variable has significant deterring power to explain both cash dividends and 
share repurchase type of payments. Therefore, an interaction variable of each proposed 
determinant is introduced in Model III to capture the difference of each of the explanatory 
factors’ ability in distinguishing the dividend payments determinants across DCs and MCs.
The evidence of this interaction effect on individual slope coefficient for MCs is empirical and 
therefore no reference is made in explaining Table 5.3. The interaction of MCs’ diversification 
slope coefficient for cash dividend payments and repurchase payments suggests two different 
explanations of dividend payments. For example, the interaction of MCs’ geographical 
expansion or diversification (M DIVER) locally and internationally has positive and significant 
impact on increasing cash dividend payments (t=2.25) while it does not have a significant 
impact on overall dividend payout ratios. This result is intuitive and justified in a sense that 
diversification cannot have same directional impact on both cash and a non-cash dividend 
payment as one is believed to be a substitute of another.
The slope coefficient of foreign exchange risk (M_FX) states that the fluctuations of foreign 
exchange risks impacts significantly (t=-1.87) more on the reduction of combined payout ratios 
(cash and share repurchase) but not cash dividend payout ratios only for Australian MCs 
relative to DCs.
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Consistent with Hines (1996), the interaction factor of profitability (M PROF) is positive and 
significant (t= 1.65) which suggest an increase in profitability would significantly increase the 
Australian MCs’ cash dividend payments capacity than its DCs counterparts.
The interaction of negative and significant (t=-1.80) firm-specific risk {BETA) coefficient or 
proxy for external financing costs suggests that it is rather costlier for Australian MCs to raise 
finance externally in order to maintain stable cash dividend payout and therefore firm risk 
significantly decreases cash dividend payments relative to DCs. Similarly, the increase in firm- 
specific risks discourages significantly Australian MCs to be involved in share repurchase 
activity type of dividend payment mode, since the result seems to be insignificant for our 
sample (t=-0.05). This may be argued in the sense that if the managers could sense that firm- 
specific risk is increasing, then it would be unwise to payout cash dividends instead of buying 
the shares back from the shareholders, which will make more sense as it saves them losing out 
on the market value of the firm due to higher firm-specific risks.
Interestingly, the significant of interaction variable (M SIZE) for MCs show that it is negative 
and insignificant in explaining the slope difference of cash dividend payouts (t=-0.72). 
Similarly, the slope coefficient of collateral value of assets for MCs also shows a negative and 
significant relationship (t=-1.97), which suggests that as MCs increase their collateralised 
assets, it reduces the cash dividend payments for MCs more than DCs. Intuitively, this result 
suggests that Australian MCs are not exploiting the benefit of transaction costs of raising long 
term debt, especially when it needs to finance dividend externally.
Finally, the interaction slope coefficients of MCs financial M  SLACK variable suggest that 
Australian MCs cash dividend payment is positive and significant (t=2.62) and dividends 
comprised of cash and share repurchase is also positive and significant (t=3.44) and a possible 
explanation for this is that Australian MCs do not participate in financial slacking and therefore 
MCs are able to pay relatively higher dividends than DCs.
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Table 5.3
Interaction effects for cash dividend and total dividend determinants of Australian DCs and MCs
This table reports the results of OLS regression (Model III) to obtain the parameters and t-statistics accordingly for the sample of 
2248 (994 DCs and 1254 MCs separately) listed companies in the Australian Stock Exchange over 10 years to 2004. The adjusted 
R squared indicates the model’s goodness of fit.
D 1 V C , ;  = ß 0 + ß . M U L T , ,  + ß  2D I V E R , ,  + ß  , F  X  , , + ß  AP R , ,  + ß 5A GC , _ ,  + ß  6F C F , ,
+ ß 7G R O W  _ M B , ,  + ß ^ G  R O W  _ P T , ,  + ß , S R ,  , + ß i0A T R , ,  + ß , J A X  _  C L T L , ,
+ ß ^ C F V , ,  + ß „ P R O F , ,  + ß „ B E T A , , ,  + ß  „ S I Z E , ,  + ß „ C V A , ,  + ß „ A G E u  
+ ß „ L T D  , ,  + ß i9S L A C  K , ,  + ß  20M  _  D I V  E R , , + ß  2lM  _ F X , ,  + ß  12M  _  P R , ,
+ ß  23M  _  A G  C , ,  + ß  24M _  F C  F , , + ß 2SM  _  G R O W  _ M  B,  , + )3 26M  _ G  R O W  _  P T , ,
+ ß 21M  _  S R ,  , + ß 2%M  _ A T  R , , +  ß 29M  _ T A X  _  C L T L ,  , + ß 30M  _  C F V , ,
+ _  P R O F ,  , + ß 32M  _  B E T A , , + ß „ M  _ S I Z E , ,  + ß 3AM  _ C  VA,  , + ß 3$M  _  A G  L
+ ß 36M  _  L T D , ,  + ß 31M  _ S L A C K , ,  + £ , ,
* indicates that this model uses two different measurement of dividend payout ratios which is explained below.
Two dependent variables have been employed and they are: DIVC u (cash payout ratios) is calculated using cash dividend paid to 
net earnings and D I V R (cash and share repurchase dividend payout ratios) is calculated as cash plus change in treasury stock 
scaled by net earnings. In order to capture the multinationality effect a dummy variable is introduced where it takes a 1 when a 
corporation is a multinational otherwise it is 0. DIVER u (diversification) is the total number of subsidiaries that any firm has within 
their domicile country and overseas. FXu (foreign exchange risk) is calculated by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales revenue.
PR i t (political risk) is the sum of all the MCs subsidiaries countries’ political risk ratings exposed to the proportion of each sale that 
a subsidiary makes overseas. A G C (agency cost) is the natural logarithm of total shareholders. FCFu (free cash flow) measured 
after Lehn and Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings before interest and tax plus depreciation plus amortization plus tax paid minus 
dividend paid and minus interest expense and then it was scaled by 10000 so that the magnitude of this variable is compatible with 
other measurements. Two growth measures have been used in this study namely GROW M B (market value of equity to book 
value of asset) which is measured as market value of asset to book value o f asset. And secondly, GROW PTu (past growth) which 
is measured as the change in total assets over total assets. SRU (stock return) is measured as expected return of individual 
corporations by using CAPM. ATRU (average tax ratios) is calculated as total tax paid per annum scaled by net profit. TAX CLTLu 
(tax clientele) is the ratio of number of common shares outstanding by the institutional shareholders to number of total shares 
outstanding. CFV,,, (cash flow variation) is the standard deviation of the first difference in earnings before interest and taxes, scaled 
by mean value of interest expense. SIZE u is the natural logarithm of total asset. C V A (collateral value of assets) is the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets. AGE,,, is the natural logarithm of the age of the firm in years from date of incorporation. LEVERAGE,,, is 
the Tatio of \ong-tenn debt to long-term debt plus market value of equity. SLACK,,, (financial slack) is measured as the sum of cash 
balances and marketable securities scaled by the market value of equity. Model III incorporates slope dummy variables in addition 
to common eighteen variables to capture multinationality impact on each of the explanatory variables. For example, Model III aims 
to discover any unexplained issues that Model II failed to capture which are either hard to measure or just not available to explain 
the MCs’ operational behaviour and its impact on dividend payments. Besides, some of these other attributes are hard to measure 
since some are qualitative information. The interaction dummy variable is used to find the significant difference of the common 
eight variables. For example, M DIVER takes the actual value of MCs while it is 0 for the DCs.
D IV C ,, D IV R ,,
CoefT t-Stat CoefT t-Stat
c -0.15 -0.46 -0.28 -0.80
MULTij -0.54 -0.91 -0.61 -0.90
D IV E R ,, -0.08 -4 .34  a -0.06 -2 .72  3
F X U 0.05 0.74 0.14 1.67 C
PRu 0.00 0.81 0.00 1.05
A G C „ 0.02 0.98 0.02 0.91
F C F ,, -0.01 -0.77 0.00 -0.34
G R O W M B ,, 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.52
G R O W  PT U -0.01 -1.37 -0.01 -1.13
SR u 0.03 2.99 8 0.03 3.00  3
A T R U 0.00 -0.38 0.00 -0.50
T A X C L T L ,, 0.57 2.12 3 0.52 1.91 b
C F V U -4.39 -4 .26  3 -4.24 -4 .14 3
P R O F u 0.04 3 J 0 0.03 3.20 3
B E TA i, 0.47 2.63 3 0.46 2.44 3
S IZ E 0.07 4.31 3 0.07
a
4.43
C V A „ 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03
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AGEi,, - 0.03 - 1.52 - 0.03 - 1.28
LTD - 0.14 - 1.60 - 0.12 - 1.35
SLACKw - 3.21 -3.60 3 - 6.19 -2.74 3
MDIVERi, , 0.06 2.25 3 0.03 0.91
M F X i j - 0.17 - 1.53 - 0.24 -1.87 b
M P R i j 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.52
M A G C i j 0.04 0.93 0.05 0.99
M_FCFU - 0.03 - 0.55 - 0.01 - 0.13
M G R O W M B i j 0.00 0.06 0.00 - 0.12
M_GROW_PTu - 0.04 - 0.50 - 0.05 - 0.52
M_SRi,t - 0.01 - 0.83 - 0.01 - 0.74
M A  TRU 0.05 0.63 0.07 0.77
M_TAX_CLTLU 0.58 1.27 0.98 2.02 3
M C F V U 3.06 1.16 4.47 1.63
M P R O F i, , 0.20 1.65 C 0.18 1.48
M B  ETA ^ - 0.48 -1.80 b - 0.01 - 0.05
M S I Z E i j - 0.02 - 0.72 0.00 0.03
M_CVA - 0.26 -1.97 3 - 0.21 - 1.48
M A  GEu 0.05 1.07 0.05 0.99
M L  TDi,, - 0.20 - 1.26 - 0.23 - 1.40
M S L A  CKjj 2.81 2.62 3 10.83 3.44
Adj R-sqr 0.44 0.45
No . o f  Obs 2248 2248
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
5.6.4 Industry Effect on Dividend Payout
In order to investigate the industry influence on DCs and MCs cash and cash and repurchase 
type dividend payments, Table 5.4 shows that firms that belong to the transportation and 
communication industry it has negative and significant relationship with cash dividend 
payments (t=-l .77) but no apparent relationship is found with any other industry classifications. 
This result is consistent with Lintner (1956), Baker and Powell (2000) and Dempsey, Laber and 
Rozeff (1993). This evidence suggests that after controlling for industry effect the original 
findings of the cash and cash and share repurchase of dividend payout determinants mainly 
remain unchanged. Further, this industry result also suggest that in Australia there is no 
apparent evidence of industry influence on explaining any important relationship of any DCs 
and MCs to any particular industry apart from firms that belong to the transportation and 
communication industry.
Table 5.4
Industry effect on cash dividend and total dividend for Australian firms
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This table reports the industry effect on the dividend payout results of OLS regression (Model II) to obtain the parameters and t- 
statistics accordingly for the sample of 2248 (994 DCs and 1254 MCs separately) listed companies in the Australian Stock 
Exchange over 10 years to 2004. The adjusted R squared indicates the model’s goodness of fit.
DIVCt * = ß 0 + ß^MVLT" + ß 2DIVERil + ß , F X it + ß APRlt + ß . AGC, ,  + ß , FCFit + ß . GROW _ MB, t 
+ ß f i R O W  _ P T + ß 9SR(l + ß ]0ATR,,  + ß uTAX _ CLTL ., + ß nCFVit + ß^PROF, ,
+ ß\A B E T A , ,  + ß i5S I Z E jl + ß i6C VA,,  + ß ^ A G E , ,  + ß xiL T D it  + ß l9S L A C K , ,
k = 8
+ ^  I n d u s t r y  _  D u m m y , lk + £ ,
/ , /=  1
* indicates that this model uses two different measurement of dividend payout ratios which is explained below.
Two dependent variables have been employed and they are: DIVC „ (cash payout ratios) is calculated using cash dividend paid to 
net earnings and DIVR,,, (cash and share repurchase dividend payout ratios) is calculated as cash plus change in treasury stock 
scaled by net earnings. Multinationality effect is measured where it takes a value of 1 when a corporation is a multinational 
otherwise it is 0. DIVER „ (diversification) is the total number of subsidiaries that any firm has within their domicile country and 
overseas. FX „ (foreign exchange risk) is calculated by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales revenue. PR „ (political risk) is the 
sum of all the MCs subsidiaries countries’ political risk ratings exposed to the proportion of each sale that a subsidiary makes 
overseas. AGC,,, (agency cost) is the natural logarithm of total shareholders. FCF „ (free cash flow) measured after Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings before interest and tax plus depreciation plus amortization plus tax paid minus dividend paid 
and minus interest expense and then it was scaled by 10000 so that the magnitude of this variable is compatible with other 
measurements. Two growth measures have been used in this study namely GROW MB„ (market value of equity to book value of 
asset) which is measured as market value of asset to book value of asset. And secondly, GROW P T „ (past growth) which is 
measured as the change in total assets over total assets. SR,,, (stock return) is measured as expected return of individual corporations 
by using CAPM. ATR,,, (average tax ratios) is calculated as total tax paid per annum scaled by net profit. TAX CLTL„ (tax 
clientele) is the ratio of number of common shares outstanding by the institutional shareholders to number of total shares 
outstanding. CFV,,, (cash flow variation) is the standard deviation of the first difference in earnings before interest and taxes, scaled 
by mean value of interest expense. SIZE „ is the natural logarithm of total asset. CVA „ (collateral value of assets) is the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets. AGE,,, is the natural logarithm of the age of the firm in years from date of incorporation. LEVERAGE, , is 
the ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt plus market value of equity. SLACK,,, (financial slack) is measured as the sum of cash 
balances and marketable securities scaled by the market value of equity. Model II incorporates a dummy variable in addition to 
common eighteen variables to capture multinationality. There are eight industries in the sample and a dichotomous variable is used 
to capture each of these industries’ effect on dividend payout ratios. The industries are: IN D AAG R1FISH  (agricultural, forestry 
and fishing); IND B MIN1NG (metal, coal, oil and gas); IND CjCONSTRUCTN (building constructions and heavy constructions); 
INDDMNFCTRNG  (manufacturing, food, Tobacco, Textiles, Furniture and Fixtures and Papers); 1ND E TRNSPT CMCTN 
(Transport, Communication, Electric, and utilities); IND F WHOLESALE (wholesale trade and durable goods); 1ND G RETAIL 
(retails) and IND1SERV1C  (health, legal, educational, engineering and social).
D IV C ,, D IV R u
CoefT t-S ta t CoefT t-S ta t
c - 0.09 - 0.33 - 0.21 - 0.74
M V LTij, 0.05 1.20 0.06 1.25
D IV E R ,, - 0.06 -4 .30  8 - 0.06 -3.71 8
F X „ - 0.01 - 0.22 0.02 0.34
P R „ 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.71
A G C „ 0.03 1.56 0.03 1.77  b
F C F „ 0.00 - 0.50 0.00 - 0.01
G R O W M B ,, 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.79
G R O W _P T ,j - 0.01 - 0.68 - 0.01 - 1.00
S R ,j 0.03 3.47  3 0.03 3.61 3
A T R ,, 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.28
T A X C L T L i j 0.82 3 .56  3 0.95 3.89  3
C F V „ - 3.97 -4.61 3 - 3.36 -3 .88  3
P R O F ,, 0.03 3 .89  3 0.03 3 3 2  *
B E T A ,, 0.07 0.53 0.31 1.98 8
S IZ E ,, 0.06 4.57 8 0.07 4.73 3
C V A „ 0.03 0.44 0.04 0.57
A G E ,, - 0.02 - 0.87 - 0.01 - 0.36
LTD,,, - 0.17
a
-2.53 - 0.18 -2.52 8
S L A C K ,, - 0.85 - 0.90 - 0.12 - 0.04
I N D A A  G R I F I S H - 0.02 - 0.16 - 0.03 - 0.21
IN D  B  M IN IN G - 0.10 - 1.00 - 0.10 - 0.94
USD C  C O N S  TR U C T N - 0.13 - 1.23 - 0.12 -1.11
I I S D D M N F C T R I S G - 0.04 - 0.44 - 0.06 - 0.64
IISD _E _ T R N S P T C M C T N - 0.19
a
-1 .77 - 0.18 - 1.59
I 1 S D F  W H O L E S A L E 0.02 0.20 0.01 0.05
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I N D G R E T A I L 0.08 0.70 0.07 0.57
I N D I S E R V I C -0.02 -0.22 -0.03 -0.29
A d j  R -s q r 0.41 0.42
N o. o f  O bs 2248 2248
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
5.6.5 Time Varying Effect on Dividend Payout
In order to investigate the time varying effect on cash dividend payout and cash with share 
repurchases mode of dividend payouts, a yearly dummy (YR 01) variable is introduced to 
investigate the yearly effect of dividend payments across Australian DCs and MCs such that any 
noteworthy economic events can be captured. The result in Table 5.5 suggests that every year 
since 1999 the cash payment is disappearing in a higher magnitude than the cash and repurchase 
type of dividend payments, while the reduction in cash dividend across 2002-2004 is highly 
significant (t=-2.35, t=-4.13 and t=-3.68 respectively). A similar pattern is also observed in the 
cash and share repurchase type of dividends payout ratios across 2002, 2003 and 2004 (t=-2.56; 
t=-3.68 and t=-3.46).
Table 5.5
Time variation effect on cash dividend and total dividend for Australian firms
This table reports the industry effect on the dividend payout results of OLS regression (Model 11) to obtain the parameters and t- 
statistics accordingly for the sample of 2248 (994 DCs and 1254 MCs separately) listed companies in the Australian Stock 
Exchange over 10 years to 2004. The adjusted R squared indicates the model’s goodness of fit.
D I V C = ß 0 + ß,MÖLT, ,  + ß 1DIVER, l + ß 3FX, ,  + ß , PR, ,  + ß sAGC, ,  + ß bFCF, ,  + ß . GROW _ MB,,  
+ ß , GROW  _ PT, , + ß 9SR, , + ß l0A TR, , + ß uTAX _ CLTL, , + ß n CFV,, + ß u PROF, ,
+ ß u BETA, , + ß l5SIZE, , + ß X6CVA, , + ß xlAGE, ,  + ß XiLTD, ,  + ß „SLACK, ,
t= 10
+ ^  Yearly Dummy, ,  + £,,
i= I
* indicates that this model uses two different measurement of dividend payout ratios which is explained below.
Two dependent variables have been employed and they are: D I V C (cash payout ratios) is calculated using cash dividend paid to 
net earnings and DIVR u (cash and share repurchase dividend payout ratios) is calculated as cash plus change in treasury stock 
scaled by net earnings. Multinationality effect is measured where it takes a value of 1 when a corporation is a multinational 
otherwise it is 0. DIVER,,, (diversification) is the total number of subsidiaries that any firm has within their domicile country and 
overseas. FX ,,, (foreign exchange risk) is calculated by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales revenue. PR,,, (political risk) is the 
sum of all the MCs subsidiaries countries’ political risk ratings exposed to the proportion of each sale that a subsidiary makes 
overseas. AGC ,,, (agency cost) is the natural logarithm of total shareholders. FCF ,,, (free cash flow) measured after Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings before interest and tax plus depreciation plus amortization plus tax paid minus dividend paid 
and minus interest expense and then it was scaled by 10000 so that the magnitude of this variable is compatible with other 
measurements. Two growth measures have been used in this study namely GROW MB u (market value of equity to book value of 
asset) which is measured as market value of asset to book value of asset. And secondly, GROW P T u (past growth) which is 
measured as the change in total assets over total assets. SR,,, (stock return) is measured as expected return of individual corporations 
by using CAPM. AIR ,,, (average tax ratios) is calculated as total tax paid per annum scaled by net profit. TAXCLTL ,,, (tax 
clientele) is the ratio of number of common shares outstanding by the institutional shareholders to number of total shares 
outstanding. CFVU (cash flow variation) is the standard deviation of the first difference in earnings before interest and taxes, scaled 
by mean value of interest expense. S I Z E is the natural logarithm of total asset. CVA ,,, (collateral value of assets) is the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets. AGE,,, is the natural logarithm of the age of the firm in years from date of incorporation. LEVERAGE,,, is 
the ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt plus market value of equity. SLACK,,, (financial slack) is measured as the sum of cash 
balances and marketable securities scaled by the market value of equity. Model II incorporates a dummy variable in addition to 
common eighteen variables to capture multinationality. There are 10 years in the sample and a dichotomous variable is used to 
capture each of these years on dividend payout ratios.
D IV C u D IV R u
Coeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat
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c - 0.08 - 0.31 - 0.20 - 0.65
M U L T ij 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.51
D IV E R u - 0.05 -4.40 3 - 0.06 -3.93 3
F X U 0.00 0.10 0.04 0.66
P R u 0.00 1.25 0.00 0.95
A G C i,r 0.04 2.43 8 0.04 2.81
F C F 0.00 - 0.24 0.00 0.02
G R O W  M B U 0.01 1.14 0.01 0.99
G R O W P T ij - 0.01 - 0.83 - 0.01 - 0.92
S R ij 0.03 3.52 3 0.03 5.96 3
A T R u 0.00 0.42 0.01 0.79
T A X C L T L i j 0.81 3.59 3 0.91 3.79 8
C F V ,j - 4.78 -5.08 3 - 4.11 -4.33 3
P R O F * 0.04 4.89 8 0.04 2.45 3
B E TA i,, - 0.13 - 1.07 0.10 0.65
S I Z E 0.05 433  8 0.07 5.14 3
C V A U - 0.08 - 1.42 - 0.06 - 0.98
A  G E it - 0.01 - 0.57 0.00 0.06
L T D U - 0.15 -2.22 3 - 0.15 -1.95 3
S L A C K u - 0.42 - 0.44 0.34 0.15
Y R 9 9 - 0.07 - 1.04 - 0.07 - 1.00
Y R 0 0 - 0.11 -1.91 b - 0.10 - 1.59
Y R 0 1 - 0.01 - 0.15 - 0.02 - 0.36
YRJ02 - 0.12 -2.35 8 - 0.14 -2.56 3
Y R 0 3 - 0.21 -4.13a - 0.21 -3.68 3
Y R J04 - 0.20 -3.68 3 - 0.20 -3.46 8
Adj R-sqr 0.43 0.44
No. o f  Obs 2248 2248
a. b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Further, the incremental yearly impact is captured by employing an incremental yearly 
codification from year 1995 to 2004 in order to investigate the average impact of incremental 
time effect on the cash and cash and share repurchase dividend payments across DCs and MCs. 
The result in Table 5.6 dictates that on average cash dividend payments has been decreasing 
significantly (t=-5.58 and t=-5.63) for Australian DCs and MCs (t=-4.05 and t=-3.92) across 
cash dividend payments and cash and share repurchase payout ratios. Overall, the result of time 
effect on dividend payments suggests that over the last ten years, both cash and cash and share 
repurchase declined, almost as equally across DCs and MCs.
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Table 5.6
Incremental year effect for Australian DCs and MCs on cash dividend and total dividend
Table 6 presents regression results of Australian DCs and MCs year effect on dividend payout policy. The following table uses the 
following model to capture the time effect:
D i v e , ,  = ß 0 + ß j r it + e,',
DCs MCs
D IV C u D IV R u D IV C u D IV R u
CoefT t - S t a t CoefT t - S t a t CoefT t - S t a t CoefT t - S t a t
c 38.41 5 .6 3 a 38.75 5 .6 8 a 37.60 4 . 1 0a 38.27 3 .9 7 a
Yr - 0.02 - 5 . 5 8 a - 0.02 - 5 .6 3 a - 0.02 - 4 .0 5 a - 0.02 - 3 .9 2 a
A d j R -sqr 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
No. o f  Obs 994 994 1254 1254
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Lastly, a yearly regression analysis is conducted to test whether the determinants that explain 
cash dividend and cash dividend and share repurchase type of dividend payout vary across 
countries. The result is reported in Table 5.7 and it suggests that, generally, the significance 
level of the independent determinants across years varied and this variation remained similar 
across cash and cash and share repurchase payout ratios. Interestingly, the determining factor 
remained similar across years for both cash and cash and share repurchase. However, there 
seems to exist a difference of determining factors for dividends payout ratios between DCs and 
MCs and this is shown with a significant coefficient of (MULT,,) in year 2002 (t=1.81); 
otherwise the determining factors stayed relatively similar across years for DCs and MCs except 
for one particular year 2002. A possible explanation is that there might be an effect of the 2001 
terrorist attack on the selling and distribution of multinational corporations internationally.
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5.7 Conclusion
This chapter documents the determinants of dividend payout for a sample of 1254 Australian 
multinational and 994 domestic corporations over a 10-year period to 2004. It is reported that 
Australian multinationals have higher cash dividend and total dividend (cash and share 
repurchase) payout than Australian DCs. The determining factors for cash dividend and total 
dividend are not similar across DCs and MCs. The results indicate that the determinants of cash 
dividend payout ratios for Australian DCs include diversification, stock return, tax clientele, 
cash flow variation, profitability, firm-specific risks, firm size and financial slack . These 
variables also significantly explain total dividend payout ratios for DCs. For multinational 
corporations the determinants of cash dividend payout are tax clientele, profitability7, collateral 
value of assets and leverage (when dependent variable is measured as of dividend payment to 
earnings). We also report that the determining factors vary between DCs and MCs although 
multinationality of a firm indicated that MCs have relatively higher dividend payout ratios; 
however, the result is not significant. The results also show that diversification, profitability, 
firm-specific risk, size, collateral value of assets and financial slack are the significant variables 
that explain the difference in cash dividend payout ratios while tax clientele, cash flow 
variability and financial slack explain the difference between Australian DCs’ and MCs’ share 
repurchase mode of dividend payments. After controlling for industry and time effect, the 
majority of the initial explanatory factors in explaining dividend payouts remain unchanged for 
both DCs and MCs regardless of different measurements of dividend payout dependent variable. 
The only industry that has a significant negative impact in the reduction of cash and cash and 
share repurchase type of dividend payout ratios is the transportation and communication 
industry. Further, the time variation effect shows that both DCs’ and MCs’ cash and total 
dividend has, on average, decreased over the last 10 years. However, the magnitudes of 
decrease between cash payment and share repurchase are not similar across DCs and MCs.
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DIVIDEND POLICY OF MCs AND DCs -  
AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
- 6 -
6.1 Introduction
The unsolved mystery of dividend payout policy has been a prime issue in the corporate finance 
world in the last two decades. Much of what we know about dividend policy originates from a 
series of interviews conducted by Lintner (1956). Lintner finds that dividends are sticky, tied to 
long-term sustainable earnings, paid by mature firms, smoothed from year to year, and that 
managers target a long-term payout ratio when determining dividend policy. This seminal work 
started the development of theories of dividend policy. At the theoretical level, Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) show that dividend policy is irrelevant to firm value. Most notable in this 
area is that the work of Black and Scholes (1974) on clienteles and the dividend puzzle (Black 
1976). Fama and French (2001) re-ignited the debate on dividend policy showing that the 
proportion of U.S. firms paying dividends has fallen threefold in the past 20 years to 1999. 
They attribute this finding to changing firm characteristics and the propensity of firms to pay 
dividends. Grullon and Michaely (2002) extended the debate by showing that the change in 
dividend as documented by Fama and French (2001) is attributable to a change in the form of 
dividends from cash to repurchases and not simply a reduction in cash dividend payout. 
Changes in taxation and relaxations of legal restrictions on share repurchases were reasons cited 
for this change in the form of dividends.
Most recently, Brav et al. (2004) document that one of the key findings of Lintner (1956) still 
holds: dividend policy remains very conservative. However, two important differences relative 
to Lintner (1956) emerge. First, firms target the dividend payout ratio less than they used to, 
and second, share repurchases are now a very important form of payout. What is striking about 
this current debate on dividend policy is that it is driven solely research on U.S. firms.
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Michel and Shaked (1986) investigated whether a systematic relationship exists between a 
firm's dividend policy and the country which it operates. They conclude that there is a 
difference in the payout ratios of firms in U.S. and Japan. Sawicki (2003) also finds differences 
in dividend policy in a sample of seven countries in Asia. Reasons cited for these differences 
include bank ownership of companies, growth rate of economy, and also accounting, tax and 
risk characteristics. La Porta et al. (2000) find that international dividend policy is influenced 
by the nature of legal protections provided to minority shareholders. They contend that the 
effective protections provided to shareholders in a common law legal environment allow 
minority equity investors to extract more dividends from controlling shareholders than in civil 
law nations where such protections are weaker.
In addition to different legal environments, countries with different tax regimes may induce 
corporations to adopt different dividend payout policies (Miller and Scholes (1978) and recently 
Bell and Jenkinson (2002)). Miller and Scholes (1978) show that in a world where both 
dividends and capital gains income are taxed at investor levels, the preference for dividends or 
capital gains depends upon relative tax rules governing the different forms of income. Bell and 
Jenkinson (2002) find evidence that taxation effects on dividends impact on firm values, while 
Pattenden and Twite (2004) find that firms changed their dividend policy with the introduction 
of the imputation tax system in Australia. There are many other studies documenting a link 
between dividend policy, firm value and tax regimes. Further, Kang and Stulz (1997) argue that 
institutional structure may be a reason for differences in dividend payout in different countries. 
Issues such as corporate governance systems within a country can induce firms to adopt a 
particular dividend payout policy.
In addition to firm and country factors influencing dividend policy, Dempsey, Laber and Rozeff 
(1993) amongst others, document evidence of an industry effect in dividend payouts. Factors 
driving an industry effect in dividend policy are largely unexplained, but may be explained by 
differences in regulation, fund flows, sales volumes and volatility of earnings across industries.
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Multinational corporations operate across more than one country with often different legal, tax 
and institutional environments. How the determinants of dividend policy affect multinational 
corporations (MCs) is unknown. MCs control considerable resources and if dividend policy has 
an impact on their value, then the financial implications could be substantial. For example, 
MCs are more prone to international risks exposures (for example, foreign exchange risk and 
political risks). Given that previous studies have identified determinants of dividend policy 
from a sample of both domestic and multinational corporations without distinguishing the 
impact of multinationality, the existing evidence of these different types of firms behaviour of 
dividend policy is unknown. Most studies focus on U.S. firms. We expand the investigation by 
studying dividend policy from a different perspective focusing on firms in five representative 
countries namely, Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia. We measure the relationship 
between dividend payouts (cash dividends and combined cash and share repurchase) and 17 
different dividend theory related determinants. We also investigate industry, timing and country 
differences.
The rest of the Chapter 6 proceeds as follows: Section 6.2 elucidates the aim of this chapter. 
Section 6.3 explains the theories of dividend payouts. Section 6.4 briefly explains the 
determinants which will be used in this chapter. Section 6.5 presents data and models 
descriptions. Section 6.6 discusses the findings of the regression results and the last section 6.7 
concludes the chapter.
6.2 Aim
The intent of this chapter is to provide additional empirical analysis on dividend policy 
literature across DCs and MCs in different countries. The studies that investigate the dividend 
payout of corporations across different countries are somewhat dated, use limited data, or have a 
narrow focus on firm types (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Therefore, this chapter investigates the 
different financial and institutional traditions of DCs and MCs in Australia, Japan, U.S., U.K., 
and Malaysia. This helps to ascertain whether different financial and institutional traditions do 
impact on dividend payout decisions. Secondly, the data for most of the previous studies do not
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cover the period through the 1990s when there were important developments in the 
globalisation of financial markets (McClure, Clayton & Hofler, 1999), especially when barriers 
to entry to many countries were removed and it provided firms with the opportunity for global 
expansion. Thus, this chapter examines whether there are systematic differences in the 
determinants of dividend policy between DCs and MCs across countries, and whether there are 
additional, uniquely international, factors that may help to explain the dividend payout choice of 
MCs. Thirdly, given the problems potentially encountered by firms as they attempt to establish 
optimal global financial structures, it is important to determine whether financial norms and 
practices vary across countries. Therefore this study investigates the country-driven 
institutional characteristics that are believed to affect dividend policy for both MCs and DCs 
across Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K., and Malaysia.47 These countries represent different financial 
structures and traditions. The U.S. and U.K. are known to follow the English tradition where 
there are large numbers of publicly-listed companies and hostile takeovers owing to agency 
conflicts are common. Japan follows the Japanese tradition where corporate decisions and 
restructuring are made through the involvement of universal banks and financial holdings. On 
the other hand, Malaysia is known to follow the Latinic tradition where corporate ownership 
structure can be characterised by family control, financial holdings, state ownership, cross­
shareholdings, and where agency problems are internalised (Booth et al., 2001). Financial 
theory would suggest that in an efficient global market the financial policy of identical firms in 
different nations would be the same (McClure, Clayton & Hofler, 1999). If international market 
imperfection existed through the 1990s, dividend policy and costs may be different among 
similar firms in different nations and business advantages (or disadvantages) may provide 
profits (or costs) to firms incorporated in different countries. Fourthly, the industry effect on 
DCs’ and MCs’ dividend policy is considered. Fifthly, the relationship between financial 
structure and overseas operation especially for MCs has led in recent years to the development 
of a considerable literature that underlies its time-variant effects (Bernanke & Gertler, 1989; 
Greenwald & Stiglitz, 1993). Lastly, firms can distribute excess cash to shareholders through
47 This aspect allows this thesis to compare the results with research obtained for U.S. firms and to help explain any 
differences.
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cash dividend payments or by repurchasing their own shares. The repurchase of stock is a 
potentially useful adjunct to dividend policy when tax avoidance is important.
The eclipsing of dividend payments by repurchases potentially reflects two trends that have 
emerged over the past several decades. The first is the striking increase in firms’ use of stock 
repurchases over the 1980s and 1990s. The second is simultaneous decline in the proportion of 
firms paying dividends. Specifically, during the 1990s, the share of public firms paying 
dividends reached an all time low of 24% (Dittmar & Dittmar, 2004). Despite this decline in 
the overall proportion of firms paying dividends, the aggregate volume of dividends paid has 
not decreased, as shown in DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004). However, the dividend 
payout ratio has declined over time. According to Brav et al. (2005), the increased amount that 
firms spend on repurchases and the decline in the number of firms that pay dividends indicate 
that corporate payout policies have changed over the past 50 years. The evidence implies that 
stock repurchases may be replacing dividends as the dominant from of distribution. However, it 
is also possible that these are two unrelated trends. Despite recent investigations of aggregate 
distributions, it remains unclear if repurchases are replacing dividends as primary means of 
distributing earnings and how the potential substitution of these distribution mechanisms 
impacts aggregate payout policy. For instance, Fama and French (2001) show that the non­
dividend-paying firms are not the firms repurchasing stock; rather, firms that repurchase 
continue to pay dividends. De Angelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004) question the 
disappearance of dividends, showing that real dividends increased by 16% between 1978 and 
2000. This increase is driven by substantial increases in dividends by large dividend-paying 
firms, the same group of firms that Fama and French (2001) show are repurchasing stock. Thus 
the current evidence does not show or rule out the possibility that repurchases are replacing 
dividends, but rather indicates that the firms that have funds to pay dividends also have funds to 
repurchase stock. The question remains, is there a connection between the increased use of 
stock repurchases and changes in dividend payout. Since both repurchases and dividends are 
mechanisms to distribute earnings, we examine the determinants of dividend payout for both
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cash dividends and cash and share repurchase. In this aspect the focus of this thesis is on 
answering the following questions:
□ Is multinationality a significant explanatory variable in determining the payout policy 
for firms?
□ Do additional international factors explain MCs’ dividend policy decisions across 
countries?
□ Are the determinants of dividend policy similar for both multinational and domestic 
corporations?
□ Are the predictions of conventional dividend policy determinants improved by knowing 
the nationality of DCs and MCs?
□ Is there any commonality between domestic and mutinational corporations’ dividend 
policy determinants across different countries?
□ Do the recent increase/decrease of cash dividend and share repurchase or the total 
payout policy activities differ significantly between MCs and DCs across countries?
□ Are the repurchases a potential replacement for dividends across the countries? If so, 
then can the determinants of dividends be similar to the determinants of share 
repurchase across MCs and DCs and across countries?
□ Is the country effect of tax system and legal system an important factor in explaining 
dividend policy?
□ Does industry play a significant role in determining DCs’ and MCs’ dividend payout?
□ Is dividend policy of DCs and MCs time-variant? Are the factors that affect cross- 
sectional variability in individual countries’ dividend payout similar across countries for 
both MCs and DCs ?
Understanding the motivation behind the recent surge in share repurchase activity within DCs 
and MCs will allow us to better understand whether corporations view dividends and repurchase 
as interchangeable payout methods similarly across those two types of firms across countries.
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This chapter has four major findings. Firstly, results show that stock return, cash flow variation, 
profitability and age are significant factors in explaining cash dividend payout ratios for DCs 
across countries. Meanwhile tax clientele, cash flow variation and profitability are significant 
factors in explaining cash dividend payout ratios for MCs across countries. These results are 
sensitive to the definition of total dividend payout ratios. Secondly, the determinants that 
explain the difference between DCs’ and MCs’ cash dividend payout ratios across countries are 
diversification (Australia and U.S.), agency costs and average tax ratios (U.K. and Malaysia), 
tax clientele (U.S. and Malaysia) and cash flow variation (Japan and Malaysia). The common 
determinants explaining the difference of DCs’ and MCs’ total dividend payout ratios changes 
but only for U.S. corporations. Determinants that become significant are political risks, stock 
return, profitability and age. Thirdly, controlling for country effects shows that firms operating 
under an imputation tax system (Australia and U.K) and common law environments (Australia, 
U.S., U.K. and Malaysia) pay comparatively higher dividends relative to firms operating in a 
classical tax system (U.S., Japan and Malaysia) and civil law environment (Japan). It results 
also show that MCs operating in an imputation tax system and common law regime pay 
significantly lower dividends relative to the DCs counterparts. Fourthly, Lintner’s (1956) 
model is considered to investigate the difference in speed of adjustment in cash dividends 
towards a target level between DCs and MCs across the five sampled countries. The results 
suggest that MCs in Australia, U.S. and Malaysia adjust their target cash dividend payout ratios 
faster than their DCs counterparts. The opposite holds for Japanese and U.K. MCs.
6.3 Dividend Theory
6.3.1 21st Century View
During the last two decades of the 20th century, the propensity of U.S. companies to pay cash 
dividends declined significantly (Fama & French, 2001; DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Skinner, 2004; 
Dittmar & Dittmar, 2004; Brav et al., 2005). The trend away from cash dividends accelerated 
during the late 1990s, leading some researchers to conclude that dividend policy was shifting in 
a very fundamental way. Grullon and Michaely (2002) argue that the disappearance of cash
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dividends is just a mirror image of share repurchase which is believed to be a substitution of a 
form of cash dividend payment. They show that share repurchases have not only became an 
important form of payout for U.S. corporations, but also that firms finance their share 
repurchases with funds that otherwise would have been used to increase dividends. They also 
find that young firms have a higher propensity to pay cash through repurchases than they did in 
the past and that repurchases have become the preferred form of initiating a cash payout. 
Although large, established firms have generally not cut their dividends, those firms also show a 
higher propensity to payout cash through repurchases.
6.3.2 Cash Dividend Versus Repurchase
From a tax perspective, there is an obvious incentive for corporations to substitute share 
repurchases for dividends because capital gains are taxed at more favorable rates than ordinary 
income. Although the Tax Reform Act 1986 in the U.S. greatly reduced the relative tax 
advantage of capital gains, the gap between the top marginal rate on ordinary income and the 
marginal rate on capital gains is still positive and significant (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). In 
addition, share repurchases have the advantage of allowing investors to postpone the realisation 
of capital gains and thus payment of taxes.
6.3.2.1 Disappearance of Dividends
The predictions of the various payout theories are not uniform on the subject. For example, 
John and Williams (1985), Bemheim (1991), and Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) conclude 
that management uses dividends, as opposed to share repurchases, to signal the firm’s quality. 
Thus, according to these theories, dividends and repurchases are not interchangeable. On the 
other hand, Miller and Modigliani (1961), Bhattacharya (1979), Easterbrook (1984), Miller and 
Rock (1985), and Jensen (1986) imply that it is the payout (as either dividends or repurchase) 
that can be used to signal undervaluation or to reduce agency conflicts. Thus, substitution of 
repurchases for dividends would be consistent with those theories.
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Most of the signalling models entail that dividends and repurchases are perfect substitutes. For 
example, in Bhattacharya (1979) the signalling cost is the transaction cost associated with 
raising new capital, and in Miller and Rock (1985) it is the cost of reducing investments. 
Neither is related to the choice of payout. An exception is the John and Williams (1985) model, 
in which the higher taxes on dividend are the costs of the signal. This model suggests that share 
repurchases and dividends are not interchangeable.
Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) develop a model in which share repurchases and cash 
dividends are not substitutes because the cash dividend payout method attracts institutions. They 
further argue that institutional investors are more likely to discover whether a firm is overvalued 
or undervalued because institutions have better information-gathering abilities and are also 
better monitors. Since institutions prefer cash dividends, only undervalued firms want to be 
monitored (or signal they are undervalued); thus, these are the firms that will pay higher 
dividends. This signalling equilibrium is not achieved with share repurchases.
Recently DeAngelo et al. (2004) argue that the decrease can be explained by the changes in 
firms’ characteristics in the last twenty-five years. However, they suggest, changes in 
profitability can explain about 36% of the trend in dividend payers. They argue changes not 
related to firm characteristics can explain about 44% of the trend in dividend payers. A 
possible explanation to this effect is the catering theory of Baker and Wurgler (2004).
Baker and Wurgler (2004) propose a new theory of dividend policy -  catering theory. They 
argue that investors’ demand for dividend-paying stocks is time-varying, thereby causing the 
relative prices of dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying stocks to fluctuate (assuming 
arbitrage limits). As a result, managers cater to investor demand for dividends by paying 
dividends when investors place a premium on dividend-paying stocks, and vice versa. 
Consistent with their theory, Baker and Wurgler (2004) report empirical evidence that aggregate 
dividend initiations are positively related to their measure of dividend premium, and also report
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that the dividend premium is related to the propensity to pay dividends documented in Fama and 
French (2001).
6.3.2.2 Reappearance of Dividends
On the one hand, dividends are bad because (as pointed out in Black, 1976) there appear to be 
negative tax connotations to dividends. On the other hand, paying dividends might limit the 
resources managers can waste and thus serve a useful bonding role (Jensen, 1986). During 
much the 1990s many firms quit paying dividends. This was well documents by Fama and 
French (2001). However, while some are arguing dividend is disappearing mainly due to 
increase in share repurchase activities and then possibly different firm’s characteristics over the 
past years, some argue that dividend policy is shifting in a very fundamental way -  the trend 
appears to have reversed. Recently, Julio and Ikenberry (2005) have found that U.S. firms have 
returned to paying dividends. They report that among all U.S. industrial firms (i.e. excluding 
financials), 32% paid a positive dividend in 1984.
Although one might hesitate to read too much into what may be a brief change in an otherwise 
downward trend, the evidence indicates a material reversal in dividend policy by corporate 
America. One wonders whether earlier notions of the death of dividend policy were not perhaps 
premature. As to why dividends appear to be staging a comeback, among the possible 
explanations Julio and Ikenberry (2005) suggested the following five reasons:
• The tax policy change in U.S. for dividends vs. capital gains. Tax cut on dividends in 
2003 reduced from 38.1% to 15%, but did not eliminate or take advantage of dividends 
which pay less tax.
• Dividends can be used to signal the quality of earnings. This became particularly 
important in the post-Enron world.
• Dramatic increase of new firms during the 1990s. The 1990s were a time when there 
were unusually good investment opportunities. Thus, firms conserved cash to take 
advantage of these investments.
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• Firms that survived the fallout of the high-tech collapse are now more mature and a 
lifecycle hypothesis would suggest they would then begin paying more dividends. 
Large and old firms with limited growth prospects may be choosing to signal 
confidence to investors by shifting payout in favour of dividends to stay compatible 
with the new firms’ entry. Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) points out the 
important linkage between dividends change and firm maturity.
• Investors wanted dividends and thus firms are just catering to their investors’ desires. It 
is hard to understand the fundamentals behind what causes investor demand for cash 
dividends, though it is hard to deny the possibility that if investor demand for dividends 
for some reason increased abruptly in recent years, one naturally expects well- 
intentioned managers to respond in kind.
Until 1989, Australian companies were prohibited from undertaking share buy-backs. In 1987 
the Companies and Securities Law Review Committee published its report titled A Company’s 
Purchase o f Its Own Shares in which it recommended that the law be amended to allow share 
buy-backs. This occurred in 1989. The regulation permitted five types of buy-backs with each 
type subject to different regulations. Among the mandatory requirements imposed under this 
legislation were requirements including changes to the company’s constitution before initiating 
buy-back programs, detailed disclosure requirements pertaining to the buy-back, imposition of 
stringent limits on the proportion of shares that could be repurchased, stringent shareholder 
approval requirements, etc.
These rigid requirements contrasted with the less regulated environment for buy-backs in the 
United States. State corporations statutes typically expressly empower companies to purchase 
their own shares with few restrictions.48 It would seem that the effect of this detailed regulation, 
which imposed high transaction costs on companies wishing to undertake buy-backs, resulted in 
few buy-backs being undertaken by Australian companies.
48 See. for example, section 160 of the Delaware Law of Corporations and Business Organizations.
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Rau and Vermaelen (2002) conclude that the level of open market repurchase activity in the UK 
appears tiny in comparison to that reported for the US. They hypothesise that this low 
repurchase volume is attributable to regulatory restrictions that reduce the opportunity for firms 
to use open market buybacks to take advantage of an undervalued share price. Consistent with a 
less pronounced underpricing effect, they find that the average stock market reaction to UK 
repurchase announcements, while positive, is less than half the level reported by comparable US 
studies. Further, in contrast to the results reported by Ikenberry et al. (1995) for the US, RV find 
no evidence that UK repurchase announcements are either preceded by significant negative 
excess returns or followed by significant positive excess returns. With the regulatory 
environment in the UK apparently denying companies the chance to exploit underpricing 
opportunities, RV’s results suggest that the majority of repurchase activity is tax driven. In 
particular, they document that the volume of repurchase completions peaked between 
September 1994 and October 1996 when a loophole in the tax code allowed pension funds to 
earn tax credits on share repurchases (Oswald & Young, 2004). Finally, the rules and 
regulation on share buy back in Japan and Malaysia do not have any special rules and 
regulations. They both follow standard share repurchase activity in their corporate governance 
system.
Our aim is to investigate whether analysing dividend policy using different definitions at 
contemporaneous level basis reveal any important characteristics of dividend payout policy 
across MCs and DCs across countries.
6.4 Dividend Determinants
The determining factor that has been discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 5) will be 
employed in this chapter with an exception of one variable deduction and that is SLACK. The 
SLACK variable is excluded as there is not enough observation available across countries to 
include this variable. In addition to the determinants of dividend payout ratios, we also consider 
whether international difference of a country’s economy and structure, legal system and tax 
regime are important in explaining the cross-sectional variation of dividend payments.
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6.4.1 The Dividend Policy and Country-specific Variables
6.4.1.1 International Differences -  Economic and Structural
Michael and Shaked (1986) argue that country may influence corporate dividend policy. They 
argue that because of structural characteristics of a country, in particular differences in capital 
markets mechanism and/or in the structure of the country’s financial institutions, it is likely that 
corporations in one country will be differently leveraged than their counterparts in other 
countries. They also conduct country analyses for Japan and the United States to determine if a 
systematic relationship exists between: (i) a firm’s dividend policy and its industry; and (ii) a 
firm’s dividend policy and the country in which it operates. Using annual data from 1977 to 
1981 (16 industries with 13 firms in each country), they find that: (i) both across industry stock 
returns and dividend payout ratios are different in the U.S. and Japan; and (ii) the stock returns 
of the various industries in the U.S. are higher than those of their Japanese counterparts; but (iii) 
the dividend payout ratios of the sampled industries in the U.S. are lower than those of the 
comparable Japanese industries.49 Glen et al. (1995) investigate dividend policy and behaviour 
in the emerging stock-market countries, considering the aggregate stock market.50 They find 
that firms’ dividend policies in emerging markets are influenced by a number of factors. Firms 
in different countries have different dividend policies because of different growth rates, tax 
rates, accounting systems, shareholders’ preference toward dividends, structure of industries, 
regulations, inflation rates, and so on. Firms in emerging markets are less concerned with 
volatility in dividends over time than firms in developed countries. Further, Foerster, Prihar and 
Schmitz (1996) argue that stock returns are a within-the-equity market measure of economic 
health. According to the authors, high stock returns relative to equity prices suggest that the 
public does not view economic growth as probable. That is, economic agents perceive present
49 Since the authors expect lower dividend payout ratios in Japan because Japan's financial systems stimulate a long­
term orientation in general, they provide five possible explanations for the reported results. For example, "the 
accounting, tax and risk characteristics in Japan are somewhat different from those in the U.S. This may provide an 
additional explanatory factor for the high payout ratios prevalent in Japan". For further details, see Michael and 
Shaked (1986).
50 The sample o f emerging markets is Chile, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey.
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and future economic prospects as poor and bid down equity prices relative to current dividends. 
Therefore it is important that we control for this issue in our regression.
6.4.1.2 International Differences -  Legal Regime
Evidence supporting differences in the agency costs across countries is provided in La Porta, 
Silanes and Sleifer (2002), which compares shareholders relationships in 27 countries in 1995 
and concludes that different ownership patterns significantly impact the agency problems of the 
firm. Their finding suggests that controlling shareholder pursue policies which benefit them at 
the direct expense of minority shareholders. Shliefer and Vishny (1986) and Allen, Bemado 
and Welch (2000) find that institutional investors prefer to own shares of firms making regular 
dividends payments, and argue that large institutional investors are more willing and able to 
monitor corporate management than are smaller and more diffuse owners. Further, they argue 
that dividend policies can be shaped to attract institutional investors, who can in turn provide 
monitoring services. For the U.K., Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) examine three alternative 
dividend models, and show that dividend payout is positively related to institutional ownership. 
La Porta et al. (2000) compare corporate dividend policy across 33 countries. According to the 
authors, dividends are an outcome of effective legal protection of shareholders, which enables 
minority shareholders to extract dividend payments from corporate insiders. They argue that a 
country’s legal system is correlated with corporate dividend payouts. Empirically, they find that 
dividend policies vary across legal regimes in ways consistent with a particular version of the 
agency theory of dividends. Specifically, firms operating in countries with better protection of 
minority shareholders (common law countries) pay higher dividend payouts than do firms in 
civil law countries. They also find that dividend payouts are negatively related to sales growth 
in the sample of firms from civil law countries. These finding suggest that an effective legal 
system allows investors to pressure managers to disgorge dividends when the firms do not have 
good investment opportunities. La Porta et al. (2000) offer evidence that U.S. laws protecting 
the rights of minority shareholders are associated with higher dividend payout ratios, which is 
consistent with the use of dividends to control managerial actions. In our sample, Japan follows 
civil law and the other four countries (U.S., U.K., Australia and Malaysia) follow common law.
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In light of La Porta et al.’s findings, we expect the impact of the other explanatory factors under 
consideration in this paper to be different depending on whether firms are located in common 
law or civil law countries. Specifically we hypothesise that the impact of agency costs and 
investment opportunities on dividend payments may be relatively weak in countries where legal 
protection of investors is poor. This is because outside shareholders in those countries may not 
be able to force managers to payout excess cash even if agency conflicts are great or firms do 
not have good investment opportunities. This effect will be captured by our analysis through 
dichotomous variable.
6.4.1.3 International Differences -  Tax Regime
Tax considerations have obvious potential to influence dividend payments to common 
shareholders, since dividends trigger tax obligations that might otherwise be deferred or 
avoided. The treatment of dividends is different in imputation tax systems as opposed to 
classical tax systems. For example, under imputation tax system the curse of double taxation is 
eliminated. Double taxation of dividends occurs when both a company and a shareholder pay 
tax on the same income. The company pays taxes on profits and subsequently distributes a 
dividend out of their after-tax profits. Shareholders must then pay tax on the dividend received. 
The tax imputations indicate to the government (tax authorities) that the company issuing the 
dividend has already paid a portion of the tax due. The shareholder is able to reduce the tax 
paid on the dividend by the amount of the tax imputation credits.
Australia and U.K. follow an imputation tax system while U.S., Malaysia and Japan pursue a 
classical tax system. In general, for Japanese corporate tax purposes, capital gains are not taxed 
separately. Such gains are treated as ordinary income to which normal tax rates apply. 
Dividends distributed from domestic corporations are subject to a 20% withholding tax, unless a 
tax treaty modifies the rate. For U.K., capital gains on chargeable assets are taxed at the normal 
corporation tax rate. Until 6 April 1999, U.K. had a partial imputation system of corporation 
tax. For dividends paid before 6 April 1999, a company making a distribution paid one fourth 
of the distribution as advance corporation tax (ACT). The ACT paid was offset against
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Corporation tax liabilities, subject to detailed rules. However, the ACT system was abolished 
for dividends paid on or after 6 April 1999 and replaced by the quarterly instalment payment 
system. Companies with surpluses of ACT as of 6 April 1999 may carry forward the ACT and 
set it off against profits in accordance with the rules that were in effect before the abolition of 
the ACT system. However, this setoff is limited through a system of “shadow ACT.” In 
conjunction with the abolition of ACT, for dividends paid on or after 6 April 1999, the tax credit 
attaching to dividends is reduced to one ninth of the net dividend, and tax credits are no longer 
repayable to U.K. shareholders. Under several of the U.K.’s double tax treaties, a foreign 
shareholder in a U.K. company may still claim payment of part or all of the tax credit 
repayments which continue to be available to foreign shareholders if so provided in the relevant 
treaty. However, effective from 6 April 1999, the size of the benefit decreases dramatically. In 
most cases, the benefit is eliminated or reduced to a negligible amount. Dividends received 
from U.K. resident companies are not subject to further U.K. taxation in the hands of the U.K. 
recipient company. U.K. resident shareholders other than companies are subject to income tax 
on the distribution received plus the deemed tax credit. Capital gains are taxed at a maximum 
rate of 35% in the U.S. In general, loss may be carried back three years and forward five years 
to offset capital gains in such other years. Gains resulting from capital gains tax (CGT) events 
may be subject to tax. Capital losses are calculated using the reduced cost base of assets 
without indexation for inflation. Capital losses are deductible only from taxable capital gains, 
not from ordinary income. Dividends paid by Australian resident corporations are franked with 
an imputation credit to the extent that Australian income tax has been paid by the corporation at 
the full corporate rate on the income being distributed. Application of the imputation system 
varies depending on the category of the recipient shareholder.51 Finally, Malaysia and Japan 
follow classical tax system similar to U.S.
51 Resident Corporate Shareholders: Under the imputation tax system, companies receiving franked distributions 
will gross up the amount received by the amount of the franking credit on the distribution. This credit equals the tax 
paid by the paying entity. The grossed up amount will be included in the assessable income of the company. The 
company is entitled to a tax offset (franking rebate) that may be used against tax payable. The tax offset is equal to 
the amount of the franking credit on the distribution. A corresponding credit equal to the amount of the gross-up will 
be creditable against corporate income tax payable on the distribution or other income.
Resident Individual Shareholders: The shareholder includes the dividend received plus the full imputation credit in 
assessable income. The imputation credit can be offset against personal tax assessed in the same year, up to the 
amount of tax payable. Excess credits relating to dividends paid are refunded to the shareholder.
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Finally, tax considerations influence the choice of dividend payout by foreign affiliates of 
multinational corporations (Desai, Foley and Hines, 2005). In addition to the domicile 
country’s tax system, multinationals’ foreign affiliates are exposed to the foreign tax countries 
tax regime. Our multinationality measurement will incorporate this effect.
6.4.2 Dividend Policy and Other Issues
6.4.2.1 Industry
Industry dummies are included in regressions (Model II) to account for differences in asset 
structure, accounting practices, government regulation and competitiveness, each of which may 
affect corporate governance and firm valuation.
6.4.2.2 Timing
Similarly, yearly dummy variable and incremental year factor considered to verify any time 
effect on dividend payout across DCs and MCs and across firms.
6.5 D a t a  a n d  M e t h o d o l o g y
We follow the usual practice of excluding financial institutions because of their unique 
structure, regulatory requirements, and accounting standards. There are occasionally slight 
differences in the way company names appear in Osiris, Compustat and Datastream data sets. 
Because much of the firm-level data originate from financial statements based on accounting 
practices that vary across countries, it is difficult to directly compare data. However, one of the 
key distinguishing characteristics in legal regimes is accounting standards; thus, to some extent, 
the legal regime variable controls for their differences. All dependent variables and independent 
and variables are detected from any statistical misspecifications and have been winsorise at the
Nonresident Shareholders: Dividends paid or credited by residents are generally subject to a final 30% withholding 
tax (unless the rate is reduced by a tax treaty), deducted at source on the gross amount of the dividend. To the extent 
that dividends are ranked, they are free from dividend withholding tax. No refund of an imputation credit is 
available.
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1st and 99th percentile to reduce the impact of outliers. The number of observations for DCs and 
MCs are the same as Chapter 4.
In this chapter multiple linear regression procedures is decided to be appropriate to apply in the 
proposed models. Therefore this chapter adopts four main models to explain DCs’ and MCs’ 
dividend payout determinants. This study uses both in a univariate and multivariate analysis. 
Univariate analysis will include Mann-Whitney tests, analysis of 2-way variance, correlation 
and factor analysis. Multivariate analysis will employ ordinary least square regression method 
with heteroscadastic adjusted coefficient (HAC) regression results.
Model I represents the multivariate regression for DCs’ and MCs’ dividend payout 
determinants. Model I assumes that DCs and MCs payout ratio is determined by 17 variables. 
This model is performed on a sample of DCs and MCs across Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and 
Malaysia over 1994-2005. The variables in Model I are as follow:
6.5.1 Modell
DIVER
FX
PR
AGC
FCF
SR
ATR
DIVC*
CFV
PROF
BETA
NDTS
SIZE
GROW MB 
GROWPT
TAX CLTL
= Cash dividend (* represents that total dividend (comprised of cash dividend 
and share repurchase) also use same regression)
= Diversification 
= Foreign exchange risk 
= Political risk 
= Agency Costs 
= Free cash flow
= Growth for market to book value 
= Growth for past 
= Stock return 
= Average tax rate 
= Tax Clientele 
= Cash flow variation 
= Profitability
= Firm specific risk (De-geared beta)
= Non-debt tax shield 
= Total assets
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CVA
AGE
LTD
Collateral value of assets 
Firm’s age 
Long-term debt
age, size, collateral value of asset, agency costs, operational risk, firm-specific risk, long-term 
debt, free cash flows, growth, profitability, proportion of tax to profit, political risk, foreign 
exchange risk and diversification.
Model II is a slight modification of Model I and uses a pooled sample of DCs and MCs 
together. The common 14 variables are similar to Model I except ß ]SMULTlt. This additional
factor ofß ]SMULTu is introduced to identify whether being a multinational has any additional
explanatory power to determine the dividend payouts. Even though Model 1 directly captures 
the effect of the MCs-related issues, there are other factors (e.g. inflation, interest rates, 
subsidiaries geographical related issues, economic growth and market efficiency etc.) that may 
also explain the multinationals’ dividend payout which my dataset is unable to create any 
variables to capture. Therefore, the variable ß l5MULTn attempts to incorporate any additional 
information for MCs’ debt payouts that is not captured by using Model I. Therefore, after 
pooling the sample of DCs and MCs, the additional variable ß j^U L T ^  takes a value of unity 
when the corporation is a multinational, otherwise it is 0 (domestic corporations).
6.5.2 Model II
6.5.3 Model III
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DIVC,;  = ß 0 + ß.MULT,,  + ß 2DIVERlt + ß 3F X it + ß APR,, + ß sAGC,,  + ß 6FCF,,
+ ß-jGROW _ MB, , + ß f i R O W  _ PT, t + , + ß ]0ATR,, + ß uTAX _ CLTL, ,
+ /^C FF,., + ß l3PROF" + ß u BETAit + j315F/ZF,, + £ 16CFZ,;, + £ 17Z G F ,, + £ 18f  TD(, 
+ ß 19M _ DIVER, , + ß 20M _ F X it + ß ,,M  _ F F ,, + i322M _AGC,  t + ß 23M _ FCF, ,
+ ß 24M _ GROW _ MB, , + ß 25M _ G RO W _ P T it + ß 26M _ FF ,, + ß 21M _ ATRjt 
+ ß 2,M TAX _CLTL, I + ß 29M _ C F V it + ß 30M _ PROF,, + ß 3]M _ BETA, ,
+ ß 32M _ SIZE,„ + ß 33M _ C VA„ + ß 3<M _ A GE, , + ß 35M _ L  TD, , + SlJ
Model III is a further extension of Model II. Model III adds additional interacting dummy 
variables for each of the fourteen common explanatory variables. The purpose of this model is 
to differentiate the significance of slope difference in each of the common fourteen variables 
between DCs and MCs. This model is designed to encapsulate additional information, which is 
the difference of DCs’ and MCs’ dividend payouts level determinants’ explanatory power to 
verify the payouts level decision.
6.5.4 Model IV
The final equation of the multivariate model is as follows:
DIVC = ß 0 + ß 2DMC + X  Firm + ßtYs  x  C ountry  + ß ,1m putation _ Tax + ß 6C om m on _ law
or £ 4I  X  industry  0r ß 5 ^  X  Time + £ U
For an intensive investigation of dividend payout and its determinants for DCs and MCs, we 
apply regression modelling technique. Generally, there is no consensus model of dividend 
payout behaviour. In its absence, this Model IV fits the data to some alternative models that 
include multinational corporations’ effect. This model is a further extension of Model II. 
Theoretical research shows that dividend policy is influenced by firm, industry and country 
factors. Firm factors include size or transaction costs, growth, profitability, agency costs, 
collateral value of assets and firm risks. Industry factors include industry regulations, growth 
levels, profitability and risks. Dividend policy is also influenced by taxation policy, legal 
systems and broader economic conditions that are country-specific. In relation to the 
determinants of payout policy for MCs, very little is known. The number and size of MCs has
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grown substantially over the past few decades and the effect these organisations have on payout 
policy is unknown.
6.5.5 Model V
Lintner’s (1956) model is applied within the DCs and MCs sample framework. The empirical 
work on corporate dividend policy has been significantly influenced by Lintner’s (1956) model 
of dividends as the outcome of a partial adjustment process. Based on his interviews with 
corporate executives, Lintner hypothesised that firms adjust dividends to “desired” levels that 
are determined by current profits. He specifies a model of the form:
AD„ =al +cl(D'J- D llA) + ^ IJ
in which AZ> t is the first difference or change in dividend payments, and Dt and Z) are the 
amounts of dividends paid in the years identified by the dating subscripts t. The subscript i 
identifies the individual company and Z), represents the dividends which the company would 
have paid in the current year if its dividend were based simply on its target payout ratio which is 
determined by dividend payout determinants. The parameter at is a firm-specific constant and 
this constant will be zero for some companies but will generally be positive to reflect the greater 
reluctance to reduce than to raise dividends. C( is the speed of adjustment factor which indicates
the fraction of the difference between the “target” dividends ( Dn ) and actual payment made in 
the preceding year Z) M , which the company will intend, on average, to reflect in its current 
year’s dividend as an increase (or decrease) from previous year’s payment, an error term 
which represents the discrepancy between the observed change AZ); t and that expected on the
basis of other terms in the equation. Note that Lintner specifies Dtl = rjEit, in which rt is a 
firm-specific target payout rate, and Eit is the firm’s net earnings in year t. However, we 
slightly modify Lintner’s original equation and replace Dn for the estimated values which can 
be obtained using equation Model I.
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By using the above model, Lintner (1956) finds that 85 percent of the variation in the dividends 
is explained. The model is the foundation of a number of subsequent empirical dividend 
studies.52 However, the effect of multinationality has not been considered in any of the above 
analysis. The results would be empirical evidence and therefore no pre-assumed hypothesis is 
constructed. Therefore, mainly following Lintner’s model with slight alteration mentioned 
above, we investigate whether the DCs and MCs follow stable dividend changes and most 
importantly whether there is any difference in DCs’ and MCs’ dividend stability or partial 
adjustment of dividends towards their target level across five sample countries.
The analysis is designed in the following manner. Firstly, a preliminary analysis is conducted to 
observe the payout behaviour across years across five countries. Secondly, an intensive analysis 
of regression models that has been proposed is utilised on the level of dividend payout ratios. 
Thirdly, the planned models, especially Model II will be utilised in addition to Lintner’s (1956) 
model for the firms’ time on a DCs and MCs sample to investigate the difference of dividend 
payout ratios and the impact of its corresponding determinants across five countries. Finally, a 
conclusion is drawn.
6.6 Preliminary Results
Table 6.1 provides details of the average annual level of cash dividend payments and share 
repurchase and total dividend payout for the five countries for each year from 1995 to 2004. 
From this table a number of trends in payout ratios can be seen and it is also clear that cash 
dividend and share repurchase payout ratios vary considerably across countries.
Over the period of 1995 to 2004, the cash dividend payout ratios for Australian DCs are 
generally lower than the Australian MCs. The ratio of cash dividend for Australian MCs ranges
52 Tax considerations may influence the level of Dit, and thereby influence dividend payouts. Feldstein (1970),
King (1971), and Porteba and Summers (1985) find a negative correlation between dividend taxes and dividend 
payouts in aggregate quarterly British time series. Porteba (1987) reports similar results for annual aggregate U.S. 
data. It should be noted, however, that other studies - such as Auerbach (1982) and Marsh and Merton (1987) - that 
do not include the tax cost o f paying dividends, also report reasonably good fits for aggregate annual U.S. data.
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from 0.513 to 0.351 as opposed to DCs ratios which range from 0.446 to 0.270. The cash 
dividend payments decreased for both Australian DCs and MCs over the years. For example, 
cash dividend payment for DCs decreased from 0.421 in 1995 to 0.270 in 2004. Similarly, the 
cash dividend payments for Australian MCs decreased from 0.464 in 1994 to 0.356 in 2004. 
Share repurchase activity for Australian DCs appears visible during 1997 to 2000 while similar 
activity' is observed for Australian MCs during 2000 to 2004. Nevertheless, the cash dividend 
payment is far more prominent than share repurchase type of dividends payments to their 
shareholders in Australia.
The cash dividend payments and share repurchase activity is rather noticeable in the U.S. in 
comparison to other four countries in the sample. There is a clear distinction of U.S. DCs’ cash 
dividend payments decreasing trend, falling from 0.350 in 1995 to 0.274 in 2004 which is 
nearly a 21% drop over ten years, while the share repurchase activity increased from 0.165 in 
1995 to 0.279 in 2004 which is approximately 40% increase over ten years. Similar pattern of 
cash payment and share repurchase are also observed in U.S. MCs, although share repurchase 
activity is relatively more pronounced in MCs.
A similar behaviour of cash dividend payments across DCs and MCs in Japan is observed. 
Meanwhile although U.K. DCs’ and MCs’ cash dividend payout ratio decreased over years but 
no obvious share repurchase activity is detected in DCs. However, U.K. MCs appear to 
gradually increase the share repurchase mode of dividend payment recently.
Malaysian DCs and MCs experience a similar trend of gradual decrease in cash dividend the 
payments in comparison to the other four countries in the sample, but there seems to exist a 
strong increase of share repurchases mode of dividends payments since 1999, and every year 
then on a higher proportion of share repurchase is observed.
Table 6.1
Average annual cash dividend, share repurchase and total dividend payout ratios across 5 sampled
countries: 1995-2004
DCs MCs
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Y e a r s C a s h  D i v i d e n d s S h a r e  R e p u r c h a s e T o t a l  D i v i d e n d C a s h  D i v i d e n d s S h a r e  R e p u r c h a s e T o t a l  D i v i d e n d
A U  -  9 5 0.421 0.000 0 .422 0.464 0.018 0.482
A U  -  9 6 0 .446 0.000 0 .446 0.492 0.017 0 .509
A U  -  9 7 0.388 0.001 0 .389 0 .480 0.000 0 .480
A U  - 9 8 0.407 0 .002 0 .409 0.513 0.000 0.513
A U  -  9 9 0 .3 6 9 0.004 0.373 0.479 0.000 0 .479
A U  -  0 0 0.357 0.005 0 .362 0.434 0 .009 0.443
A U  -  01 0 .352 0.000 0 .352 0.424 0 .009 0.433
A U  -  02 0 .290 0.000 0 .290 0.358 0.000 0 .358
A U  -  0 3 0 .296 0.000 0 .296 0.351 0.012 0.363
A U  -  0 4 0 .2 7 0 0.000 0 .270 0 .356 0.008 0 .364
U S - 9 5 0 .350 0.165 0.515 0.300 0.297 0.602
U S - 9 6 0.333 0.171 0.505 0.294 0.331 0 .629
U S - 9 7 0 .348 0.175 0 .527 0.285 0 .336 0.627
U S - 9 8 0 .322 0 .199 0 .528 0.285 0.364 0.653
U S - 9 9 0 .328 0.265 0 .596 0.307 0.396 0.706
U S - 0 0 0.271 0 .248 0 .520 0.251 0 .399 0.655
U S - 0 1 0.271 0.255 0 .529 0.271 0.363 0.635
U S - 0 2 0 .269 0.247 0.523 0.286 0.407 0 .694
U S - 0 3 0.265 0.257 0 .524 0.262 0.384 0 .644
U S - 0 4 0.274 0 .279 0 .553 0.259 0.398 0 .659
J P - 9 5 0.383 0 .006 0 .389 0.348 0.004 0.352
J P - 9 6 0.403 0 .006 0 .408 0.335 0 .002 0.337
J P - 9 7 0.381 0 .008 0 .390 0.367 0.003 0 .370
J P - 9 8 0 .350 0 .016 0.365 0.294 0 .005 0 .300
J P - 9 9 0 .330 0.047 0.377 0 .279 0.023 0.301
J P - 0 0 0 .282 0.061 0.343 0.275 0.023 0 .297
J P - 0 1 0.261 0.094 0.355 0.265 0.081 0 .346
J P - 0 2 0 .328 0.196 0.524 0 .267 0 .236 0 .503
J P - 0 3 0 .299 0.248 0.547 0.249 0 .290 0 .540
4 P  - 0 4 0 .2 7 6 0.237 0 .5 \3 0 .238 0 .2 5 0 0 .4 8 9
U K - 9 5 0 .3 5 6 0.000 0 .356 0.434 0.000 0.434
U K - 9 6 0 .349 0.000 0 .349 0 .389 0.000 0 .389
U K - 9 7 0 .297 0.000 0.297 0 .382 0.000 0 .382
U K - 9 8 0 .304 0 .000 0.304 0 .372 0.001 0 .373
U K - 9 9 0 .319 0.000 0 .319 0.363 0.000 0.363
U K - 0 0 0 .290 0.000 0 .290 0.364 0.000 0.364
U K - 0 1 0 .278 0 .000 0 .278 0 .330 0.001 0.331
U K - 0 2 0 .294 0 .000 0.294 0.355 0.001 0.355
U K - 0 3 0 .309 0.000 0 .309 0.387 0.008 0.395
U K  -  0 4 0.331 0.024 0.355 0 .380 0 .056 0.437
M L  - 9 5 0.273 0.000 0.273 0.263 0.000 0.263
M L - 9 6 0.253 0.000 0.253 0.313 0 .000 0.313
M L - 9 7 0 .222 0 .000 0 .222 0.210 0.000 0 .210
M L - 9 8 0 .189 0.000 0.189 0.166 0.000 0.166
M L - 9 9 0 .154 0.003 0.157 0.102 0.001 0.102
M L - 0 0 0 .147 0.006 0.153 0 .109 0 .007 0.117
M L - 0 1 0 .122 0.018 0.140 0 .156 0 .019 0.175
M L - 0 2 0 .108 0.019 0.127 0 .122 0 .030 0.153
M L - 0 3 0.181 0.039 0 .220 0.193 0 .016 0 .209
M L - 0 4 0 .189 0.033 0.222 0.225 0 .040 0.265
Figure 6.1 and 6.2 is graphical representation of cash dividend payouts and dividends payouts 
(including share repurchase) distribution across five sample countries’ DCs and MCs. Figure
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6.1 shows the average yearly time trends of cash dividends, share repurchase and dividends 
(comprised of cash and share purchase) across DCs and MCs across Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. 
and Malaysia for 1995 to 2004. Alternatively, Figure 6.3 shows a direct comparison of 10 years 
average cash dividends, share repurchase and DCs and MCs across those five sample countries.
Figure 6.2 reveals that cash dividends and dividends for both DCs and MCs gradually decreased 
over the last 10 years for both DCs and MCs. It also appears that Australian DCs had almost 
negligible share repurchase activity while MCs had little share repurchase activities. However, 
it is clear from the graph that although both DCs’ and MCs’ dividend decreased over time, the 
proportion of dividends for MCs has been always marginally higher than DCs. In comparison, 
in the U.S. cash dividends and share repurchase for DCs have shown mirror reflection during 
the period of the 1990s (eg. 1995-1999) indicating higher cash dividends payments relative to 
share repurchase. However, from year 2000 onwards it appears that U.S. DCs slightly shy away 
from higher cash dividends payments and instead marginally increase the share repurchase 
activities mode of dividends payments since 1998. Over the last 5 years (2000-2004) both cash 
dividend payments and share repurchase activities across U.S. DCs are almost same as cash 
dividend mode of dividend payments. Lastly, the dividend policy for DCs in the U.S. appears 
to remain sticky over the last 10 years with an exception in 1999. A striking result can be 
observed for MCs in the U.S. The mirror transparency of cash dividends and share repurchase 
activity is clearly noticeable across U.S. MCs and the graph also shows that the share 
repurchase mode of dividends payments across U.S. MCs have been steadily increasing and has 
been higher than cash dividend payouts over the sample period. This graph is consistent with 
Grullon and Michaely (2002). Overall, the net dividend remains steady and sticky with a few 
bumps in 1999 and 2003.
The two different modes of dividends payment mode appear to have similar pattern across 
Japanese DCs and MCs. In the recent years (2001-2004) the share repurchase activity for both 
DCs and MCs increases aggressively while cash dividends payments decreased, but overall
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dividends payments in Japan increased by almost 25 percent over the last five years 
(2000-2004).
Both cash and share repurchase type dividends payments in the U.K. across DCs and MCs 
display that no recognisable share repurchase activity has taken place for both type of firms over 
the last 10 years. The main type of dividend payment mode is cash dividends and this remained 
relatively steady over the 10-years period.
The last sample country in this study, Malaysia, shows that the cash dividends is clearly higher 
then share repurchase type of dividends payments across DCs and MCs. Given there is poor 
share repurchase activity in Malaysian DCs and MCs, it is clearly noticeable that there is no 
steadiness in dividend (or cash dividends in this instance) payments in either of those two types 
of firms (DCs and MCs).
Finally, the very last graph is drawn to show the ultimate cash dividend and share repurchase 
type of dividend payment modes by disregarding countries of origin. It shows that MCs have 
relatively high proportion of both types of dividend payments (cash and share repurchase) 
occurring across the last ten years. While the cash dividend for DCs slightly declined, the
counterpart cash dividend payments remained relative steady. Share repurchase activity is more 
prominent in MCs than DCs. Overall, in the recent years (2003-2004) the dividend payments 
for DCs slowly were reaching up to the level of mid-1990s (the start of my sample period) and 
at the same time MCs maintained steadiness on dividend payment throughout 1995-2001 and 
lately the dividends payments increased and have a upward trend.
Finally, Figure 6.3 presents a summary and a direct comparison of cash and share repurchase 
dividend payout ratios across DCs and MCs for the five sample countries over 10 years. Figure 
6.3 clearly depicts that, in Australia, share repurchase activity is almost close to none within 
DCs and also very little for MCs. In the U.S., DCs pay slightly higher cash dividend than MCs
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Figure 6.1
Graph of cash dividend, share repurchase and total dividend for DCs and MCs across 5
sampled countries over 10 years
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and it is due to higher share repurchase conducted by MCs than DCs. However, MCs pay 
higher dividends than DCs which is similar to Australian DCs and MCs. As far as cash 
dividends is concerned U.S. and Japanese MCs interestingly appear to have similar average 10 
years cash payout level but do have a distinguishable difference in share repurchase type 
dividend payments than U.S. MCs. Within Japanese firms, DCs pay higher cash dividends than
MCs and the proportion of share repurchase activity is similar across DCs and MCs. Further, 
cash dividend payments for U.K. MCs are higher than DCs and interestingly U.K. MCs do not 
appear to participate in share repurchase type dividend payments. Lastly, Malaysian DCs and 
MCs show the lowest dividend payments among all the sample countries. Finally, on average, 
MCs are involved in paying higher cash and repurchase type dividends than DCs counterparts.
F igure 6.2
D irect com parison  o f  cash d ividend , share rep u rch ase and total d ividend  
across D Cs and M C s across 5 countries
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There is a further yearly incremental effect of cash dividend across countries, especially the 
dividend payout of cash dividend payments to net earnings (which is the main focus of this 
paper). Figure 4 displays trend of dividend payout for DCs and MCs over the last 10 years. It 
shows that on average dividend payout for DCs and MCs are highly correlated in almost all 
sample countries. The graph also depicts that in most cases DCs have higher cash dividend 
payout ratio than DCs, especially in Australia and U.K. However, (in Figure 4: the bottom right
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hand comer graph), when all DCs and MCs are pooled (ignoring country of origin), it shows 
that MCs have higher cash dividend payment ratios than DCs and this is consistent with Hines 
(1996) and the discussion in the earlier graphs.
Figure 6.3
Overall cash dividend behavior for DCs and MCs 
across countries: Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia
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A t-test (mean) and Mann-Whitney (median) and F test (standard deviation) test is conducted to 
investigate if dividend payout ratios are different between DCs and MCs. The results are shown 
in Table 6.2 (cash dividend and total dividend between DCs and MCs across countries) and 
Table 6.3 (cash dividend and total dividend between DCs and MCs across different tax law 
countries and legal regimes).
In Table 6.2 Panel A shows univariate mean and median test results of cash dividends across 
DCs and MCs cash dividend payments while Panel B presents mean and median test results of 
dividends comprising of cash and share repurchase. It appears that MCs in Australia and U.K. 
have significantly higher average cash dividends payouts than their DCs counterparts (t=7.19 
and 11.14) while U.S. and Japanese MCs present significantly lower cash dividend payments
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than the DCs counterparts (t= 1.97 and P=5.01). Further, median test of cash dividends also 
mostly confirms this result except U.S. being insignificant. Overall, on average, MCs pay 
higher cash dividends than DCs regardless of country origin (t= 14.74).
Figure 6.4
Comparison of DCs and MCs cash dividend across 5 sampled countries over 10 years
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Panel B further confirms that the dividends, which are comprised of cash and share repurchase, 
and it states that on average MCs pay significantly higher dividends payout ratio relative to DCs 
and this is consistent across Australia, U.S. and U.K. (t=7.44; t=6.17; t=l 1.39. A similar result 
exists in Malaysia; however, it is insignificant.
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Table 6.2
Univariate tests of cash dividend and total payout ratios between DCs and MCs across countries
Panel A -Cash Dividend Payments
C ash Dividend AU US JP UK M L ALL
DCs M Cs DCs M Cs DCs M Cs DCs M Cs DCs M Cs DCs M Cs
M ean 0.26 0.36 0.29 0.27 0.32 0.27 0.22 0.31 0.14 0.16 0.23 0.29
a b a a a
t  Test 7.19 1.97 5.01 11.14 1.59 14.74
M edian 0.00 0.31 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.00 0.30 0.00 0 00 0.05 0.23
a a a a a
M an-W hitney 6.93 0.60 3.52 10.69 2.78 16.97
S tan d a rd  deviation 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.29 0.31 0.27 0.28 0.32 0.23 0.23 0.30 0.31
F Test 1.07 1.23 1.28 1.28 1.08 1.04
No of O bs 994 1254 1371 1417 1093 814 719 1469 1861 964 6038 5918
Panel B -  Cash and Share repurchase (total) dividend Payments
T otal D ividend AU US J P UK M L A LL
DCs M Cs DCs M Cs DCs M Cs DCs M Cs DCs M Cs DCs M Cs
M ean 0.26 0.36 0.50 0.62 0.40 0.36 0.22 0.32 0.15 0.17 0.28 0.39
t Test
a
7.44
a
6.17
a
3.81
a
11.39 1.52
a
20.74
C ash M edian 0.00 0.32 0.37 0.46 0.28 0.25 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.29
M an-W 'hitney
a
7.03
a
5.08
a
2.65
a
10.93
a
2.78
a
20.84
S tan d a rd  deviation 0.35 0.37 0.51 0.60 0.42 0.38 0.29 0.33 0.25 0.24 0.37 0.43
F Test 1.12 1.37 1.21 1.31 1.09 1.34
No of O bs 994 1254 1371 1417 1093 814 719 1469 1861 964 6038 5918
Table 6.3 reports univariate test results of MCs’ and DCs’ cash and repurchase mode of 
dividends payments operating in different legal regimes and tax regimes to investigate whether 
there is any significant difference in cash and share repurchase type dividends payments across 
DCs and MCs. The result suggest that MCs operating under the imputation and classical tax 
system have significantly higher dividends than DCs, suggesting that MCs are in a better 
position to exploit the benefit of each type of tax system and manage to pay higher cash 
dividends than DCs counterparts (t=8.75 and t=11.90). However, MCs in common law 
countries pay significantly higher cash dividends than DCs while MCs in civil law countries pay 
significantly lower cash dividends than DCs (t=37.41 and t=5.01). Similar result also holds for 
total dividends. The median test results also produced similar results. Further, when net 
dividends are tested for significant difference between DCs’ and MCs’ dividends payments, it 
also draws the same results.
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Table 6.3
Univariate tests of cash dividend and total dividend payout ratios between DCs and MCs across
different tax and legal regime
Panel A -  Cash Dividend Payments
C a s h  D iv id e n d I m p u ta t i o n  T a x C la s s ic a l  ta x C o m m o n  L a w C iv i l  L a w
D C s M C s D C s M C s D C s M C s D C s M C s
M e a n 0.26 0.33 0.22 0.28 0.10 0 .22 0.32 0.27
t T e s t
a
8 .7 5
a
1 1 .9 0
a
3 7 .4 1
a
5 .01
M e d ia n 0.00 0.33 0 .08 0.21 0.00 0.02 0.24 0.22
M a n - W h it n e y
a
9 .5 1
a
1 3 .7 8
a
3 2 .6 8
a
3 .5 2
S t a n d a r d  d e v ia t io n 0.33 0 .32 0.29 0.30 0.23 0.30 0.31 0.27
F  T e s t 1.04 1.06 1.71 1.28
N o  o f  O b s 6038 5918 6038 5918 6038 5918 6038 5918
Panel B -  Cash and Share repurchase (total) dividend Payments
T o t a l  D iv id e n d I m p u ta t io n  T a x C la s s ic a l  ta x C o m m o n  L a w C iv i l  L a w
D C s M C s D C s M C s D C s M C s D C s M C s
M e a n 0.26 0 .34 0.29 0.41 0.12 0 .30 0.40 0.36
t T e s t
a
8 .8 5
a
1 8 .8 4
a
4 3 .3 4
a
3 .8 1
M e d ia n 0.00 0.33 0.12 0.27 0.00 0 .00 0.28 0.25
M a n - W h it n e y
a
9 .5 3
a
1 8 .3 0
a
3 5 .6 2
a
2 .6 5
S t a n d a r d  d e v ia t io n 0.33 0.33 0 .39 0.46 0.28 0.43 0.42 0 .38
F  T e s t 1.02 1.42 2.34 1.21
N o  o f  O b s 6038 5918 6038 5918 6038 5918 6038 5918
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Panel C shows DCs operating in imputation tax system tend to pay significantly higher (t=5.44) 
cash dividends than DCs operating under the classical tax system. In comparison, MCs 
operating under the imputational tax system also pay significantly higher cash dividends than 
MCs operating under classical tax system (t=8.27). Similarly, DCs and MCs operating in civil 
law countries pay significantly (t=40.20 and t=7.88). Median test results also support the mean 
test results.
Panel C -  Impact of Legal regimes and Tax regimes on DCs & MCs
C a s h  D iv id e n d D C s M C s D C s M C s
C o m m C iv il
I m p u ta t io n C la s s ic a l I m p u ta t io n C la s s ic a l C o m m  L a w C iv i l  la w L a w la w
M e a n 0 .26 0.22 0.33 0.28 0.10 0.32 0.22 0.27
t T e s t
a
5 .4 4
a
8 .2 7
a
4 0 .2 0
a
7 .8 8
M e d ia n 0.00 0.08 0.33 0.21 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.22
M a n - W h it n e y
S ta n d a r d
0.77 6 .8 5 3 8 .8 8 1 4 .0 5  2
d e v ia t io n 0.33 0.29 0 .32 0 .30 0.23 0.31 0.30 0.27
F T e s t
a
1 9 .6 2
a
6 8 .4 7
a
1 5 .7 1
a
6 2 .0 7
N o  o f  O b s 6038 5918 6038 5918
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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6.7 Regression Results
The results of regressing the set of explanatory variables against the payout ratio is reported in 
Table 6.4 for DCs and MCs across five countries. The correlation test among the variables is 
conducted and it shows that there is no significant multicollinearity problem.
6.7.1 Determinants of Cash Dividends and Dividends Slope Coefficient
Table 6.4 presents the determinants of cash dividends (Panel A) and cash dividend and share 
repurchase (Panel B). Results in these two Tables (Panel A and Panel B) assumes that the 
additional factors such as diversification, foreign exchange risks and political risks (.DIVER, FX 
and PR) and other corporate dividend determinants residuals are distributed normally and 
independently. Further, the determining factors in Table 6.4 (Panel A and B) and Table 6.5 are 
essentially the same except in the latter table a dichotomous variable is used to isolate the effect 
of multinationality as it is believed that choosing additional variables to determine MCs’ 
dividend payouts may not necessarily be enough to explain the full characteristics of dividend 
payout behaviours.
The regression coefficient of diversification {DIVER) shows that it is negative and significant 
for Australia and U.S. (t=4.43 and t=2.11) and surprisingly no significant relationship of this 
variable is observed for MCs in any of the sample countries. This suggests that as the DCs in 
Australia and U.S. expand within their home country to become larger, the strategy has a 
negative impact on cash dividend payments to shareholders. A possible explanation for this 
may be that when DCs grow through full take over activities and open a new subsidiary, it 
imposes constraints on the availability of excess cash which otherwise would have been used 
for cash dividend purposes.
The proxy of agency costs (AGC) is negative and significant for DCs in U.S. (t=-2.95) and MCs 
in U.K. and Malaysia (t=2.54 and t=-1.98 respectively). The different sign of agency costs 
significance supports the arguments that La Porta et al. (2000) put forward. According to the
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authors, dividends are an outcome of effective legal protection of shareholders, which enables 
minority shareholders to extract dividends payments from corporate insiders. Empirically, they 
find that dividend policies vary across legal regimes in ways consistent with a particular version 
of the agency theory of dividends. Specifically, firms operating in countries with better 
protection of minority shareholders pay higher dividend payouts. The negative significant 
results of agency costs (AGC) for DCs in U.S. and MCs in Malaysia suggest that as the number 
of shareholders increase in those countries, the cash dividend payment decreases significantly 
due to the increased transaction costs of external financing to those increased number of 
shareholders. However, the positive significant results of MCs in U.K. suggests that as the 
number of shareholders increases, they pay higher dividends to reduce agency costs and it is 
consistent with Rozeff (1982).
The free cash flow (FCF) of agency costs appears to have mixed sign and significant level. 
FCF coefficient is significant for Japanese DCs (t=-2.54) and U.S. MCs (t=7.95). This means 
that when there is an increase in cash flows in Japanese DCs, the Japanese DCs’ managers have 
tendency to use the excess free cash flow sub-optimally and therefore it imposes a negative 
impact on cash dividend payments. In contrast, MCs in U.S. have positive and significant 
relationship (t=7.95) suggesting that as the availability of free cash flow increases, it 
significantly increases the cash dividend payments to shareholders.
The growth of a firm depends on: (i) the amount of resources retained and reinvested in the 
firm; and (ii) the rate of return that is earned on the retained earnings. GROW MB variable for 
Japanese DCs appears to have significant positive relationship (t=1.90) with cash dividend 
payments while it has negative significant relationship in DCs of U.K. (t=-6.49) and MCs of 
Malaysia (t=-5.23). This negative significant relationship suggests that a firm’s growth 
(investment) opportunities are negatively related to corporate cash dividend payments. This 
means that as DCs in U.K. and MCs in Malaysia experience substantial success and rapid 
growth, the firm would require large additions of capital. Therefore, growth firms may expect 
to pursue a low dividend payout policy since investment and dividends are linked through the
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firm's cash flow identity.53 This is consistent with Rozeff (1982) and Schooley and Barney 
(1994) who find that dividend payout ratio is negatively related to predicted growth revenues of 
the firm, implying that higher growth rates in future revenues require more funds to sustain 
growth; thus firms pay lower dividends in order to finance further growth. These authors also 
find dividend payout is also negatively related to past growth revenues. However, the evidence 
indicates that past growth variable DCs across Japan and U.K. (t=2.67 and 2.21) and MCs in 
U.S. (t=1.86) have significantly positive relationship with cash dividends payouts, suggesting 
higher growth rates in the past do not require as much additional funds to sustain growth.
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979, 1982) and Morgan and Thomas (1998) argue that 
dividend increases are associated with increases in stock return (SR) because the percentage 
change in stock price is typically much smaller than the percentage change in its dividend. 
Recently, this evidence is further documented by McManus, Gwilym & Thomas (2004). 
Lamont (1998) finds that stock return has a significant positive relationship with dividend 
payout ratios. Our result confirms the above finding for both DCs (t=3.03; 6.09, 7.34; 4.36 and 
9.94) across Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia and MCs (t=12.06; 9.19, 4.73 and 3.75) 
across all sample countries except Australia.
The dividend clientele effect originally suggested by Miller and Modigliani (1961) indicates 
that different groups of investors desire different levels of dividends. For example, high-tax- 
bracket investors will prefer stocks with low-dividend yield and low-bracket investors will 
prefer high-dividend yield. The dividend clientele effect is a possible explanation for 
management’s reluctance to change dividend policy: such changes might lead to clientele shifts 
and cause investors to incur undesirable transaction costs. The significant positive coefficients 
of tax clientele (TAX CLTL) across Australia and U.S. DCs (t=2.26 and t=3.11) and across 
Australia and Malaysian MCs (t=3.06 and t=2.88) supports Elton and Gruber (1970).
53 In general, the greater the amount of investment during the period, the smaller the dividend or the greater the new 
equity issued.
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It is often argued that a firm with more systematic risk (BETA)54 tends to adopt a policy of 
setting a relatively low payout ratio. Consistent with this argument the test results show that 
firm risk proxied by firm beta (BETA) show that the DCs in Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and 
Malaysia (t=-4.35, t=-2.61, t=-6.11, t=-2.62 and t=-5.15) have negative and significant 
relationship, and similarly the beta of MCs in U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia also have 
negative and significant (t=-4.10, t=-3.29, t=-5.18 and t=-4.17) impact on cash dividend 
payments. This result is supported by Rozeff (1982), Lloyd (1985), Bajaj and Vijh (1990), 
Schooley and Barney (1994) and Dyl and Weigand (1998).
There are two alternative hypotheses that predict no abnormal dividend payments after debt 
issue. First, the debt covenant (LTD) hypothesis predicts that firms will decrease or not increase 
after debt issues. Kalay (1982) suggests that debt contracts restrict dividend payments directly 
and indirectly. Consistent with the debt covenant hypothesis, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990), 
Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992), and Long, Malitz and Sefcik (1994) find an inverse 
relationship between dividends and debts. However, Denis (1990), Gupta and Rosenthal 
(1991), Smith and Watts (1992), Mougou and Mukherjee (1994), and Adedeji (1998) find a 
positive relationship between the leverages of a firm and dividends. Our result show that the 
reputation hypothesis significantly holds for U.S. DCs (t=2.08) and it suggests that on the basis 
of asymmetric information between insiders of the firm and outside debt holders, U.S. DCs are 
willing to maintain their reputation. This is consistent with Long, Malitz and Sefcik (1994). 
John and Nechman (1985) develop a model which shows the importance of reputation in 
controlling costs. The debt covenant hypothesis significantly holds for Malaysian DCs (t=- 
5.80) and MCs across Australia (t=-2.52), U.S. (t=-L70) and Malaysia (t=-4.22).
Similar to systematic risk, Beaver et al. (1970), Michel and Shaked (1986), Bar-Yosef and 
Huffman (1988), Glen et al. (1995), and others argue that the uncertainty of a firm’s earnings 
may lead it to pay lower dividends because the existence of large fluctuations in earnings 
materially increases the risk of default. Further, if firms follow a policy of dividends
54 A firm's security beta represents its level o f systematic risk.
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stabilization, firms with greater volatility in earnings will set a low payout ratio, which can be 
maintained even if firms follow a policy of dividend stabilisation - firms with greater volatility 
in earnings will set a low payout ratio, which can be maintained even in the face of a relatively 
serious or prolonged decline in earnings. The findings in the regression result show that cash 
flow variability coefficient (CFV) has a mixed sign. As the result shows CFV for U.S. DCs is 
negative and significant (t=-2.36), it is positive and significant for DCs in Australia (t=2.40) and 
Japan (t=2.01) and Malaysia (t= 1.80).
Chang and Rhee (1990), Smith and Watts (1992), Graver and Graver (1993), Lloyd, Jahera and 
Page (1985), and Holder, Langrehr and Hexter (1998) discover a positive relationship between 
dividend and firm size, that is, the larger a firm, the higher the dividends payments. The firm 
size (SIZE) variable has positive and significant relationship between cash dividends in both 
DCs in Australia and U.S. (t=4.39 and t=4.25) and MCs in U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia 
(t=2.26, t=3.48 and t=2.85 and t=3.05 respectively) - indicates that larger DCs and MCs tend to 
be more mature and thus have easier access to the capital markets, which reduces their 
dependence on internally-generated funding and allows for higher dividend payout ratios. 
There are two alternative hypotheses that predict no abnormal dividend payments after debt 
issue. First, the debt covenant hypothesis predicts that firms will decrease or not increase 
dividends after debt issues. Kalay (1982) shows that debt contracts restrict dividend payments 
directly and indirectly. He shows that the stockholders of leveraged firms choose to pay 
dividends under the debt contracts. Consistent with the debt covenant hypothesis, DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo (1990), Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992), and Long, Malitz and Sefcik (1994) 
find an inverse relationship between dividends and debts. However, Denis (1990), Gupta and 
Rosenthal (1991), Smith and Watts (1992) and Mougoue and Mukherjee (1994) find a positive 
relationship between the leverages of a firm and its dividends. On the other hand, the reputation 
hypothesis also predicts no abnormal dividend payments after debt issues. On the basis of 
asymmetric information between the insiders of the firm and outside debt-holders, John and 
Nachman (1985) suggest that firms are willing to maintain their reputation. Long, Malitz and 
Sefcik (1994) test both the debt covenant and reputation hypothesis and conclude that reputation
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is the most plausible explanation why firms do not transfer wealth from bondholders to 
stockholders through dividend policy. Our result of debt constraint variable {LTD) finds 
support for debt covenant hypothesis for DCs in U.S. (t=2.08) while the support for reputation 
hypothesis is observed for Malaysian DCs (t=-5.80) and MCs across Australia (t=-2.52), U.S. 
(t=-1.70) and Malaysia (t=-4.22).
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6.7.2 Multinationality Effect on Dividend Pay out Ratios
There is no prior literature on the share repurchase behaviour in multinational firms. This is the 
first empirical testing and therefore the results interpretation makes no reference to prior studies. 
However, as the theory suggests a corporation that plans to distribute cash to its shareholders 
may do so by way of a dividend or a share repurchase. As discussed earlier, Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) demonstrated that in a perfect market setting shareholders would be 
indifferent between share repurchases and the payments of cash dividends. However, the 
prediction that corporations will distribute cash to shareholders by way of repurchases only, in 
order to avoid the adverse tax consequences of dividends, is clearly counterfactual, and the 
challenge remains to explain the survival of dividends in the age of the income tax. Prior to 
2003, while dividends gave rise to an immediate income tax liability for taxable investors, the 
situation with repurchases is more complex. Selling shares used to be potentially liable to 
capital gains tax on the excess of the sale price over their costs basis. However, even if capital 
gains are taxed at the same rates as ordinary income as under the current tax law, an individual’s 
tax liability under a repurchase is likely to be less than under an equivalent cash dividend since 
only a portion of the repurchase payment will be liable for tax. The tax bias on repurchases is 
even stronger when capital gains are taxed at preferential rates (Brennan & Thakor, 1990).
The aim of this regression analysis presented in Table 6.5 is to investigate the relationship of the 
multinationality of a firm and dividend payout behaviour after controlling for firm-specific and 
international factors. The significance level of these factors remains relatively similar to the 
results discussed earlier that were shown in Table 6.5 and therefore no discussion will be 
provided accept from multinationality (MULTU) variable.
In this model, the entire samples of DCs and MCs have been pooled while the controlling 
variables are kept consistent. To capture the effect of multinationality, a dummy variable is 
introduced where it takes a value of unity for MCs, otherwise zero. The result suggests that the
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coefficient of the multinationality is mixed sign across countries for both cash dividend 
payments, and surprisingly no significant relationship is observed.
The only corporations out of five sample countries, the MCs in Australia have tendency of 
paying higher cash dividends and dividends (cash and share repurchase); however, statistically 
it is not significant (t=0.59 and t=0.82). In contrast, although the cash dividend payment of U.S. 
MCs shows negative relationship, it does show positive relationship with dividend payment, 
indicating MCs in U.S. pay higher dividends than their DCs counterparts although statistically it 
is not significant. Interestingly, the result also shows that when dividend is comprised of cash 
and share repurchase types, U.S. MCs pay higher dividends relative to DCs; however, this 
relationship is not statistically significant (t=0.38). This result is not consistent with Hines Jr. 
(1996) on a statistical level.
The adjusted R 2 for the regression across countries indicates that the explanatory power of the 
model is reasonably well explained. This ranges from 21% (Malaysia) to 47% (U.S.) for cash 
dividends, and as for dividends it ranges from 20% (Malaysia) to 41% (Australia).
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6.7.3 Multinationality and Slope Difference of Cash Dividend and 
Dividends Payout
Hines Jr. (1996) attempted to investigate the effect of foreign profitability and dividend policy 
of DCs and MCs, and found that MCs pay three times as much dividends than the DCs because 
foreign operation assist them to make high profits therefore, they pass them to shareholders. 
We further extend the other explanatory factors to test the slope difference such that some 
economic explanation can be revealed about MCs’ dividend payout policy determinants.
As noted earlier, the major determinants of a firm’s payout ratio include firm-specific and 
international factors. Each of these factors, therefore, will be tested to investigate whether there 
is a significant difference between DCs and MCs firm-specific factors that may contribute to the 
difference in their dividend payment in addition to the MCs international factors (e.g. 
diversification, foreign exchange risk and political risk). Table 6.6 provides an insightful result 
of the difference of DCs’ and MCs’ dividend payment determinants. The following table 
attempts to differentiate between DCs’ and MCs’ dividends payments behaviour that is 
associated with the firm and environmental factors. The adjusted Rz shows that the model 
provides a reasonable explanation, as the values range between 23% (Malaysia) to 44% 
(Australia).
The common determinants of coefficients significance level and sign remain relatively 
unchanged across countries. Since the aim of this model is to identify the significant slope 
differences, the original coefficients and their significance will not be discussed. This is to 
avoid repetition since similar results were discussed in Model I.
In Table 6.6, it appears that diversification (M DIVER) is an important issue to consider in 
dividend payments decision for both DCs and MCs in Australia as this variable tested as 
statistically significant (t=2.28) in explaining the difference of Australian DCs’ and MCs’ cash 
dividend payment. This suggest that Australian MCs benefit from diversifying locally and
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internationally, which assists to increase the cash dividend payments relative to counterpart 
DCs. Similar result also holds for U.S. MCs (t=2.39), indicating diversification is a useful tool 
to maximize the benefit of different geographical locational advantages to increase dividends 
payments.
The slope coefficient of political risk (M_PR) is found to be significant and positive for U.S. 
(t=-2.46) and (t=2.07) for Malaysian corporations. This result is intuitive since MCs that 
originated in the U.S. and have subsidiaries outside of the U.S. are not the same as far as the 
impact of political risk is concerned. This is because the U.S. generally has a more stable 
political environment than other countries within our sample. Therefore, the negative and 
significant result is justified. On the contrary, the MCs that originated in Malaysia and 
expanded geographically can internalise the benefit of more stable political environments 
outside the domicile country and the result of negative and significant (t=1.87) relationship of 
slope difference of political risk factor (M_PR) indicates such a situation.
The slope difference of agency costs (M AGC) of dividend payout produced mixed results for 
MCs in U.K. and Malaysia. For example, there is a significant and positive relationship with 
U.K. MCs’ cash dividend payment (M AGC) while it is a significant and negative relationship 
with Malaysia (t=-1.84). It indicates that Malaysian MCs are relatively more prone to agency 
costs which impact on the cash dividend payments. In contrast, U.K. MCs are better at 
managing their dividend-related agency costs and therefore it has a significant positive 
relationship (t=2.19) in explaining the difference of cash dividend payments between DCs and 
MCs in U.K..
The magnitude of free cash flow slope difference (M_FCF) for Japan indicates that it is positive 
and significant (t=2.53), indicating MCs in Japan have significantly higher FCF and it enables 
them to maintain cash dividend. The agency cost-related growth variable (M GROW MB) 
suggests that Malaysian MCs are relatively in more of a growth stage than the Malaysian DCs
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which requires more cash availability and therefore has a significant negative relationship (t=- 
5.37).
The significant interaction variable of average tax rate (M ATR) implies that average tax rate is 
negative and significant (t=-1.91) to explain the difference of cash dividend payments for U.K. 
MCs and DCs and positive and significant in explaining the difference of Malaysian DCs and 
MCs (t=4.51). Further, the slope difference of tax clientele (M TAX CLTL) is only significant 
(t=2.85) in explaining the difference of Malaysian DCs’ and MCs’ cash dividends.
The interaction variable for business risk is positive and significant for Japanese MCs (t=2.29) 
and negative and significant for Malaysian MCs (t=-2.09).
While the interactive size variable (M SIZE) is positive and significant in explaining the 
difference of Malaysian MCs’ cash dividend payout, (M_CVA) and (M AGE) only appears to 
significantly explain the difference of Australian and U.S. MCs cash dividend payments with 
their DCs counterparts.
Finally, the significant difference of (M LTD) variable suggests that US is the only country out 
of five sample countries where the slope difference of dividend payouts between DCs and MCs 
is explained by long-term debt ratio (t=-2.69).
Adjusted R-sqr explains the model fairly well and the result shows that the proposed model 
explains better for U.S. as the model explains about 44%. This model also explains fairly well 
for the other four countries and it ranges between 23% to 49%.
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Table 6.6
Interaction effect in explaining the difference of cash dividend between DCs and MCs across 5
sampled countries
This table reports the results of OLS regression (Model III) to obtain the parameters and t-statistics accordingly for the sample of 
2248 (994 DCs and 1254 MCs separately) listed companies in the Australian Stock Exchange over 10 years to 2004. The adjusted 
R squared indicates the model’s goodness of fit.
D I V C = ß 0 + ß , M U L T , t + ß 2D I V E R , ,  + ß  , T I I( + ß AP R , .  + ß 5A G C , ,  + ß 6F C F , ,  + ß 2G R O W  _  M B ,  
+ ß , G R O W  _  P T , , + ß 9SR, ' ,  + ß l0A T R „  + ß xlT A X  _ C L T L , ,  + ß X2C F V, , + ß ^ P R O F , ,
+ ß  XiB E T  A,  , + ß  15 5 I Z  E , ,  + ß i6C V A , , + ß  17 A G E , ,  + ß  xi L T  D , , + ß X9M  _  D I V E R , ,
+ ß 20M  -  F X  >,,+ _  /*/?,., + ß 22M  _  A G C ,  , + ß 22M  _  F C F , ,  + ß  24M _ G  R O W  _  Af (
+ 0 25M  G R O W  _ P T, ,  + ß  2bM  _ S R , , + ß  21M  _ A TR,  , + ß  2iM  _ T A X  _  C L T  L,  ,
+ ß  29M  _  C F E ,  , + j33üAf _  P R O F , ,  + ß 3xM  _  B E T A , ,  + ß i 2M  _  S I Z E , , + ß  „ M  _  C Fzl,.,
+ ß 2*M  _  ^  G F i,t + ß  i s M  _  ^ E E), ,  + £ , ,
* indicates that this model uses two different measurement of dividend payout ratios which is explained below.
Two dependent variables have been employed and they are: DIVC u (cash payout ratios) is calculated using cash dividend paid to 
net earnings and DIVR u (cash and share repurchase dividend payout ratios) is calculated as cash plus change in treasury stock 
scaled by net earnings. In order to capture the multinationality effect a dummy variable is introduced where it takes a 1 when a 
corporation is a multinational otherwise it is 0. DIVER u (diversification) is the total number of subsidiaries that any firm has within 
their domicile country and overseas. FXu (foreign exchange risk) is calculated by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales revenue.
PR , , (political risk) is the sum of all the MCs subsidiaries countries’ political risk ratings exposed to the proportion of each sale that 
a subsidiary makes overseas. A G C (agency cost) is the natural logarithm of total shareholders. F C F (free cash flow) measured 
after Lehn and Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings before interest and tax plus depreciation plus amortization plus tax paid minus 
dividend paid and minus interest expense and then it was scaled by 10000 so that the magnitude of this variable is compatible with 
other measurements. Two growth measures have been used in this study namely GROW MB u (market value of equity to book 
value of asset) which is measured as market value of asset to book value of asset. And secondly, GROW PTu (past growth) which 
is measured as the change in total assets over total assets. SR,.r (stock return) is measured as expected return of individual 
corporations by using CAPM. ATRU (average tax ratios) is calculated as total tax paid per annum scaled by net profit. TAX_CLTL 
(tax clientele) is the ratio of number of common shares outstanding by the institutional shareholders to number of total shares 
outstanding. CFVit, (cash flow variation) is the standard deviation of the first difference in earnings before interest and taxes, scaled 
by mean value of interest expense. S I Z E is the natural logarithm of total asset. C V A (collateral value of assets) is the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets. AGEU is the natural logarithm of the age of the firm in years from date of incorporation. LEVERAGE,,, is 
the ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt plus market value of equity. Model III incorporates slope dummy variables in addition 
to common eighteen variables to capture multinationality impact on each of the explanatory variables. For example, Model III aims 
to discover any unexplained issues that Model II failed to capture which are either hard to measure or just not available to explain 
the MCs’ operational behaviour and its impact on dividend payments. Besides, some of these other attributes are hard to measure 
since some are qualitative information. The interaction dummy variable is used to find the significant difference of the common 
eight variables. For example, M DIVER,,, takes the actual value of MCs while it is 0 for the DCs.
D I V C ,,
AU US J P UK M L
C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat
C -0 .13 -0 .40 0.13 0.72 0.22 1.11 0.31 0 .96 0.03 0.29
M U L T U -0 .56 -0 .95 0.02 0.07 -0 .08 -0 .28 -0 .54 -1 .44 -0 .39 -1.93C
D IV E R U -0 .08
a
-4.37 -0.01
b
-2.12 0.00 0.28 -0.01 -0 .45 -0 .02 -1 .60
F X ,, 0.04 0 .5 2 0 .02 0.60 -0 .07 -0 .72 -0 .06 -1 .00 -0.03 -1 .05
P R t , 0 .00 0.75 0 .0 0 0.67 0 .00 -1 .13 0.00 -0 .40 0.00 0.55
A G C ,, 0.02 1.01 -0 .05
3
-2.96 0.00 -0 .47 -0.01 -0.71 0.00 0.19
F CF,,, -0.01 -0 .78 0 .0 0 -0 .96 -0 .28
3
-2.54 0.00 -0 .02 -0.01 -1 .58
G R O W  M B U 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.90C 0.00
<1
-6.56 0.00 0.53
G R O W  PT,,t -0.01 -1 .38 0.02 1.55 0 .00
a
2.67 0.06
b
2.24 0.02 1.22
S R u 0.03
a
2.99 0 .0 9
a
6.10 0.07
a
7.35 0.03
a
4.41 0.03
a
9.91
A  T R ,j 0.00 -0 .34 0 .0 0 0.57 0.03
a
2.89 0.03
a
2.68 0 .00
a
6.23
T A X  C LT L,,, 0.60
b
2.23 0 .0 0
a
3.11 0 .00 -0 .46 -0.23 -1 .35 0.04 1.24
C V F u -4 .37
a
-4.29 -3 .29
a
-2.61 -5 .67
a
-6.12 -2 .73
b
-2.64 -1 .89
a
-5.13
P R O F ij 0.04
a
3.34 -0 0 2 -0 .87 0.60
a
2.79 0.25
a
3.24 0.12
a
3.01
B E T A i , 0.41
b
2.37 -0 .12
b
-2.36 0.07 0.90 0.05 0.30 0.13 1.63
S I Z E u 0.07
3
4.33 0 .02
3
4.26 0.00 0.90 0.01 1.15 0.00 1.08
C VA ,., 0.00 0 .0 6 0 .0 6 1.57 0.03 0.62 -0 .02 -0 .23 0.03 1.31
A G E U -0 .03 -1 .55 0 .00 0 08 0 .06
a
3.76 0.03
b
2.40 0.02
a
3.65
l t d ,, -0.14 -1.61 0 .06
b
2.09 -0 .04 -1 .28 -0 .10 -1 .36 -0 .09
a
-5.78
M  D I V E R « 0.06
b
2.28 0 .02
b
2.39 0.01 0.53 0.00 0.12 0.02 1.49
M F X , j -0 .15 -1 .38 -0.01 -0.35 0.03 0.31 0 .10 1.43 0.01 0.19
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M  P R ,, 0.01 0.86 0.00 -1.09 0.00 -0.36 0.00 1.19 0.01
c
1.87
b c
M A  GCjj 0.04 0.92 0.04 1.84 0.01 0.91 0.04 2.19 -0.02 -1.84
M F C F „ -0.03 -0.55 0.00 1.50 0.28
ä
2.53 -0.01 -0.79 0.00 -0.10
M  G R O W  M B u 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.37 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.33 -0.02 -5.37
M  G R O W  P T U -0.04 -0.50 -0.02 -1.52 0.00 -1.38 -0.07 -1.62 0.02 0.44
M _SR i,, -0.01 -0.84 0.02 1.07 0.01 0.65 0.00 -0.50 -0.01 -1.53
M _A  TRi,, 0.05 0.63 0.00 -0.41 0.02 1.22 -0.03
c
-1.91 0.03
ä
4.51
M  T A X  C L T L u 0.55 1.22 -0.05 -5.34 0 00 047 -0.02 -0.08 1.14
s
2.85
a b
M C V F i f 3.02 1.15 0.45 0.31 2.88 2.29 -1.45 -1.11 -2.11 -2.09
M _ P R O F u 0.20 1.66 -0.04 -0.56 -0.30 -1.15 -0.14 -1.53 0.12 1.07
M B E T A i j -0.43 -1.61 0.08 1.27 0.05 0.52 0.09 0.46 0.21 1.06
M S I Z E i j -0.02 -0.74 -0.01 -1.18 0.01 1.64 0.01 0.96 0.02
D
2.28
M _C V A i,, -0.26 -2.00a -0.01 -0.28 0.07 1.12 0.06 0.68 -0.04 -0.63
M A G E i j 0.05 1.09 0.03
D
2.59 -0.03 -1.10 -0.01 -0.80 -0.01 -0.39
M L T D U -0.20 -1.26 -0.10 -2.69 0.01 0.28 0.10 1.10 -0.06 -1.59
A d j R -sqr 0.44 0.49 0.27 0.33 0.23
No. o f  Obs 2248 2788 1907 2188 2825
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Table 6.7
Pooled sample with interaction slope dummy variables for multinational firms across 5 countries in
explaining dividend
D I V R , ;  = ß 0 + ß , M U L T , ,  + ß 2D I V E R , ,  + ß 3F X , , + ß 4P R , ,  + ß sA G C u  + ß 6F C F , ,
+ ß nG R O W  _ M B U + ß^ G R O W  _ P T , ,  + ß 9S R , , + ß l0A TR, ,  + ß u T A X  _  C L T  L , ,
+ ß i2CFV, ' ,  + ß l3P R  O F , , + ß i4B E T  A , , + ß iaS I Z E ltl + ß i6C V A , , + ß l7A G  E , , + ß , t L T D ,,  
+ ß , 9M _ D I V E R , ,  + ß 10M  _  F X ,,  + ß lxM  _ P R , , +  ß i rM  _ A G C , , + ß 13M _ F C  F it 
+ ß 24M _ G  R O W  _ MB, ' ,  + ß 15M _ G  R O W  _ PT , ,  + ß 26M  _  S R , ,  + ß 21M _ A TR, ,
+ 0 28M _  T A X  _ C L T L , , + ß 29M _ C F V , ,  + ß 30M _ P R O F , ,  + ß 3iM _ B E T A , ,
+ ß 32M _ S I Z E , ,  + ß 33M  _  C V A , , + ß 34M  _  A G E , ,  + ß 35M _ L T D, ,  + e , ,
D IV R «
AU US JP UK ML
C oeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat
C -0.24 -0.70 -0.77 -2.11 0.01 0.05 0.35 1.07 0.00 0.02
M U L  T j -0.68 -1.03 0.61 1.20 -0.55 -1.42 -0.44 -1.11 -0.47 -2.20
D IV E R ,, -0.06
D
-2.72 0.03 2.22 0.00 -0.27 -0.01 -0.45 -0.01 -0.55
F X „ 0.10 1.28 0.14 2.29 0.16 1.07 -0.06 -1.06 -0.01 -0.14
P R u 0.00 0.95 0.01 3.79 0.00 0.10 0.00 -0.52 0.00 0.63
A G C « 0.02 0.96 -0.10 -3.45 0.01 0.49 -0.01 -0.57 0.00 0.28
F C F « 0.00 -0.33 0.00 -0.84 -0.21 -1.55
b
0.00 -0.14
a
-0.01 -1.55
G R O W  M B « 0.00 0.53 0.00 -3.62 0.00 2.52
a
0.00 -6.61
b
0.00 0.54
G R O W  P T « -0.01 -1.14
a
-0.03 -0.46 0.00 3.02
a
0.07 2.23
a
0.02 1.06
a
S R « 0.03 2.99 0.07 4.90 0.08 6.18
b
0.03 4.38
b
0.03 9.43
a
A  TR « 0.00 -0.42 0.01 0.76 0.04 2.58 0.04 2.26 0.00 6.10
T A X JC L  T L« 0.57
D
2.11
a
0.00 1.65 0.00 0.09
a
-0.23 -1.34
a
0.02 0.48
a
C V F « -4.21 -4.16
a
-5.02 -2.50 -8.89 -7.03
a
-2.87 -2.75
a
-2.30 -5.56
a
P R O F « 0.03 3.25 0.15 1.20 1.27 4.10 0.25 3.18 0.11 2.86
B E T A « 0.35 1.83 C 
a
-0.16 -1.55
b
-0.05 -0.47 -0.01 -0.03 0.18 2.20
c
S IZ E « 0.07 4.46 0.03 2.22 0.01 1.28 0.02 1.27 0.01 1.71
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CVAi,, 0.01 0 .1 0 - 0 .0 3 - 0 .4 2 - 0.01 - 0 .1 7 - 0 .0 3 - 0 .4 5 0 .0 2 1 .06
a a b a
A G h ^ t - 0 .0 3 - 1 .34 0 0 4 2.94 0 .0 9 3.69 0 .0 3 2.42 0 .0 3 4.26
LT D ij - 0 .1 2 - 1 .3 6 0 .0 8 1 .5 3 - 0 .0 5 - 1.03 - 0 .1 0 - 1 .4 4 - 0 .1 0
3
-5.90
M D I V E R u 0 .0 3 0 .9 2 0 .0 4
D
2.05 0 .0 0 0 .0 8 0 .0 0 - 0 .0 8 0.01 0 .8 4
M  F X U - 0.21 - 1.61 - 0 .0 4 - 0 .5 2 - 0 .1 0 - 0 .6 3 0 .1 1 1 .52 0 .0 0 0 .0 5
b b
M  P R U 0 .0 0 0.61 - 0.01 -2.46 0 .0 0 1 1 8 0 .0 0 0 .8 8 0  01 2.07
b b
M A G C u 0 .0 5 1 .0 0 0 .0 9 1.96 0 .01 0 .7 4 0 .0 4 2.27 - 0 .0 2 - 1 .5 4
M _ F C F U 0 .0 0 - 0.11 0.01 1 .3 8 0 .21 1 .5 3 - 0 .0 1 - 0 .6 7 0.01 0 .2 1
M G R O  W M B i j 0 .0 0 - 0 .1 2 0 .0 0 0 .51 0 .0 0 1.61 0 .0 0 0 .21 - 0 .0 3 - 5.71
M G R O W P T i , - 0 .0 4 - 0 .4 7 0 .0 3 0 .4 7 0 .0 0 - 1 .26 - 0 .0 6 - 1.33 0 .0 4 0 .8 7
M _ S R U - 0 .0 1 - 0 .7 3 0 .0 4 2.04 0 .0 2 0 .9 5 0 .0 0 - 0 .5 3 - 0 .0 1 - 1 .4 2
M  ATRi, , 0 .0 7 0 .7 7 - 0.01 - 0 .61 0 .0 3 1.15 - 0 .0 3
c
-1.74 0 .0 3
3
4.39
c a b
M _  T A X C L  TLi,t 0 .9 4 1.95 - 0 .1 0 -10.43 0 .0 0 0 .2 8 0 .0 0 - 0 .0 1 1 .0 8 2.51
M C V F i , , 4 .6 7
c
1.73 - 2 .1 0 - 0 .8 6 2 .9 3 1.73 - 1 .5 0 - 1 .1 2 - 1.81 -1.69C
M P R O F i , , 0 .1 8 1.47 0 .5 0 2.29 - 0 .1 8 - 0 .4 8 - 0 .1 4 - 1 .5 0 0 .1 0 0 .8 9
M B E T A i j , 0.11 0 .3 5 0 .1 8 1 .3 2 - 0 .1 0 - 0 .7 5 0 .1 4 0 .6 8 0 .0 9 0 .4 4
M S I Z E i j 0 .0 0 0 .1 0 - 0 .0 2 - 1 .1 4 0 .0 1 1 .2 9 0 .01 0 .8 5 0 .0 2 2.00
M C V A u - 0 .2 2 - 1.55 0 .1 3 1 .2 2 0 .0 8 0 .9 2 0 .0 7 0 .7 6 - 0 .0 4 - 0 6 1
M A G E i j 0 .0 5 0 .9 7 0 .0 7
4
3.44 - 0 .0 3 - 0 .9 2 - 0 .0 2 - 0 .9 8 0 .0 0 - 0 .0 4
M _ L T D U - 0 .2 3 - 1 .44 - 0 .1 2 - 1 .5 9 - 0 .0 4 - 0 .5 6 0 .1 2 1 .2 8 - 0 .0 8 -1.93C
A d j  R -sqr 0 .4 4 0 .2 8 0 .2 3 0 .3 2 0 .2 2
N o .  o f  Obs 2 2 4 8 2 7 8 8 1 9 0 7 2 1 8 8 2 8 2 5
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
6.7.4 Country, Tax Law and Legal Regime Effect on Cash Dividends 
and Multinationality
Table 6.8 provides comparisons between dividend payout ratio and the effect of multinationality 
across the sample countries. As discussed earlier, firms with more growth options tend to pay 
lower dividends because investments and dividends are linked through the firms’ cash flow 
identity. Given multinational corporations across different countries face different degrees of 
investment and growth opportunities, it is possible that the dichotomous variable of 
multinationality will isolate that effect.
The controlling dichotomous country variable suggest that the cash dividend payment ratio 
coefficient is significantly higher in a ranking order of Australia, U.S., U.K., Japan and 
Malaysia (t=4.92, t=4.81, t=4.27, t=4.18 and t=2.67 respectively). As indicated by the results, 
all the dummy variables for firms in Australia {Country_AU), United States {Country US), 
Japan {Country JP), United Kingdom {Country UK) and Malaysia {Country ML) are 
statistically significant and positively related to cash dividend payout ratio. The country affect
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on total dividends show that U.S. is the only country which pay relatively higher total dividends 
compared to rest of the four sample countries. These findings indicate that firms in different 
countries follow statistically different dividend policies, because each country has different 
country-specific factors which may lead it to establish different dividend policies.
As per taxation policy, Australia is a dominant imputation tax country after U.K. U.K. had an 
imputation tax system until 1997. The principal difference in the taxation of corporate profits 
among the sample countries relates to the nature of the corporate tax system. The U.S. operates 
the classical tax system, under which profits are distributed in the form of dividends and are 
fully taxed twice, once at the corporate level, and again at the shareholder level. On the other 
hand, Australia adopts a full imputation tax system, which provides shareholders with full credit 
for the tax paid by corporations. U.K. adopts partial imputation tax system where partial credit 
is given to shareholders in respect of corporate tax paid on distributed profits. The impact of 
dividend imputation {IMPUTATION TAX) states that the countries which exercise imputation 
tax systems pay significantly higher cash dividend payout ratios (t=4.42) and also dividends 
(t= 1.98).
The significant positive relationship with both cash dividends and dividends payout ratios 
(t=4.22 and t=7.24) suggest that corporation that operate under the common law system have 
the tendency of paying relatively and significantly higher dividends to shareholders relative to 
firms in civil law countries, because dividends are an outcome of effective legal protection of 
shareholders, which enables minority shareholders to extract dividends payments from 
corporate insiders. These findings suggest that an effective legal system allows investors to 
pressure managers to disgorge dividends when the firms do not have good investment 
opportunities. This is consistent with agency theory that La Porta et al. (2000) put forward.
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Table 6.8
Country effect, different tax and legal regime effect in determining cash dividend and total
dividend for 5 sampled countries
This table reports the results of OLS regression using mainly (Model II) in addition to country, tax regime and legal regimes effect 
to obtain the parameters and t-statistics accordingly for the sample of 2248 (994 DCs and 1254 MCs separately) listed companies in 
the Australian Stock Exchange over 10 years to 2004. The adjusted R squared indicates the model’s goodness of fit.
DIVC ' =ß0 + ß.MULT, + ß2DIVERjl + ß3FXiJ + ß.Pß, + ß,AGCi} + ß(FCF, + ß,GROW MB,, + ßfiROW PT,
+ß9SRiJ + ßl0ATRIJ+ßuTAX_CLTLtJ +ß12CFViJ+ßi3PROFil+ßuBET4J+ßl5SIZEu + ßi6CVAJ +ßvAGEiJ
+ ßwLTDi, 4 ßv^ jFountry _ Dummy + ßMImputation +ßmConvnon_ law+£( (
* indicates that this model uses two different measurement of dividend payout ratios which is explained below.
Two dependent variables have been employed and they are: DIVC (cash payout ratios) is calculated using cash dividend paid to 
net earnings and DIVR (cash and share repurchase dividend payout ratios) is calculated as cash plus change in treasury stock 
scaled by net earnings. Multinationality (MULT ,.,) effect is measured where it takes a value of 1 when a corporation is a 
multinational otherwise it is 0. DIVER(diversification) is the total number of subsidiaries that any firm has within their domicile 
country and overseas. FX „ (foreign exchange risk) is calculated by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales revenue. PR „ (political 
risk) is the sum of all the MCs subsidiaries countries’ political risk ratings exposed to the proportion of each sale that a subsidiary 
makes overseas. A G C (agency cost) is the natural logarithm of total shareholders. FCF „ (free cash flow) measured after Lehn 
and Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings before interest and tax plus depreciation plus amortization plus tax paid minus dividend 
paid and minus interest expense and then it was scaled by 10000 so that the magnitude of this variable is compatible with other 
measurements. Two growth measures have been used in this study namely GROW_MB, , (market value of equity to book value of 
asset) which is measured as market value of asset to book value of asset. And secondly, GROW_PT„ (past growth) which is 
measured as the change in total assets over total assets. SR,., (stock return) is measured as expected return of individual corporations 
by using CAPM. ATR „ (average tax ratios) is calculated as total tax paid per annum scaled by net profit. TAX_CLTL„ (tax 
clientele) is the ratio of number of common shares outstanding by the institutional shareholders to number of total shares 
outstanding. CFV( cash  flow variation) is the standard deviation of the first difference in earnings before interest and taxes, scaled 
by mean value of interest expense. S I Z E i s  the natural logarithm of total asset. CVA(collateral value of assets) is the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets. AGE,,, is the natural logarithm of the age of the firm in years from date of incorporation. LEVERAGE,,, is 
the ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt plus market value of equity. Model II adds a dummy variable in addition to common 
eighteen variables to capture multinationality. For example, other attributes: inflation, interest rates, restrictions on the quantity of 
amount DCs and MCs can borrow overseas, debt market efficiency and borrowing costs to finance dividend payments which FX, 
PR and DIVER do not capture. To control for country effect and different tax and legal regimes, a dichotomous variable is used.
D I V C ,, D I V R ,,
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The proposed model in each of the regression equation appears to explain well and the variation 
of explanatory power ranges between 0.24 to 0.28. The explanatory variable and the 
significance level remain similar relative to earlier results.
6.7.5 Cross-country Partial Adjustment Test of Cash Dividends 
Payouts
Table 6.9 presents the results of estimating the partial speed of adjustment factors (SPEED) in 
the Lintner model across DCs and MCs of five sample countries. As mentioned earlier, Lintner 
(1956) argues that a firm’s dividend changes respond only partially to the difference between 
the firm’s target dividend and the past values of its dividends, a response based on the speed of 
adjustment factor (SPEED) of current dividends to the target dividends. The speed of 
adjustment factor (SPEED) indicates how responsive the firm’s dividends are to changes in 
earnings. A higher value of (SPEED) implies a speedier adjustment. Thus, conservative firms 
will have a lower adjustment rate, while less conservative firms will have a higher adjustment 
rate. It would be interesting to see whether DCs and MCs across countries have higher speed of 
partial adjustment towards their target cash dividend payments.
The speed of adjustment factor (SPEED) in each model is a coefficient of the difference 
between the target dividend payment (Z), ) and the past dividend (Dl_]) ; that is, SPEED
(Dt -  Z) ) . As discussed before, (Dt ) is related to current earnings in the Lintner model.
The result in Table 6.9 shows that speed of partial adjustment are all statistically significant 
across DCs and MCs across countries; however, the magnitude of the coefficient (SPEED) 
factor varies across DCs and MCs.
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Table 6.9
Test of partial adjustment (Lintner 1956) towards target cash dividend payout for DCs and MCs
across 5 countries
This table presents the Lintner (1956) model to capture the speed o f adjustment o f target payout ratios. a„ cit indicates the constant 
and speed o f adjustment towards the target level o f cash dividend payments. The details o f this model (V) are outlined in the 
methodology section of this chapter. Note that Model IV is only tested on cash dividend payments as Lintner (1956) did not 
investigate share repurchase mode o f dividend payments.
ADjt a, +  ci{Dit t _ i ) +  / i , ,
DCs MCs
Cash Dividend AU u s JP UK ML AU US JP UK ML
C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat
c - 0.01  - 1.00 0.00  - 0.53 - 0.01  - 0.87 0 .0 0  0.07 - 0.01  - 1.56 0 .0 0  - 0.05 0 .00  - 0.05 0 .00  - 0.60 0 .00  - 0.33 0 .00  0.17
a a a a a a a a a a
SPEED 0.54  8-17 0.65  9.36 0.84  24.84 0 .69  8.42 0 .69  21.73 0 .62  4.97 0 .67  17.98 0 .7 9  20.97 0 .68  14.61 0 .7 8  10.99
Adj R-sqr 0 .30 0.37 0.51 0.33 0 .36 0.33 0.35 0.49 0.35 0 .46
No. o f  Obs 994 1371 1093 719 1861 1254 1417 814 1469 964
a, b and e are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Table 6.10 gives a summary of speed of partial adjustment across DCs and MCs and across 
countries. It shows that the speed of partial adjustments range between 0.84 (JP) to 0.54 (AU) 
for DCs and 0.79 (JP) to 0.62 (AU) for MCs. It appears the ranking of countries stays the same 
when DCs’ and MCs’ speed of partial adjustment is isolated. While Japanese, Malaysian U.S. 
and Australian MCs have higher partial speed of adjustment than the DCs, U.K. MCs have 
marginally lower partial speed of adjustments towards their target.
Table 6.10
Ranking of partial speed of adjustment towards target cash payout across DCs and MCs
DCs MCs
Rank - Country Speed Rank - Country Speed
KJP) 0.84 1(JP) 0 .79
2 (M L ) 0 .69 2(ML) 0.78
3 (U K ) 0 .69 3(UK) 0 .68
4 (U S ) 0 .65 4(U S) 0 .67
5 (A U ) 0.54 5(AU) 0 .62
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6.7.6 Cross-country Industry Effects on Cash Dividends and 
Multinationality
This section presents industry effect across the countries for DCs and MCs to investigate 
industry effect on cash dividend payout ratios and dividend, and is presented in Table 6.11. The 
aim here is to see whether each country’s industry has on average a similar effect on debt ratio 
in DCs and MCs.
The results suggest that industry influence is observed and it appears that the transportation 
industry in Australia (INDETRNSPTCMCTN) has significant negative (t=-l .76) relationship 
with cash dividend payments. The wholesale (IND FWHOLESALE), retail (IND G RETAIL) 
and service (IND I SERVIC) industries have significant and negative relationship (t=-1.79; t=- 
3.53 and t=-2.26 respectively) on cash dividend payments and this impact is even more on U.S. 
MCs as it has a negative significant coefficient (t=-1.70). There is no apparent significant 
relationship in Japan. While the firms in U.K. have significant negative relationship with 
mining (IND B MINING) and construction (IND C CONSTRUCTN) industries, firms in the 
transportation industry appear to pay significantly higher cash dividend (t=1.67). Similarly, the 
wholesale industry in Malaysia also pays higher dividends (t=1.86). However, firms in the 
mining industry on the other hand pay significantly less cash dividends (t=-1.71).
In summary it can be concluded that controlling for industry affect across countries supports the 
country industry hypothesis that industry effect is significant and varies across countries and 
also across firms. These findings support Bradley, Jarrell and Kim’s (1984) argument that the 
firms that are more regulated and have high variation in cash flows tend to pay less cash 
payments, while firms that are relatively stable and less exposed to risk pay high dividends.
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Table 6.11
Industry influence on cash dividend payments for DCs and MCs across 5 sampled countries
D I V C ,  ' = ß 0 + ß , M U L T it + ß 2D I V E R , , + ß , F X it + ß , P R , ,  + ß , A G C it + ß bF C F , , + ß . G R O W  _  Af 5 , ,
+ ß f i R O W  _ P T it  + ß 9S /? ,( + ß l0A T R ,, + ß u T A X  _  C L T L (I + ß n C F V jt + ß  u P R O F it 
+ ß u B E T A it + ß l5S I Z E ll + ß ]6C VAit + ß xlA G E it  + ß n L T D it + £  I n d u s t r y , ,  
indicates that this model uses two different measurement of dividend payout ratios which is explained below.
Two dependent variables have been employed and they are: D /FC „ (cash payout ratios) is calculated using cash dividend paid to net 
earnings and DIVR „ (cash and share repurchase dividend payout ratios) is calculated as cash plus change in treasury stock scaled by net 
earnings. Multinationality effect is measured where it takes a value of 1 when a corporation is a multinational otherwise it is 0. DIVER,, 
(diversification) is the total number of subsidiaries that any firm has within their domicile country and overseas. FX„ (foreign exchange 
risk) is calculated by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales revenue. PR„ (political risk) is the sum of all the MCs subsidiaries countries’ 
political risk ratings exposed to the proportion of each sale that a subsidiary makes overseas. AGC „ (agency cost) is the natural logarithm of 
total shareholders. FCF„ (free cash flow) measured after Lehn and Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings before interest and tax plus 
depreciation plus amortization plus tax paid minus dividend paid and minus interest expense and then it was scaled by 10000 so that the 
magnitude of this variable is compatible with other measurements. Two growth measures have been used in this study namely GROW MB„ 
(market value of equity to book value of asset) which is measured as market value of asset to book value of asset. And secondly, GROWPT  
„ (past growth) which is measured as the change in total assets over total assets. SR,., (stock return) is measured as expected return of 
individual corporations by using CAPM. ATR „ (average tax ratios) is calculated as total tax paid per annum scaled by net profit. 
TAX CLTL „ (tax clientele) is the ratio of number of common shares outstanding by the institutional shareholders to number of total shares 
outstanding. CFV „ (cash flow variation) is the standard deviation of the first difference in earnings before interest and taxes, scaled by mean 
value of interest expense. SIZE„ is the natural logarithm of total asset. CVA ,, (collateral value of assets) is the ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets. AGE,, is the natural logarithm of the age of the firm in years from date of incorporation. LEVERAGE,,, is the ratio of long-term debt 
to long-term debt plus market value of equity. SLACK,,, (financial slack) is measured as the sum of cash balances and marketable securities 
scaled by the market value of equity. Model II incorporates a dummy variable in addition to common eighteen variables to capture 
multinationality. There are eight industries in the sample and a dichotomous variable is used to capture each of these the industry effect on 
dividend payout ratios. The industries are: IND A AGRI FISH (Agricultural, Forestry and Fishing); INDBMINING  (Metal, Coal, Oil and 
Gas); IND C CONSTRUCTN (Building constructions and Heavy constructions); 1NDDMNFCTRNG (Manufacturing, Food, Tobacco, 
Textiles, Furniture and Fixtures and Papers); IND_E_TRNSPT_CMCTN (Transport, Communication, Electric, and Utilities); 
IND F WHOLESALE (Wholesale trade and durable goods); INDGRETAIL  (Retails) and 1NDJ SERVIC (health, Legal, Educational, 
Engineering and Social).____________ __________________________________________________________________________
DIVC,,
A U US JP U K M L
C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat
c - 0 .09 - 0.32 0.16 1.32 0.17 1.16 0.09 0.53 - 0.09 - 0 .97
MULT,, 0.05 1.23 - 0.02
2
- 1.70 - 0.01 - 0.73 - 0.02 - 1.02 0.00 - 0 .17
DIYERU - 0.06
2
-4.32 0.00 - 0 .24 0.01 1.32 0  00 - 0.35 0.00 - 0 .54
FXU - 0.01 - 0.26 0.01 0.52 - 0.05 - 1.46 0.03 1.13 - 0.04 - 1.50
PRu 0.00 0.86 0 .00 - 0.08 0 .00 -1.83 C 0 .00 0 .19 0.00 1.40
AGCU 0.03 1.56 - 0.03
2
-2.62 0.00 0.43 0.01 1.64 0 .00 - 0 .88
FCFo 0.00 - 0.50 0.00
2
4.82 0.00 - 0.57 - 0.01 - 0.97 0.00 - 1.51
GROWMBu 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.11 0.00
2
- 4 .05 0.00 1.07
GROW PTu - 0.01 - 0.68 0 .00 0.65 0 .00
2
2.96 0.02 0.93 0.02 1.16
a a a a a
SR,, 0.03 3.47 0 .09 10.45 0.08 10.03 0.03 6.02 0.03 10.52
a a a a
A TRu 0.00 0.14 0 .00 12.46 0.04 4.00 0.01 2.64 0.00 4.46
a a b
TAX CL TL„ 0.82 3.60 0 .00 4.39 0.00 - 1.43 - 0.36 -2.85 0.05 2.26
a a a a a
CVF,,, - 3.97 -4.62 - 2.94 -4.27 - 4 .20 -6.71 - 3.71 -5.78 - 1.90 -5.50
a a a a
PROF,, 0.03 3.90 - 0.01 - 0.29 0.32 2.72 0.13 2.80 0.11 2.89
a b
BETA,, 0.06 0.47 - 0.04 - 1.30 0.11 2.11 0.09 0.91 0.14 1.99
a a a a a
SIZE,,, 0.06 4.57 0.02 4.52 0.01 4.05 0.03 3.49 0.01 3.02
CVA,, 0.03 0.46 0.01 0.33 0.05 1.26 - 0.01 - 0.25 0.03 1.55
a a a a
AGE-,, - 0.02 - 0.89 0.02 3.65 0.04 3.11 0.02 2.32 0.02 3.56
a a a
LTD,, - 0.17 -2.53 - 0.02 - 0.84 - 0.05 -2.19 - 0.04 - 0.95 - 0.10 -7.15
INDAAGRI_FISH - 0.02 - 0.16 0.06 0 .46 0.10 0.71 0.12 1.35 - 0.02 - 0.67
INDBMINING - 0.10 - 1.00 0.02 0 .40 - 0.02 - 0.23 - 0.11
2
-1.82 - 0.12
2
-1.71
INDCCONSTRUCTN - 0.13 - 1.23 0.07 1.47 0.05 1.08 - 0.12 -2.08 3 0.00 - 0.13
INDDMNFCTRNG - 0.04 - 0.44 - 0.02 - 0.67 0.03 0.63 0.01 0.14 0.01 0 .62
IND_E_ TRNSPT CMCTN - 0.19
c
-1.76 - 0.01 - 0.35 0.05 1.22 0.11 1.67 0.00 - 0.11
IND_F_ WHOLESALE 0.02 0.20 - 0.06 -1.79 C 0.01 0.19 0.05 0.91 0.05 1.86 C
INDGRETAIL 0.09 0.71 - 0.12
2
-3.53 0.04 0.98 0 .04 0.77 0.01 0.21
INDJ SERVIC - 0.02 - 0.22 - 0.07
2
-2.26 - 0.04 - 0.88 - 0.02 - 0.42 - 0.02 - 0 .80
Ad) R-sqr 0.41 0.48 0.26 0.33 0.21
No. o f  Obs 2248 2788 1907 2188 2825
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6.7.7 Cross-country Time Variation Effect on Cash Dividends and 
Multinationality
Table 6.12 presents the overall time effect on dividend payments across five countries. The time 
period reported here is chosen to be 1999-2004 since there is no major variation in the time yearly 
coefficients (YR) after controlling for multinationality. Table 6.12 shows a univariate regression 
that tests the yearly effect on cash dividend payments to investigate the hypothesis of whether time 
has any significant effect on dividend payments to isolate any significant economic-related issues 
like the Asian crisis or the incident of a 7/11 in the U.S. The result shows that over time DCs across 
countries dividend payments decrease significantly. For example, DCs in Australia experienced 
significant decrease during 2002-2004 (t=-2.36; t=-4.16 and -3.74 respectively). A similar pattern 
is also observed in U.S., Japan and Malaysia. It is also noticeable that the MCs in Japan experienced 
paying significantly less cash dividends than the DCs counterparts. This suggest that, overall, time 
has a mixed impact on DCs’ and MCs’ cash dividends payments and it shows that time has a mixed 
impact on DCs’ and MCs’ dividend payments. These findings support the time effect hypothesis 
for DCs and MCs. A further analysis of individual year effects has been investigated to identify 
whether time effect has any significant variation on cash dividend payments determinants, which 
might cause dividend payments to vary.
Table 6.12
Time variation impact cash dividend payout for DCs and MCs across 5 sampled countries
This table reports the results of OLS regression using mainly (Model II) in addition to country, tax regime and legal regimes effect to obtain the 
parameters and t-statistics accordingly for the sample of 2248 (994 DCs and 1254 MCs separately) listed companies in the Australian Stock 
Exchange over 10 years to 2004. The adjusted R squared indicates the model’s goodness of fit.
DIVCt;  =ß0 + ß]MULTjl +ß2DIVERIJ +ß,FX„ +ß4PRIJ + ßsAGC„ + ß(FCFJ + ß1GROW_MBIJ +ßsGROW_PTiJ + ßgSRtJ +ß]0ATRiJ
+ ß\\TAX_CLHi, +ß]2CFVu +ß]3PROFi, +ß]ABETAtJ+ßl5SIZEiJ + ß](CVAII +ßvAGEil +ß]SLIDil + ßl9'£lndustryIJ +£,,
Two dependent variables have been employed and they are. DIVC (cash payout ratios) is calculated using cash dividend paid to net earnings and 
DIVR u  (cash and share repurchase dividend payout ratios) is calculated as cash plus change in treasury stock scaled by net earnings. 
Multinationality (MULT ,,) effect is measured where it takes a value of 1 when a corporation is a multinational otherwise it is 0. DIVER 
(diversification) is the total number of subsidiaries that any firm has within their domicile country and overseas. FX (foreign exchange risk) is 
calculated by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales revenue. P R (p o litica l risk) is the sum of all the MCs subsidiaries countries’ political risk 
ratings exposed to the proportion of each sale that a subsidiary makes overseas. AGC,, (agency cost) is the natural logarithm of total shareholders. 
FCF,,, (free cash flow) measured after Lehn and Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings before interest and tax plus depreciation plus amortization 
plus tax paid minus dividend paid and minus interest expense and then it was scaled by 10000 so that the magnitude of this variable is compatible 
with other measurements. Two growth measures have been used in this study namely GROW M B (m arket value of equity to book value of asset) 
which is measured as market value of asset to book value of asset. And secondly, GROW_PT,, (past growth) which is measured as the change in 
total assets over total assets. SR,,, (stock return) is measured as expected return of individual corporations by using CAPM. A T R (average  tax 
ratios) is calculated as total tax paid per annum scaled by net profit. TAX_CLTL (tax clientele) is the ratio of number of common shares 
outstanding by the institutional shareholders to number of total shares outstanding. C F V ( c a s h  flow variation) is the standard deviation of the first
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difference in earnings before interest and taxes, scaled by mean value of interest expense. SIZE u is the natural logarithm of total asset. CVA 
(collateral value of assets) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. AGE,, is the natural logarithm of the age of the firm in years from date of 
incorporation. LE V E R A G E is the ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt plus market value of equity. Model II adds a dummy variable in 
addition to common eighteen variables to capture multinationality. For example, other attributes: inflation, interest rates, restrictions on the 
quantity of amount DCs and MCs can borrow overseas, debt market efficiency and borrowing costs to finance dividend payments which FX, PR and 
DIVER do not capture. To control for time effect for each year (e g. 1999, 2000, - 2004) a dichotomous variable is used.
D IV C u
A U U S J P U K M L
C o e f f t -S ta t C o e f f t -S ta t C o e f f t -S ta t C o e f f t -S ta t C o e f f t -S ta t
c a
c - 0 .0 8 - 0.31 0 .2 4 1 .7 9 - 0 .0 4 - 0 .2 6 0 .0 8 0 .45 0 .4 3 3 .5 7
M U L T u 0 .0 0 0 .1 0 0 .0 0 - 0 .2 5 - 0 .0 3 - 1 .8 2  C - 0.01 - 0 .3 5 - 0.01 - 0 .5 5
D IV E R ,, - 0 .0 5
a
-4 .4 2 0 .0 0 - 0 .5 9 0 .0 0 1.05 - 0.01 - 0 .6 9 0 .0 0 - 0 .4 0
F X U 0 .0 0 0 .0 8 0 .0 2 1.03 0.01 0 .3 6 0.01 0 .3 0 0.01 0 .4 7
P R u 0 .0 0 1.25 0 .0 0 - 1.02 0 .0 0 0 .0 6 0 .0 0 0.31 0 .0 0 -2 .3 0  3
b a
A G C „ 0 .0 4 2 .4 4 - 0 .0 4 -3 .1 6 0 .0 0 0 .5 4 0.01 1.36 - 0.01 - 1.08
F C F U 0 .0 0 - 0 .2 4 0 .0 0 4 .1 7 0 .0 0 0 .5 6 - 0.01 - 0 .8 0 - 0 .0 1 - 1.50
G R O W M B it 0.01 1.14 0 .0 0 - i n 0 .0 0 1.05 0 .0 0
a
-4 .7 6 0 .0 0 0 .6 8
G R O W  PT ij - 0.01 - 0 .8 4 0 .0 0 0 .5 5 0 .0 0 2 .8 6  3 0 .0 2 0 .7 7 0.01 0 .9 8
a a a a
S R ,, 0 .0 3 3 .5 2 0 .0 9 1 0 .72 0 .0 8 1 0 .7 2 0 .0 3 6 .1 9 0 .0 3 10.41
a a a a
A  TR ,j 0 .0 0 0 .4 2 0 .0 0 1 1 .7 8 0 .0 4 3 .9 7 0.01 2 .6 4 0 .0 0 4 .0 5
a a b
T A X  C L T L U 0.81 3 .6 0 0 .0 0 4 .4 4 0 .0 0 - 0 .4 3 - 0 .3 0 -2 .4 1 0 .0 2 0 .5 7
a a a a a
C V F ,, -4 .7 8 -5 .0 9 - 3 .0 4 -3 .7 7 - 4 .6 5 -6 .8 3 - 4 .0 6 -5 .7 1 - 2 .5 5 -6 .81
a a a a
P R O F u 0 .0 4 4 .9 0 - 0.01 - 0 .6 8 0 .4 0 3 .3 4 0 .1 4 2 .9 9 0 .0 9 2 .7 7
B E T A ■„ - 0 .1 4 - 1.14 - 0 .0 2 - 0 .5 2 0 .0 6 1.05 0 .1 6 1.56 - 0 .0 2 - 0 .2 3
a a a a c
SIZEu, 0 .0 5 4 .3 3 0 .0 2 4 .1 7 0.01 4 .2 4 0 .0 2 3 .0 2 0.01 1.88
C V A U - 0 .0 8 - 1.42 0 .0 4 1.56 0 .0 9 2 .9 6 0 .0 3 0 .8 3 0 .0 3 1.60
a a a a
A G E ,, - 0.01 - 0 .5 7 0 .0 2 4 .2 4 0 .0 6 4 .4 3 0 .0 2 2 .5 7 0 .0 2 3 .6 0
b a a
L T D u -0  15 -2 .2 3 0  01 0 .2 7 - 0 .0 6 - 2 .9 3 - 0.01 - 0 .3 4 - 0 .0 8 -5 .6 5
YR 99 -0 .0 7 - 1.06 0 .0 2 0 .9 4 -0 .0 1 -0.45 0 .0 3 \ .0 9 - 0 .0 7
a
-3 .2 7
c C a
YR 00 - 0.11 -1 .9 2 - 0 .0 3 - 1.45 - 0 .0 4 - 1 .6 7 0 .05 1.54 - 0.11 -5 .1 2
a a
YR 01 - 0.01 - 0 .1 6 - 0.01 - 0.62 - 0 .0 9 -4 .1 8 0 .0 0 -0.04 - 0.11 -5 .9 7
b a a
YR 02 - 0 .1 2 -2 .3 6 - 0 .0 2 - 1.11 - 0 .0 6 -3 .2 9 - 0.01 - 0 .2 2 - 0 .1 5 -7 .9 6
a a a c b
YR 03 - 0.21 -4 .1 6 - 0 .0 3 -2 .0 4 - 0 .0 8 - 4 .5 7 0 .0 6 1.80 - 0 .0 5 -2 .2 5
a a a a
YR 04 - 0 .2 0 -3 .7 4 - 0 .0 4 -2 .6 4 - 0 .1 3 -8 .4 5 0 .0 0 - 0 .1 5 - 0 .0 6 -3 .6 1
A d j  R -s q r 0 .4 3 0 .4 7 0 .2 7 0.31 0 .2 4
N o. o f  O bs 2 2 4 8 2 7 8 8 1907 2 1 8 8 2 8 2 5
Further, in order to investigate whether cash dividend payments are time sensitive, individual yearly 
regressions were conducted (shown in Table 6.13); however, they were not reported as the results 
are identical to earlier results and discussion. However, the following table attempts to test the 
overall time effect on dividend payments. The result show that the DCs in Australia experienced a 
significant (t=-5.63) decrease over the last ten years and Malaysian DCs also experienced a 
downward movement in their dividend payments. In comparison, MCs in any of the sample
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countries show significant change in the dividend payment pattern and this is indicated by an 
insignificant result.
Table 6.13
Trend of time effect on cash dividend for DCs and MCs across 5 sampled countries
D C s -  D I V C u M C s -  D I V C u
A U U S J P U K M L A U U S JP U K M L
C o e f f  t-S ta t C o e f f  t -S ta t C o e f f  t -S ta t  C o e f f  t -S ta t C o e f f  t -S ta t C o e f f  t -S ta t C o e f f  t -S ta t C o e f f  t -S ta t  C o e f f  t -S ta t C o e f f  t -S ta t
a a a a ac 3 8 .7 5  5 .6 8 0 .0 0  0 .5 0 0 .0 2  5 .2 0 6 .6 6  1.07 12.45  3 .2 9 - 0 .0 2  - 3 .9 2 0.01  1.13 0 .0 2  7 .3 5 2  0 9  0 .4 9 0  0 0  -0  97
YR - 0 .0 2  - 5 . 6 3 3 0 .0 0  0 .0 0 0 .0 0  0 .0 0 0 .0 0  - 1.02 - 0.01  - 3 .2 4 0 .0 0  0 .0 0 0 .0 0  0 .0 0 0 .0 0  0 .0 0 0 .0 0  - 0 .4 0 0 .0 0  0 .0 0
A d j  R -sq r 0 .0 2 0 .0 0 0.01 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 2 0 .0 0 0 .0 2 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
N o .  o f  O bs 6 0 3 8 6 0 3 8 6 0 3 8 6 0 3 8 6 0 3 8 5 9 1 8 5 9 1 8 5 9 1 8 5 9 1 8 5 9 1 8
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
6.8 Conclusion
This chapter provides first evidence on the determinants of cash dividend and total dividend payout 
ratios for DCs and MCs across Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia.
On a univariate analysis, it appears that Australia, U.S., Japan and U.K. have significantly different 
cash dividends and total dividend payments relative to DCs. Further, test results also show that 
MCs in both imputational and classical tax system regimes have significantly higher tendency of 
paying both cash dividends and total dividends. Similarly, MCs in common law countries also pay 
significantly higher cash dividend and total dividends relative to DCs. In contrast, MCs in civil law 
countries pay significantly lower cash dividend and total dividends than DCs counterparts. Further, 
DCs and MCs in civil law countries also pay significantly higher dividends than the DCs and MCs 
in common law countries. Similarly, DCs and MCs pay significantly higher dividends under the 
imputational tax regime.
The regression test results of both cash dividend payout and total dividend payout ratios provide 
significant evidence of multinationality effect in determining the difference of cash dividends and 
dividends determinants between DCs and MCs across Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia.
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The effect of multinationality of a corporation is considered as a determining factor for dividend 
distribution across countries and it indicates that the impact of multinationality is explained by 
various determining factors that vary across countries. The common determinants that mostly 
explain the difference between DCs’ and MCs’ cash dividend payout ratios across countries are 
diversification (Australia and U.S.), agency costs and average tax ratios (U.K. and Malaysia), tax 
clientele (U.S. and Malaysia), cash flow variation (Japan and Malaysia). When share repurchase is 
included within the definition, the dividend payout ratios show that the common determinants 
explaining the difference of DCs’ and MCs’ dividend payout ratios slightly changes mainly for U.S. 
corporations, and those additional factors are political risks, stock return, profitability and age. 
Controlling for fixed country effects shows that all sample countries hold significantly positive 
relationship with cash dividend payout ratios and U.S. is the only country which higher total 
dividends relative to other four sample countries. Further, it shows that firms operating in 
imputation tax system and common law environments pay comparatively higher dividend payout 
ratios relative to firms operating in classical tax system and common law regimes. It also shows 
that MCs operating in imputation tax system and common law regime pay significantly lower 
dividend payout ratios relative to DCs counterparts. Lintner’s (1956) model is considered to 
investigate the difference of speed of adjustment in cash dividends between DCs and MCs across 
five sample countries. The results suggest that MCs in Australia, U.S. and Malaysia adjust their 
target dividend payout ratios more than DCs counterparts, while the opposite holds for Japanese and 
U.K. MCs.
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- 7 -
SENSITIVITY
7.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on discussing the robustness of the results obtained with regards to both 
independent and dependent variables definitions and model assumptions in Chapter 4 and Chapter 
6. The sensitivity issues that arise due to different measurement are quite interesting because the 
discrepancies of existing literature. It may be purely driven by different measurements issues. 
Further, the sensitivity issues that arise include the possibility of heteroscadasticity, outliers, 
autocorrelation and multicollinearity in the proposed models. Given the statistical issues of outliers, 
autocorrelation and possible multicollinearity have been considered in describing the distribution of 
the dataset in the data chapter (Chapter 2), and all the regression coefficients reported have been 
adjusted for heteroscadasticity, this chapter mainly emphasises on investigating the sensitivity of 
variable measurement issues and endogenous or interdependent relationship of debt and dividend 
payout ratios.
It is often argued that dividend, investment and leverage have interrelationships (McCabe, 1979; 
Dhrymes & Kurz, 1967). Specifically, to the extent that outlays for investment and dividends are 
viewed as competitive, dividends should have a negative impact on investment. An increase in 
external financing, on the other hand, should exhibit a positive influence on investment since such 
an action increases the pool of funds available to competing uses. The aim of this sensitivity 
chapter is to gain better understanding of the interdependence of financial behaviour and statistical 
validity of results that has been discussed in the earlier chapters.
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7.2 Alternative Variable Specification
To see whether the results are affected by the selection of alternative measurements, two 
measurements are considered: long-term debt scaled by total asset and total debt scaled by total 
asset for the cross country comparison of capital structure (Chapter 4), and one alternative 
measurement is selected for the cross country comparison of dividend payout ratios (Chapter 6). 
The sensitivity analysis of the dividend payout ratios (Chapter 6) will be tested by redefining the 
dependent variable of cash dividend payout ratios scaled by total assets.
No attempt is made in altering any independent variable measurements as the purpose of this thesis 
is not to resolve the different measurement issues that exist in defining proxies in the existing 
literature. Further, given no consensus is reached about any particular best measure for any 
variable, it is decided that the sensitivity of dependent variables only will be tested for sensitivity 
purpose.
7.2.1 Long-term Debt to Total Asset
Table 7.1 presents the sensitivity test results of different long-term debt ratios measurements. When 
long-term debt measurement took the form of long-term debt scaled by total asset, a few changes to 
the coefficient signs and level of significance seem to be obvious in both DCs and MCs (Model I), 
except for U.S. and Japanese DCs and Japanese and U.K. MCs. This demonstrates that the initial 
measurement is not biased towards alternative measurements that are used for the purpose of the 
sensitivity. Further, the explanatory powers of DCs and MCs regression seems compatible 
compared to the original results across countries that reported in Chapter 4.
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7.2.2 Total Debt
Table 7.2 provides a sensitivity analysis of total debt scaled by book value of total assets. The 
impact of this altered dependent variable measurement shows slightly different results, especially 
the size effect on DCs in the U.K. and U.S. For example, in U.K. and U.S., the DCs do not show a 
significant positive relationship with total debt. This may be due to scaling the total debt with total 
assets, as total assets is used to scale a few other independent variables that might have caused the 
inconsistency in size effect results; however, the sign of this coefficient remained consistent. The 
rest of the coefficients have expected signs and are similarly as significant as the original models. 
The adjusted R2 shows a mixed result; for example, the explanatory power increased from 0.33 to 
0.47, 0.20 to 0.24 and 0.19 to 0.22 for Australian, U.K. and Malaysian DCs respectively. However, 
the explanatory power decreased from 0.25 to 0.18 and 0.53 to 0.45 for U.K. and Japanese DCs 
respectively. It appears that this measurement suits Australian and Malaysian MCs better, as the 
model improved in explaining the variations by the selected coefficients (e.g. adjusted R2 increased 
from 0.43 to 0.58 and 0.41 to 0.46) and most of the significance levels of the determinants are 
consistent with the prior literature.
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7.2.3 Cash Dividends to Total Assets
Table 7.3 shows the sensitivity of cash dividend to total assets. This sensitivity of cash dividend 
measurement as an independent variable shows different results, especially the coefficient effect on 
DCs and MCs across countries. For example, in Model I, the number of significant coefficients for 
Australian, U.S., Japanese, U.K. and Malaysian DCs increased from 7 to 9, 8 to 10, 8 to 16 and 6 to 
9 respectively. This may be due to scaling the total debt with total assets, as total assets is used to 
scale a few other independent variables that might have caused the inconsistency in size effect 
results; however, the sign of this coefficient remained consistent. The rest of the coefficients have 
expected signs and are similarly as significant as the original models. The adjusted R2 indicates a 
mixed result; for example, the explanatory power increased for both U.S. DCs and MCs while it 
remained similar for U.K. DCs and MCs. However, the explanatory power decreased for U.S. and 
Malaysian DCs and MCs respectively. It appears that this measurement suits Australian and 
Japanese MCs better as the model explains them better (e.g. adjusted R2 increased from 0.42 to 0.53 
and 0.27 to 0.53) and most of the significance levels of the determinants across DCs and MCs 
across countries produce relatively more promising results as the number of significance across 
coefficients increased notably.
280
T
ab
le
 7
.3
Se
ns
iti
vi
ty
 a
na
ly
si
s 
of
 ca
sh
 d
iv
id
en
ds
 m
ea
su
re
d 
as
 c
as
h 
di
vi
de
nd
s 
to
 to
ta
l a
ss
et
s 
fo
r 
D
C
s 
an
d 
M
C
s
OO
<N
T
ab
le
 7
.3
 C
on
tin
ue
d 
.
p  8 p
o o oo  o  o
o § P
7.2.4 Z-score
Using Altman’s Z-score (1968)55 as an alternative proxy for bankruptcy costs shows that the 
adjusted R2 is higher than original Model I (Table 4.6 in Chapter 4) across the five countries (DCs: 
0.438; 0.289; 0.562; 0.253 and 0.291 and MCs: 0.531; 0.432; 0.548; 0.291 and 0.474 in Australia, 
U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia). The coefficients’ significance level slightly changed. 
Profitability is highly negatively significant in Australian DCs but in the rest of the countries’ DCs 
it remains insignificant. This measurement of bankruptcy appears to have captured the bankruptcy 
costs better than the previous measurement of bankruptcy costs. For example, this is indicated by 
higher significance level of t-test statistics and expected negative coefficients across DCs and MCs 
(t = -7.521, -3.127, -3.955, -5.271 and -3.225 for DCs in Australia, Japan, U.S., U.K. and Malaysia 
respectively and t = -4.082, -2.122, -2.664 and -4.114 for Australia, U.S., U.K. and Malaysia 
respectively). The results of this sensitivity is not presented in a table to minimise repetition of rest 
of the coefficients results.
7.2.5 Multinational Corporations and Diversification
It has been argued in the literature that firms international effect is non-linear to debt and dividend 
payout ratios (Allen & Pantzalis, 1996). This non-linearity rises from the fact that as the operation 
of any firm increases, it does not necessarily confirm a positive impact on a firm’s capital structure 
and dividend policy decision. This occurs because the advantage of diversification has an optimal 
level of benefit, and once this level is achieved, the additional exposure of international operational 
risks outweighs the benefit and in return it impacts negatively on a firm’s performance, which leads 
to a concern with on capital structure and dividend payment decisions. This impact non-linearity of
55 Altman z-score =
C u r r e n t  A s s e t
C u r r e n t L i a b i I i t i e s 
T o t a l  A s s e t
+  0 . 6 *
M a r k e t  V a l u e  o f  E q u i t y
+
S a l e s
B o o k  V a l u e  o f  T o t a l  L i a b i l i t y T o t a l  A s s e t
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diversification and its effect on debt and dividend payout ratios will be assessed across five sample 
countries. The reason for testing the non-linearity of foreign expansion and its impact on five 
countries is to investigate whether the non-linearity of foreign involvement is uniform across five 
countries as those five sample countries’ firms are in different phases of their maturity and also vary 
in the extent of international involvements. For example, firms in U.S. are far more diversified, 
while firms in Malaysia are less diversified, smaller in size and relatively more in a growth phase.
The extent of diversification can be explained through depth and breadth of firms geographical 
involvement. DIVER measures firm’s breadth of geographical diversity while FX measures the 
depth or concentration of foreign involvement. Table 7.4 presents the optimal level of foreign 
involvement through breadth {DIVER)2 and depth {FX)2 and their impact on long-term debt ratios. 
Similarly, Table 7.5 shows the optimal level of foreign involvement through breadth {DIVER)2 and 
depth {FX)2 and their impact on dividend payout ratios.
The results in Table 7.4 show that the optimal degree of geographical diversification (breadth: 
{DIVER)2) for U.S. firms presents a significant positive (t=3.12) relationship with long-term debt 
ratios. This suggests that as U.S. firms become larger through multiple subsidiaries across domicile 
and foreign countries, it assist to raise more long-term debt. The positive outcome might include 
favourable subsidiaries’ business conditions to raise local debt, less interest expense and low 
transaction costs. However, the coefficient for MULT is negative and significant (t=-3.95) and this 
magnitude of the coefficient is much larger than the coefficient of {DIVER)2, which indicates that 
the U.S. MCs benefit significantly less than DCs counterparts in expanding in multiple geographical 
locations.
Sometimes the depth of international operation is measured by the extent of foreign sales {FX). It is 
also often argued that this proxy is used to capture diversification or extent of any firm’s 
international involvement. It appears that the optimal depth of foreign countries operation {FX)2
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shows a significant and negative relationship with long-term debt ratios only in Malaysia. This 
indicates that as the sales of Malaysian firms increase overseas, they significantly decreases (t=- 
2.26) after reaching an optimal level of sales.
Table 7.4
The concavity effect of the depth and breadth of international operation and their impact on long-term
debt across 5 sampled countries
This table reports the concavity effect of the depth and breadth of international operation and their impact on debt for the sample of 11956 (6038 
DCs and 5918 MCs separately) listed companies across five stock exchanges, namely: Australia, U.S., Japan, U K. and Malaysia Stock Exchange 
over 10 years to 2004. The adjusted R squared indicates the model’s goodness of fit.
L T D it = ß 0 + ß xM U L T it + ß 2 DI VER, ,  + ß , F X it + ß ^ D J V E R , , ) 2 + ß s( F X i l ) 2 + ß 6 P R tl + ß l i t B P T C Y
+ ß . B E T A , ,  + ß . N D T S , ,  + ß x0 A T R it + ß u S l Z E it + ß xlC V A it + ß ^ A G E , ,  + ß ^ P R O F , ,  + ß ]5 D l V it 
+ ß \ 6 E C F it + ß ^ G  R O W  t , + s jt
The dependent variable is measured as long-term debt divided by long-term debt and market value of assets (LTD iß. The variables are 
measured in the following manner: M U L T - multinationality takes a value of 1 (unity) if the corporation is multinational corporations 
otherwise it is 0 (domestic corporations). D I V E R -  diversification is defined as the natural logarithm of total subsidiaries in home 
country and overseas countries. F X — foreign exchange risk is measured as a regression coefficient of trade-weighted index and this is 
obtained by regressing individual firms return against market index and trade-weighted index on a yearly basis using weekly frequency 
data. In order to capture the concavity of international operation and its benefit, a non linear approach is followed by taking the squares 
of two international operational related factors which are ((DIVER,,,)2 and (FX),,,2) measured as square of D IV E R and FX,.,. which were 
defined earlier. PR,., -  political risk variable is measured as the proportion of foreign sales to total sales times by the country’s political 
risk index which is provided by PRS Global. B P T C Y - bankruptcy risk is measured as the standard deviation of last five years earrings 
volatility of firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. BETA - firm-specific risk is measured as the covariance of firm return index and 
market index divided by variance of market index. N D T S -  non-debt tax shield is calculated as depreciation expense to total assets.
A TXj,, -  average tax is calculated as a ratio of tax expense to total income. SIZE if, -  sice variable is measured as natural logarithm of total 
assets. CVA -  collateral value o f assets is measured as the ratio of total fixed assets to total assets. AGE Ll -  age is defined as the 
natural logarithm of the number of years since it has been incorporated until the year of analysis. PROFu -  profitability is defined as the 
average ratio of net income over total sales. D I V -  dividend payment is a ratio of total dividend paid to net income (note losses made 
any year has been deleted from sample). AG C ,,, is defines as is the natural logarithm of total shareholders. F C F -  free cash flow  
measured after Lehn and Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings before interest and taxes, depreciation, amortization minus tax, dividend 
and interest expense scaled by 10,000. GROW i4 -  growth is the market value of assets over total assets._________________
LTD AU US JP G B MY
Variable C oeff t-Stat Coeff t-Stat C oeff t-Stat CoefT t-Stat C oeff t-Stat
c - 0 .2 5 - 1.56 0 .0 2 0 .1 3 - 0 .8 5 -6 .0 7 - 0 .6 3 - 4 .6 2 - 0 .1 0 - 0 .8 2
M U L T ü 0 .0 4 1.60 - 0 .0 7 -3.95 0 .0 3 1.54 0 .0 2 1.17 0 .0 5
a
1.94
D I V E R ,., - 0 .0 2 - 1.07 - 0 .0 8 -3.74 - 0.01 - 0.81 - 0 .0 2 - 1.15 - 0.01 - 0 .4 4
F X ij - 0 .0 2 - 0 .1 9 - 0 .1 5 -1.97 - 0.01 -0.11 0 .0 3 0 .4 0 0 .2 8 2.73
( D I V E R j 0 .0 0 0 .5 4 0.01 3.12 0 .0 0 0 .5 2 0 .0 0 0 4 8 0 .0 0 - 0 .4 8
( F X J 2 - 0 .0 8 - 0.71 0.11 1.35 - 0 .0 3 - 0.21 - 0 .0 2 - 0 .2 7 - 0 .2 8
a
-2.26
P R  i , t 0 .0 0 1.30 0 .0 0 0 .2 5 0 .0 0 - 0 .3 4 0.01
a
3.43 0 .0 0 - 0 .4 7
a b
B P T C Y u 0 .0 0 1.13 0 .0 0 - 0 .0 2 0 .0 0 1.41 0 .0 0 -3.72 0 .0 0 -1.71
a a a a
B E T A - 0 .2 0 -2.03 - 0 .2 6 -7.36 - 0 .3 0 -6.08 - 0 .3 0 -3.97 - 0 .1 2 - 1.20
a a a
A T R i't - 0 .2 8 - 1.14 - 2 .7 7 -8.73 - 0 .3 9 -1.91 - 0 .1 3 - 1.62 - 0 .8 7 -2.39
a a a
XDTS^t 0 .0 0 2.18 0 .0 0 9.73 0.01 2.04 0 .0 0 - 1.60 0 .0 0 1.26
a a a a a
S I Z E  ; , 0 .0 7 9.68 0 .0 6 12.37 0 .0 9 35.27 0 .0 6 8.93 0 .0 8 14.60
a a a a
C VA 0 .0 3 0 .6 7 0 .3 8 11.57 0 .2 8 8.16 0 .1 6 4.65 0 .1 8 5.50
a a a a
A  G E  i t - 0 .0 3 -2.84 - 0 .0 4 -6.62 0 .0 7 4.96 0 .0 3 3.88 0 .0 0 - 0 .4 0
a a a
P R O F Ut - 0 .0 5 -1.74 - 0 .6 7 -3.54 - 1.77 -6.22 - 0 .0 7 -2.38 - 0 .3 9 -3.65
a a a a
DIVi,, - 0 .0 9 -3.24 0 .1 0 4.51 - 0 .0 6 -2.73 - 0.01 - 0 .3 7 - 0 .2 9 -10.15
a a a
f c f u - 0 .0 5 -2.36 0 .0 0 8.88 0 .0 2 4.74 - 0.01 - 1.49 0.01 1.04
a a a a
G R O W  M B  i j - 0.01 -3.43 0 .0 0 -1.82 0 .0 0 2.41 0 .0 0 2.94 0 .0 0 1.25
N o . o f  O b s 2 2 4 8 2 7 8 8 1 907 2 1 8 8 2 8 2 5
A d j  R - s q r 0 .3 4 0.31 0 .5 2 0 .2 3 0 .2 0
a, b and c represents 1%, 5% and 10% level of statistical significance respectively
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When the non-linear relationship of diversification {DIVER)2 and foreign sales (FX)2 have been 
controlled within the cash dividend payout ratios model (Model 1 in Chapter 5), it suggests that the 
effect of optimal geographical involvement (e.g. breadth and depth) play a significant role on 
dividend payout ratios (Table 7.5). For example, the {DIVER)2 coefficient shows a statistical 
positive significant relationship with dividend payout ratios (t=1.80; 2.88 and t= 1.85) for U.S., U.K. 
and Malaysian firms respectively. This result suggest that the MCs of U.S., U.K. and Malaysia are 
geographically dispersed and are located in countries where markets are uncorrelated with the 
domicile country which assists to take advantage of market imperfections in payments of cash 
dividends. On the contrary, (FX)2 suggest that when firms in U.K. that are more concentrated in 
foreign sales, experience a significant inverted U shaped relationship with cash dividend payout 
ratios (t=-1.92). This suggest that foreign sales for U.K. firms have an optimal level and once it 
reaches that optimal point of foreign sales, it significantly reduces the cash dividend payment 
capacity.
The above resuhs suggest that it is not necessarily the case that firms in every country experience 
the non-linear relationship with foreign involvement in determining capital structure and dividend 
payout decisions. The significant impact of the additional non-linear variable (e.g. {DIVER)2) 
which is proxied for local and international dispersion have a significant positive relationship for 
three out of five sample countries and this effect is similar for both DCs and MCs. However, the 
results also show that the concavity effect of foreign sales {FX2) on DCs and MCs is similar for 
Malaysian firms. The negative significant effect of {FX2) indicates that there is an optimal level of 
obtaining foreign market share as far as product sales goes and, when this level is achieved, the 
additional sales and associated costs and risks impose negative effect on firms’ profit level, which 
in return decrease dividend payments in Malaysia.
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Table 7.5
The concavity effect of the depth and breadth of international operation and their impact on cash dividend payout
across 5 sampled countries
This table reports the concavity effect of the depth and breadth of international operation and their impact on debt for the sample of 11956 (6038 
DCs and 5918 MCs separately) listed across five stock exchanges namely: Australia, US, Japan, UK and Malaysia Stock Exchange over 10 years to 
2004. The adjusted R squared indicates the model’s goodness of fit.
D1VC, ,  = ß 0 + ß xM U L T it + ß 2DIVER, ,  + ß 3FX, ,  + ß , ( DI V E R , , ) 2 + ß s( F X , , ) 2 + ß 6PR_,  + ß . A G C , ,
+ ß^FCF, , + ß , G R O W  _ MB, ,  + ß wG R O W  _ PT, ,  + ß u SR, ,  + ß n ATR,, + ß ]3TAX _ CL T L , ,
+ ß u CFV , ,  + ß ]5P ROF,, + ß X6BETA, , + ß xlS l ZEit + ß xsCVAi , + ß x9A G E , , + ß 10LTD , , + s , ,
The dependent variables has been employed and it is calculated as DIVC ,., (cash payout ratios) cash dividend paid to net earnings. 
Multinationality (MULT,.,) effect is measured where it takes a value of 1 when a corporation is a multinational otherwise it is 0. DIVER,, 
(diversification) is the total number of subsidiaries that any firm has within their domicile country and overseas. FX,, (foreign exchange 
risk) is calculated by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales revenue. (DIVER)2 and (FX)2 are the square of DIVER and FX that mentioned 
earlier. PR,., (political risk) is the sum of all the MCs subsidiaries countries’ political risk ratings exposed to the proportion of each sale 
that a subsidiary makes overseas. AGC,., (agency cost) is the natural logarithm of total shareholders. FCF,., (free cash flow) measured 
after Lehn and Poulsen (1989) is the sum of earnings before interest and tax plus depreciation plus amortization plus tax paid minus 
dividend paid and minus interest expense and then it was scaled by 10000 so that the magnitude of this variable is compatible with other 
measurements. Two growth measures have been used in this study namely GROW MB,, (market value of equity to book value of asset) 
which is measured as market value of asset to book value of asset. And secondly, GROW P T ,., (past growth) which is measured as the 
change in total assets over total assets. SR,-, (stock return) is measured as expected return of individual corporations by using CAPM.
A T R ,., (average tax ratios) is calculated as total tax paid per annum scaled by net profit. TAX CLTL ,., (tax clientele) is the ratio of 
number of common shares outstanding by the institutional shareholders to number of total shares outstanding. C F V ,., (cash flow 
variation) is the standard deviation of the first difference in earnings before interest and taxes, scaled by mean value of interest expense.
PROF (Profitability) is the average ratio of net income over total sales for the last three years. BETA is calculated as the capital market 
beta. SIZE,., is the natural logarithm of total asset. CVA ,., (collateral value of assets) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. AGE,., -  
age is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of years since it has been incorporated until the year of analysis. LEVERAGE,., is 
the ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt plus market value of equity.__________________________________________
C a sh A U U S J P G B M Y
V a r ia b le C o e f f t -S ta t C o e f f t -S ta t C o e f f t -S ta t C o e f f t -S ta t C o e f f t -S ta t
C - 0 .1 3 - 0 .5 0 0 .1 9 1.57 0 .1 4 0 .9 9 0 .1 7 0 .9 6 - 0 .0 3 - 0 .3 8
MULT 0 .0 4 0 .8 9 0 .0 0 - 0 .2 6 0 .0 0 - 0 .2 2 - 0.01 - 0 .3 6 0.01 0 .3 2
D IVERu -0  08
a
-2 .51 -0  03
a
-1 .7 4 - 0 0 1 - 0 .4 2 - 0 .0 8
a
-2 .9 7 - 0 .0 3
a
- 1 .9 7
F X U 0 .1 5 0 .8 0 0 .0 5 0 .8 7 - 0 .1 8
a
- 2 .1 4 0 .1 8
a
1 .9 5 - 0 .0 5 - 0 .7 2
(D IV E R T  *2 0 .0 1 1 .4 8 0 .0 0
a
1 .8 0 0 .0 0 0 .8 9 0 .0 2
a
2 .8 8 0.01
a
1 .8 5
(F X J*2 - 0 .2 0 - 0 .9 6 - 0 .0 3 - 0 .5 5 0 .2 6 1.63 - 0 .1 8 -1 .9 2 0 .0 3 0.31
PRu 0 .0 0 1.11 0 .0 0 - 0 .3 7 0 .0 0 - 1.51 0 .0 0 0 .2 4 0 .0 0 1.13
A G C U 0 .0 3
a
1 .9 0 - 0 .0 3
a
-2 .8 6 0 .0 0 0.51 0.01 1.44 0 .0 0 - 0 .5 8
F C F i , - 0.01 - 1.02 0 .0 0
a
4 .8 6 0 .0 0 - 0 .5 5 - 0.01 - 0 .7 0 - 0.01 - 1.57
G R O W M B ,, 0 .01 1.08 0 .0 0 - 1.05 0 .0 0 1.44 0 .0 0
a
-4 .5 4 0 .0 0 0 .3 8
G R O W  PT U - 0.01 - 0 .6 7 0 .0 0 0.51 0 .0 0
a
2 .9 5 0.01 0 .6 5 0 .0 2 1.19
SR,j 0 .0 3
a
3 .5 8 0 .0 9
a
1 0 .94 0 .0 8
a
1 0 .6 0 0 .0 3
a
6 .3 2 0 .0 3
a
1 0 .5 3
A T R U 0 .0 0 0 .1 7 0 .0 0
a
1 1 .72 0 .0 4
a
4 .0 4 0.01
a
2 .6 8 0 .0 0
a
4 .4 3
TAX CLTL,., 0 .9 0
a
4 .0 0 0 .0 0
a
4 .6 3 0 .0 0 - 0 .8 0 - 0 .3 0
a
-2 .4 9 0 .0 5
a
2.11
CVF U - 4 .6 4
a
-5 .2 0 - 3 .0 6
a
-4 .3 0 - 4 .2 8
a
- 6 .8 9 - 3 .5 8
a
-5 .5 8 - 1.98
a
-5 .7 3
PRO Fu 0 .0 4
a
4 .5 7 0 .0 0 - 0 .2 6 0 .3 2
a
2 .7 8 0 .1 5
a
3 .0 8 0.11
a
3 .0 3
BETAi^ 0.01 0 .0 7 - 0 .0 5 - 1.59 0.11
a
2 .1 0 0 .0 8 0 .8 7 0 .1 4
a
1 .9 9
SIZE ,, 0 .0 5
a
4 .4 7 0.01
a
4 .1 3 0.01
a
4 .0 3 0 .0 2
a
3 .1 7 0.01
a
2.21
CVA„ - 0 .0 3 - 0 .5 2 0 .0 4
a
1 .69 0 .0 7
a
2 .2 8 0 .0 4 1.07 0 .0 3 1.63
A G E U - 0 .0 3 - 1.61 0 .0 2
a
4 .0 6 0 .05
a
3 .6 2 0 .0 2
a
1.81 0 .0 2
a
3.71
LT D U - 0 .1 8
a
-2 .6 2 0 .0 0 - 0.11 - 0 .0 5
a
- 2 .3 5 - 0 .0 2 - 0 .5 3 - 0 .1 0
a
- 7 .0 0
Adj R-sqr 0 .4 0 0 .4 7 0 .2 5 0.31 0.21
No. ofObs 2 2 4 8 2 7 8 8 1907 2 1 8 8 2 8 2 5
a, b and c are the statistical significance level for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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7.3 Endogeneity Test between Cash Dividends & 
Leverage
In this section we test for endogeneity between leverage and dividend payout ratios through 
Hausmen test statistics. We test this endogeneity behaviour by employing mainly Model I from 
Chapter 4 and Model I from Chapter 6:
Model I of Chapter 4:
Leverage ( L ^  ^  1 ß \ ^ InternationalJactors(i.t) ß l ^ Tradeoff _  factors(i,I) ^  1 Firm peckinporderfi.l)
or
LTDit= ß0 + ß xDIVERlt + ß2FXlt +ß,PRll + ß4BPTCYtl + ß 5BETA1, + ß.ATR,, + ß 7NDTSlt
+ ßsSIZEi l + ß 9CVAi l+ ß xoAGElt + ßuPROFlt + ßuDIVCit + ßnFCFit + ß  fiROWlt + eu
Model I of Chapter 6:
DIVC,, = ßQ + ß,DIVER, + ß 2FXlt + ß 3PRlJ + ß 4AGCl l + ß 5FCFl + ßfiROW  _MB,,
+ ß.GROW _PTit + ß&SR,, + ß9ATR,t + ßwTAX_CLTLit + ßuCFVit + ß, 2PROFlt 
+ ß„BETA„ + ßHSIZE„ + ßaCVA,_, + ß ltAGE,, + +
In our view of the trade-off and pecking order model, the two endogenous variables are the target 
dividend payout ratios and target leverage. Both are functions of profitability, investment 
opportunities (growth), and other variables which are exogenous. The target payout depends on 
target leverage, and vice versa. We chose to investigate the cash dividend only for the purpose of 
testing endogeneity because the share repurchases activity across our chosen sample countries are 
not that strong and frequent except for the U.S. In order to preserve the consistency across 
countries endogeneity test between MCs and DCs, we only focus on cash dividend type of dividend 
payment method and disregarded the alternative modes of dividend payment (e.g. share 
repurchases).
Leverage ratio is included in the estimation model to control for the simultaneity of dividends and 
capital structure decisions. Following the results obtained by Bradley et al. (1998), firms with high
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debt ratio would be expected to pay lower dividends. Since the previous studies on capital structure 
found debt ratios to be related to many of the right hand side variables included in the regression 
model for dividends, a simultaneous equation is conducted in this section so that the endogeneity of 
the dividend payout and leverage is justified. Also, Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992) linked the 
interaction between financial policies (dividend payout and leverage) and found that corporate 
financial decisions are interdependent.
Given one of the determinants of LTD, , (Model 1 -  Chapter 4) is DIVCU and LTD, , also happens to 
be one of the explanatory factors of DIVC,it (Model I -  Chapter 6), it creates an endogenous 
relationship which we believe may have biased the results in Table 6.4 -  Panel A. Therefore, to test 
this biasness we conducted a Hausman test (1978) as mentioned earlier, which accounts for 
detecting the endogeneity of the two interdependent economic variables (e.g. leverage and dividend 
payout ratios). Results suggest that endogeneity is highly significant for DCs and MCs across 
Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia. This indicates that the model specification in Chapter 4 
(explaining leverage ratios with the suggested explanatory variables) and model specification in 
Chapter 6 (explaining dividend payout ratios with the suggested explanatory variables) is violated 
and not justified. There may be a number of reasons for this violation, and one of the main reasons 
we suspect is the existence of an interdependency relationship between leverage and dividend 
ratios. To account for this violation, a further test is conducted in section 7.4 and presented in 
Tables 7.6 and 7.7.
7.4 2SLS Test between Cash Dividends and Leverage
Given we found significant endogenous relationship between dividend payments and leverage 
across the sample countries for both DCs and MCs, a two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) is 
considered to account for the violation of OLS regression’s recursivity, especially models where we 
showed that the disturbance term of the dependent variable (leverage and dividend payout ratios) is 
correlated with the cause(s) of the independent variables (dividend and leverage ratios). Tables 7.6
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and 7.7 present the 2SLS regression results for cash dividends and leverage for both DCs and MCs 
across five countries and the table reports the second stage results with the newly created variable 
DIV_HATlt for long-term debt model and LEVERAGE HATlt for dividend payout ratios model 
which is adjusted for endogeneity. Results in these two tables show that after adjusting for 
endogeneity, the initial results in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 remains mostly unchanged. Therefore, 
despite the existence of endogeneity we observed in the earlier results (shown in this sensitivity 
chapter), the reported results remain very similar relative to endogeneity adjusted results. 
Therefore, we can argue that the endogeneity and core arguments of the dividend payout and capital 
structure determinants do not impact on the variables of concern.
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7.5 Robustness of Statistical  Assum ptions
This section focuses on discussing the robustness of the results obtained with regards to model 
assumption that we relied on in the earlier chapters. The sensitivity issues including 
multicollinearity, outliers, heteoscadasticity and autocorrelations are discussed below.
7.5.1 Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity refers to correlation among the independent variables in a multiple regression 
model (Wooldridge, 2000). The problem of multicollinearity is that the experimental design is 
such that the data does not contain enough “information” about the individual effects of control 
variables to permit us to estimate the parameters of the statistical model precisely. The concern 
regarding specification errors from a multivariate regression is the possibility that high 
correlation exists between independent variables. A commonly used rule of thumb is that a 
correlation coefficient between two explanatory variables greater than 0.80 or 0.90 indicates a 
strong association and a potentially harmful collinear relationship (Griffith, Hill and Judge, 
2000). High multicollinearity among independent variables could result in imprecise parameter 
estimates and hypothesis testing would not be powerful (Kennedy, 1992). The Pearson Product 
Moment correlation matrix presented in Appendix 4 shows the pair-wise relationship for the 
independent and dependent variables across the five sample countries’ DCs and MCs. It shows 
that some of the variables are correlated to each other; however, not to a 0.80 or 0.90 level. 
This results were discussed in data chapter (Chapter 2). Further, a test for the potential of 
harmful collinearity is conducted using the inverse of the correlation matrix to drive the 
variance inflation factors (VIF). The VIF is given by:
VIF =  1/(1-R2)
where R2 is the correlation. As a general rule, a VIF value greater than 10 or 20 indicates 
harmful collinearity (Kennedy, 1992; Greene, 2003). The above VIF values for the crucial 
financial variables across the five countries are presented in Appendix 2 (A: DCs and B: MCs)
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and it shows that the reported VIF variables for all the models in the earlier chapters across five 
countries are all less than 10 or 20, and therefore substantiating that multicollinearity is not 
thought to be a problem.
7.5.2 Influential observations
Outliers are observations in a data set that are substantially different from the bulk of the data, 
perhaps because of errors or because some data are unusual observations (Wooldridge, 2000). 
The rationale for looking for outliers is that they may have a strong influence on the estimates, 
an influence that may not be desirable. One should not be looking only for outliers of whatever 
type, but also for observations that have a strong influence on the estimates such outliers, called 
influential observations. If the outlier is an error, then it should be excluded from the analysis. 
If the outlier is an observation, then having a sufficiently large sample will indicate that the 
influence of the unusual observation will be insignificant. Often regression assumes normality 
in the distribution of the residuals. Outliers can cause the residuals to be non-normally 
distributed. This in turn can lead to erroneous estimates of the coefficients. Therefore, a further 
residual normality test is conducted (Kennedy, 1992) in addition to winsorising (discussed in 
Chapter 2) and presented in Appendix 3 for Model I (Panel A for DCs) and Model II (Panel B 
for MCs).56
The Jarque-Berra test result of the residuals (Appendix 3) for Model I (Table 4.6 in Chapter 4) 
across all countries rejects the null hypothesis of normality in the sample residuals at a 1 percent 
significance level (p=0.000). This finding casts doubt on the initial result obtained from Model 
I. As discussed by Brailsford, Faff and Oliver (1997), large absolute values of residuals can 
cause non-normality, leading to unreliable inferences. Therefore, a two step procedure is
56 Note that no attempt is made to include the test results for other models in sensitivity analysis (e.g. 
heteroscedasticity, outlier, autocorrelation) because, since these models use the pooled sample, the result would be 
nothing but a repetition.
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followed to identify influential observations:57 firstly, to visually assess outliers (Appendix 1). 
As expected, there are some extreme values lying above the bulk of the sample observations. A 
trimmed least-squared approach was followed to identify outliers, with data points first removed 
if they exceeded three standard deviations from the mean and, second, observations removed if 
their residuals exceeded three standard deviations from the mean. This is sufficient to remove 
the extreme values of concern without ‘data mining’ the results. By following this procedure, 
some outliers are indeed identified and excluded. Then the regressions are run again for Model 
I (Table 6.4 in Chapter 6). However, the outcome suggests a very minor difference in the 
magnitude of coefficient estimates (e.g. slight change on the 5th decimal points) and no 
difference in coefficient signs or even statistical significance of the coefficient estimates. 
Therefore, more confidence can be given as to the robustness of the initial results.
7.5.3 Heteroscadasticity
Heteroscedasticity refers to the situation where the error terms do not have constant variance. It 
is thus a violation of one of the classical error assumptions (homoscedasticity).58 
Heteroscadasticity poses potentially severe problems for inferences based on least squares 
regressions estimates. In our OLS regression analysis, we report White (1980) adjusted t- 
statistics which accounts for any heteroscadastic problems. Further, for the OLS model it is 
possible to examine the residual plots and determine visually if the residuals appear to move in 
a non-homoscedastic manner. Appendix 4 provides the result of testing for homoscedasticity 
for Model I for Chapter 5 (Table 3).59 The fitted value against the residuals for Model I across 
five countries indicates that heteroscedasticity is not an issue (e.g. Appendix 3 for Model I for 
the existence of homoscedasticity).
57 Cook (1979) states that an observation may be judged influential if important features of the analysis are altered 
substantially when the observation is deleted. He also noted that the influence of an observation is partially 
manifested through the associated and residual variance.
58 Keller and Warrack (2003).
59 Similar results are also observed for other tables; however, the result is not reported to avoid repetitions.
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7.5.4 Autocorrelation
The autocorrelation or serial correlation is the correlation between the errors of a variable with 
itself over successive time intervals (Keller and Warrack, 2003). In a time series data set the 
existence of autocorrelation is more likely. A detection of autocorrelation is necessary because 
in real world problems there is uncertainty as to whether the errors in the econometric model are 
correlated. That is, the set of residuals must be pair-wise independent, so that the residual for 
one observation is independent of the residuals for every other observation. Otherwise the 
estimates would be biased and unreliable. As mentioned earlier, problems of autocorrelation are 
more likely to occur in time-series data as opposed to cross-sectional data. In order to 
investigate the existence of autocorrelation this study calculated Durbin-Watson statistic for 
both DCs and MCs (Table 4.6 of Chapter 4: Panel A - DCs and Panel B - MCs). This study will 
be testing the following:
H0: p = 0 (No autocorrelation in the model)
Hi: p > 0 (Autocorrelation exists in the model) 
The decision rules:
If d < dLc, reject H0: p = 0;
if d > dUCi do not reject H0: p = 0;
if dLc< d < dUc, the test is inconclusive.
Table 7.8
Test for autocorrelation
P a n e l A  - D C s P a n e l B  - M C s
j p UK us AU M L j p UK US AU M L
R h o  ( p ) 0.056 -0.115 0.002 0.043 -0.001 0.013 0.006 0.070 -0.013 -0.033
D u r b i n  W a t s o n  ( d ) 2.896 3.669 2.981 2.572 3.106 2.975 2.189 2.351 2.125 3.016
K 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
d u c @ 5 % 1.908 1.908 1.908 1.908 1.908 1.908 1.908 1.908 1.908 1.908
d u  @ 5 % 1.632 1.632 1.632 1.632 1.632 1.632 1.632 1.632 1.632 1.632
Do not Do not Do not Do not Do not Do not Do not Do not Do not Do not
Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject
D e c i s i o n H, Ho Ho H„ H„ Ho H„ Ho Ho Ho
Table 7.8 presents the autocorrelation detection test results. The p represents the 
autocorrelation of Model I for DCs and MCs across each countries, d stands for Durbin-Watson
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test statistics for those two models, K is the number of independent variables used in the 
regression model, and dUc and dLc are the upper and lower critical values for the Durbin-Watson 
statistics respectively. It can be seen from Table 9 that, following the decision rules, there is no 
existence of autocorrelation in DCs and MCs across countries. This further confirms the 
robustness of the initial findings.
7.6 Conclusion
In this sensitivity chapter we have showed that our reported results in the previous chapters do 
not suffer from any statistical and definitional problems. The results produced in this chapter 
confirm the reliability, validity and unbiasness in the crucial financial determining factors in the 
regression analysis that has been conducted for capital structure and dividend payout ratios in 
earlier chapters across multinational and domestic corporations for five sample countries. 
Despite the existence of endogeneity, the initial results and the interpreted theory to support the 
hypothesis still holds. Robustness check has been considered and further confirms the validity 
of our reported results.
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- 8 -
SUMMARY & CONCLUSION
8.1 Introduction
This thesis is motivated by the lack of consensus regarding the determinants of capital structure 
and dividend payouts ratios for DCs and MCs and across countries. This thesis attempts to 
provide comparative and comprehensive evidence of the determinants of capital structure and 
dividend payout ratios for DCs and MCs in Australia and a comparison for DCs and MCs in 
five sampled countries (Australia, U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia) over the time period of 1995 
to 2004. This thesis consists of two essays on corporate capital structure and two essays on 
dividend payout policy. Essay I and II are focused on the determinants of capital structure for 
DCs and MCs in Australia and comparison of five sampled countries. Essay III and Essay IV 
focus on the determinants of dividend payout ratios for DCs and MCs in Australia and a 
comparison of five sampled countries. The following sections provide brief description of the 
key findings that have been documented through empirical analyses in this thesis. Finally, 
limitations are discussed and a conclusion is drawn.
8.2 Key Findings
The results in Chapter 3 (Essay I) documents that multinationality of a firm is important in 
explaining long-term debt for Australian firms. The determining factors for long-term debt 
ratios and short-term debt vary for Australian DCs and MCs. The difference in Australian DCs’ 
and MCs’ long-term debt ratios is explained by geographical diversification, firm’s age, 
bankruptcy risks and growth. The impact of increasing Australian firms’ global association 
through foreign sales (depth) and number of subsidiaries (breadth) show no significant optimal 
relationship with debt ratios. In addition to industry and time effect control, other important 
capital structure factors (e.g. industry median, credit risks, financial risks and economic risks) 
are also tested and it showed that the inclusion of these variables improves the strength of the 
proposed model. The chapter concludes with strong evidence that the capital structure is time-
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variant for both Australian DCs and MCs and this is further confirmed by the significant 
positive partial speed of adjustment suggesting Australian MCs rebalance their target level of 
capital structure faster than their DCs counterparts.
Chapter 4 (Essay II) compares capital structure determinants for DCs and MCs in Australia, 
U.S., Japan, U.K. and Malaysia. The results show that the majority of the determinants vary for 
short-term and long-term debt both between DCs and MCs and across countries. Debt holding 
capacity of firms varies significantly between DCs and MCs and across countries. In the U.S., 
the MCs hold significantly less long-term and short-term debt ratios than their counterpart DCs 
but the opposite is found for Malaysian MCs’ long-term debt ratios and Japanese MCs’ short­
term debt ratios. After controlling for country effects, the result shows that firms in Australia, 
Japan U.K. and Malaysia hold significantly less long-term debt relative to U.S. firms. However, 
no significant difference is observed in short-term debt for firms across sampled countries. 
Also, firms in countries that have adopted an imputation tax system (Australia and U.K.), hold 
significantly less short-term and long-term debt as opposed to firms in countries that adopted a 
classical tax system (U.S., Japan and Malaysia). Further, firms in countries that follow common 
law practice (Australia, U.S., U.K. and Malaysia) have significantly less short-term debt and 
significantly higher long-term debt than the firms in civil law environment (Japan). This result 
is irrespective of whether the firms are DCs or MCs. When industry effects and time effects are 
considered, the results indicate that the effects are not consistent across DCs and MCs and they 
vary across countries. The result of testing the speed of adjustment towards the target level of 
capital structure confirm that Australian and Japanese MCs adjust their long-term debt ratios 
towards a target level faster than their DCs, while U.K. and Malaysia exhibits the opposite. 
Likewise, Australian, U.S. and U.K. MCs adjust their short-term debt ratios towards a target 
level relatively more rapidly than DCs counterparts.
Chapter 5 (Essay III) investigates the determinants of dividend payout ratios for Australian DCs 
and MCs. Two dividend payout definitions are adopted cash dividends and total dividends. 
The cash dividend payout ratios consists of cash dividends to net earnings while total dividend
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payout ratios consists of both cash dividends and share repurchases to net earnings. The result 
suggests that the sample of MCs in Australia has significantly different dividend payout ratios 
(both cash and total dividend payout ratios) relative to Australian DCs. Secondly, the results 
indicate that the determinants of both cash dividend and total dividend payout for Australian 
DCs include diversification, stock return, tax clientele, cash flow variation, profitability, firm- 
specific risks, firm size and financial slack. For Australian MCs the factors that explain the 
cash dividend payout ratios are tax clientele, profitability, collateral value of assets and 
leverage. Similar factors also explain the total dividend payout ratios for MCs in addition to the 
financial slack variable. It is also found that the determining factors vary between DCs and 
MCs. The results also show that diversification, profitability, firm-specific risk, size, collateral 
value of assets and financial slack are significant variables that explain the difference in cash 
dividend payout ratios between DCs and MCs while tax clientele, cash flow variability and 
financial slack explain the difference between Australian DCs’ and MCs’ total dividend payout 
ratios. Lastly, the results show that industry influence and time affects have varying degrees of 
significant impact for DCs and MCs in Australia.
Chapter 6 (Essay IV) examines the determinants of dividend payout ratios across the five 
sampled countries. The results show that stock return, cash flow variation, profitability and age 
are significant cash dividend payout determinants for DCs in each sampled country. Tax 
clientele, cash flow variation and profitability are the significant factors in explaining cash 
dividend payout ratios for MCs across sampled countries. However, this result varies slightly in 
explaining total dividend payout ratios for DCs and MCs irrespective of the country. The 
common determinants that explain the difference in cash dividend payout ratios for DCs and 
MCs across countries are diversification (Australia and U.S.), agency costs and average tax 
ratios (U.K. and Malaysia), tax clientele (U.S. and Malaysia) and cash flow variation (Japan and 
Malaysia). The common determinants explaining the difference of DCs’ and MCs’ total 
dividend payout ratios changes but only for U.S. corporations. Determinants that become 
significant are political risks, stock return, profitability and age. Importantly, country effects 
shows that firms operating under an imputation tax system (Australia and U.K.) and in a
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common law environment (Australia, U.S., UK. And Malaysia) pay comparatively higher 
dividends relative to firms operating under a classical tax system (U.S., Japan and Malaysia) 
and in a common law environment (Australia, U.S., U.K. and Malaysia). Further, MCs 
operating under an imputation tax system and in a common law regime pay significantly lower 
cash and total dividends relative to DCs counterparts. Lastly, the speed of adjustment towards 
the target level of cash dividend payout ratios suggests that MCs in Australia, U.S. and 
Malaysia adjust their target cash dividend payout ratios more quickly than DCs, while the 
opposite holds for MCs in Japan and U.K. Further, these results are robust to various tests of 
sensitivity for statistical bias or measurement issues. Finally, the results are also insensitive to 
endogeneity between leverage and dividend decisions.
8.3 Limitations, Possible Extensions and Future 
Research
There has been limited research on comparison of capital structure and dividend policy for MCs 
and DCs across countries. This thesis is one step towards providing greater insight into this area 
of research. Extensions to this study would assist in developing a better understanding of the 
relationship between capital structure and dividend payouts determinants for both DCs and MCs 
across Japan, U.K., U.S., Australia and Malaysia.
The trade-off theory of capital structure is primarily driven by the corporate tax benefits of debt 
financing and the costs associated with debt. It is important to recognise MCs utilising transfer 
pricing to gain tax benefit. Transfer pricing provides opportunity to manipulate earnings and/or 
cash flows across different corporate segments to reduce taxes. Transfer pricing may also 
provide opportunity for MCs to lower transaction costs. It is not known what effect these 
decisions have on the valuation of MCs and the impact on capital structure and dividend policy. 
Identifying firms that utilise transfer pricing to arbitrage tax opportunity and the impact transfer 
pricing has on capital structure and dividend policy is an area of future research.
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Another factor that may impact on the capital structure decisions of the DCs and MCs is 
managerial ownership and block holdings.60 The choice of financing policies as a means of 
reducing conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders has been examined in several 
studies. Novaes and Zingales (1995) show that the choice of debt that would be optimal for 
shareholders is generally different from the choice made by entrenched managers. Berger, Ofek 
and Yermack (1997) provide evidence that managers who become entrenched may deviate from 
choosing the optimal leverage due to the agency costs of managerial discretion.61 These issues 
are also left for future research, particularly across different countries and across MCs and DCs.
Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimation procedure use the average slopes from year-to-year cross- 
section regressions. This estimation technique can be employed to study the determinants of 
leverage and dividends. This requires a long period of data, for example 40-50 years to obtain 
robust standard errors. Expanding the dataset for DCs and MCs would provide further evidence 
on the reliability of the results documented in this thesis.
One potential limitation in this thesis is specific to the sample selection of firms. The sample 
selection was made only from the listed companies. Including unlisted firms would add further 
reliability of results. A further extension would be to increase the sample size across all 
countries worldwide. Some recent work has considered the debt ratios of firms in general in the 
U.S., developing countries and a few East Asian countries. However, there does appear to be a 
need to conduct a more recent and detailed worldwide survey of DCs’ and MCs’ capital 
structure.
The capital structure and dividend payment models tested in thesis can be regard as traditional 
models. More recent behavioural models could be tested for DCs and MCs.
60 See, among others, Kim and Sorenson (1986), Stultz (1988), Smith and Watts (1992), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 
and Lang et al. (1996).
61 Berger et al. (1997) find that the leverage levels are lower when CEOs are entrenched, i.e. when CEOs do not face 
intense monitoring from outside shareholders, when their compensation is not tied to performance, or when they 
already own a large proportion o f the outstanding shares.
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To conclude, the results documented in this thesis provide further evidence on the complexity of 
capital structure and dividend policy. The results show considerable variation in the 
determinants of capital structure and dividend policy over time, across countries and across DCs 
and MCs. The results of this thesis will be of great value and one step forward in solving the 
practical problems faced by corporate financial officers of DCs and MCs across Australia, U.S. 
Japan, U.K. and Malaysia.
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